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THESIS SYNOPSIS 
This thesis considers the subject of crowd safety and investigates how the application 
of risk assessment can provide support for decision making in crowd safety 
management and planning. The focus is on major public venues and events where 
large crowds arc a normal part of the operation. 
Conventional methods of assessment tend to be ad hoc, reactive and rely on individual 
experiences. The risk assessment approach, which is comprehensive, systematic and 
pro-active, can help to overcome these shortfalls. Risk assessments have already been 
successfully applied in many workplaces, ranging from high hazard industrial plants 
to the office environment. However, this thesis argues that for it to be of benefit, the 
risk assessment must be appropriate to the nature of the operation and the nature and 
the extent of the hazards involved. The existing risk assessments are inappropriate to 
crowd safety in this respect and a more suitable methodology is required. Therefore, 
the specific aims of the thesis are: 
(i) To show that risk assessment can be applied to crowd safety and that it can 
improve on the conventional crowd safety assessments. 
(ii) To investigate, through the development of a risk assessment methodology for 
crowd safety, how risk assessment can be best applied to support crowd safety 
management and planning. 
(iii) To demonstrate that the methodology, which takes into consideration the nature 
of crowd safety risks, can lead to further improvements in crowd safety 
assessment. 
The thesis describes the research work carried out to achieve these aims and presents 
the outcomes. The first part of the research is devoted to identifying the differences in 
terms of the hazards between the various work environments and crowd safety. It 
also looks at the assessment of crowd safety hazards and their risks. As there is little 
published research knowledge on the subject, two case studies and a survey of public 
venue assessors were conducted to collect the necessary information and data. A task 
analysis was also performed to examine the tasks involved in assessing crowd safety 
risks and identify the factors that enable the assessors to successfully complete their 
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tasks. It has found that crowd safety hazards are very different to those encountered 
in other contexts where existing risk assessments are applied. In addition to the kind 
of hazards one would normally encounter in a work situation, the presence of large 
crowds also presents a set of hazards that are unique to major public venues. Findings 
of the venue survey suggest that existing risk assessments are inadequate, particularly 
in dealing with this type of crowd and behaviour related hazards, and venue assessors 
are experiencing difficulties in identifying such hazards and assessing their risks. As 
a summary of the research findings so far, a set of criteria was drawn up to highlight 
what is needed in a risk assessment suitable for crowd safety. 
In order to identify the methods and tools that could provide the potential solutions to 
the problems of assessing crowd and behaviour related hazards, a review of other risk 
assessments was conducted. It has highlighted a number of techniques and tools that 
could be applied to assess crowd safety risks. Based on the criteria mentioned above 
and the findings of this review, a prototype crowd safety risk assessment methodology 
was developed. A series of trials were conducted to evaluate the validity and usability 
of the prototype. Revisions were made accordingly to produce the final draft. 
Experiments and a questionnaire survey were then carried out on the final draft to test 
and verify the methodology. In general, they show that the methodology has led to an 
improvement in most aspects of crowd safety risk assessment. In the experiments that 
compared the methodology against methods representing the existing risk assessments 
and the conventional way of assessing crowd safety, subjects using the methodology 
tend to perform better in most areas. More hazards were identified. In the evaluation 
of risks, better consistency was achieved between individuals using the methodology. 
However, their judgements appeared to be less consistent over time. The use of a 
larger rating scheme with more choices available in the methodology could have an 
impact on consistency in risk evaluation. Another key factor could be that the 
subjects who took part in the experiments were all novice assessors. Possible learning 
effect may have occurred in between experiments, which could have resulted in a 
change of mind over time. If this is the case, this result could be an indication that the 
methodology is more sensitive to changes in risks or risk perception. It will be 
interesting to find out if experienced assessors can achieve better consistency. In the 
questionnaire survey where only a small number of experienced assessors were 
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involved, the results were also favourable to the methodology. All assessors regarded 
the hazard identification and risk evaluation methods in the final draft as useful or 
very useful. Compared to their own risk assessment methods that they were using at 
the time, the vast majority of them found that the proposed methods were either better 
or much better. 
By and large, the experiments and questionnaire survey have served to verify, at least 
in part, the arguments that risk assessment is better than the conventional assessment 
method and that there are more benefits to be gained when the risk assessment is more 
appropriate to the nature and the extent of the crowd safety hazards that could arise in 
major public venues. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that the research work 
presented in this thesis is merely the first step towards a crowd safety risk assessment 
methodology. There are outstanding issues yet to be resolved, not least the issue of 
the apparent lack of consistency over time in risk evaluation. This thesis has 
identified the research and development work that is required to resolve these issues 
and to further the benefits that risk assessment could bring to crowd safety. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis explores crowd safety planning and decision making and examines the use of 
risk assessment as a means of supporting this process. Deciding how to ensure crowd 
safety in public venues has long been a matter of personal judgement often based on 
personal views and experience of the individual planners and decision makers alone 
(e. g. venue owners and their operation managers). Their approach is often ill structured, 
piecemeal and ad hoc, and the decisions can be unduly influenced by, for example, past 
experience, problems that have recently arisen and the "hot issues" of the time. 
Past disasters and recent studies (e. g. Au et al, 1993; Harvey, 1993) have shown that this 
traditional approach to crowd safety planning is inadequate. Two of the most recent and 
high profile disasters serve to highlight the problems; namely the failure to recognise the 
hazards and a lack of appreciation of the risks. In the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster in 
1989, the police apparently had their mind-set on crowd disorder and football 
hooliganism and (Lord Justice Taylor, 1990) had failed to identify overcrowding as a 
potential problem. Even when the spectators in the overcrowded stands began to escape 
onto the pitch, it was initially seen by the police officers in-charge as a pitch invasion. 
The King's Cross Disaster two years before that was caused by an escalator fire. The 
enquiry by Fennell (1988) has revealed that escalator fires had occurred in other 
underground stations before. This was a hazard that was known to London 
Underground (LUL) but the management had failed to appreciate the risks and did not 
take any actions that could have prevented the disaster. 
Disasters like these show that there is a need for a more comprehensive and more 
proactive approach to crowd safety planning and decision making. Decisions ought to 
be made on a more rational basis rather than on an ad hoc basis reacting to whatever 
problems or issues that come to mind. This thesis argues that by providing a more 
rational basis for decision making, a systematic risk assessment can help to improve the 
situation. Risk assessment has been successfully used in many applications but has 
never been applied to crowd safety. There are significant differences in the nature of 
risks between public venues and the other contexts where risk assessment is used; this 
will be illustrated later on in the thesis. Hence, it is important to establish a risk 
assessment that is suitable for these risks. Therefore, this thesis sets out to investigate 
how risk assessment can be best applied to provide support and to improve crowd safety 
planning and decision-making. 
1.2 Crowd Safety in Public Venues 
A public venue is a place where members of the public are admitted and where crowds 
of people could gather. It may open regularly, occasionally or on a one-off basis only 
and it may open to any members of the public or to invited guests only (i. e. fee paying or 
non-fee paying). A public venue could be in a privately owned property or on public 
land. It could be indoor or outdoor, purpose-built or adopted, fixed or transient. There 
are many types of public venues. They range from relatively small places such as clubs, 
public houses and village halls to major venues such as airports, train stations, shopping 
malls, exhibition halls, stadiums, leisure parks, fairgrounds, etc. Places that are used to 
host public events such as pop concerts, festivals and street parties can also be regarded 
as public venues. 
Crowd safety can be taken to mean the safety of the visiting crowds to a public venue in 
general. Safety problems exist in public venues just as they exist in other places. But 
common sense suggests that the higher the number of people gathering in one place, the 
bigger the problem is likely to be. A loose cable across the floor, for example, presents 
a tripping hazard regardless of whether this takes place at home, in the workplace or in a 
public venue environment. But in a public venue, more people are likely to walk past it 
and therefore more people could trip over it. Therefore, general safety hazards such as a 
loose cable across the floor often present a bigger problem in a public venue than in 
other places. The busier the venue is, the bigger the problem is likely to be. In addition, 
the gathering of large crowds in public venues could, in itself, present safety problems 
that are not normally encountered in other places. Excessive crowding, for example, is 
one such problem that could arise purely from the presence of a large high-density 
crowd. On a smaller scale, it could affect the safety of individuals; e. g. individuals get 
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pushed or crushed against a gate. On a larger scale, the crowd as a whole could be 
affected; e. g. crushing, people get trampled under foot and/or a pile-up of people. 
Moreover, members of the public are less subject to the disciplines that would be 
expected of a trained workforce. 
1.3 Crowd Safety Problems 
A catalogue of past disasters and inadequacies shows that crowd safety is an important 
issue that needs to be addressed. Failure to ensure crowd safety can result in significant 
problems that threaten the safety and well-being of visitors to public venues and events. 
There has been no shortage of major crowd safety related incidents in public venues that 
resulted in large numbers of injuries and fatalities. The King's Cross Underground Fire 
(Fennell, 1988) and the Hillsborough Stadium Disaster (Lord Justice Taylor, 1989 and 
1990) are two high profile examples of such incidents that took place recently in the 
UK. Similar tragedies also occurred in other parts of the world. A list of crowd related 
disasters over the years was drawn up by Dickie (1993) and is given in Table 1.1 below. 
It shows that they could happen in a variety of venue types and at different stages of 
operation: 
Table 1.1: Examples of Past Disasters (Dickie, 1993) 
aTT Place 
7 Venue Deaths Comment 
1863 Santiago, Chile Church 2000 Emergency egress 
1881 Vienna, Austria Theatre 570 Emergency egress 
1883 Sunderland, UK Theatre 182 Egress 
1902 Ibrox, UK Stadium 26 Structural failure 
1903 Chicago, USA Theatre 602 Emergency egress 
1943 London, UK Tube station 173 Ingress 
1946 Bolton, UK Stadium 33 During event 
1961 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil Circus 250 Emergency egress 
1964 Lirna, Peru Stadium 318 Riot 
1967 Kayseri, Turkey Stadium 40 Riot 
1968 Buenos Aires, Argentina Stadium 73 Egress 
1971 Ibrox, UK Stadium 66 Egress 
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Table 1.1: Examples of Past Disasters (Dickie, 1993) 
Year Place 71 Venue Deaths Comment 
1974 Cairo, Egypt Stadium 48 During event 
1979 Cincinnati, USA Concert 11 Ingress 
1982 Moscow, USSR Stadium 340 Egress 
1989 Sheffield, UK Stadium 96 During event 
1990 Mecca, Saudi Arabia Pedestrian tunnel 1425 Ingress/egress 
1991 New York, USA Concert 9 Ingress 
1992 Bastia, Corsica Stadium 10 Structural failure 
The list in Table 1.1 is not exhaustive, but it serves to illustrate the scale of the problem 
should a disaster occur. There have been other crowd disasters since 1992. For 
example, in the following year, overcrowding at a New Year's Eve celebrations in Lan 
Kwai Fong, Hong Kong resulted in crushing and people being trampled under foot and, 
consequently, caused many fatalities (Mr Justice Bokhary, 1993). 
In addition to these high profile disasters, there are likely to have been many more 
incidents and near misses that were unreported or did not receive as much media 
coverage. Moore (1992) has given two earlier examples of near disasters in UK's 
football grounds: the collapse of a huge retaining wall at the Sheffield Wednesday's 
ground in 1914 that injured 75 people, and an overcrowding at the Wembley Stadium in 
1923 during which many people fainted. Over 1,000 people were treated for shock and 
minor injuries. Such incidents and near misses have the potential to develop into 
something much more serious and tragic. 
The power of television has brought home to many people the horror of recent disasters. 
The Hillsborough Disaster is particularly hard hitting in this respect. Vivid pictures of 
the disaster were transmitted live and later on in the evening and the following days to 
many, showing people being crushed to death. In his inquiry report, Lord Justice Taylor 
(1989) pointed out that his was the ninth official inquiry of this kind and many of his 
recommendations had already been made before in previous inquiries. Yet, sadly, 
Hillsborough still happened. It would have been avoidable if lessons from past disasters 
had been learnt properly. 
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The Hillsborough Disaster has highlighted to the public the dangers of overcrowding. 
Its inquiry and the prosecutions that followed have also brought to the attention of many 
venue owners and their managers the importance of ensuring crowd safety. So, has 
enough been done to ensure crowd safety since then? 
Although the football industry (especially the grounds of the higher divisions' clubs) has 
since applied many of the Taylor recommendations and made efforts to improve crowd 
safety on the ground, crowd safety provisions in many venues are still inadequate some 
years after Hillsborough. This view is reinforced by the findings of two studies 
commissioned by the Consumers' Association. The first study was carried out between 
1990 and 1991 (Consumers' Association, 1992; Harvey, 1993), the second study was 
conducted in 1994 (Consumers' Association, 1995). In both cases, crowd safety 
inspections were carried out by safety experts to a number of indoor and outdoor public 
venues throughout the UK. In the second study, the safety expert also discussed pre- 
planning with management to judge the level of consultation had taken place before the 
event. A total of 19 venues were covered in the studies, they include concerts, matches, 
motor racing, shows and firework displays. Although on the whole the studies found a 
good standard of safety at many of the venues, a catalogue of problems were revealed. 
They include: 
" Inadequate means of escape, blocked emergency routes and locked escape doors. 
" Poor maintenance of some constructions. 
9 Building design pre-dating modem standards. 
9 Too much reliance on good stewarding or policing to prevent crowd safety 
problems. 
" Inadequate separation of vehicles and pedestrians. 
" Dangerous crowd bottle-necks and obstructions. 
" Serious deficiencies in electrical safety, fire safety provisions and marquee layout. 
The findings of the Consumers' Association studies were particularly critical of one-off 
events held at sites not normally used for that purpose. In some venues, the inspections 
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revealed what the study reports describe as "serious shortcomings" and "instances where 
safety lacks could have cost lives". 
1.4 Improving Crowd Safety 
Crowd safety problems are different in many ways to those found in other industries and 
workplaces. Thus, the conventional methods of problem identification and assessment 
via testing, performance review and/or failure data are not always suitable. 
The fundamental difficulty is that there are no reliable ways to test and validate any 
crowd safety plans and provisions before implementation. Conventionally, the 
development of products or services is aided by testing and a continuous process of 
analysis, revision and re-analysis. For example, in medical research, a new drug can be 
tested through laboratory analyses, animal experiments and, eventually, trials involving 
human subjects. In the motor industry, crash tests can be used to test the safety features 
of their vehicles under different collision scenarios and identify areas for improvement. 
In engineering, new designs can be evaluated through testing the key components and by 
conducting trials on the entire system under actual or simulated conditions. In all these 
cases, once the products or services are launched, their performance can be monitored 
and information on failures, accidents and mishaps can be collected. This data can then 
be fed back for improving the products and for future research and development. But 
none of these approaches can be applied to assessing crowd safety (particularly for one- 
off events) because of two main reasons. 
Firstly, there are little or no means of properly testing crowd safety. Field trials are often 
expensive to run, disruptive to venue operations if actual visitors are involved and, more 
importantly, could expose the participants to dangers and unacceptable risks. 
Occasionally, when the enforcing authorities require public venues to carry out field 
trials to ensure that safety provisions are adequate, the trials are usually carried out in the 
quieter hours of the venue operations (e. g. late night) and sometimes use volunteers. 
Whilst they may be useful exercises for staff training and rehearsal purposes, this 
arrangement is insufficient as the sole means of testing. This is because the visitor types 
(and their behaviour) could be different and the numbers involved could be much higher 
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in real-life situations. Also, such trials are usually carried out for the purpose of testing 
evacuation arrangements; the other aspects of crowd safety. such as overcrowding, 
remain untested. Computer simulations are available for crowd modelling. In theory, 
they can also be used as a testing tool. However, they too are restricted to emergency 
evacuations only and they have been criticised for failing to take sufficient account of 
human behaviour (e. g. Sime, 1991). There have been some attempts to simulate crowd 
movement in non-emergency situations, but the early models were very primitive and 
have yet to be properly validated. There appears to be some improvements to the more 
recent efforts, but details about them are still unavailable at the time of writing this 
thesis. 
Secondly, the scope for learning from past mistakes and failures is limited. Serious 
crowd safety accidents are relatively rare in comparison to, say, road accidents or 
accidents in the workplace. But the consequences are often far more severe. For minor 
incidents, mishaps and near misses, there has been little effort by public venues to 
record, collect and collate such information. This is partly due to the reluctance of 
public venue owners to publish their information. Recorded failure data concerning 
crowd safety is, therefore, limited. The lack of failure data and information poses a 
number of problems to both the practitioners (e. g. public venue owners) and the 
researchers. Firstly, there are insufficient data for venues to analyse the performance of 
their crowd safety plans and identify areas for improvements. Secondly, because of their 
potentially severe consequences, crowd safety accidents should not be allowed to occur 
in the first place. This means that venue owners would have to address any crowd safety 
problems without proper data and the opportunity to learn from serious past mistakes. 
These reasons also help to explain why the traditional approach that relies so heavily on 
the experience of individuals has not been very successful for crowd safety planning. If 
crowd safety plans and provisions cannot be properly tested and validated in the same 
way as in the other contexts, then it becomes even more important that planners and 
assessors must get it right the first time when deciding how to ensure crowd safety in 
their venues. 
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1.5 The Application of Risk Assessment to Crowd Safety 
Crowd safety, though very different from most other contexts, is not unique. The high 
hazard industries (e. g. the Nuclear and the Chemical industries) also have a similar 
problem in that they too experience infrequent but severe accidents and, hence, they too 
cannot solely rely on learning from such accidents. Compared to crowd safety, 
however, the high hazard industries have devoted much more effort in research and 
development to find a suitable tool to assist and support the decision-making process. 
The tool they have adopted is risk assessment (HSE, 1992a). It is a systematic and 
structured way to identify hazards and evaluate their risks. It is also a proactive 
approach that enables planners and decision makers to examine the overall situation 
(rather than narrowly focusing on specific issues alone), to determine what problems 
could arise and to put them into perspective so that efforts and resources to those 
problems that require more attention. Risk assessment is a well-established method and 
is currently applied to many other contexts. Experience has shown that it is an 
invaluable aid to decision making and provides a credible solution to the problem of 
insufficient planning. 
There is also a practical reason for using risk assessment; i. e. the legal requirements set 
out in the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 (i. e. MHSWR). 
The Regulations were revised in 1999 but the requirements on risk assessment remain 
the same. Under the regulations, all employers, including venue owners, are required to 
carry out risk assessments. This gives rise to the need for a suitable risk assessment for 
crowd safety. 
Risk assessment can be regarded as the process to identify and assess hazards and risks. 
The literature review in Section 2.2 will look at what is meant by risks and the risk 
assessment principles in more detail. But in brief, risks arise from hazards, and a hazard 
can be referred to as something that has the potential to cause harm, such as an item, a 
substance, an activity, a process or an adverse event. The term "risk" implies something 
that is uncertain and undesirable. Therefore, risk might, for example, be expressed as 
the likelihood (i. e. an uncertainty) of people suffering from a certain health problem, 
serious injury or even death as a result of, say, poor work practice, over-exposure in a 
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hazardous environment or an accident (i. e. an undesirable outcome). Risk assessment is 
a process that enables people to seek answers to the following: 
0 What are the hazards (e. g. hazardous substances, activities, processes and events)? 
" How likely is it that people will be harmed? 
9 What harm could occur and how many people might be affected? 
The idea of a risk assessment is that by answering these questions, public venue owners 
will have a better understanding of the problems. They will then be in a better position 
to make more informed and more rational decisions. 
1.6 Research Objectives 
Given the problems and concerns associated with assessing crowd safety, the objectives 
of the research work presented in this thesis are: 
(i) To show that risk assessment can be applied to crowd safety to remedy the pitfalls of 
the conventional methods highlighted above and, therefore, to improve crowd safety 
assessment. 
(ii) To investigate and explore, through the development of a crowd safety risk 
assessment methodology, how risk assessment can be best applied to assess crowd 
safety risks and provide support for decision making in crowd safety management 
and planning. 
(iii)To demonstrate that such a methodology, which takes into account the specific 
nature of crowd safety risks, can lead to further improvements in crowd safety 
assessment. 
In order to achieve the above objectives, there are specific risk assessment issues that 
need to be addressed. They are highlighted in Section 1.7 below. 
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1.7 The Research Questions 
Essentially risk assessment is about two things. Firstly, to establish what could go 
wrong or what problems may arise so that precautionary measures can be incorporated 
into the safety plan. Secondly, to decide how significant these problems are (i. e. their 
risks) to ensure that important problems are addressed and resources are efficiently 
deployed. It has to be noted that the high hazard industries are also different to crowd 
safety in terms of the availability of failure data. In the high hazard industries, failure 
data and similar information is available to enable safety engineers to risk assess a 
particular plant, a part of the plant or a process of operation. But as previously discussed 
in Section 1.4, there is no such data in crowd safety. Also, in the high hazard industries, 
the behaviour of the systems, the substances they handle and the operations involved are 
all more predictable, better understood and can be clearly defined. Furthermore, risk 
assessments in the high hazard industries are often carried out by specialist safety 
engineers. These differences could have significant impacts on the kind of risk 
assessments that can be employed. What is suitable to safety engineers in the high 
hazard industries may be unsuitable for public venue managers. Hence, the specific 
research questions that need to be looked at are as follows: 
9 How best to assist public venue owners to identify potential safety problems, bearing 
in mind the wide ranging outcomes due to human behaviour? To address this, it is 
necessary to look at what hazards could arise in public venues and how they differ 
from problems elsewhere. 
0 How to evaluate the risks given that there are no relevant failure data to support the 
evaluation process? 
" Overall, how to ensure that the risk assessment method for crowd safety is suitable 
and can be used by practitioners as efficiently as possible? 
1.7.1 Hazards and Hazard Identification 
Different contexts involve different operations and different task activities are conducted 
under different operating conditions. These differences, in turn, cause different hazards. 
So the hazards in, say, the nuclear industry are not the same in manufacturing industries. 
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The hazards in road travel are not the same as those in rail or air travel. Equally, the 
kinds of hazards found in a factory will be different from those in an office, or in a 
laboratory or a building site or in a mine. By the same token, crowd safety and public 
venue operations are also likely to present a set of hazards that are different from those 
in other industries and workplaces. Therefore, one of the key tasks for this research 
project is to establish what kind of hazards can arise in public venues and then to 
determine how best to account for them in risk assessment. The relative unpredictability 
of crowd safety hazards can be a problem. Essentially, managing a public venue is 
about "processing" a large number of visitors. The "human factors" are important 
contributory factors to safety. Yet, human beings are much less predictable in terms of 
behaviour than engineering components and the substances/materials used in industry. 
Where there is a significant human involvement in the industry, human behaviour in the 
workplace is often much restricted by rules, work procedures and the tasks people have 
to carry out. There are no such restrictions in public venues. There are also other 
factors affecting crowd safety; for example, venue design and undesirable external 
circumstances. Hence, the outcomes in terms of crowd safety hazards could be wide 
ranging. Because of these factors, different hazards could arise in different venues at 
different times. The challenge, therefore, is to establish a suitable way to deal with these 
wide ranging and less definable behavioural factors and other factors in order to assist 
owners of different venues to account for hazards that are specific to their operations. 
1.7.2 Evaluation of Risks 
In a nutshell, risk evaluation essentially means making judgements about the possibility 
of an undesirable or adverse outcome(s) for a given hazard. Validating such judgements 
is always a problem. In many other areas where risk assessment is applied, judgements 
concerning the possibility of adverse events are made on the basis of failure 
rate/probability data of engineering components. The data is generated through 
experiments, trials and testing. But as discussed in Section 1.4, there are no such data 
available for crowd safety. The main basis for evaluation is the operational knowledge 
and experience of individual assessors. This is exacerbated by the rarity of accidents 
and the enormity of consequences, which gives little opportunity for the assessors to 
review and revise their judgements. 
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Realistically, given that there is no usable failure data and that there is little or no real 
prospect of getting it in the near future, it can be argued that operational knowledge and 
experience is probably the most valid basis feasible for passing judgements. However, 
the danger is that if knowledge and experience are used casually in an unstructured and 
ad hoc manner, risk evaluation could become merely an expression of personal opinions. 
There is also the danger that judgements could be unduly influenced by political factors, 
"hot issues" of the day, etc. What needs to be achieved in the research is to establish a 
way to minimise such dangers and make the judgement of possibilities less subjective 
and less ad hoc. 
There is always an element of subjectivity in risk evaluation, even where reliable failure 
data is available. A key problem is how to ensure the reliability and validity of the 
judgements; the problem is even worse when there is no failure data on which to base 
the evaluation. Finding a means to ensure better reliability and validity in risk 
evaluation is also an important issue in the investigation. 
1.7.3 Overall Methodological Issues 
Even though the risk assessment principles are the same, the methods of assessment can 
vary depending on the applications. In some cases, a simple and loosely structured risk 
assessment is deemed suitable. In other cases, detailed probabilistic assessments using 
sophisticated risk quantification techniques are required. What method is suitable for a 
particular application and how sophisticated it needs to be depend only partly on being 
able to satisfy the hazard identification and risk evaluation needs described above. There 
are also other factors that need to be taken into consideration. For example, operational 
constraints, availability of resources, the existing practice and who the assessors are. It 
is important to recognise that assessors must be able to use the method efficiently if risk 
assessment is to be effective in supporting decision-making. A mismatch between what 
is required by the methods and what is achievable could render the assessment method 
unsuitable and seriously undermine its effectiveness. Part of the research is therefore to 
look into these factors to establish what the assessors' needs (or user requirements) are 
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in terms of assessing crowd safety risks and how the assessment method could help to 
best address these needs. 
It is also worth noting that risk assessment and the subsequent risk management decision 
making can be affected by an array of social political factors such as public risk 
perception, the public's attitude towards specific industries (e. g. the nuclear and railway 
industries) and public tolerance of different types of risks. Such factors are regarded as a 
different area of research. They are not the main focus of this investigation, although 
they are discussed in Section 2.3 in relation to how they may affect the choice of risk 
assessments. 
1.8 The Research Constraints 
The research described in this thesis is applied in nature, aiming to provide a usable 
solution to a practical problem. The subject area, i. e. crowd safety, is a very young 
discipline and is one that has been rarely investigated in the past. The lack of research 
information and the various constraints and difficulties associated with studying crowd 
safety discussed in the previous sections, together with a number of other factors, have 
posed severe constraints on how this research can be carried out. Two areas of the 
research project are particularly affected: data collection and the testing of the research 
output in relation to the hypnosis set out in Objectives (i) and (iii) in Section 1.6. 
1.8.1 Data Collection 
Data collection in a research project would normally involve a review of past research 
studies and provide an account of the current situation and wisdom in the subject area of 
concern. This is often achieved by means of literature review, which should be aimed at 
generating information relating to the nature of the research problem, the issues 
involved, what has already been done and so on. This would enable the researcher to 
identify any gaps or inadequacies in the existing research and where further research is 
required. A theoretical perspective can then be proposed to address the research 
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question. Further data collection would be carried out to gather information about the 
theoretical device. 
However, in this particular piece of research, the subject area has posed some problems 
for data collection. Crowd safety is a brand new subject area. Even though people have 
been practising it for many years, crowd safety has received little research attention. Up 
until the Hillsborough Disaster in 1989, there had been no serious efforts to study crowd 
safety or to learn from past mistakes. In his inquiry report into the Hillsborough 
Disaster, Lord Justice Taylor (1990) wrote: 
It is a depressing and chastening fact that raine is the ninth official (inquir ) 
report covering crowd safety and control at football grounds. After eight 
previous reports and three editions of the Green Guide', it seems astounding 
that 95 people could die f om overcrowding before the eyes of those 
controlling the event... 
After Hillsborough, the HSE commissioned a study into the management of crowd 
safety in public venues. This appeared to be the only extensive study into the subject so 
far. Apart from a lack of published studies, crowd safety problems and how they can be 
assessed is rarely discussed in public forums. This could be due to a number of reasons. 
For example, a lack of appreciation of the risks involved (also see the literature review 
on current practice in Section 2.6) and the reluctance of venue owners to share 
information about their mishaps and near misses for fear of adverse publicity. 
Given the lack of published information, data collection on crowd safety cannot be done 
by means of conventional literature review alone. Alternative data gathering methods 
have to be used to make this research possible. Hence, it was decided that literature 
review should also include unpublished information. This included materials generated 
in the HSE study previously mentioned (Au et al, 1993), from consultancy works carried 
out by the author, and from documents collected in the course of these works. But this 
is deemed insufficient on its own, not least because the source of this information cannot 
be referenced for reasons of confidentiality. The amount of relevant information is also 
quite limited. Therefore, the literature review was supplemented, firstly by case studies 
i. e. Guide to Safety to Sports Grounds (Home Office and Scottisj Office, 1990) 
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to examine the nature of public venue operations and crowd safety problems and, 
secondly, by a survey to talk to managers of public venues and to collect information 
about how crowd safety is assessed. 
To a lesser extent, insufficient published research knowledge also has an impact on the 
review on risk assessments. In brief, there are two types of risk assessment: quantified 
risk assessment (QRA) and qualitative risk assessment. The former has been widely 
adopted in the process and the high hazard industries for years. It is well established and 
a lot of effort has been devoted in the development of methods and techniques and in the 
studies of specific risk assessment issues. There is plenty of literature on QRA but they 
are considered unsuitable for the vast majority of workplaces, including public venues, 
the main reason being a lack of data for risks to be quantified. The relative 
unpredictability of crowd safety problems and the fact that crowd activities are very 
difficult to define also make QRA unsuitable. Qualitative risk assessment, on the other 
hand, has received far less attention. Literature on the subject, be it on methods and 
techniques or on specific risk assessment issues, is few and far between. The author is 
aware that some studies on qualitative risk assessment and its application into different 
workplaces are in progress. But such information was not yet available in the public 
domain at the time of this research. Once again, the survey was used for gathering 
additional information from those venues that have attempted to do risk assessments 
about how they carry out the assessments and the issues involved. 
1.8.2 Evaluation and Verification 
The difficulties highlighted in Section 1.4 (e. g. rarity of major crowd safety accidents, a 
lack of failure data and unpredictability of crowd activities and problems) affect how the 
output of the research can be tested in much the same way as how they restrict the 
testing of plans and provisions. For example, to test the output against every possibility 
is prohibitive due to the wide-ranging outcomes in public venues. Testing is further 
restricted by availability of resource and suitable subjects for the test. Because of these 
difficulties, the methods of evaluation and verification are somewhat unconventional. 
Details of how these difficulties affect evaluation and verification and the alternative 
methods of testing are discussed in Chapters 
8 and 9 of this thesis. But in a nutshell, the 
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evaluation process had to be carried out in stages involving, firstly, Human Factors 
specialists to assess the presentational aspect of the research output. This was then 
followed by user trials on a selected sample of public venues representing different 
public venue operations and different crowd safety problems. 
Similarly, it is not possible to verify the research output against every outcome. Also, it 
is impossible to validate by reference to actual outcomes (i. e. to show that it can lead to 
fewer accidents or reduced severity) because of the rarity of major accidents, nor by 
simulation of the outcomes because of the risks to those who take part in the 
simulations. Though, in practice, it is possible to measure the effectiveness of the risk 
assessment methodology (and the subsequent risk reduction measures) from evidence 
such as the frequency of crowding or other dangerous occurrences, injury figures and the 
number of complaints from visitors. Feedback from the front line staff (e. g. during post 
event de-briefing) can also provide some indication on the effectiveness of the risk 
assessment methodology. However, these are not feasible within the context of this 
research. Therefore, the only viable options are through controlled experiments to 
compare the performance of subjects using different methods of assessment and by 
obtaining subjective judgements from a small sample of the end user population. On the 
basis of the key research questions highlighted in Section 1.7, the two criteria for the 
verification are (i) the number of crowd safety problems that can be identified and (ii) 
the reliability and validity of the judgements on the significance of the identified 
problems. 
1.9 Research Methodology 
The methodology employed in the research includes a literature review, case studies, 
survey and field investigations, an analysis of the risk assessment tasks and a review of 
existing risk assessment methods. Table 1.2 shows how these different elements of the 
research work together to contribute towards addressing the research questions on 
hazard identification, risk evaluation and ensuring suitability of the assessment methods. 
In brief, investigations into hazard identification issues were done mainly through case 
studies and the review of existing risk assessments. The risk evaluation issues were 
addressed mainly through the review of the existing risk assessments, based on 
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information generated in the survey and the literature review. Survey and task analysis 
are the main methodologies used to identify the operational issues that could have an 
impact on assessment methods and to define the needs of the assessors in terms of 
crowd safety risk assessment. 
Table 1.2: Overview of the Investigation Methodology 
Research Questions Methods of Investigation 
Hazard Identification 
What types of crowd safety problems exist in public venues - Literature review 
and how do they differ from those in the other industries and - Case studies 
normal workplace? - Survey/field investigations 
How to overcome the unpredictability problems associated - Review of existing risks 
with human behaviour? assessments 
How to cater for the wide-ranging hazards in different - Survey/field investigations 
venues? - Review of existing risk assessments 
Risk Evaluation 
How to make the risk evaluation process more rational and - Literature review 
less subjective? - Survey/field investigations 
- Review of existing risk assessments 
How to overcome the problem of a lack of failure data? - Survey/field investigations 
- Review of existing risk assessments 
How to enhance reliability and validity of the evaluation? - Review of existing risk assessments 
Overall Methodological Issues 
What are the operational issues affecting the assessment of - Case studies 
crowd safety? - Survey/field investigations 
Given the above, what do the assessors need to enable them - Literature review 
to successfully assess the crowd safety risks in their venues? - Survey/field investigations 
- Task analysis 
What help the assessment method could provide to satisfy - Survey/field investigations 
assessors' needs? - Task analysis 
- Review of existing risk assessments 
Initially, effort was directed towards collecting the necessary background information on 
crowd safety and risk assessment. To this end, a literature review was conducted on a 
range of topic areas that could be of relevance to the research. These topics include the 
legal requirements, the risk assessment principles, some of the specific issues 
concerning risk assessment, risk assessment techniques and tools used elsewhere in 
other contexts, existing guidance available to venue owners and the current practice in 
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crowd safety planning and assessments. The review is presented in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. 
From the reviews on legal requirements and the risk assessment principles, the notion of 
a "suitable and sufficient" risk assessment has emerged as a key issue. The assessment 
must identify all significant risks, enable the identification and prioritisation of remedial 
measures and be appropriate to the nature of the operations. These requirements are in 
line with the research questions set out in Section 1.7. The reviews on existing guidance 
and current practice have also revealed that both are inadequate in terms of achieving a 
suitable and sufficient risk assessment for crowd safety. 
The literature review was therefore followed by detailed investigations into crowd safety 
hazards, risk evaluation and the overall methodological issues. The investigations began 
by looking into public venue operations, the types of safety hazards that could arise and 
how they may differ from those found in other industries. This part of the research is 
particularly relevant to hazard identification. Normally, the investigation would proceed 
with a review of the literature to highlight the key issues involved. However, due to the 
lack of published information, this review was not extensive. To illustrate the issues to 
be investigated, two case studies are presented in Chapter 3: a street festival and a high 
street/open market type environment. The case studies enable detailed examinations of 
the types of hazards that could be resulted from the presence of large crowds. They also 
give an insight into public venue operations and the operational issues involved in 
managing and assessing crowd safety. 
Field investigations were also carried out to look at how crowd safety was assessed in 
different venues, the pros and cons of the different methods used, the kinds of problems 
the assessors encountered, the constraints within which they had to work and, thus, what 
help and support they may require. The field investigations were carried out by means 
of a public venue survey. The survey was intended primarily for identifying the 
operational factors and constraints that need to be taken into consideration when 
determining what methods are suitable for crowd safety assessors, although some of the 
information generated here is also relevant to hazard identification and risk evaluation. 
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A total of fifteen venues and organisations took part in the survey. Details of the survey 
and its findings are presented in Chapter 4. 
To ensure that the proposed risk assessment methods are appropriate to the needs of the 
assessors, a task analysis was then carried out to examine the tasks involved in 
conducting a crowd safety risk assessment. This analysis provides a description of the 
high level risk assessment tasks, breaks them up into specific sub-tasks and then 
identifies the knowledge, information and methodological guides an assessor would 
need in order to complete each sub-task successfully. Chapter 5 presents the task 
analysis. Based on the findings of the literature review, the case studies, the survey and 
the task analysis, a set of criteria was developed to set out all the issues and factors that 
should be catered for in the development of the methodology. This is also presented in 
Chapter 5. 
Having identified what is required, the next phase of the research project was to look at 
how risk assessment can be best applied to satisfy these requirements. A review of the 
existing risk assessments was carried out to examine what methods and techniques there 
are for different needs and circumstances. The review is particularly important to hazard 
identification and risk evaluation. By looking at the risk assessments carried out in other 
industries and contexts, the aim of the review was to see what can be learnt and identify 
where existing methods and techniques are suitable to crowd safety application and 
satisfy the criteria set out previously in Chapter 5. The review of risk assessments 
elsewhere is presented in Chapter 6. 
Incorporating all the information and findings generated so far, a prototype methodology 
for crowd safety risks assessment was then developed. Chapter 7 discusses the rational 
behind its design. The final part of the development is fine-tuning; i. e. to evaluate the 
prototype to identify areas where improvements are required. Chapter 8 describes the 
evaluation methods used and the results. How much help the methodology can provide 
to the assessors depends not only on its validity and its suitability for purposes alone, it 
also depends on how the methodology is presented to the users. As in product design, 
the benef it of a good product could be seriously undermined if its user interface is poorly 
designed or the instructions badly written. Therefore, the evaluation consisted of tests 
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on both the validity and the usability aspects of the methodology. Usability experts and 
actual assessors were employed in the evaluation. Modifications were then made to the 
methodology following each test. 
The final phase of the research was to verify the methodology. Chapter 9 gives details 
of the verification. As previously discussed in Section 1.8.2, the verification can only be 
achieved by comparing the performance of people using different assessment 
methodologies. It is recognised that in crowd safety assessment, the methodology used 
is merely one factor that could affect performance. Other factors may include the 
experience of the assessors on the problems that could arise and local knowledge of the 
venue being assessed. These factors cannot be kept as constant variables if actual 
assessors, who have different knowledge and experience, are used for the verification. 
Given this, the verification programme was done in two parts: a controlled experiment 
using novice assessors (i. e. university students) and user trials to obtain subjective 
judgements from actual assessors. The latter is an additional measure to compensate the 
fact that the subjects used in the experiments do not have some of the qualities of an 
actual assessors (e. g. in terms of venue specific knowledge and experience) and, 
therefore, are not fully representative of the user population in this regard. 
Finally, the work carried out in this research project is only an initial attempt to apply 
risk assessment principles to crowd safety. Whilst the results of the verification show 
that the methodology has led to improvements in some aspects of assessors' 
performance, it is by no means perfect. There are still some gaps in the research and 
outstanding issues that require further research. Also, to build on what has been done in 
this research, additional developments are necessary to assist assessors further in order 
to improve their performance. A summary of this research, what it has achieved and 
ideas for future research and development are presented in Chapter 10. 
1.10 Definitions of Terms 
The meanings of public venue, risk and risk assessment have already been set out earlier 
in this chapter. The following gives the meanings of other terms commonly used in this 
thesis: 
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Crowd safety Refers to the safety of individual visitors to a public venue 
or the visiting crowd as a whole (e. g. excessive crowding). 
Crowd safety assessor A person who is given the task of assessing crowd safety, 
in a public venue. This person could be the venue owner 
himself or he could delegate this duty to, for example, his 
operation manager, an in-house health and safety specialist 
or someone external to the organisation. For the purpose 
of this thesis, crowd safety assessors are sometimes 
referred to simply as "assessors". 
Hazard Something with the potential to cause harm (HSC, 1992), 
see Section 2.2. of this thesis for details. 
Public venue owner A person or organisation that owns a public venue and/or 
can legally seek to control the number of people entering it 
and the activities within it. Regarded as an employer 
under UK health and safety legislation, a public venue 
owner is ultimately responsible for ensuring the health and 
safety of his employees and visitors. 
Public venue manager A person or an organisation who manage the operation of 
a public venue. He could be the venue owner himself or 
he could be working on his behalf. 
Visitors People attending a public venue. They could be fee 
paying customers, revellers, passengers passing through a 
station or non-fee paying members of the public in the 
premises. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The aims of this literature review are to establish what is known about crowd safety and 
risk assessment practice and, generally, to collect the necessary background information 
and set the scene for the rest of the research. These aims were accomplished by studying 
the relevant legal requirements, literature on risk assessment, existing guidance 
publications and information about current practice. 
A review of the relevant legal requirements is given in Section 2.1. Apart from setting 
out the legal obligations, the legal requirements also specify what venue owners and 
assessors are required to achieve in ensuring crowd safety and in risk assessment. 
Literature on legal requirements is an important information source for defining the 
needs of the assessors in relation to the legal obligations and the systems in which they 
need to operate (e. g. licensing). 
Section 2.2 looks at what is meant by risks, the concept of hazards and risks and the risk 
assessment principle. This provides a basic understanding of risks and risk assessment. 
A more in-depth review on some of the specific risk assessment issues is carried out in 
Section 2.3. The topics covered in this review include the types of risks, different risk 
assessment approaches, acceptability and tolerability of risks and how to deal with 
uncertainties. Section 2.4 looks at some of the existing risk assessment techniques and 
tools. The implications of these techniques and tools are discussed later in Chapter 6 as 
part of the investigation into establishing suitable methods for crowd safety (i. e. to see if 
any aspects are suitable for crowd safety or if anything can be learnt from them). 
Having looked at the legal requirements and the subject of risk assessment, the next step 
of the review was to discover existing provisions aimed at guiding and assisting public 
venue owners and assessors to achieve a suitable risk assessment for crowd safety. 
Section 2.5 reviews the guidance documents that are likely to be obtainable by public 
venue owners. The existing guidance also provides an insight into what is generally 
recognised as good practice in safety management and risk assessment. Finally, a 
review was carried out on the current practice, in Section 2.6, to establish 
how crowd 
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safety is assessed in practice and identify where the problems may be and what 
improvements may be required. 
2.1 The Legal Situations 
The health and safety law in the UK regards operating a public venue as a work activity. 
Hence, the health and safety legislation, which covers almost all workplaces, also 
applies to public venues. 
2.1.1 General Requirements on Ensuring Crowd Safety 
The main piece of legislation which sets out the legal requirements on ensuring health 
and safety in the workplaces, including public venues, is the Health and Safety at Work 
etc. Act 1974 (HSW Act). The 1974 Act places a duty on employers to ensure, so far as 
is reasonably practicable, the health, safety and welfare at work of his employees and 
non-employees who may be affected by their undertakings. In particular, Section 3 of 
the Act specifies the health and safety requirements concerning non-employees. This is 
applicable to anyone who could be affected, such as contractors in the premises, visitors 
and members of the public. The full text of Section 3 of the 1974 Act is as follows: 
It shall he the duty of every employer to conduct his undertaking in such a way as 
to ensure, so, far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment 
who may be affected thereby are not thereby exposed to risks to their health or 
safety. 
Under this Act (and other health and safety legislation), the owner of a public venue is 
regarded as an employer whose works involve the attendance of crowds. It is therefore 
clear that the legal responsibility to protect the visitors lies with the public venue owner. 
Whilst he may delegate this duty to his employees (e. g. operation or safety manager) or 
to an outside body (e. g. stewards from a security company), he is ultimately responsible 
for ensuring that the visiting crowds and anyone else who may be affected are, so 
far as 
is reasonably practicable, not exposed to safety risks. In general, the venue owner will 
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need to provide and maintain an environment where the risks to health and safety are 
kept as low as possible and take the necessary actions to ensure the health and safety of 
the visiting crowds. 
A key principal emerging from the 1974 Act is that employers have to ensure, so far as 
is reasonably practicable (SFRP), that people are not exposed to risks. This is perhaps 
better known as the ALARP principal - i. e. employers must keep the risk as low as 
reasonably practicable. As discussed in Section 2.1, what the law requires here is not 
about asking employers to do everything to ensure absolute health and safety. The 
ALARP principal serves to "qualify" the duties on employers; i. e. in terms of what is 
practicable and what is reasonable to do to ensure health and safety. It has become one 
of the most important principals behind the UK health and safety law. But what does 
"reasonably practicable" mean? The following was quoted by Cohen (1982) and Kletz 
(1982) as the definition of the phrase: 
`Reasonably practicable' is a narrower term than physically possible ', and 
implies that a computation must be made in which the quantum of risk is placed in 
one scale and the sacrifice involved in the measures necessary for averting the 
risk (whether in money, time or trouble) is placed in the other, and that, if it be 
shown that there is a gross disproportion between - the risk being insignificant in 
relation to the sacrifice - the defendants discharge the onus upon them. (Fife & 
Machin, 1976) 
It follows that an employer should assess the risks associated with his undertaking so as 
to enable him to determine in an informed manner, what reasonably practicable actions 
to take to reduce the risks as much as possible. 
2.1.2 Legal Requirements on Risk Assessment 
In addition to the general requirements of the HSW Act, the Management of 
Health and 
Safety at Work Regulations 1992 (MHSWR) place a more specific duty on employers to 
assess the risks posed by their undertakings. 
This is in line with the ALARP principle of 
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doing what is "reasonably practicable" to avert risks. Regulation 3 of the MHSWR sets 
out the risk assessment requirements as follows: 
Every employer shall make a suitable and sufficient assessment of-- 
(a) the risks to the health and safety of his employees to which they are exposed 
whilst they are at work; and 
(b) the risks to the health and safety of persons not in his employment arising out 
of or in connection with the conduct by him of his undertaking, 
for the purpose of identifying the measures he needs to take to comply with the 
requirements and prohibitions imposed upon him by or under the relevant 
statutory provisions. 
For public venue owners, this means that they are required to carry out an assessment of, 
amongst other things, the risks to the safety of the visiting crowds. This is to ensure that 
they think carefully about the nature and the extent of the hazards at their venues. The 
ultimate aim of the assessment is to identify the measures required to minimise the risks 
and to comply with the appropriate statutory requirements. For most public venues, the 
appropriate statutory requirements may include those set out under the fire safety and 
precautions legislation and, for venues where hazardous substances are stored and used, 
the Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1988 (COSHH). Section 
3.1.3 will look at legislation concerning specific areas relevant to crowd safety and those 
concerning specific venue types. 
Apart from conducting risk assessment, Regulation 3 also requires employers to review 
their assessment if there is a reason to suspect that it is no longer valid or there has been 
a significant change in matters to which it relates. Where necessary, changes to the risk 
assessment will then have to be made. It also requires employers who have five or more 
employees to record the significant findings of the risk assessment and any group of his 
employees identified by it as being especially at risk. 
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The text of Regulation 3 specifically states that the risk assessment the employers carry 
out must be "suitable and sufficient". The MHSWR Approved Code of Practice (HSC, 
1992) provides clear guidance on what this means; namely that a suitable and sufficient 
risk assessment should: 
o identify all significant risks; 
0 enable the identification and prioritisation of the measures that need to be taken; 
and 
0 be appropriate to the nature of the work such that it remains valid for a reasonable 
period of time. 
The first two points set out what public venue owners need to do to improve their safety 
planning and provisions. They also provide the basic criteria for the development of the 
crowd safety risk assessment methodology. The last point specifies the need for the risk 
assessment methodology to be relevant to venue operations and the sorts of crowd safety 
problems that could take place there. 
The MHSWR is the main legislation as far as risk assessment is concerned. There are 
other pieces of legislation that also require risk assessment to be carried out for specific 
areas of health and safety (e. g. fire safety, COSHH, manual handling). But the principle 
of what they require is exactly the same. 
2.1.3 Other Requirements 
Together, the HSW Act and the MHSWR set out the general requirements for owners of 
public venues to ensure the safety of their visiting crowds and conduct crowd safety risk 
assessment. Depending upon the circumstances and the nature of their operations, some 
venues are also subjected to other legislation that covers specific areas or applies only to 
certain venue types. In terms of safety and risk assessment, the requirements imposed 
by such legislation are very much in line with those specified in the HSW Act and the 
MHSWR. 
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Fire safety is one area which is particularly relevant to crowd safety and where the legal 
requirements on fire risk assessment are very similar in nature to those in the MHSWR. 
The main piece of fire safety legislation is the Fire Precautions Act 1971. It applies to 
all types of public venues except tents and other moveable structures and some open air 
venues. Regulation 4 of the proposed Fire Precautions (Places of Work) Regulations 
1994 also requires a risk assessment to be made on fire safety. As in the MHSWR, the 
assessment should be revised whenever there is a reason to believe that it is no longer 
realistic or there is a significant change in the activity. Also, findings of the assessment 
have to be recorded if five or more persons work there at any one time. 
Some venues such as railway stations, sports grounds and places of public entertainment 
are also subject to legislation that is designed specifically to ensure the safe operation of 
these venues and to introduce extra protection to the health and safety of the public. In 
addition to the general requirements mentioned previously, owners of these venues also 
have to satisfy other requirements before they are allowed to operate. They can be in the 
form of a safety case to prove the adequacy of their safety provisions or in the form of 
terms and conditions specified in a safety certificate or a licence. The requirements on 
different public venue types are dictated by different legislation. The Railways (Safety 
Case) Regulations 1994, for example, require operators of trains, stations, etc. to prepare 
and secure the acceptance of a safety case. The safety case will then have to be accepted 
by the infrastructure controller or, in certain cases, by the HSE before starting to operate. 
There is a requirement to conduct a crowd safety risk assessment under the regulations. 
Schedule I specifies that the safety case should deal with the risks that can arise from 
congestion and the movement of people within the station and the evacuation of persons 
from a station in an emergency. It also requires the safety case to include a satisfactory 
record of the risk assessment made under Regulation 3 of the MHSWR. But the 1994 
regulations go further than the MHSWR in that they require a risk assessment record to 
be made regardless of whether the station operator employs five or more employees. 
Sports grounds and most places of public entertainment, on the other hand, are subjected 
to licensing laws. In order to be allowed to operate or to admit visitors, owners of public 
venues need to obtain a licence or a safety certificate from the relevant authority and 
must abide by the terms and conditions on the licence. In the case of sports venues, the 
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relevant legislation is the Safety at Sports Grounds Act 1975, which is amended by the 
Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987. The safety control imposed by the 
1975 Act is primarily through the issuing of safety certificates to designated sports 
grounds - i. e. grounds which, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, have the capacity 
to hold more than 10,000 people and where football, rugby and cricket are played. The 
1987 Act has extended the safety certificate system and inspection to regulate stands - 
i. e. stands that are able to accommodate under cover 500 spectators or more at sports 
grounds not designated in the original 1975 Act. Under both the 1975 and 1987 Acts, 
the terms and conditions of the safety certificate are at the discretion of local authorities. 
The local authorities also have the power to prohibit admission of spectators to a sports 
ground or part of a sports ground if, in its opinion, the admission of spectators would 
involve a serious risk to them. Applications for the certificates are usually considered by 
a "safety team" consisting of the appropriate local authority, the building authority, the 
police and the fire authority (Graham, 1993). 
Under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 and the London 
Government Act 1963, local authorities have powers to license certain places of public 
entertainment. Under the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976 and the Civic Government 
(Scotland) Act 1982, local authorities in Scotland have powers to grant an entertainment 
licence to this type of venue only when the public has to pay to get in. The terms and 
conditions of the licence, by which the venue owner must abide, are again determined by 
the local authorities and are prescriptive. 
Exactly how the licensing and safety certificate requirements link to the risk assessment 
requirements made under the MHSWR may require further consideration. This issue is 
particularly relevant to venues such as sports grounds and places of entertainment. This 
is because these venues are often subject to overlapping legislation, namely the HSW 
Act (and the MHSWR under it) and the relevant licensing law. According to the Guide 
to Health, Safety and Welfare at Pop Concerts and Similar Events (HSC et al, 1993), the 
licensing legislation will normally be regarded as the more appropriate legislation in 
these circumstances. Whilst such an arrangement may be necessary to avoid duplication 
of enforcement, it could also mean that in practice, the only mechanism to control safety 
in these venues is the prescriptive measures determined entirely by the relevant licensing 
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authorities. Since the licensing law does not require the venue owners or the authorities 
to assess risks when deciding on the terms and conditions, there are no mechanisms in 
place to ensure that the terms and conditions are themselves adequate. Furthermore, 
such an arrangement could encourage venue owners to aim at satisfying only the terms 
and conditions on the licence instead of looking afresh at what safety problems could 
arise and how people could be harmed. 
2.2 Risk and Risk Assessment 
This section looks at the basic ideas concerning risks and the risk assessment principles. 
A more in-depth review on some of the issues concerning the application of risk 
assessment will be conducted in Section 2.3. A further literature review on 
methodological issues and specific techniques for different risk assessment tasks will be 
carried out later in Chapter 6 when detailed requirements of the risk assessment 
methodology have been defined. 
2.2.1 Definitions of Risks 
A simple way to summarise what has been said in the literature about risk is that it arises 
from a hazard, it represents something that is undesirable and unwanted and that there is 
an element of chance in it. There are many types of risks affecting many aspects of our 
life; for example, financial risks, social risks (e. g. crime), risks to the environment, 
public health and safety risks that affect a large population overall (e. g. travel risks, risks 
associated with smoking). But the focus of this thesis is on safety and, in particular, the 
risks to visitor safety in a public venue. It is within this context only that the review and 
investigations on risk, risk assessment and risk assessment methodological issues were 
conducted. 
Hazards 
The term "hazard" represents some forms of danger. The HSC (1992) defines hazard as 
something that has the potential to cause harm. Under this definition, a hazard could be 
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a substance, an item such as a piece of machinery, a work method, aspects of the work 
organisation, the circumstance, an event, an activity, etc. In this respect, the undesirable 
and unwanted outcome is that people are harmed by the hazard. In safety, harm usually 
means injuries or fatalities. The British Medical Association (i. e. BMA) (1987) gives a 
slightly different definition; namely, hazard is "a set of circumstances which may cause 
harmful consequences". For example, a car travelling through a crowd of pedestrians 
can be regarded as a hazard under BMA's definition. Shrader-Frechette (1985) has 
provided more examples of natural and man-made hazards. The former includes floods, 
droughts, famines, infectious diseases and fire. The latter, which are also regarded as 
technological hazards, include nuclear war, toxic chemical, explosive materials and 
automobile accidents. All these are events, circumstances or substances that could cause 
harm to those who are involved. 
Risks 
Unlike hazard, there are more variations in terms of exactly how the term "risk" is 
defined. Dunster (1985), for example, takes it to mean the probability of a specified 
adverse event or consequence. This definition is close to our everyday use of the word 
when we say the risk of a fire, the risk of an accident, the risk of skin cancer, etc. This 
definition tends to give an impression that risk is equal to chance, likelihood or 
probability. From the risk assessment viewpoint, however, this interoperation is not 
correct. Health and safety analysts generally understand risk as a measure of the 
probability and the severity of loss or injury (Whipple, 1986). The definition given in 
the MHSWR Approved Code of Practice (HSC, 1992) is consistent with this: 
" Risk expresses the likelihood that the harm from a particular hazard is 
realised 
" The extent of the risk covers the population which might be affected by a risk; 
i. e. the number of people who might be exposed and the consequences for 
them 
Risk therefore reflects both the likelihood that harm will occur and its severitl'. 
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The Royal Society Study Group on Risk (1983 and 1992), on the other hand, gives the 
following definition: 
(Risk is) the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated 
period of time, or results fr om a particular challenge. 
The study group also pointed out that: 
As a probability in the sense of statistical theory risk obeys all the formal laws of 
combining probabilities. Explicitly or implicitly, it must alivays relate to the `risk 
of a specific event or set of events' and where appropriate must refer to an 
exposure to hazards specified in terms of its amount or intensity, time of starting 
or duration. ... 
All risks are conditional, although often the conditions are implied 
by context rather than explicitly stated. 
The Royal Society's definition is rather similar to that by Dunster. There are two 
important properties in the definition; i. e. probability and adverse event. In its report to 
the European Commission on risk assessment for hazardous installations, J. C. 
Consultancy Ltd (1986) argued that an adverse event is an occurrence that produces 
harm, and harm is a loss to a human being or a population of human beings. So this 
definition actually incorporates the concepts of both probability and consequences. The 
term "probability" can be taken to mean a numerical measure, on a scale from zero (i. e. 
impossible) to one (i. e. certainty), of the degree of confidence in the occurrence of an 
(adverse) event. In some areas of health and safety, the probability of exposure to an 
adverse event for a stated period of time can be based on failure data of system 
components, obtained through repeated tests and past statistics. This type of method is 
already in use within the process industries as part of a Quantified Risk Assessment 
(QRA). For many other workplaces, however, QRA is not practicable because of the 
lack of failure data. The extensive expertise and effort required also make this type of 
method prohibitive for smaller employers. Section 2.3.4 of this thesis will look into this 
issue further in relation to crowd safety. 
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Despite the differences in emphasis and wordings, the various definitions are essentially 
the same in principle; namely, risk signifies the likelihood of occurrence of an adverse 
event that could cause a certain amount of harm to people. The HSC definition makes it 
more explicit that risk should also reflect the severity or intensity of the adverse event. 
This is very much in line with what Covello and Merkhofer (1993) have said. They also 
point out that "risk" implies something that is uncertain and undesirable. This point of 
view is in agreement with that of Rowe (1977) and Moore (1983) who said that risk 
should consist of two elements, an unwanted outcome and an uncertainty over its 
occurrence; e. g. the risk of losing money in the stock markets. But paying the bills, 
paying tax and making monthly repayments on a loan is not a risk. Although they are 
undesirable, there is no uncertainty, as people should know how much and when they 
have to pay. On the same token, winning the Lottery or wining a gamble cannot be 
regarded as risk. Although there is uncertainty, the outcome is by no means undesirable. 
Therefore, a risk assessment can also be regarded as a process to determine the degree of 
uncertainty of an undesirable event and how undesirable it is. The assessment outcomes 
can then form the basis for decisions on what needs to be done and prioritise the 
remedial measures in a more rational manner. 
Definitions elsewhere are generally in line with those given by the HSC and the Royal 
Society. For example, in the medical field, the BMA (1987) regards the word "risk" as 
an expression of the probability or likelihood that something unpleasant will happen: 
A hazard is a set of circumstances which may cause harmful consequences, and 
the likelihood of its doing so is the risk associated with it. 
Kinchin (1982) also pointed out that "risk" in risk assessment should refer to both the 
magnitude of the hazard and the probability of its occurrence. 
With this in mind, the HSC definition will be used for the purpose of this research. This 
is because, firstly, their definition is largely in line with the other definitions reviewed. 
Secondly, it is the "official" definition given in association with the regulations on risk 
assessment (i. e. the MHSWR). Thirdly, it is used by the HSE, which is one of the main 
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enforcing authorities in crowd safety. It is also widely used in government guidance and 
hence should be more familiar to venue owners and assessors. 
2.2.2 The Risk Assessment Principles 
On the basis of the definitions of risk described above, risk assessment can be regarded 
as a systematic examination of the risks in terms of their likelihood and severity. 
According to the HSC definition, it should involve identifying the hazards and 
evaluating the likelihood that harm will occur and its severity (or the extent of the risk). 
Based on this principle, the HSE (1994) has set out a framework for risk assessment and 
what it entails. It consists of the following five steps: 
0 Look for the hazards. 
0 Decide who might be harmed and how. 
" Evaluate the risks and decide whether existing precautions are adequate or more 
should be done. 
0 Record the findings. 
0 Review the assessment from time to time and revise it if necessary. 
To comply with the legal requirements, all risk assessment must follow these principles. 
But other than that, there are no fixed rules on exactly how it should be carried out. In 
general, the assessment required will depend on the nature of the undertaking, the type 
of hazards and the extent of the risks (HSC, 1992). For a workplace where the work 
activities are straightforward and well understood and the hazards are few and simple, 
the risk assessment required can be a simple, common sense process. At the opposite 
end of the scale, however, a risk assessment can be a very sophisticated process. It often 
requires specialist expertise and can be very time consuming and resource intensive to 
do. An example of this is QRA. In the type of workplace where QRA is appropriate, 
complex systems are used in conjunction with human inputs to perform complicated 
operations involving hazardous materials. A QRA process may involve the following 
(Edmondson and Manfield, 1989; HSE, 1992; RM Consultants Ltd, 1994): 
" Identify potential safety hazards. 
" Identify the causes and estimate the consequences of hazards. 
" Establish the logical combinations of events which could lead to the hazards. 
" Estimate the probability or frequency of occurrence of each event. 
" Calculate the overall probability of the occurrence of each hazardous situation and 
the costs of such an occurrence to form a basis for decision making. 
Shrader-Frechette (1985) suggested that generally risk assessment tends to include three 
processes: risk identification, risk estimation and risk evaluation. Risk identification is 
essentially hazard identification. Risk estimation aims to determine the magnitude of 
risk. For chemical hazards, once a substance has been identified as a hazard, risk 
estimation involves two main tasks: to determine the dose-response relationship and to 
estimate the population at risk and the dose it receives from that substance. Finally, risk 
evaluation is to decide whether the estimated risk is acceptable. This could be done 
through risk-cost-benefit analysis or comparisons against standards, legal requirements 
or good practice. 
Rowe (1977) suggested that risk assessment should consist of risk determination and 
risk evaluation. Figure 2.1 below gives an overview of the risk assessment hierarchy: 
Figure 2.1: Risk Assessment Hierarchy (Rowe, 1977) 
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Covello and Merkhofer (1993), on the other hand, gave a slightly more complex model 
of risk assessment. They used the term risk analysis instead of risk assessment and saw 
risk assessment as one component of risk analysis. In this model, there are three stages 
of risk analysis: hazard identification, risk assessment and risk evaluation. The hazard 
identification stage is about identifying risk agents and the conditions and events under 
which they potentially produce adverse impacts to people or the environment. The risk 
evaluation stage is about comparing and judging the significance of the risk. The middle 
stage of risk assessment, is about describing and quantifying risks. This, in turn, 
consists of the following four assessments: 
" Release assessment - i. e. to describe and quantify the potential of a risk source to 
release or otherwise introduce risk agents into an environment accessible to people, 
animals, plants or other things that people value. 
0 Exposure assessment - i. e. to describe and quantify the relevant conditions and 
characteristics of human and environmental exposures to risk agents produced or 
released by a given risk source. 
0 Consequence assessment - i. e. to describe and quantify the relationship between 
specified exposures to a risk agent and the health and environmental consequences 
of those exposures. 
9 Risk estimation - i. e. to integrate the results from the above assessments to produce 
quantitative measures of health and environmental risks. 
There are minor discrepancies between authors in terms of what a risk assessment is and 
what it should consist of. There are also differences in the use of terms and some of the 
risk assessment principles were clearly given with specific applications in mind. But 
despite all these, a general picture emerges whereby a risk assessment can be regarded as 
something that consists of the following basis elements: 
" Hazard identification - to establish what hazards could arise to harm people (or the 
environment or things that people value). 
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0 Consequence analysis - to identify the severity of the consequence or the extent of 
the harm (i. e. who might be harmed, how they might be harmed and how many of 
them might be harmed). 
0 Risk estimation - to determine the risk associated with a specific hazard in terms of 
the likelihood (or probability) to cause harm and the severity/extend of harm. 
0 Risk evaluation - to judge and decide how significant the risk is; i. e. whether or not 
it is acceptable or should more be done, to what extent risk should be reduced and 
what actions need to be taken to reduce the risk. 
Chapter 6 will review different risk assessment methods and techniques used elsewhere 
to determine how these principles could be best fulfilled in the context of crowd safety. 
2.3 Specific Issues Concerning Risk and Risk Assessment 
This part of the review looks at some of the specific issues concerning risk assessment 
and risk management. Without taking too much for granted concerning the legal 
requirements on risk assessment, the aim of this section is to take a step back and look at 
the kinds of issues that could affect the kinds of risk assessment required for crowd 
safety. 
Firstly, Section 2.3.1 looks at the distinctions between risks that people take voluntarily 
(i. e. voluntary risks) and imposed risks (i. e. involuntary risks). The significance of this 
issue is that it may impact on whether certain regimes for safety management and risk 
assessment are acceptable if the risks are of one type or another. For example, it may 
well be necessary to adopt a tougher regime to deal with risks that are involuntary and 
have a severe effect on a large number of people. Secondly, Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 
explore two related topics associated with decision making in risk management. In 
reality, there is no such thing as absolute safety. Decisions have to be made as to 
whether one can live with certain risks or not. The issue is on what basis such decisions 
should be made. Section 2.3.2 looks at the concept of acceptability and tolerability of 
risks. Although the literature review in the previous section suggests that there is a 
general consensus amongst many authors that risk assessment should reflect both the 
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likelihood and severity of consequence, there are also other views. For example, it may 
be argued that in some circumstances, the hazards rather than the risks should be the 
main determining factor. In other circumstances, cost effectiveness should be the basis 
for decision-making. The different approaches to risk assessment and decision-making 
are examined in Section 2.3.3. Section 2.3.4 is concerned with the issue of dealing with 
uncertainty. Risk assessment comes in different shapes and forms when applied in 
different contexts. Some are based on experimental data, some use statistics, some 
employ risk quantification techniques and some are qualitative and rely on subjective 
judgement and experience. Also, in different applications, risks are expressed in terms 
of level of exposure, costs of life, the number of people killed (or its equivalent) or, 
simply, a rating level (e. g. high, medium or low). The section looks at which of these 
approaches are more appropriate to crowd safety. Finally, Section 2.3.5 looks at the 
issue of latent failures and incubation of crisis as a contributory factor to crowd related 
disasters. Of particular interest is some of the works carried out within the football 
industry. 
2.3.1 Voluntary Risks vs. Involuntary Risks 
Risk taking is an inseparable part of our everyday life. For example, crossing the road, 
travelling to work, playing sports, going on holiday, etc. all involve taking risks. Yet, 
we all do it without any hesitation even though we know that we could be run over by a 
bus whilst crossing the road, be involved in a road accident on our way to work, injure 
ourselves when playing sports and our homes could get burgled while we are away. But 
there are some risks that we decide not to take. Also, people do not always agree with 
each other on what risks to take and what not to. For example, investing in the stock 
market can be rather risky. Putting your money in the bank, on the other hand, is 
generally recognised as a safer option (although you could still lose some or all of your 
money through bank error or if the bank collapses). Yet some people decide to invest 
heavily in shares, some decide to keep their money in the bank, some decide to do both 
and a few choose to do neither - instead, they keep it at home under the mattress (and 
risk being burgled). So, the question is why we do what we do despite the risks and, 
more importantly, on what basis do we decide whether «we should accept the risk or not? 
Risk taking behaviour is a complex issue and is a subject that is probably of great 
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interest to behavioural scientists. It could be a combination of subjective judgement and 
rational decision influenced by factors such as risk perception, rewards, personality (i. e. 
are you a risk taker? ), experience (e. g. bad experience with banks in the past may lead 
some people to not trusting them and to keep their savings at home), personal preference 
and value, circumstances and so on. But ultimately, the answer to the above question is 
that we choose to do it (or not to do it). We make the decisions (sometimes 
subconsciously) that we should do these things despite the risks. They are generally 
regarded as voluntary risks. 
However, not everything is of our choosing. There are risks that are already there and 
there are risks that are imposed on us regardless of whether we, as individuals, feel that 
they are acceptable or not. These are generally referred to as involuntary risks. 
According to Rowe (1977), a voluntary risk involves some motivation for gain whereas 
an involuntary risk is imposed on the risk takers without regard of their own assessment 
of benefits or options. Shrader-Frechette (1985) describes voluntary risks as risks 
through voluntary activities (e. g. smoking, rock climbing). In general, these risks are 
assessed in terms of individual's own value system and each person has a relatively 
large degree of freedom in deciding to accept them (although regulations and 
government policies on, say, smoking do limit the degree to which one's decision to 
take risk is freely chosen). On the other hand, an involuntary risk (or a social risk as 
Shrader-Frechette also calls it) is involuntarily imposed rather than voluntarily chosen; 
for example, the location of a gas work or a chemical plant. This type of risk is not 
assessed on the basis of each person's value system. Instead, it is in the hands of 
governments, political groups, etc. What is significant about the issue of voluntary vs. 
involuntary risks is that whilst people may be prepared to engage themselves in high risk 
activities voluntarily, they are less tolerant of involuntary risks. To give an insight of 
why this is the case, the HSE (1999) quoted the findings of several studies by social 
scientists on factors affecting risk perception. The key factors identified in these studies 
include: how well the process that gives rise to hazard is understood, how equitably the 
danger is distributed, how well individuals can control their exposure and whether risk is 
assumed voluntarily. Other factors that have also been suggested include culture, ethical 
and social considerations and degree of trust to those creating the risk and in the 
regulator in ensuring adequate measures are in place. Involuntary exposure and the lack 
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of personal control over the outcomes are also among the eleven negative attributes of 
hazards that influence risk perception and risk acceptance listed in the Royal Society 
report (1992). Other interesting attributes include man-made hazards rather than those 
from natural causes, fear of unknown, exposure that threatens future generations and 
infrequent but catastrophic accidents. The last attribute appears to have a particular 
influence on how we decide if a risk is acceptable. This will be discussed further in the 
following sub-section. 
There is, however, a grey area as to whether certain risks are voluntary or involuntary. 
From the definition by Shrader-Frechette, the criterion for determining this appears to be 
how much freedom an individual has in deciding whether to take the risk or not. If a 
person has a high degree of freedom to decide, then it is voluntary. Otherwise, if the 
decision is taken elsewhere and the individual exposed to the risk has very little 
influence over it, then it is involuntary. But how large or small does the degree of 
freedom need to be before one can say it is a voluntary or an involuntary risk? Rowe 
gave an example of someone living in a house near the approach runways of a busy 
airport to illustrate this problem. Even if the airport was built after the person settled in 
the runway area, he does have the option to move away from this source of risk at some 
cost. And what if people move into the area well aware of the airport or, in some parts 
of the world, people knowingly live in (natural) disaster-prone areas. Are these risks 
still involuntary? The same argument applies to people living near a chemical, gas or 
nuclear installation, employees in a hazardous workplace, or visitors to an unsafe public 
venue. At least in theory, they too have the option to move away, to work elsewhere or 
not to go to the venue. 
In crowd safety, there is no firm evidence to show whether people go to a public venue 
knowing the risks involved but still choose to do so (e. g. because of the atmosphere, the 
entertainment value) or whether they are simply not fully aware of the risks. If it is the 
latter, it can perhaps be argued that this is like someone moving into an area without 
being told of the plan for a new airport nearby. Would this be an involuntary risk and is 
therefore less acceptable? 
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Another way of looking at voluntary vs. involuntary risks is by considering who makes 
the decisions concerning whether the risk is acceptable or worth taking and who would 
be affected or exposed to the risk as a result. This would determine the basis on which 
such decisions need to be made. For example, to take up a dangerous sport, to adopt a 
certain lifestyle, to smoke or to live in a natural disaster-prone area are decisions that, by 
and large, are likely to be a personal decision and the consequences are likely to affect 
only the decision makers and the people they value (e. g. their families). In this case, it 
may be perfectly acceptable that one can base their decisions on subjective judgement 
and personal preference alone. If, however, the decision is likely to affect others, then it 
can be argued that a tougher set of criteria should apply. The decision must therefore be 
more rational and justifiable. People who are affected need to be satisfied that risks are 
properly controlled and, as the law requires, kept "as low as reasonably practicable". On 
this basis, crowd safety risk assessments should be sufficiently robust because visitors to 
public venues, regardless of whether they are fully aware of the risks or not, are usually 
not involved in decision-making. What remains to be established is how robust the risk 
assessment needs to be for crowd safety. Other factors such as operational constraints 
will need to be taken into consideration. 
2.3.2 ALARP and Tolerability of Risks 
An underlying principle of risk assessment is the recognition that there is no such thing 
as absolute safety. The notion that as long as the problems and the remedial actions are 
identified, employers would be able to completely get rid of all problems is unrealistic. 
There is a whole host of reasons why this is so. Financial considerations and resources 
limitations are perhaps the most commonly used reasons. Other reasons may include 
engineering constraints, design limitations, disruption to services and political pressure. 
For public venues, there are further reasons - public order/security concerns, fire safety 
requirements, staff's health, safety and welfare, disruptions to the normal traffic and the 
activities of non-visitors, reduced entertainment value, etc. In other words, there are a 
lot of gives and takes involved in making such decisions. For example, if the costs of 
remedial measures exceed the means of the venue owner, a decision will then have to be 
made on whether to go for a cheaper alternative or to take the drastic measure of closing 
a part or the whole of the venue. But even if the costs are within the means, there are 
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other considerations. The types of questions one would probably ask may include: is it 
cost effective to spend a large amount of money on problems that may only happen only 
rarely or would it be better to use the resource on something else? Does the problem 
warrant a remedy that brings disruptions and inconvenience to the visitors/local 
residents, reduce the enjoyment and entertainment value of the event, undermine the 
security arrangements, increase public dissatisfaction, create problems elsewhere, etc.? 
In short and to quote from Shrader-Frechette (1985), how safe is safe enough and how 
much we ought to pay for safety? A more realistic notion, therefore, should be one that 
venue owners are able to strike this balance in order to achieve an optimum level of 
crowd safety (as opposed to absolute safety). 
This view is shared by Kletz (1982) who pointed out that providing for everything to 
remove every possible risk, however slight, is impossible. Even if we decide to try to do 
so, we cannot do everything at once. The question is how to decide what to do first and 
what can be left until later on? In other words, how do we best allocate the resources 
available? This is also in line with what the law says. As discussed in Section 2.1, the 
law does not demand for absolute health and safety. Instead, the requirement is for 
employers to do what is "reasonably practicable" (HSW Act, 1974). This implies that 
whilst the employers still need to achieve a high standard of health and safety, they can 
do so taking into account things like time, money and cost effectiveness. Whilst this 
principle is fine, the issue that emerges from this is that how can we decide what actions 
are reasonable to take to deal with the identified problems. 
Following the public inquiry into the Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station, HSE published 
the document "The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations" (1992c). It sets 
out a framework that describes the HSE's philosophy of risk control for a nuclear power 
station, illustrated by the "carrot diagram" (e. g. HSC, 1991; HSE, 1992c). It has since 
been known as the Tolerability of Risk or TOR framework and is being increasingly 
used in other industries. Figure 2.2 reproduces the "carrot diagram" for illustration 
purposes. According to the TOR framework, risks can fall into three levels: the 
Intolerable Region where risks cannot be justified on any ground, the ALARP Region 
where risks have to be kept as low as reasonably practicable and the Broadly Acceptable 
Region where there is no need for detailed working to demonstrate ALARP. 
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Figure 2.2: Levels of Risk and ALARP (HSE, 1992c) 
Intolerable region 
Risk cannot be justified 
on any ground 
Tolerable only if risk reduction is 
impracticable or if its cost is grossly 
disproportionate to the improvement 
gained 
The ALARP or 
Tolerability region 
(Risk is undertaken 
only if a benefit is 
desired) 
Tolerable if cost of reduction would 
exceed the improvement gained 
Broadly acceptable 
region 
(No need for detailed 
working to demonstrate 
ALARP) 
Negligible risk 
The following definition of tolerability was given in the document: 
"Tolerability" does not mean "acceptability". It refers to the willingness to live 
with a risk to secure certain benefits and in the confidence that it is properly 
controlled. To tolerate a risk means that we do not regard it as negligible or 
something we might ignore, but rather as something we need to keep under review 
and reduce still f rrther if'and as we can. 
As for acceptability, the following was said: 
For a risk to be "acceptable " ... means that. 
for purposes of life or work, we are 
prepared to take it pretty well as it is. 
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Tolerable implies neither absolutely safe or unsafe but the range in between. Tolerable 
does not mean acceptable, instead it refers to a willingness to take a risk so as to secure 
certain benefits (HSE, 1999) - sometimes one has to take risks even if one is not entirely 
happy in doing so. For example, vehicles cause road traffic accidents that injure and kill 
people. We do not like the risk (therefore it is not an acceptable risk) but generally we 
are willing to take it (i. e. to tolerate it) because we need and like our vehicles for the 
benefits motorised vehicles bring. However, because this is not something we are happy 
to live with as such, we demand continuous improvements and seek to keep our roads as 
safe as possible (i. e. ALARP ). An informed balancing act between risks and benefits is 
of prime importance to decisions on whether the risks are tolerable (or "safe enough"). 
The HSE (1999) argues that the TOR philosophy is applicable across the full range of 
risks whether they are quantifiable or not (and even if there are uncertainties). 
2.3.3 Basis for Decision Makin 
The need to balance between risks and other factors is well recognised. There are some 
risks that we can live with, some we need to do something about and some are simply 
unacceptable and therefore not a matter for compromise or optimisation (Engineering 
Council, 1993). The subsequent issue is on what basis we can decide. There appears to 
be at least four ways upon which risk decisions could be based: 
" Risk based approach. 
" Hazard based approach. 
" Target setting and de minimus. 
" Cost effectiveness. 
Rick based 
The principle of the risk based approach is very much in line with what has been said so 
far in this document about risks and the ALARP principle. The determining factor for 
decision-making is how much risk a hazard/event poses to people. The general idea is 
that the higher the risk, the more serious the problem is and therefore there is a higher 
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priority for doing more about it. As identified previously, risk reflects both likelihood 
and severity of consequences. Therefore, under the risk based approach, the degree of 
control required for the hazard is decided purely and simply by whether the combined 
result of likelihood and severity is unduly high, tolerable or broadly acceptable. When 
used in conjunction with ALARP, the risk based approach allows considerations to be 
given to the costs of controlling risks. 
This is a "purist" approach whereby decisions on allocation of resources for health and 
safety are made based on the assessments of how likely and how much people could be 
harmed alone. Risk based decisions do not get influenced by factors such as politics and 
public perception. Therefore, it can be argued that this is a more objective approach that 
would lead to more rational decisions. But on the other hand, it can equally be criticised 
as not sufficiently sensitive to public concerns and public inputs. Despite the fact that 
the public do not have the necessary expertise and knowledge to make professional 
judgement, their concerns are sometimes well found and justified (Kletz, 1988). 
Another pitfall of this approach is that it does not relate benefits clearly enough to 
tolerability (Royal Society, 1992). 
Hazard based 
If the risk based approach for resource allocation represents the conventional way of risk 
assessment, then there are situations in which it may be necessary to deviate from such a 
convention. For example, if we look at "risk" in a wider context, it could be argued that 
it should encompass more than just physical harm but should also take into account of 
other factors such as ethical and social considerations and, hence, public concerns and 
public opinions (HSE, 1999). Similarly, public perception too can be a key influence to 
decision making. This is acknowledged by the HSC who stated that the judgement on 
what is tolerable is not a scientific but a political matter (1991). 
In the previous sub-section, infrequent but catastrophic accidents were identified as one 
of the negative attributes of hazards that influence risk perception. Another attribute is 
exposure that threaten future generations. These go some way in explaining the public 
concerns on, for example, nuclear accidents despite the fact that major accidents are 
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rare. The public demands a higher safety standard from the nuclear industry not because 
they pose high risks but because they are "high hazard"; i. e. the consequence of an 
accident could be catastrophic. Influenced by risk perception and public demand, 
decisions on priority and resources allocation are sometimes made on the basis of high 
hazards rather than high risks. 
A specific example of hazard based decision making is the construction of the Thames 
Barrier. In early 1953 there were the great floods on the east coast. By good luck rather 
than good management, London escaped. There was a great worry over how one might 
protect the city from another such disaster. The barrier was suggested and it was built at 
Woolwich. The structure was expensive and the likelihood of London being flooded 
was deemed to be rather small. Nevertheless, it was decided that it must not be allowed 
to happen at all because of the catastrophic consequences. Apart from human casualties, 
the tube system, the telephone network, the sewer system, etc. would all be out of action 
because of the mud and water damages. The thinking behind the decision was therefore 
that if it was possible to avoid such a thing, it had to be avoided. The cost, though high, 
was affordable and, as such, the exact value of the structure, for all practical purposes, 
was deemed irrelevant (Bondi, 1985). 
Another situation whereby the hazard-based approach may be used is when there is a 
high degree of uncertainty about likelihood (HSE, 1999). Infrequent but catastrophic 
accidents such as those mentioned above also fall into this category. The issue of how 
to deal with uncertainty will be looked at in Section 2.3.4. 
A problem with the hazard-based approach is in knowing when it should be adopted. So 
far, the literature does not offer any clear guidance or even rules of thumb. It appears 
that decisions to use a hazard-based approach instead of a risk-based approach is very 
much based on subjective judgement and political considerations rather than some form 
of fixed rules or the outcome of a more objective analysis of the situation. For example, 
aircraft falling from the sky hitting a football stadium (or any buildings under a flight 
path) too is a rare but catastrophic accident that could result in large number of 
casualties. Yet it does not attract anything like the amount of attention and public 
concerns as nuclear accidents - this is despite the fact that a similar accident occurred in 
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Amsterdam fairly recently. Public venues under the flight path can be reinforced to 
withstand the impact, though it is very costly to do. But unlike the Thames Barrier, the 
argument that "if it is possible to avoid it then it has to be avoided" does not seem to 
apply in this case. Therefore, for the purpose of crowd safety risk assessment, it is felt 
that a hazard-based approach should be kept out of the risk assessment process. For the 
meantime, it is perhaps best left as a management/political decision for venue owners 
and managers to make on the merit of the individual situations. 
Target Setting and De Minimus (or Probability-Threshold) 
Apart from the risk-based and hazard-based approaches, Kletz (1988a) has highlighted 
two approaches for decision-making: "target setting" and "cost-effectiveness". Target 
setting is perhaps the most widely used in industry. The basic principle is to remove or 
reduce first those risks that exceed an average or specified value (e. g. level of exposure, 
dose received). When it involves the public, if the average risks to life to those living 
nearby or risks to hypothetical persons (HSE, 1999) are above the target, actions must be 
taken to reduce them. For risks to employees, Kletz (1982) pointed out that within the 
Chemical industry, actions would be taken as a matter of priority for activities that 
contribute more than 0.4 to the FAFR (fatal accident frequency rate, i. e. the number of 
fatal accidents in a group of 1,000 men in a working lifetime (100 million man-hours)). 
But when we consider risks to the public, Kletz argued that the target should be much 
lower on the basis that the public may have the risks imposed on them without their 
permission (i. e. involuntary risks). If we benchmark it against the various involuntary 
risks people tend to accept with little or no complaint, we could have a target figure of 
about 1 in 10 million per person per year or less (a FAFR of 10-3). 
De minimus or probability-threshold can perhaps be regarded as a form of target setting. 
But instead of saying something must be done about any risks that are above the target, 
proponents of the de minimus view claim that hazards whose probabilities are below a 
given level, ordinarily 10-6 per person, are unimportant or insignificant from the point of 
view of risk assessment (Shrader-Frechette, 1985). According to Whipple (1986), "de 
minimus" is a term used in law to describe trivial issues not deserving of a court's time 
and attention. When applied to health and safety risks and regulation, the term refers to 
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a risk that avoids regulatory attention by virtue of its small size. From a regulatory view 
point, the de minimus rationale could be used either to determine the regulatory standard 
or to decide that no standard is required. For risk assessment, de minimus is effectively 
a risk threshold below which no review or risk assessment ought to be required. 
For target setting to work, we need to be able to set targets or standards in the first place. 
There is some general guidance around for crowd safety, e. g. holding capacity of 4.7 
persons/m2 for football stadium (Home Office and Scottish Office, 1990) and 0.5 metre/ 
person for pop concerts and similar events (HSC et al, 1993). But these are by no means 
universally applicable standards. For crowd safety, there are two problems with regard 
to target setting. Firstly, it is obvious from the above figures that they do not appear to 
be in agreement with each other. It could be argued that because the circumstances are 
different between a football ground and a pop concert, different targets are required. If 
this is the case, the implication is that neither of these figures can be accepted as targets 
for other venue types. Secondly, as will be demonstrated in the case studies in Chapter 
4, holding capacity is not the only factor affecting crowd safety. It is apparent that 
crowd safety is still an extremely young discipline and many of the risk factors involved 
are still not fully understood. Much further research is required before we are in the 
position of setting targets (and perhaps risk targets) that are applicable to different 
venues and different circumstances. 
At present, although neither target setting nor de minimus are applicable to crowd safety 
per se, the principles of these approaches together are essentially the same as the HSE 
framework on risk level and the general principle behind the "carrot" diagram (also see 
Figure 2.2). The principles of the two approaches are also in line with the views of 
many authors (e. g. Cohen, 1982; Dunster, 1985); namely that there should be an upper 
risk limit that should not be exceeded and some cut-off in the deployment of resources 
to further reduce risks that are already trivially small. 
Cost effectiveness 
Allocation of resources according to how many risks there are and determining the level 
of control required based on the ALARP principle do allow the costs of remedial actions 
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to be taken into consideration. However, this is not necessarily the most efficient way to 
reduce risks from a cost effectiveness point of view. Whether a risk-based approach, a 
hazard-based approach or target setting is adopted, the focus is on safety. The more 
"unsafe" it is (or if it goes beyond a certain safety level), the more we need to do to 
make it safe. The cost effectiveness approach approaches the need to improve safety 
from a different angle; namely, to ensure that our money, resource and effort are spent to 
achieve the greatest effect. The emphasis is on saving more lives per money spent. In 
his paper about setting priorities in safety, Kletz (1988a) discussed two possible 
approaches of this kind. 
The first approach is to remove first the risks that are cheapest to remove. Kletz argued 
that road safety, for example, may benefit - more lives would actually be saved if money 
is spent in a more cost effective way. However, in the industry particularly, the pitfalls 
are, firstly, moral. People are prepared either to accept a risk because it is extremely 
small or to tolerate it because the benefits outweigh the risk. Experience suggests that 
they would not accept the risk just because it is expensive to remove or reduce. This is 
especially so if it is an involuntary risk. Secondly, there is a temptation in practice for 
venue owners to use the cost argument merely as an excuse for unwillingness to take 
action. Apart from the costs of implementation, there are other reasons a venue owner 
could use to avoid taking the necessary measures, such as practical difficulties in their 
implementation or that they could make the venue less attractive to the visitors. 
The second possible approach is called by Kletz as "weighing in the balance". It looks 
at costs and benefit together and gives priority to those remedial actions that can remove 
or reduce the most risks (per unit cost). This approach takes into account benefits and it 
is very cost effective. However, the clear danger is that people are left exposed to high 
risks because removing or reducing them is not sufficiently cost effective. Nevertheless, 
there are some things about this approach which could be of interest to this project. In 
crowd safety, there is often more than one contributory factor to a hazard and therefore 
several remedial measures may be required. But at the same time, the same factor could 
contribute to more than one hazard. If a particular action can control this factor, several 
risks could be removed/reduced at the same time. But, in reality, experience suggests 
that venue owners tend to go for the immediately obvious solutions and, thus, tackle the 
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symptom rather than the cause of a hazard. Unless they start looking into the underlying 
causes, the benefit of this approach could be lost. There are also practical difficulties in 
adopting this "weighing in the balance" approach. In order for it to work, it is necessary 
first of all to express the costs of various courses of action and the benefits in a common 
unit, usually money, so that they can be compared. This cannot be achieved at present 
because the cost of action is more than just financial. It could also be in the form of, for 
example, compromised architectural design, reduction in enjoyment value, etc. For the 
moment at least, it is impossible to convert them into monetary terms or another 
common unit. On the benefit side of the equation, there is the issue of cost per life 
saved (and the cost of saving someone from various degrees of injury and suffering). 
The value placed on a life in different industries varies over a large range (Kletz, 1982). 
Also, apart from saving lives, good crowd management means good customer care and, 
thus, customer satisfaction. The value of this is also hard to measure. 
Very similar in principle to the "weighing in the balance" approach is Risk-Cost-Benefit 
Analysis (RCBA) (e. g. Shrader-Frechette, 1985). According to Shrader-Frechette, this 
type of approach generally involves four main steps: 
" Define the risk problem by listing alternative courses of action and the set of all 
possible consequences associated with each action. 
9 Describe the relationships among these alternatives and their consequences; various 
mathematical, economic and social models may be used to arrive at quantitative 
accounts of dose-response relationship, market behaviour and event probabilities. 
0 Evaluate all the consequences of alternative risk decisions in terms of a common 
unit; in RCBA, this unit is usually money. 
" Integrate all the components of the analysis to produce a single number representing 
the value of each alternative. 
As in the case of "weighing in the balance", the need to convert various cost and benefit 
elements into a common unit is the main hurdle for applying RCBA to crowd safety. 
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2.3.4 Uncertainty 
The following is a quote from the 1983 report entitled "Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government: Managing the Process" by the US National Research Council (Whipple, 
1986): 
The goal of risk assessment is to describe, as accurately as possible, the possible 
health consequences of changes in human exposure to a hazardous substance; the 
need for accuracy implies that the best available scientific knotivlcdge, 
supplemented as necessary by assumptions that are consistent with science, will 
be applied. 
However, not all disciplines are well understood and well documented. So what can we 
do if there is insufficient knowledge or a lack of data to enable an accurate assessment of 
the risk? In this respect, Cohen (1982) identified at least three kinds of risk: 
0 Risks which clearly and identifiably lead to casualties for which reliable statistics are 
available. 
0 Those for which an effect is believed to exist but where the causal connection to the 
individual cannot be certain. 
0 Experts' best estimates of probabilities of catastrophes which it is hoped will never 
happen. 
The figure put out on the first kind of risk should be a reasonably reliable assessment of 
what actually happens. The second and third categories imply uncertainty. 
Rowe (1977) pointed out that uncertainty exists in the absence of information about the 
past, present or future events, values or conditions. Although there are various degrees 
of uncertainty, the basis of the concept is the absence of information about parts of the 
system under consideration. 
Uncertainty is not the same as risk. Whipple (1986) made the following distinction: risk 
measures the probability and severity of loss or injury. Uncertainty, on the other hand, 
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refers to a lack of definite knowledge, a lack of sureness; "doubt is its closest synonym". 
If a lack of predictability arises from a well-understood probabilistic process, then it is 
risk. If, however, it arises from insufficient knowledge, it is an uncertainty. The HSE 
(1999), on the other hand, sees uncertainty itself is a state of knowledge in that, although 
the factors influencing the issue are known, their effects cannot be precisely described. 
Moore (1983) drew the distinction between risk and uncertainty in terms of whether it is 
a repeatable or non-repeatable event. For example, games of chance (e. g. roulette) are 
repeatable. As far as assurance companies are concerned, death is also a repeatable 
event in the sense that the alternative events of "death" and "no death" are repeated for 
each person in a large population each year. For these events, the rules of probability or 
statistics can be used to predict the risks with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Repeated 
trials and experiments (e. g. the testing of a new drug to establish the probability of 
people adversely affected by it) can also generate sufficient data for accurate prediction 
of risks. However, the outcome of the next general election or the gender of the next 
President of the United States is non-repeatable. This distinction in terms of repeatable 
or non-repeatable is probably not sufficient, as uncertainties can also exist in repeatable 
events. From Rowe (1977) and Whipple (1986), the key distinction appears to be 
whether there is adequate knowledge, information or data for a reliable and accurate 
assessment of risk. Shrader-Frechette (1985), on the other hand, categorised risks into 
historical risks and new risks. Historical risks are those that have occurred often enough 
in the past for sufficient data to have been accumulated for analysis. Historical risks 
may, therefore, include those from diseases and illness, road accidents, industrial 
accidents, certain pollution and natural phenomena (e. g. earthquake, tornadoes, 
lightening, flooding, etc. ). Kletz (1982) provided a list of various voluntary and 
involuntary risks from various sources. The following are examples of the data and 
statistics available at the time of his paper on the risks of death per person per year from 
various activities: 
0 Smoking (20 cigarettes per day) = 500 x 10-5 
" Drinking (1 bottle of wine per day) = 75 x 10-' 
" Car racing = 120 x 10-5 
" Rock climbing =4x 10 
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" Run over by road vehicles (US) = 500 x 10-5 
" Run over by road vehicles (UK) = 450 x 10-5 
" Floods (US) = 22 x 10"5 
" Earthquake (California) = 17 x 10-5 
" Lightening (UK) =1x 10-5 
New risks include those from events never previously observed or those historical risks 
whose frequency is so low that it is hard to assess accurately; for example, exposure to 
previously unknown chemicals, rare but catastrophic accidents, use of new technology. 
Crowd safety certainly belongs to the "new risk" category. Although the gathering of 
large crowds takes place many times each year and despite repeated crowd disasters (e. g. 
see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1), there has been very little organised effort made to study the 
subject and collect data and information. Our understanding of crowd safety and crowd 
safety risks is still far from sufficient for enabling reliable and accurate assessments. 
Where the past does not provide sufficient guidance on what the risks are, then we have 
to rely on expert judgement and experience. There are ways in which expert judgement 
and experience can be formulated to estimate risks. This can be done quantitatively or 
qualitatively. 
Quantification of Risks 
Where there is insufficient risk data, Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA) techniques 
have been employed to estimate risks numerically. Often, these estimates represent no 
more than a complex set of expert judgements based on various factors such as failure 
rate of engineering components. 
Human Reliability can be regarded as the human factors version of QRA, where human 
error probability is quantified. In the high hazard industries where Human Reliability 
Assessment (HRA) is most widely used, there is a need to cohere human reliability with 
engineering reliability so that they can be assessed together as one man-machine system. 
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The assessment of engineering reliability is often data based. In the early years of HRA, 
attempts were made to create a human error data bank but it was soon realised that the 
data bank approach was not working for human errors (Kirwan, 1994). Instead, the 
current HRA techniques such as HEART (Williams, 1988) are risk factor based, i. e. a 
quantification is made based on the estimation on how much effect various performance 
shaping factors (or error producing conditions, etc. ) have on the human error of concern. 
Such an approach is unsuitable for crowd safety for two reasons. Firstly, unlike HRA, 
crowd safety is very much about human beings and their interaction with each other in 
public venue environments. The interaction of human beings and engineering systems 
in crowd safety is minimal. As such, there is no need for (and no pressure on) crowd 
safety to cohere with any better developed data based assessments. Secondly, the risk 
quantification approach requires a good understanding of the risk factors involved and 
the extent of their effect on safety. In HRA, years of effort have been devoted towards 
achieving this. Crowd safety, however, is still a very young discipline requiring much 
research. Also, the factors affecting crowd safety can vary from venue to venue and 
under different circumstances (Au et al, 1993). The case studies in Chapter 4 will show 
that the extents of their effect also vary. Furthermore, there are less constraints on 
human behaviour amongst visitors than employees in the workplace. Under the 
circumstances, it is not possible to develop a credible risk factor based approach that is 
suitable for all public venue types. Furthermore, even if such a technique were 
developed, it is doubtful whether it would be as useful as it might appear to be. 
Experience in HRA suggests that despite the sophisticated looking formulae and figures, 
it is fundamentally a subjective method and the accuracy of its findings cannot be 
validated. 
Whilst the quantified approach may appear more attractive in the long run, some argue 
that reducing everything to "X x 10' is far too complex for many sectors (Kazer, 1992). 
From a practical viewpoint, the risk quantification approach tends to require a 
substantial amount of expertise and effort. In the high hazard industries where such an 
approach is most widely used, the level of health, safety and environmental risks they 
pose can justify the cost of conducting quantified assessments. The cost of the 
assessment is also very small for industries that require huge investment and high 
operating costs. In public venues, as in many other workplaces, the risks are much 
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lower and the costs of quantified assessment are absolutely prohibitive for smaller 
owners. Even for owners of major venues, the costs could be disproportionately high 
for their level of investment and operating costs. 
Qualitative Approach to Risk Estimation 
Probabilities and risks are sometimes expressed in verbal terms as a rating, and in terms 
of ranking rather than as numbers. Qualitative risk assessment is increasingly common 
in many industries, including certain sectors of the high hazard industries where QRA 
was traditionally used. 
The HSC/HSE have provided much guidance on qualitative risk assessment (e. g. 1992, 
1994,1996,1997a and 1998). This will be looked at as part of the review of existing 
guidance in Section 3.4. In addition, in a recent discussion document, the HSE (1999) 
has provided a case study of a qualitative assessment of crowd safety risks (at the Pinner 
Fair). The author was involved as part of the HSE study team. In this particular case, 
observations, together with an analysis of the safety management, formed the basis for 
hazard identification and risk assessment. Comparisons were made with standards in 
codes of practice and guidance. Good practice elsewhere and opinions voiced by local 
residents, the local authority and the police were taken into account. Risks were then 
rated qualitatively using a five-point scale from "very low" to "very high". 
Moore (1993) looked at assessments by words and argued that words are useful only if 
the writers and the readers agree on the meanings to be ascribed to the words. In reality, 
however, words do not have a generally accepted and agreed meaning. To illustrate his 
argument, Moore compiled a list of ten expressions of uncertainty and asked some 250 
executives on the middle and senior general management programmes to rank them in 
descending order of uncertainty. The expressions are: probable, quite certain, unlikely, 
hoped, possible, not unreasonable that, expected, doubtful, not certain and likely. The 
results showed considerable overlapping of the ranks for many of the expressions and, 
thus, the inconsistent use being made of these words among the respondents. However, 
the author is of the opinion that this problem can be overcome if expressions are put in 
the context of a rating (or ranking) scale, by a careful choice of words, by clearly 
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defining the words and by having sufficient anchor points to enable clear distinctions to 
be made between each rating (ranking) level (also see Section 7.3.4). 
2.3.5 Latent Conditions and Incubation of Crisis 
As in other areas of safety, crowd safety disasters were often caused by a combination of 
immediate causes and latent failures. An example of this is the Hillsborough Disaster 
(Lord Justice Taylor, 1990) mentioned earlier in Section 1.3, whereby the contributory 
factors to the disaster include the circumstances on the day, the venue layout at the 
Lapping Lane end and the mind-set of the police. The circumstances caused the late 
arrival of many of the Liverpool supporters on the day, and hence a last minute rush into 
the stadium. The layout contributed towards the continuous influx of people into the 
part of the stadium that was already overcrowded. The mindset by the police on public 
disorder led to their failure to identify overcrowding as a potential problem. This, in 
turn, led to their failure to take the appropriate crowd management measures to prevent 
the disaster as well as their failure to respond promptly to the disaster. The last factor is 
regarded in some of the literature on management as latent conditions, which lead to the 
incubation of failure potentials or crisis. 
The Hillsborough Disaster is not the only example of crisis incubation within public 
venues. To investigate the relationships between crisis incubation and disasters, Elliott 
and Smith (1993) had examined four crowd related disasters at football grounds; 
namely, the Ibrox Stadium Disaster, the Bradford Fire, the Hysel Stadium Disaster and 
the Hillsborough disaster. From the case studies, they have highlighted the four key 
factors affecting crisis incubation as management beliefs/mind-set, costs, inter- 
organisational communication and culture. They have also concluded that in all cases, 
"there is evidence of crisis incubation and a failure to consider the possibility of crisis 
amplification by those responsible for managing the stadia". In particular, it was argued 
that management beliefs are fundamental to the way in which an organisation processes 
the information collected for decision making and that this mind-set would determine 
the range of policy options that are deemed to be acceptable to the organisation. The 
rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions by senior management is considered as 
an important barrier to learning from past incidents and disasters and a key factor in 
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incubating potential for crisis (Elliott, Smith & McGuinness, 2000). Smith (1999) also 
argued that many failures and crises merge from an organisation's system of 
management (i. e. core belief, culture, ineffective communication, etc. ) and that potential 
for such failures is often built into the system by management practice, protocols and 
processes. The Ibrox Stadium disaster, the Bradford Fire and the King's Cross Fire 
serve to illustrate that an awareness of the hazards does not always guarantee 
improvement in safety. Management complacency is thought to be an important factor 
for inadequate safety management in Ibrox and King's Cross, where similar incidents 
had occurred prior to the main disasters. Equally, a similar incident occurred a year 
before the Hillsborough Disaster, and numerous crowd safety related disasters occurred 
in other football grounds (Lord Justice Taylor, 1989). In the case of the Bradford Fire, 
the financial situation might be a factor for inaction, although the football club had been 
repeatedly warned about the fire hazard and was apparently aware of the problem. A 
survey by Au et al (1993) on a range of public venues (see Section 2.6.1 for details) 
suggested that one possible reason for management complacency is their lack of 
appreciation of the risks. Therefore, a proper risk assessment should not only identify 
the hazards that could occur, but also determine the extent of the risks involved. 
There has been growing concern in the football industry for crowd safety following a 
series of crowd related disasters such as those mentioned above. For example, there 
were radical changes made in response to the Hillsborough Disaster in 1989 and the 
industry has since implemented many of the Taylor recommendations (Lord Justice 
Taylor, 1990). Nevertheless, it appears that crowd safety problems continue to occur. 
An analysis by Elliott et al (1997) of club accident records, Football Licensing Authority 
(FLA) inspections, police match reports, media reports, anecdote and research 
experiences had revealed a multitude of examples of potential and actual disasters in 
sporting venues in Britain since Hillsborough. Quoting a survey carried out by Arnold 
and Benveniste, Elliott et al also pointed out that ground improvements were a very low 
priority amongst football clubs, citing only 7% of the clubs identifying this as one of 
their top three objectives. In recent years, many clubs have built or are planning to build 
new and more modern stadiums away from residential areas. This, however, is probably 
driven more by financial considerations rather than spectators' safety and wellbeing. 
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Elliott et al (1997) argued that this is probably because the response of the legislators 
(and the industry) has frequently dealt with the immediate causes, such as all-seater 
stadiums for all upper division clubs, often ignoring the underlying management issues, 
such as the four crisis incubation factors mentioned previously. Other authors (e. g. 
Elliott and Smith, 1993; Smith, 1995) have also highlighted the danger of over-reliance 
on technical solutions alone. They argued that this could indeed serve as a barrier to 
learning (from past incidents) within the organisation, leaving the "human elements" 
shortfalls (e. g. communication, culture) free and active within the management system. 
As a result, it is argued that history could repeat itself and similar problems could re- 
occur despite the technical solutions. Similarly, in examining the Man-Made Disaster 
(MMD) model (by Turner, 1978), Pidgeon (1997) also highlighted that disasters in large 
scale technological systems are not chance events, nor can they be described purely in 
technological terms. Turner argued that instead they arise from an interaction between 
the human and organisational arrangements of the social technical systems set up to 
manage complex and ill-structured risk problems. Furthermore, over-reliance on 
technical solutions and technical expertise alone could also be problematic for risk 
managers when the issue of concern is "trans-scientific" in nature and is beyond the 
abilities of science to prove (Calman & Smith, 2001). A proper risk assessment should 
enable an organisation to identify the technical solutions and should go some way in 
helping to reduce mindset and complacency. But exactly how to combine technical 
solutions with management issues and address them in conjunction with each other will 
certainly require more thought. 
2.4 Risk Assessment Techniques and Tools 
This review looks at some of the risk assessment techniques and tools currently being 
employed or proposed elsewhere in a range of different contexts. The review combines 
a literature review with information obtained through informal discussions with other 
risk assessment specialists and ten years of personal experience in the field of safety and 
reliability. It has been necessary to include these personal observations in view of the 
fact that qualitative risk assessment methods tend to be widely used but are seldom 
discussed in the literature. Over sixty technical papers, guidance documents, training 
materials, reports, etc. were reviewed. They cover a range of contexts including the high 
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hazard industries, offshore oil and gas, occupational health and safety in general 
workplaces, engineering, medical, emergency response, computer security, machinery 
design (e. g. human-robot interface) and product risks (e. g. air bags, pharmaceutical 
products, poultry products). 
2.4.1 An Overview of the Risk-Based Assessments 
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 requires employers to ensure that, so far as 
is reasonably practicable, their employees, visitors and others affected are not exposed to 
risks to their health or safety. In this respect, the purpose of a risk assessment is to help 
the employers to ensure that everything that is reasonably practicable has been done to 
ensure health and safety. 
In the field of safety and reliability, there are a number of ways in which employers can 
demonstrate that health and safety risks are kept as low as reasonably practicable. The 
first approach is to compare the estimated risks against a set of criteria or risk thresholds 
that are recognised within the industry of concern and accepted by the regulators. In the 
nuclear industry, for example, such thresholds can be expressed in terms of dose level or 
the annual rate of exposure to radiation. By applying the ALARP principle described in 
Section 2.3, for example, it is then possible to determine whether the estimated risk is 
acceptable, tolerable or intolerable (e. g. HSE, 1992c). The risk criteria or thresholds are 
often established based on scientific knowledge or statistics. This enables judgement on 
how serious the risk is to be made in an unambiguous and objective manner. Another 
benefit is that such thresholds can be easily revised to reflect the latest standards and any 
new scientific development and statistical trends. This approach is commonly adopted 
in the high hazard industries where risks are expressed quantitatively. 
The second approach is benchmarking. Where there are no definite standards or any 
universally accepted risk thresholds, comparisons can be made between the estimated 
risk and risks associated with other activities. The activities used for benchmarking 
purposes often range from everyday and popular leisure activities, where the risks are 
commonly accepted (or taken for granted) by the general public, to activities in another 
comparable workplace. Such an approach has been used in a variety of contexts. For 
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example, in their assessment of the risks at fairground rides, Holloway and Williams 
(1990) benchmarked them against a range of activities such as travelling by motor car, 
walking, pedal cycling (on local roads and the main roads), horse riding and the average 
risk present during waking hours. The comparison can be used to show that the risks 
from fairground riding were low on the basis that that they were lower than the risk of 
motoring to and from the fair. Again, such comparisons can only be made if the 
estimated risks can be expressed in quantitative terms. Furthermore, extreme care must 
be taken when using this approach to ensure that sufficient consideration is given to the 
issue of voluntary vs. involuntary risks (discussed in Section 2.3.1). For example, in the 
case of the fairground rides, it can be argued that a tougher criterion should be applied as 
leisure activities, motor car travelling, etc. are all voluntary or, at least, "semi-voluntary" 
activities. 
The third approach is to show that due considerations and all reasonable steps have been 
taken to assess and, subsequently, control the risks and keep them low. This approach is 
particularly suitable where risks cannot be quantified and therefore cannot be compared 
against any standards or benchmarks elsewhere. In many cases, record of a suitable and 
sufficient risk assessment can be used to demonstrate to the regulators and in the courts 
of law that due considerations have been given to controlling risks (Barrell and Scott, 
1982). This approach is not as clear cut as the other two approaches. It does not give 
precise answers on exactly how significant a risk is. But it ensures that risk management 
decisions are based on and supported by a risk assessment process that is systematic and 
comprehensive; and it is suitable for qualitative assessments. It also enables the 
prioritisation of risks and, thus, facilitates risk management decision-making. 
2.4.2 An Overview of the Risk Assessment Methodologies 
Risk assessment has been used in many different commercial and industrial sectors and 
by government departments for a variety of applications. For example, a company may 
want to weigh up the risks against the potential benefit before deciding whether to, say, 
open a new office elsewhere, build a new factory, buy more machines, introduce a new 
product or start a marketing campaign. Financial institutions need to constantly assess 
the risks they take on their investments. Insurance companies utilise risk assessment to 
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help set premiums (Wrightson, 1995). The pharmaceutical industry uses it to look at the 
risk of a new drug and the benefits it could bring to the patients. Engineers apply risk 
assessment to analyse their designs. Government departments also use risk assessment 
for various purposes such as setting safety regulations, emergency planning, decisions 
on investment, setting operational priority, carrying out feasibility studies and project 
appraisal, environmental issues and pollution control, food safety, weapons procurement 
and storage, licensing of medicines, IT security, setting public health policy, etc. (MoD, 
1991, HSE, 1996a). There is a common purpose in all these different applications, i. e. 
to aid the decision making process and to enable decisions to be made on a more rational 
basis. This is also true in the context of health and safety. 
As in other applications, the methodologies used for safety risk assessment fall into two 
categories: qualitative risk assessments and QRA. Even though qualitative assessments 
tend to have a much wider application, it is the QRA methods that have received much 
of the attention in the literature. Compared to qualitative risk assessment, QRA is much 
better established and substantially more effort has been devoted to the development of 
QRA techniques and tools. Issues concerning the evaluation of risks have also been a 
focus of attention over the years. In terms of applications, much of this effort has been 
devoted to the high hazard industries. Nevertheless, a number of references were found 
in other applications. For example, the fatigue failure of highway bridges, the delivery 
of poultry products, the enactment of the air bag standard for new cars, human-robot 
systems and the assessment of pollution. (e. g. Yazdani and Albrecht, 1988; Kumamoto 
et al, 1988). But the main theme of these papers is on how these areas could benefit 
from the use of QRA rather than tackling the issues or proposing a methodology. 
Qualitative risk assessment, on the other hand, is much less well documented. Although 
over the years many employers may have already carried out one form of qualitative risk 
assessment or another, there is very little published information. It is not until recently 
that more attention has been paid to this type of risk assessment. This is because of the 
risk assessment requirements made under the MHSWR. The literature identified in this 
review covered a range of areas including general health and safety, machinery design, 
defence equipment and emergency planning. 
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The rest of this section looks at the existing risk assessment methods and techniques. 
They are summarised in two tables: the first table covers QRA techniques and tools 
whilst the second focuses on qualitative assessment. In each table, the left hand column 
presents the key risk assessment stages/issues whilst the right hand column identifies the 
existing risk assessment techniques and tools used in these stages to address the issues. 
A Summary of QRA Techniques and Tools 
Table 2.1 presents an overview of the QRA techniques and tools. They are mainly used 
in the nuclear and other high hazard industries. However, the recent introduction of the 
Railway (Safety Case) Regulations (HSE, 1994c) has led to QRA also being applied to 
many aspects of railway operations. 
Table 2.1: QRA Techniques and Tools 
Risk Assessment Stages/Issues Techniques & Tools 
Identify Hazards 
Dealing with complex systems - i. e. how hazard Divide a complex plant into sections, parts 
identification is organised and components then assess each 
component in turn (e. g. the pump, the 
valve, the pipeline, the tanks, etc. ). 
Logic diagrams e. g. fault tree and event tree 
analyses to map out the relationship 
between components and the plant and to 
define the chain of events/ failures that 
could lead to a failure. 
For complex human operations, task 
analysis techniques (e. g. HTA , tabular task 
analysis) to break down a task into sub- 
tasks, the break down continues until the 
sub-tasks are at a sufficiently low level for 
them to be "assessable". 
Consider what could go wrong/identify failures HAZOP I technique at the design stage 
when details are yet to be determined. 
HAZOP II technique for existing system 
where details of how the systems work are 
known and well defined. 
"Walkthrough" techniques and the use of 
hazards checklists. 
For human operations, human error 
identification techniques like Human 
HAZOP and PHECA. 
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Table 2.1: QRA Techniques and Tools 
Risk Assessment Stages/Issues Techniques & Tools 
Establish causes and consequences of hazards Engineering knowledge. 
Data sheets. 
Past incidents/lessons. 
For human operations, various human error 
classification schemes. 
Estimate Risks 
Estimate likelihood of failure Failure rate from sources such as laboratory 
experiments, repeated trials, statistics, 
historical data, etc. 
"World wide" averaged data. 
Generic failure data. 
Failure data for specific items. 
For complex systems, logic diagrams to 
pull together the failure rates or 
probabilities of the various components to 
give an overall failure rate/probability of 
the system. 
For human operations, human reliability 
assessment (HRA) techniques such as 
HEART and THERP. 
Establish the consequences of failure For toxic release, look at the relevant 
factors such as the materials released, their 
physical & chemical status, how much 
energy is released at the same time & the 
duration of the release. 
To determine who and/or what could be 
affected and how, consider the effect of the 
failure on operators/staff, members of the 
public, the environment, damage to system 
and equipment, loss of production, etc. 
Estimate the severity of consequences/extent or Usually measured in terms of cost or level 
magnitude of harm of exposure. Other measures suggested in 
the literature include: 
" individual risk (i. e. fraction of the 
population at risk that suffer death per 
unit time) 
" death per unit measure of activity (e. g. 
passenger-hours, passenger-miles, no. 
of operations, etc. ) 
" loss of life-expectancy 
" frequency vs. consequence lines (fc 
lines) 
Estimate the overall risk Risk = likelihood x severity 
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Table 2.1: QRA Techniques and Tools 
Risk Assessment Stages/Issues Techniques & Tools 
Determine Tolerability and Priorities of Risks 
Decide whether the risk is tolerable/acceptable Criteria can be found in some industry 
specific regulations and standards e. g. 
acceptable level of exposure per year (i. e. 
"risk thresholds" beyond which something 
must be done). 
The ALARP principle. 
Benchmarking. 
Prioritise unacceptable risks Based on the estimated risks; i. e. the bigger 
the risk, the higher the priority. 
Decide What Actions to Take 
Decide what needs to be done Risk based, hazard based or cost 
effectiveness considerations. 
ALARP. 
Cost-benefit analysis; i. e. the costs of taking 
actions vs. costs of taking the risk. 
HSE general guidance; i. e. in order of 
preference, to eliminate hazards e. g. by 
means of engineering solutions/design 
modifications (i. e. engineer out the 
problems), or reduce risks e. g. through 
improved work practice, or contain the 
harms e. g. by means of protective 
devices/equipment. 
Identify remedial measures Based on causes and consequences of 
failures/human errors. 
Application of engineering/specialist 
knowledge. 
For human operations, human error 
classifications schemes, the HEART 
technique also provides guidance on how to 
tackle the various human error contributory 
factors or error producing conditions 
(EPC). 
Risk Assessment Documentation 
Record assessment Safety case and ancillary documents; e. g. 
HAZOP record, calculation sheets, fault 
tree & event tree analyses, outputs of 
computer analyses, etc. 
A Summary of Qualitative Risk Assessment Techniques and Tools 
Table 2.21 gives an overview of some of the existing qualitative assessment techniques 
and tools. Since the MHSWR came into force in 1993 (HSC, 1992), qualitative 
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assessment has become more widely used in the health and safety field. It has even been 
applied to the high hazard industries, where QRA is traditionally used, for the "lower 
hazard" aspects of their operations. 
Table 2.2: Qualitative Risk Assessment Techniques and Tools 
Risk Assessment Stages/Issues Techniques & Tools 
Identify Hazards 
Dealing with complex systems - i. e. how hazard No specific techniques or tools per se; 
identification is organised qualitative risk assessments are mostly used 
in applications where there are no complex 
relationships or significant "knock-on" 
effects perceived between one part of the 
workplace and another or between one 
hazard and another. 
Usually by going through the workplace 
and looking at each geographical area, 
piece of machinery, item of equipment 
and/or material being handled. 
For human operations/activities, task 
analysis techniques can be used to break 
down the overall task into more assessable 
sub-tasks. 
In the context of emergency planning, 
divide up the evacuation process into stages 
& examine the activities involved at each 
stage. 
Consider what could go wrong/identify hazards Audit. 
Inspection. 
Hazard checklists; some items on the 
checklist are in terms of hazard type (e. g. 
overpressure (process industries), acts of 
violence (policing) and some are from 
historical data (e. g. unauthorised disclosure 
in computer security). Both of these can be 
very context specific. Some checklists are 
in terms of areas covered by legislation or 
guidance (e. g. manual handling, COSHH) 
HAZOP type assessment using guide- 
words/keywords. 
Brainstorming. 
Debriefing or base on past incidents and 
experience. 
Job safety analysis/method study 
Establish causes and consequences of hazards No specific techniques or tools per se 
although for human operations, human 
error classification schemes can be used. 
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Table 2.2: Qualitative Risk Assessment Techniques and Tools 
Risk Assessment Stages/Issues Techniques & Tools 
Estimate Risks 
Estimate likelihood Based on accident/injury data, past 
incidents, etc. 
Rating; e. g. "probability ranges". 
Establish the consequences of failure Based on accident/injury data, past 
incidents, etc. 
Rating; e. g. "accident severity categories". 
Estimate the overall risks Risk rating; e. g. high/medium or low risk. 
Risk rating schemes combining likelihood 
rating with consequence or severity rating. 
"Semi-quantified" risk rating schemes. 
Determine Tolerability and Priorities of Risks 
Decide whether the risk is tolerable/acceptable Based on legal requirements & relevant 
standards. 
The ALARP principle 
Prioritise unacceptable risks Based on the estimated risks; i. e. the bigger 
the risk, the higher the priority. 
Decide What Actions to Take 
Decide what needs to be done Based on legal requirements, relevant 
standards, good practice, current state of the 
art, available technology, etc. 
The ALARP principle. 
Some form of cost-benefit analysis. 
Risk of unwanted effects vs. benefit of the 
product (pharmaceutical). 
HSE general guidance; i. e. in order of 
preference, to eliminate hazards e. g. by 
means of engineering solutions/design 
modifications (i. e. engineer out the 
problems), or reduce risks e. g. through 
improved work practice, or contain the 
harms e. g. by means of protective 
devices/equipment. 
One paper suggests that consideration 
should be given to the following means of 
safeguards: "hardware", managerial and 
procedural control. 
Identify remedial measures Based on operational experience and 
knowledge of the individuals involved in 
the assessment. 
For human operations, human error 
classifications schemes can be used to 
identify the cause/contributory factors of 
human errors. 
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Table 2.2: Qualitative Risk Assessment Techniques and Tools 
Risk Assessment Stages/Issues Techniques & Tools 
Risk Assessment Documentation 
Record assessment Tabular format. 
Report format. 
2.4.3 Dealing with Complex Systems 
When assessing a large and complex system, it is often beneficial to break it down first 
of all into smaller and more manageable parts. The break down has to be meaningful 
and adequately reflect the relationship between system components and between each 
component and the overall system. Methods for doing so can be found mainly in the 
high hazard/process industry contexts where such relationships are often well defined. 
With the exception of emergency response/evacuation, there are no specific techniques 
for dealing with complex systems in other contexts. The usual practice is to look at each 
geographical area, each piece of machinery or equipment and/or the materials stored and 
handled in the workplace and decide what hazards may arise. A reason for this could be 
because rarely in these contexts people have to deal with complex relationships of the 
kind seen in the process industries. For example, a tripping hazard at one corner of the 
shop floor is likely to have very little or no impact on what happens at another part of 
the shop floor. Another reason could be that where complex relationships exist, they are 
not as well understood or they cannot be easily defined. 
In the process industries, the hazard identification process usually involves going 
through the flow diagrams of the plant and assessing each plant component (e. g. valve, 
pump, etc. ) in turn. The relationships between each component and how failure of one 
component may affect the reliability of the whole plant are captured and defined by 
means of logic diagrams such as fault tree analysis and event tree analysis (e. g. Cross, 
1982). Computer software packages are available for such analyses. For human 
operations, task analysis techniques such as Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) and 
tabular task analysis are used to break down the overall task into more manageable and 
more "assessable" sub-tasks (e. g. Kirwan, 1994, Stammers and Shepherd, 1995). In 
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both cases, the methods can only be applied where the system components and sub- 
components can be clearly defined and their relationships are well understood. 
In the context of emergency response and evacuation, it is the process rather than the 
plant from which an evacuation takes place that gets broken down. In this case, the 
process is divided into different stages (e. g. alarm, muster, evacuation, rescues, etc. ) and 
assessments are carried out by examining the geographical areas, the activities and the 
systems (e. g. the alarm system) relevant to each evacuation stage. An example can be 
found in the method developed for identification of hazards during Evacuation, Escape 
and Rescue (EER) from offshore installations (Gould and Au, 1995). Such methods are 
applicable providing there is a clearly definable process of operations or activities. 
2.4.4 Hazard Identification Techniques and Tools 
The aim of hazard identification is to establish what hazards could arise in a workplace, 
associated with a work practice, etc. that could cause harm to people. The following 
summarises some of the techniques and tools that are already in used or are suggested in 
the literature. Strictly speaking, there are no specific hazard identification methods that 
are dedicated to or suitable only to QRA per se. The distinctions between the techniques 
and tools presented in Table 2.1 and those in Table 2.2 are that some of them tend to be 
used in association with the QRA approach whilst others are often used in qualitative 
risk assessments. It is perfectly feasible that those given in Table 2.1 could be used in 
qualitative risk assessments (and vice versa). 
" Brainstorming - This type of technique has been widely used in many other areas 
outside health and safety and risk assessment. The idea is to pull heads together to 
fresh out, for example, good design ideas or solutions. When used in health and 
safety risk assessment, brainstorming allows health and safety practitioners, design 
engineers, operation managers, risk managers, etc. to exchange views and discuss 
their concerns. In this respect, brainstorming is particularly beneficial to multi- 
disciplinary and multi-agency projects. Apart from hazard identification, it can 
also be applied for establishing remedial measures. Conventional brainstorming 
tends to be very loosely structured. 
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" Structured brainstorming - This type of technique tends to be more structured than 
conventional brainstorming, focusing the minds of the participants on one issue or 
one part of a system at a time. The Hazard and Operability Study (i. e. HAZOP) is 
probably the most well known example (e. g. Kletz, 1983). Originally developed 
for the assessments of engineering systems, a HAZOP study involves people from 
different disciplines and backgrounds. They meet and go through each sub-system 
or system component and ask the "what if...? " questions. There are two types of 
HAZOP techniques for different applications. HAZOP I tends to be more suitable 
for the conceptual design stage where things are still at their preliminary states. A 
set of more general keywords are used to help the HAZOP team to identify what 
could go wrong. HAZOP II, on the other hand, tends to be much more focused on 
the details and the specifics. Hence, it is more suitable for assessing a system that 
is at its detail design phase or an existing system where the system components, 
their functions and the operations involved are known and well defined. HAZOP 
II looks at how things may deviate from the design intention. Specific keywords 
such as "property words" and "guide words" can be used to help the participants 
to identify where things might go wrong and the failure modes respectively. 
HAZOP is a well established technique for hazard identification and its benefits 
have been widely recognised. More recently, development has been made to 
apply this kind of technique to other applications, e. g. Human Factors (Smith and 
Livingston, 1993) and the analysis of emergency response (Gould and Au, 1995). 
" Human error analysis - As the name suggests, this kind of technique is designed 
specifically for the assessments of human operations. Examples include Human 
HAZOP and PHECA (e. g. Whalley, 1987; Kirwan, 1995). These techniques are 
usually used in conjunction with task analysis. Assessors consider each sub-task 
to identify the human errors that could arise, their causes and their consequences. 
Depending upon the exact purpose of the analysis, other information may also be 
looked at (e. g. opportunities for recovery from the original error later on, time or 
workload implications of an error, what can be done in terms of work procedures, 
training or system design to reduce the error, etc. ). These techniques tend to have 
68 
I 
their own built-in tools, e. g. human error keywords and human error classification 
schemes, to aid the assessors through the analysis. 
0 Method study/job safety analysis - Used in the general health and safety context, it 
basically involves breaking down an operation into a number of steps, examining 
each step and identifying what the hazards are. The underlying principle of this 
technique is essentially the same as the above methods except it is more loosely 
structured. 
0 The "walkthrough" approaches - I. e. methods that involve the risk assessors going 
to the workplace to look for potential hazards. They could be a site inspection, a 
safety survey, an audit or simply walking around the workplace and looking afresh 
for health and safety hazards. Checklists are often used. Such methods are mainly 
used in conventional workplaces such as offices and light industrial premises. 
0 Checklists and keywords - Used either on their own in a desk-top exercise or as a 
tool for some of the above techniques. Checklists are much more prescriptive and 
there is a wide variation in their designs. Some are very extensive and detailed but 
others simply list the different areas covered by legislation (e. g. manual handling). 
The items appearing on a checklist obviously depend on exactly what the 
assessments are. They can be in terms of hazard types, the types of equipment 
(e. g. machinery, electrical, electronic), safety issues (e. g. access), operation 
concerns (e. g. "act of violence", "manual handling of prisoners" for a police 
checklist) and/or specific hazards that have occurred before. 
By comparing Tables 2.1 with 2.2, it has emerged that only those hazard identification 
techniques that are used in association with QRA approach explicitly require assessors 
to identify the causes and consequences of failures. The benefit of doing so are twofold: 
to enable the identification of remedial actions that tackle the causes rather than just deal 
with the symptoms and to provide information for estimating severity later in the risk 
assessment. 
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2.4.5 Risk Evaluation 
There are a number of key features about the QRA techniques and tools. First of all, 
QRA techniques rely on failure data and/or past statistics for risk estimation. Perhaps 
the only exception is some of the human reliability assessment techniques such as the 
HEART technique (Williams, 1988) where human error probabilities are estimated 
using a series of mathematical formulae to take into account the various error 
contributory/ergonomics factors (e. g. the work practice, the work environment, nature of 
the tasks, etc. ) that come into play. Although they do not directly rely on hard data 
because of the relative unpredictability of human activities and human behaviour, these 
formulae were nevertheless based on historical data and experience about what the 
factors tend to contribute most to human errors in a particular industry(ies). Another key 
feature of the QRA techniques is that they were designed for specific contexts, e. g. 
nuclear/chemical, and the data on which these techniques are based are specific to the 
components (e. g. valves, pumps) and the operating conditions (e. g. the chemical 
reactions, the characteristics of the substances in relation to different temperatures, 
pressure, etc. ) used in those contexts. They tend to be not easily transferable to another 
context. Thirdly, all QRA are based on the principles that can be expressed through the 
following mathematical formula, which is very much in line with what has been said 
earlier in Section 2.2: 
Risk = likelihood x severity .................................................... 
(Formula 2.1) 
Informal discussions with safety and reliability specialists have also revealed that even 
QRA is not as totally objective as it may appear. As all plants are not the same in terms 
of their design, the plant components and how they process the materials, there are needs 
for some subjective judgements, for example, to select the most appropriate data and to 
decide whether the probabilities need to be scaled up/down to reflect the specifics of the 
plant/operation of concern. This is particularly so in human reliability assessment 
where, despite the numerical outputs, the estimation of human error probabilities can be 
a very arbitrary affair at times. 
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Because of the quantitative nature of the assessment and the amount of effort devoted to 
its research and development, risk acceptability/tolerability is a relatively 
straightforward judgement to make. Guidance such as the ALARP principle, together 
with established industry specific standards/risk thresholds and techniques such as cost- 
benefit analysis, has enabled the assessors and managers to make risk management 
decisions in a more rational manner. This is one area in which QRA is much more 
advanced and qualitative risk assessment still has a huge mountain to climb. 
Compared to QRA, there is little published information in the literature on qualitative 
risk evaluation methods and discussions on related issues. Yet, since 1993 when the 
MHSWR first came into force, there are far more employers evaluating risk qualitatively 
than those using quantified methods. Even in the high hazard industries, there is an 
increasing trend to use qualitative methods for general health and safety risk assessment. 
So far, there appears to be a gap between the demand for qualitative assessment methods 
and the overall amount of effort devoted to studying them. 
Rating appears to be the universal technique being applied across all applications. The 
ranges of the rating scales used, however, vary from simple three-point scales to what is 
potentially an unlimited range. Also, unlike QRA, not all qualitative techniques require 
the assessors to consider likelihood and severity separately. Such differences probably 
serve to reflect what people perceive to be the most appropriate level of sophistication 
for their particular applications. The purpose of this thesis, and hence this review, is not 
to pass judgement on whether these techniques are truly appropriate for whatever the 
applications are but rather to find what is suitable to crowd safety. 
Rating is probably one of the most common techniques that has been used in all sorts of 
applications. The basic design of the rating techniques in risk assessment is essentially 
the same as those used in other areas. What is worth noting, however, is that the review 
has also identified what amounts to a deviation from the conventional rating system. 
For the purpose of this thesis, these are called the "semi-quantified methods". These 
techniques are more sophisticated and, in the opinion of the author, appear to imitate the 
QRA methods. Just as conventional rating, these techniques rely heavily on subjective 
judgement of the assessors. Where they differ, however, is that once the judgements are 
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made (also by means of rating, but expressed in numerical terms), the outcomes are then 
treated quantitatively. They are applied to mathematical formulae to give an overall risk 
value just like other quantitative measures. An example of this is the one suggested in a 
set of health and safety training materials for the NEBOSH Certificate (course notes 
produced by The Rapid Results College). This technique contains many of the features 
that can be found in other semi-quantified methods. Designed to be used in conjunction 
with a safety audit, the technique uses the following mathematical formula to calculate 
the overall risk: 
Overall Rating = Frequency (Severity + MPL + Probability) ............ 
(Formula 2.2) 
where 
Frequency = the number of times the hazard was observed, say, in a safety audit 
Severity = the number of people at risk 
MPL = maximum possible loss (e. g. fatal, loss of limbs/eyes, loss of hearing) 
Probability = the likelihood of an accident 
MPL and Probability are expressed in terms of rating. The rating ranges from 1 to 50 in 
seven non-linear steps (i. e. 1,5,15, etc. ). Another feature of this technique is the mix of 
real numbers (i. e. the "frequency" and "severity" values) and the numerical expressions 
of rating in the same formula. The rationale of this technique has not been explained in 
the literature. But what is more important, however, is that the notion of using 
subjective ratings as something quantitative in a mathematical calculation and mixing 
them with real numbers to give an overall risk value is fundamentally flawed in 
mathematical terms. Even though Formula 2.2 states that the final outcome is a "rating 
value", the extensive use of numerical expressions mixing with real numbers could 
easily mislead many non-mathematicians into thinking that it is in fact an absolute risk 
value. 
The pros and cons about this and other techniques identified in this review in relation to 
crowd safety will be discussed later in Chapter 6. 
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2.5 Existing Guidance 
The aim of the literature review on existing guidance was to find out what guidance is 
available in the public domain to assist public venue owners and whether it is sufficient. 
The review focused on guidance documents from authoritative sources and documents 
that public venue owners are likely to be able to obtain. They include government 
publications and materials from established health and safety bodies; e. g. the British 
Safety Council, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) and the 
National Examination Board in Occupational Safety and Health (NEBOSH). 
There are a number of government publications that contain guidance on risk 
assessment. Many of them are in guidance documents on specific legislation (e. g. 
MHSWR, Fire Precautions (Places of Work) Regulations 1994, Railways (Safety Case) 
Regulations 1994). Others are in guidance for specific types of venue operations such as 
the "Pop Concert Guide" (HSC et al, 1993) and guidance for fairgrounds and 
amusement parks (HSE, 1997). By and large, the guidance in these documents is 
consistent. The main sources of these guidance documents can be traced back to two 
publications: the MHSWR ACoP which sets out the risk assessment principles and the 
HSE booklet "5 Steps to Risk Assessment" (HSE, 1995) which lays down the risk 
assessment framework. Both publications are already reviewed earlier in this chapter. 
In addition to government publications, guidance on risk assessment can also be found 
in: (i) publications by safety bodies (e. g. British Safety Council, 1993) and (ii) training 
courses provided by professional/trade associations and commercial bodies, e. g. those 
leading toward NEBOSH qualifications. The information given in these publications 
and course materials is similar to those provided in government publications. Although 
in some cases extra advice is given and techniques are suggested to provide further help 
to assessors, they too are intended for the typical workplaces such as offices, shop floor, 
industrial premises, and so on. There is very little information that is relevant to how 
risk assessment could be applied to crowd safety. 
Where guidance is intended for public venues, it is either presented merely as an initial 
suggestion (Au et al, 1993) or simply echoes what has been said in the MHSWR ACoP 
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and the "5 Steps to Risk Assessment" booklet (e. g. HSC et al, 1993; HSE, 1994c). In its 
guidance for fairgrounds and amusement parks, the HSE has made an attempt to adopt 
the "5 Steps" method into something that is more appropriate to fairground/amusement 
parks operations. This includes the provisions of a list of "foreseeable misuse" of ride 
equipment, data on main courses of accidents on fairgrounds and amusement parks 
during a ten year duration and an example of the risk assessment. Whilst useful for 
owners of such venues, the adopted method focuses largely on ride accidents and is of 
little relevance to other public venues. 
Although the existing guidance does provide useful references to venue owners, it is not 
enough to address their specific needs. As already pointed out in Chapter 1, public 
venue operations are very different from the work activities in other workplaces, and so 
are the risks involved. Furthermore, public venue operations involve dealing with 
people, sometimes in very large numbers. Consideration should therefore be given to 
crowd behaviour and their interactions with the physical environment and the 
circumstances. These safety factors are unique to venue operations. What is needed for 
public venues is something that can inspire assessors to think about these factors. 
The risk assessment guidance given in HSE's "Managing Crowds Safely" (HSE, 1996) 
has moved some way towards achieving this. As in the "Fairgrounds Guide", this 
document has incorporated some of the crowd safety issues and hazard contributory 
factors into the risk assessment framework set out in the "5 Steps" booklet. It gives 
examples of the hazards which the venue and the crowd may present. This guidance 
document provides useful and more relevant help especially to owners of smaller 
venues. However, it is felt that the examples are not exhaustive enough and that it is too 
crude for complex crowd safety problems that often exist in the larger venues. In these 
venues, tens of thousands of visitors or more can be expected and the operations 
involved can be very large and complex Further assistance is therefore required for 
such venues. 
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2.6 Current Practice in the Assessment of Crowd Safety 
A literature review was conducted in an attempt to find out how crowd safety is assessed 
in practice and what the constraints and difficulties are. The result is very disappointing. 
There is hardly any documented information in the public domain on how crowd safety 
is assessed. The only source that could have provided some insight were public enquiry 
reports on serious crowd safety related incidents (e. g. Funnell, 1988; Taylor, 1989; and 
Taylor, 1990). But this only represents a tiny sample of public venues (mainly football 
stadiums) where things went badly wrong back in the 1980s and earlier. Furthermore, 
where bad practices were identified, they concerned inadequate safety management 
systems and operational blunders (e. g. poor safety culture, inadequate training, sending 
people to the wrong escape routes, etc. ). There is very little about crowd safety 
assessment per se. Therefore, the author had to revisit the records of the interviews 
previously conducted with public venue owners in an earlier crowd safety study, 
commissioned by the FISE (i. e. Au et al, 1993). Although these interviews were not 
intended for finding out about current practice in crowd safety assessment, nevertheless 
they give some useful insight into the matter. The following describes the results of this 
review. 
2.6.1 Crowd Safety Management in Public Venues 
As in other aspects of health and safety, crowd safety management can be affected by a 
wide variety of factors. They include safety culture, venue design, staffing level, staff 
training, roles and responsibilities, co-ordination, event planning, plans and procedures 
for crowd management, inspection and maintenance regimes, etc. In their guidance on 
health and safety management system, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (1994a, 
1997a) have summarised these factors under the following headings: 
" Policy. 
" Organisation. 
" Planning and implementation. 
" Performance measurement. 
" Audit and review. 
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In reality, a public venue owner is likely to have already achieved some of these factors 
but is lagging behind in others. Therefore, the areas that require improvement are likely 
to vary from venue to venue. But recent studies and inquiries, such as those mentioned 
above, have highlighted two factors to which the inadequacy in crowd safety provisions 
can be attributed. They are a lack of appreciation of the risks involved and insufficient 
pre-planning. 
Lack of appreciation of crowd safety risks 
A study by Au et al (1993), which includes site visits to 29 public venues and interviews 
with their management, has suggested that the level of appreciation that public venue 
owners have of crowd safety risks is often affected by: 
0 Whether or not there were disasters or major incidents that took place in similar 
venues 
0 Experience of the venues (i. e. were there any significant problems, injuries or near 
misses in the past? ) 
" Whether the venue owners (or the operation managers) perceive the visitor numbers 
as "excessive" 
0 The level of public/media attention the venues tend to attract 
Pop concert organisers and major football clubs, therefore, tend to be more aware of the 
dangers of overcrowding because of past problems and previous disasters. Owners of 
strategic venues (e. g. key transport venues) and high profile venues or events (e. g. major 
shopping complexes, large theme parks) in general also appear to pay more attention to 
crowd safety. For many of the other venues, however, there seems to be less awareness 
of the potential for crowd safety problems despite the sizeable crowds they sometimes 
attract. It is not uncommon for venue owners and managers to think that crowd safety is 
a problem exclusive to certain venue types, such as football grounds and pop concerts. 
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The study by Au et al also found that there was a difference in understanding and degree 
of appreciation towards crowd safety across the management hierarchy in some venues. 
It found that members of the front line staff who have to deal with the crowds regularly 
tend to appreciate the potential dangers more than the senior management. With smaller 
incidents and incidents of near misses not recorded or not brought to their attention, 
senior managers may come to the belief that since crowd safety problems had never 
happened before, they would not happen in the future. Where small incidents are 
recorded, there is still a danger of senior management dismissing them as something that 
is a natural consequence of the operation, bound to happen and unavoidable. The fire at 
King's Cross Underground Station (Fennell, 1988) mentioned at the beginning of this 
thesis (i. e. Section 1.1) is an example of such belief contributing to a major disaster. 
Before the disaster, small fires at station escalators were regarded as inherent risk or as 
something that is inevitable to happen. 
Another reason for the lack of appreciation of crowd safety risks could be that those 
involved in planning and implementation are pre-occupied by other issues. A mind-set 
situation could develop as a result. For example, it has been reported that, at the time of 
the Hillsborough Disaster, the police were more concerned about public order than 
public safety (Lord Justice Taylor, 1990). As a result, the initial exoduses from the 
overcrowded stands were seen as a pitch invasion by the senior police officers in the 
control room. 
Insufficient pre-planning 
Insufficient planning is another reason for inadequate crowd safety provisions. Planning 
is one factor that has the most direct impact on crowd safety. Good planning is essential 
to a safe and successful venue operation. Failure to do so, on the other hand, could lead 
to tragic consequences. The Consumers' Association studies and the King's Cross Fire 
and the Hillsborough Disaster inquiries (Fennell, 1988; Lord Justice Taylor, 1990) have 
all identified inadequate planning as a contributory factor. The importance of planning 
is also well acknowledged by many other authors (e. g. Malhotra, 1987; Irish Committee 
on Public Safety and Crowd Control, 1990; Home Office and Scottish Office, 1990; 
I-lealth and Safety Commission et al, 1993; Wanless and Stanton, 1994; Au and Carey, 
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1994). In its report to the City of Cincinnati in Ohio, USA, the City of Cincinnati Task 
Force on Crowd Control and Safety (1980) explicitly recommended that the city should 
require crowd management plans for events attracting 2,000 people or more. 
An effective planning system for health and safety requires an organisation to establish 
and to operate a health and safety management system which controls risks, reacts to the 
changing demands and sustains a positive health and safety culture (HSE, 1997a). To 
control risks, it is necessary to identify and assess the risks in the first place. To react to 
the changing demands, planning and risk assessment should not be based on past 
experience alone but should also predict what problems could arise. In many cases, 
planning was lacking in prediction. For example, the study by Au et al mentioned 
earlier also found that many venue owners and managers tended to rely too much on 
their own experience alone. The focus of their assessment and planning was on 
preventing known significant problems from re-occurring. There was very little in the 
way of predicting what could go wrong. More will be said about this type of approach 
in the subsequent section. 
2.6.2 Experience-based Approaches 
The information presented here is largely based on interviews with public venue owners 
and managers conducted by Au et al (1993) in an earlier crowd safety study for the HSE. 
Traditionally, crowd safety assessment is conducted largely based on experience and on 
feedback from previous operations. For the purpose of this thesis, such approaches are 
called the "experience-based approaches". They are by far the most popular approaches 
to crowd safety assessment. 
One such approach that is widely used, especially in public events, involves debriefing 
sessions being held after an event or a period of operation. The participants may include 
members of the venue staff and possibly representatives of any external bodies involved, 
such as the police. Depending on the size of the operation, more debriefing sessions 
may be held at different levels of the operation hierarchy. For example, sessions 
involving the front line staff and their supervisors at the ground level, sessions involving 
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managerial and supervisory staff at the operation level and top level meetings and inter- 
agency meetings at the policy level. Usually, the aims of the debriefing sessions are to 
review the previous event or period of operation, identify any problems or incidents that 
need to be addressed before the next operation and collect any comments and views of 
the participants and others on the operation. The information is then fed back to the 
planning process for the next duration or the next event. 
Another popular approach, which is similar in nature to the "feedback" approach above, 
involves a review of the existing plans and procedures at regular intervals or when it is 
felt necessary. The review may be carried out largely by the operation manager and his 
staff. Sometimes people from other parts of the organisation and external agencies are 
also involved. Instead of just looking back at what happened in the previous period of 
operation, participants will examine the existing plan or procedures to decide whether it 
is sufficient and what modifications/additional provisions are required. Past experience 
tends to have a significant influence on decision making. The review is often carried out 
on all aspects of the operations rather than just a safety review. 
Both approaches tend to rely heavily on the experience of those involved in it, problems 
that come to light and lessons learnt from past incidents. In addition, some public venue 
owners acquire further knowledge and take into account information from the following 
sources: 
0 Training courses, conferences, seminars, trade association meetings, etc. where 
they can learn and share experience. 
" Written materials such as guidance documents. 
" Lessons learnt from known incidents and disasters elsewhere. 
" Intelligence reports (e. g. for policing football matches). 
" Comments and complaints from staff and visitors. 
Whilst past experience is critical for crowd safety assessment and planning, there are a 
number of problems associated with the experience-based approaches described above. 
Firstly, there is no evidence of past experience being assessed systematically under these 
approaches. Instead, they appear rather piecemeal; i. e. it all depends on the views of the 
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participants and what they could remember most at the time of the debriefing or review. 
As such, secondly, comprehensiveness of the assessments cannot be assured. Thirdly, 
these approaches focus on past problems and on preventing them from occurring again. 
They fail to look at what could go wrong in the foreseeable future. For example, new 
hazards could arise and the risks of existing hazards could be different as the results of 
changes in the circumstances. Regulation 3 of the MHSW Regulations (HSC, 1992) 
requires employers to update their assessment to take into account such changes. Rowe 
(1977) also regarded the "observations" of new risks and changes in risk parameters as a 
key part of "risk identification". Fourthly, there are no assessments of the risks posed by 
the problems identified (or how serious they are). The literature review in Section 2.2 
shows that risk estimation and evaluation are important parts of risk assessment. The 
MHSWR Approved Code of Practice (HSC, 1992) suggests that a suitable and sufficient 
risk assessment should, amongst other things, enable the prioritisation of the measures 
that need to be taken. The experience-based approaches that fail to estimate risks do not 
satisfy this requirement. 
Furthermore, experience, previous disasters and research (e. g. Fennell, 1988; Taylor, 
1990; Donald and Canter, 1990; Wood, 1990; Au et al, 1993; Au and Carey, 1994; 
Wanless and Stanton, 1994) all show that crowd safety related accidents, like many 
accidents in other contexts, are rarely attributed to a single cause (e. g. Department of 
Energy, 1990; Department of Transport, 1990; HSE, 1992b; HSE, 1994b; Perrow, 1984; 
RM Consultants Ltd, 1994). Instead, crowd safety can be affected by a large number of 
diverse factors. For example, human behaviour plays an important role in emergency 
evacuation (e. g. Williams and Hopkinson, 1976; Canter, 1990; Building Research 
Establishment; 1993; Dowling, 1994). These factors could vary widely between venues. 
Even within the same venue, they may vary at different times and under different 
circumstances. A potential danger of approaches that are reactive to past problems is 
that the attention of the assessors could be diverted to the symptoms of the problems and 
could overlook their underlying causes. Whilst they will still help to prevent the same or 
very similar accidents from occurring, these kinds of approaches are less effective in 
identifying other reasonably foreseeable hazards. 
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2.6.3 Computer Modellin 
There has been an increase in use of computer simulation by some major venues as a 
high-tech. tool to assist safety assessment. Whilst, strictly speaking, computer 
simulation alone cannot be regarded as a complete safety assessment method, it is 
gaining popularity and has provided the assessors with the opportunities to have a better 
insight into, say, crowd movement and crowd distribution. Computer modelling can 
also be used to try out different alternatives before deciding on the best measure to put 
into practice. 
There are a number of software packages that allow users to build computer models of 
and simulate movements in public places. Many of them were built for emergency 
egress purposes (e. g. Ketchell, 1993; Okazaki and Matsushita, 1993; Thompson and 
Marchant, 1993). Others predict pedestrian flows and distribution (e. g. Hillier and 
Hanson, 1984; Dickie and Meghji, 1994; Okazaki and Matsushita, 1993; Toshiyuki, 
1993; Hillier, 1996). Nevertheless, some of these packages have the potential to be 
adopted to assess crowding problems during normal operation. The use of computer 
simulation is particularly beneficial in that firstly, it allows the users to "visualise" their 
problems. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it enables the users to try out their 
solutions without putting visitors at risk. Where the solution involves making expensive 
modifications to the venue design, the users can test and find the optimum solution 
before actually carrying out the work. Thirdly, simulation can be made on existing 
venues, brand new venues and venues which are still at their design stage. 
Despite the above benefits, computer simulation alone and in its current form cannot be 
regards as a sufficient crowd safety risk assessment method as such. Earlier versions 
were criticised for dealing only with the physics of crowd flow and giving no 
consideration to human behaviour (e. g. Sime, 1984). Since then, improvements have 
been made and some software packages have incorporated simple behavioural rules, 
such as those concerning people's choice of routes, "follow the leader" and ways of 
avoiding collision with others. These changes make the simulated crowd movement 
more realistic and can help assessors to identify hazards that are introduced by certain 
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poor venue design. It is, nevertheless, still insufficient in the identification of hazards 
due to crowd behaviour or inadequate crowd management. 
Another problem associated with computer simulation is validation. A simulation is 
valid only if it can be proved that the simulated situation is sufficiently similar to the 
actual situation which it is trying to model. As discussed above, factors affecting crowd 
safety are likely to vary in different venues, at different times and under different 
circumstances. Hence, it may not be enough to validate the package itself based on its 
applications to one or two venues. A proper validation would involve comparing 
individual simulations against what actually happened in a number of representative 
normal and emergency scenarios in the venue of concern. Given the frequency of 
changes in many venues, this is very difficult (if not impossible) and costly to achieve in 
practice. Finally, the costs involved in either purchasing a package or commissioning a 
simulation is currently rather high and is therefore beyond the reach of many public 
venues. 
2.7 Conclusions and Discussions 
The review of a recent study and past disaster reports suggests that the current practice is 
inadequate. There has been a lack of appreciation of crowd safety risks and planning is 
generally insufficient. Current practice in crowd safety assessment is also inadequate in 
meeting the legal and other requirements on risk assessment. There has been a heavy 
reliance on personal experience and incidents and problems that occurred in the past. 
Such assessments are unsatisfactory because: 
0 There are no mechanisms in place to help assessors to decide the importance of the 
problems and to prioritise the measures that need to be taken. 
" They are not systematic. The outcomes depend significantly on which direction the 
discussions go in debriefings and what past problems the participants can remember 
or see as important at the time. Holding the debriefing or review on a different date 
could generate a different set of results. 
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" They are not sufficiently comprehensive. By focusing on past experience, any new 
hazards due to changes in circumstances or the introduction of new features could be 
missed. For many venues, changes, new features, etc. are normal and necessary for 
their operations. 
" Approaches that rely heavily on experience are of little use when dealing with brand 
new venues. 
" Some crowd safety accidents could have serious consequences and should not be 
allowed to happen in the first place. Experience-based approaches are reactive in 
nature and could be dangerous in this respect. 
Furthermore, there are legal requirements for carrying out risk assessments. Although 
the detailed requirements vary between venue types, the overall requirements are clearly 
set out under the HSW Act. Namely, venue owners are required to ensure, so far as is 
"reasonably practicable", the health and safety of their employees and others who may 
be affected and that they are not exposed to risks. To determine what is reasonably 
practicable, there is a need for some form of assessment of risks. The MHSWR places a 
specific duty on venue owners to carry out risk assessments. This is to ensure that they 
think carefully about the nature and extent of hazards. A key criterion for risk 
assessment is that it has to be suitable and sufficient. This means that the assessment 
should identify all significant risks, enable the identification and prioritisation of the 
actions that need to be taken, and be appropriate to the nature of the work (HSC, 1992). 
The outstanding question is, therefore, what is a suitable and sufficient risk assessment 
for crowd safety? The existing guidance, which is primarily for workplaces, does not 
adequately address this question and, hence, further investigations are required. 
The definitions of risk and the risk assessment principles are already well defined. The 
literature review shows that there is a general consensus over what is risk and what risk 
assessment should consist of among organisations such as the HSE, the Royal Society, 
the British Medical Association, the National Research Council in the US and among 
many authors (e. g. Rowe, 1977; Kinchin, 1982; Moore, 1983; Covello and Merkhofer, 
1993; etc. ). In a nutshell, risk should reflect both the likelihood of harm and its severity. 
Risk assessment can therefore be regarded as the process to identify things that have the 
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potential to cause harm and determine the degree of likelihood and severity of harm. 
Whilst the principles are clear, how they should be applied to crowd safety to satisfy the 
criterion of being "suitable and sufficient" still requires more thought. A further review 
of the risk assessment literatures has identified a few things that could be of relevance to 
the application of risk assessment to crowd safety. 
Firstly, the HSE (1998) has set out a framework for risk assessment which consists of 
the following five elements: (i) look for hazards, (ii) decide who might be harmed, (iii) 
evaluate the risks and decide if existing precautions are enough or more should be done, 
(iv) record assessment findings, and (v) review and revise assessment to ensure that it 
remains valid. This is a general framework intended for all risk assessments under the 
MHSWR. 
Secondly, within this framework, the actual risk assessments could range from loosely 
structured methods, such as those recommended for general offices (e. g. HSE, 1994), to 
sophisticated and resource intensive probabilistic methods, such as those used in the 
high hazard industries. The type of assessment required for a particular application may 
depend on a number of factors such as the nature of work, the types of hazards, the 
extent of risks and who could be affected. The issue of voluntary vs. involuntary risks 
could also come into play. The conclusion from the literature review on this issue is that 
for involuntary or imposed risks and, where risk decisions are likely to affect many 
people, then it can be argued that a more robust assessment regime is required so that the 
decisions are rational and justifiable. On this basis, it can be argued that crowd safety 
assessment would need to be more robust than that for an office environment because 
venue visitors are not involved in the decision making process and a high number of 
them could be affected. At the same time, it can also be said that crowd safety 
assessment needs not be as robust as that for the high hazard industries because the 
extent of the risks imposed on others in crowd safety is far less. 
The third issue concerns risk management. The outcomes of a risk assessment form the 
basis for decision making on how the risks should be managed, and this could have 
implications on what kind of risk assessment is appropriate for crowd safety. Although 
it is accepted by many authors that risk should reflect likelihood and severity, and 
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therefore risk management should consider both elements, there could be circumstances 
where alternative approaches may be appropriate. The literature review has looked at 
several other suggestions to see if they would be suitable for crowd safety. Apart from 
the risk-based assessment described above, other suggestions include the hazard-based 
approach, target setting/de minimus and cost effectiveness approach. Based on the 
review, it is concluded that none of these can be suitably applied in their entirety to 
crowd safety for different reasons. The argument behind the hazard-based approach is 
that where the consequence is extremely severe, then hazard should be the dominating 
factor for decision making even though it may be very unlikely to occur. Whilst there 
could be circumstances in which this argument will apply, not all crowd safety risks are 
of that nature. Overall, it is still necessary to consider risk as a whole before deciding 
whether it is appropriate to use the hazard-based argument for managing some of the 
"extreme" risks. Perhaps it is worth noting that although the consequence of a crowd 
safety disaster could be high, it is nowhere near the severity of a nuclear disaster. Yet, 
the assessments done in the nuclear industry are risk based. If the consequence is so 
severe, under the ALARP principle (which is used in conjunction with the risk-based 
assessments), the risk will have to be controlled regardless of costs. This aspect of 
ALARP is effectively the same as the hazard-based argument. Hence, there seems to be 
no justifications for an explicitly hazard-based assessment. The main problem for target 
setting is that there are no universally accepted targets for crowd safety. Also, different 
public venue types operate differently and tend to have different problems. The same set 
of targets (e. g. on maximum crowd density, etc. ) is unlikely to be applicable across the 
whole spectrum of public venues. Nevertheless, the underlying principle is quite in line 
with the ALARP principle in the nuclear industry and the views of many authors is that 
there should be a "cut-off' point or an upper limit beyond which the risk should be 
regarded as intolerable. Whether a similar cut-off point should be set for crowd safety in 
the future could be a worthwhile subject for further research. With regard to the cost- 
effectiveness approach, the decision still has to be based on a risk-based assessment. A 
clear danger of the cost effectiveness approach is that high risks could remain 
uncontrolled because it is not sufficiently cost effective to do so. There is also the moral 
argument about whether it is justified to expose people to risks on a cost basis alone. 
The practical difficulty in applying the cost effectiveness principle to crowd safety is that 
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it is necessary to express costs and risks in a common unit so that they can be compared 
or balanced against each other. Currently, this is not possible to achieve. 
Fourthly, the QRA approach (i. e. quantification of risks) is deemed to be unsuitable for 
crowd safety at present for several reasons, for example: the unavailability of failure data 
and, hence, the issue of uncertainty discussed in Section 2.3.4; the unpredictability of 
human behaviour in public venues; and the unavailability of the necessary expertise for 
QRA. Kazer (1992) has also argued that quantified assessment is unnecessarily 
complex for many sectors. From a practicality viewpoint, the efforts and the costs 
required to conduct such assessments are also prohibitive for the vast majority of public 
venue owners. 
Fifthly, Moore (1993) has argued that qualitative assessment, which involves the use of 
words rather than figures to represent the levels of risk, is useful only if the writers and 
the readers agree on their meanings of the words used (e. g. high, medium, low risks). In 
reality, words do not have a generally accepted and agreed meaning. This is a problem 
that needs to be addressed in order for the crowd safety risk assessment methodology to 
be truly useful and produce consistent results. 
Finally, the review of the current practice has revealed that many venue managers tend 
to have a different understanding of the problems and less appreciation of the potential 
dangers than their front line staff. There is a need to enable the views and experience of 
the front line staff to be communicated to the managers and the assessors and be taken 
into account in assessment and planning. There is also a tendency of a mind-set towards 
past problems during assessment and planning and not enough forward looking. There 
is a need to encourage planners and assessors to not only look back at what went wrong 
in the past but also to consider what could go wrong in the foreseeable future. 
Because of the lack of published information, the literature review can only provide an 
overview of the current practice in crowd safety assessment. Although it has served to 
highlight some of the problems and inadequacies, the information gathered so far is not 
enough to enable the author to identify the needs of the crowd safety assessors and what 
help and assistance they may require. It is felt that more precise information is needed. 
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A public venue survey was therefore carried out to supplement the information obtained 
here. The survey and its findings are described later in Chapter 4. The literature review 
on risks and risk assessment has provided a foundation for developing a risk assessment 
methodology for crowd safety. Nevertheless, a better understanding of the crowd safety 
problems, public venue operations and the tasks involved in crowd safety assessment are 
also required. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CROWD SAFETY IN PUBLIC VENUES - CASE STUDIES 
This chapter examines in more detail the subject of crowd safety in public venues. In 
particular, it looks at the nature of venue operations, how they differ from other 
workplaces and the crowd safety issues and problems that crowd safety assessors need 
to address in their assessment. To illustrate these issues this chapter will describe two 
case studies to highlight the operational and safety issues involved in running a public 
venue. 
The two case studies concern a street festival and a high street/market environment. 
Due to confidentiality requirements, the identities of these venues cannot be revealed. 
For the purpose of this thesis, they are identified as follows: 
Case Study A-A Street Festival/Carnival 
Case Study B-A High Street/Market Environment 
Both case studies concern outdoor environments. Although they are not necessarily 
representatives of all venue types, they do provide an overview of different venue 
operations, visitor types and the associated crowd safety problems. 
3.1 Case Study A-A Street Festival/Carnival 
3.1.1 The Event 
This is an annual event which takes place over two days in the summer. Streets are 
pedestrianised for the duration of the event. Like many other successful events, it 
started off as a relatively small event that has become the victim of its own success. It 
has gained popularity and grown over the years to become one of the biggest street 
festivals in Europe attracting hundreds of thousands of visitors. 
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As in many street events, there are no official venue boundaries and no means of 
controlling how many people enter and leave. However, the majority of the visiting 
crowds can usually be found at and near the streets where the attractions are located. In 
this event, there are three types of main attractions: the carnival procession (e. g. 
costumed dancers and floats), set stages and street trading. 
The procession route follows a number of streets around the venue. Apart from visitors 
standing along the route to watch the procession, individual floats also attract their own 
crowds/supporters who tend to follow them closely. Amongst the most popular areas on 
the procession route are the judging points where the floats stop and perform in front of 
panels of judges. 
The set stages and most of the street trading can be found at various places in the area 
surrounded by the procession route. There are three set stages and numerous street 
traders. The attractions at the set stages include live acts and celebrity visits. In a way, 
each set stage is like a mini concert or show drawing a large crowd and sometimes 
generating emotional behaviour amongst the crowds. 
In theory, street traders are licensed by the local authority and allocated specific plots 
within the venue. Stewards employed by the event organiser can work with the police 
and local authority's environmental health officers to enforce the licensing conditions 
and ensure that unlicensed street trading is prohibited. However, in practice, the police 
are reluctant to remove illegal traders once they have set up for fear of triggering public 
order incidents. Because of the large size of the venue, actions to prevent illegal traders 
from setting up during the night or in the early hours can be costly. Also, this will not 
stop people from setting up stalls within the festival boundaries (e. g. residents setting up 
at their forecourts). 
A previous survey suggests that the vast majority of the visitors were under 35 years of 
age and that there were slightly more men than women. But the imbalance was not 
great. 
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There are variations in the types of visitors between the two days of the event. Day one 
is usually attended by families and people across a wide range of age groups. The 
visitor population in day two, and especially towards the evening, is dominated by 
young adults and has more of a party atmosphere. 
A recent study (Au et al, 1993) suggests that the nature of an event and different types of 
visitors could lead to different crowd behaviour which could, in turn, have a significant 
impact on crowd safety. Case study A has indeed served to highlight this. Over the 
years, this event has developed its own distinct culture and traditions which make a 
significant contribution towards some of the safety hazards found here. For example, it 
is generally perceived to be more of a street party than an event. As such, excessive 
consumption of alcohol and other excesses are considered acceptable. The resultant 
crowd behaviour and attitudes could generate situations that give rise to crowd safety 
hazards and severely constraint what actions can be taken to remedy such hazards. The 
problem is severe and more obvious on the second day of the event when there is little 
"family atmosphere" and the crowds become much more rowdy. 
3.1.2 Crowd Safety Planning and Management 
Similar to other major public events, there are a number of bodies involved in 
organising, running and providing services to this event. They include: 
" The event organiser. 
" The local authority. 
" The police. 
" Other emergency services. 
" Public transport operators. 
A liaison group is set up to co-ordinate operations and address issues of common 
concern. Apart from the above, it also includes the local MP, residents and 
organisations that have an interest in the event. 
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Each of the above bodies has its own responsibility to fulfil, but none of them seems to 
have the overall responsibility of running the event and ensuring safety. The event 
organiser organises the event but has little resources to look after issues such as health 
and safety. The local authority has some health and safety responsibilities. Their duties 
include supervising and regulating trading, monitoring music level, regulating the sound 
systems and inspecting temporary structures, e. g. the set stages. The police are 
responsible for maintaining public order and traffic matters. They also provide the 
necessary back-up to the local authority officers in, for example, enforcing the licensing 
requirements. Other emergency services cover fire safety and first-aid and provide the 
necessary emergency response. The public transport operators are responsible for 
providing public transport facilities to the visitors. 
Although there appears to be no single body with overall control over crowd safety 
matters, the police often find themselves at forefront of dealing with the crowds. 
Therefore, in practice, they have unwittingly become responsible for crowd management 
and crowd safety. Doubts have been raised within the police as to whether they have the 
necessary legal power to enforce crowd control measures purely on the grounds of 
public safety. The usual police command structure for managing events and incidents 
applies here - i. e. command and control is divided into "Gold", "Silver" and "Bronze" 
levels. The Gold Commander is in overall control of the police operation and is usually 
in the control room. The Silver Commander is in forward command and can be 
regarded as the "site commander". The affected area is split into a number of sectors. A 
Bronze Commander is responsible for operation in each sector. 
3.1.3 The Crowd Safety Problems 
Because of the large numbers of people attending, excessively high crowd density or 
overcrowding is the main crowd safety problem at this and other similar events. This 
could result in a dangerous build-up of crowd pressure, crushing and a pile-up of people. 
It has to be noted that the overcrowding problem does not necessarily have the same 
effect across the entire venue. Some parts of the venue can be worse affected than 
others. In this particular event, the southern sectors are more crowded than the northern 
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sectors. Furthermore, crowd distribution is not uniform even within the southern 
sectors. Some streets are very crowded whilst others are relatively quiet. 
The reasons for overcrowding also vary between different parts of the venue. At some 
places, this is simply a case of insufficient capacity to cope with the demand (i. e. the 
numbers of people at or passing through these places far exceed the capacity). At other 
places, the problem could be due to combinations of their proximity to major attractions, 
the presence of pinch points and obstructions and cross flows (i. e. people crossing each 
other's paths thus slowing down crowd movement and causing a larger build-up of 
crowds). Overcrowding can be exacerbated by drunkenness and other undesirable 
behaviour. For example, problems were observed at this particular event concerning 
groups of young people pushing their ways through the packed crowds. This could lead 
to a further increase in crowd pressure and an increased chance of people falling over 
and being trampled by others. Relatively minor public disorder incidents and aggressive 
behaviour could also pose a significant safety problem. Although they can also be found 
in many town centres on Saturday nights, these types of incidents could have a much 
more severe consequence in a crowded environment, resulting from surging by people 
trying to move out of the trouble spot. 
Crowding problems can also be the result of massive (lateral) movement within a 
stationary crowd and emotional behaviour. This is particularly in evidence in front of 
the set stages and also one of the main problems at places such as pop concerts where 
several accidents of this kind occurred in the past. Other key crowd safety problems 
found in this event include: 
0 The collapse of temporary structures onto the crowds below. 
0 Unsteady floats toppling over whilst turning a corner. 
0 People hit by the floats and crushed underwheels. This could be caused by unsafe 
vehicles, poor visibility from the drivers' cabs or drivers' errors. 
0 Open fire grills used by traders selling hot food being set up in crowded streets. 
This could result in passer-by receiving bum injuries or, more seriously, the grills 
could topple over due to crowd pressure. 
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0 Street traders setting up their stalls too close to main circulation routes, creating 
pinch points and obstructing crowd flows. 
In addition, tripping and slipping hazards can also be found throughout the venue. They 
are often caused by an accumulation of rubbish and bottles on the floor or people 
tripping on pavement kerbs or, in some cases, over the feet of crowd control barriers. 
Tripping, slipping, etc. can also be found in other workplaces such as offices, factories 
and shop floors and are often treated seriously. In this and many other major events, 
however, tripping and slipping are often tolerated unless they occur in a particularly 
crowded environment. This is despite more people being exposed to the hazards in a 
public venue. The reason why major public events (and some major venues as well) 
appear to have a higher level of tolerance over safety risks than other workplaces are 
two-fold. Firstly, the risks posed by tripping and slipping in a non-crowded 
environment are low in relation to the problems already identified above. Higher 
priorities must therefore be given to deal with the more serious problems first. 
Secondly, there is often no reasonably practicable measures to tackle the problems. In 
Case Study A, for example, there are three possible ways of reducing the amount of 
rubbish and bottles on the floor but none are practicable. The first method is to put in 
place more rubbish bins, etc. But given the size of the venue, this can be costly and 
would not be very effective - experience suggests that some people will continue to 
leave rubbish on the floor. Furthermore, big bins could obstruct crowd movement and 
small bins will need to be emptied frequently. The second method is to ask public 
houses to stop customers leaving their premises with bottles and cans. Experience 
suggests that full co-operation from the landlords cannot be guaranteed as this will 
require extra door staff and could increase conflicts at the doors. Furthermore, this will 
not stop people bringing in their own bottles or cans of drink or buying them from the 
nearby off-licence stores. The third method is to sweep the streets more frequently. 
Apart from the costs involved, it is also extremely difficult, if not impossible, to sweep 
the streets when they are so heavily used. 
Equally, although pavement kerbs also pose tripping hazards, they are very much a part 
of the street and cannot be removed. 
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The examples given above have served to illustrate some of the differences between a 
major public event and a workplace even when they are faced with similar safety 
problems. 
3.2 Case Study B-A High Street/Market Environment 
3.2.1 The Venue 
The area consists of several large private markets, a street market run by the local 
authority and numerous businesses. They are located along both sides of the high street. 
Another key feature of the area is a canal which runs alongside some of the markets and 
under a road bridge that forms a part of the high street. Originally occupied by disused 
industrial buildings and land, the area began to take shape in the 1970s when a weekend 
market and craft workshops were set up. Since then, it has grown from these small 
beginnings to become a major attraction. 
This area is a major tourist attraction because of its character and the goods on sale. The 
accent of the area was on arts and traditional crafts but has soon broadened to include a 
wide variety of goods including antiques, clothing and restaurants and coffee bars. 
Another reason for its popularity is the uniqueness of its locations - i. e. as part of a 
major city and easy to get to by public transport. But the main attractions are the private 
markets which are situated along the high street. They include open air markets and 
indoor market halls. Old buildings have been renovated to house workshops, small 
shops and market stalls. Stall spaces are let by the market owners on short leases. 
Most shops and business are opened everyday but the area is normally at its busiest at 
weekends during the summer period. Many tens of thousands of visitors come to the 
area each weekend in this time of the year. They consist of visitors from nearby, visitors 
from elsewhere in the UK and overseas visitors. Unlike Case Study A which tends to 
attract mainly young people, visitors here consist of people of a much wider age range, 
from children to old age pensioners. Overseas visitors are also significant in number. 
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This area is chosen for this case study because it has the characteristics of both a regular 
venue and a street event. Visitor activities and their behaviour are similar to a large 
shopping venue or a busy town centre. But it also has problems that are more often seen 
in street events. One such problem concerns the spatial layouts. As already mentioned, 
the area is transformed from an old industrial setting into its current state. Whilst this 
gives the place its character, it also means that the area is insufficient to cope with large 
numbers of visitors. Small confined space and narrow passageways are not uncommon 
in the area. Many buildings and structures are listed and therefore the scope for making 
changes to the spatial layout is very limited. This has led to concerns over issues such as 
overcrowding and fire safety. The unfamiliarity of many visitors to the area and the 
large numbers of overseas visitors who may not speak English can also have safety 
implications especially in an emergency when the area has to be evacuated. Section 
3.2.3 will look at these and other crowd safety problems that exist in this area. 
3.2.2 Crowd Safety Planning and Management 
In terms of its operation, this area can be regarded as a regular venue rather than an 
event. There are, again, a number of bodies involved in running and providing services 
to the area. The market owners are responsible for all operational and health and safety 
matters in their markets. The local authority has two different roles to fulfil. To the 
markets and licensed premises in the area, it is the licensing and enforcing authority. As 
such, its role is to ensure that they comply with the relevant health and safety and 
licensing requirements. To fulfil its enforcement role, officers from the local authority 
carry out checks and inspections during market operations. The public environment in 
the area also falls into local authority's responsibility. Its duties include public safety, 
street parking, street trading and street cleaning and refuse collection. 
The roles of the emergency services are essentially the same as in everyday situations. 
What is perhaps worth noting is that since the area is regarded as a regular venue, it does 
not have the same level of police presence as in a street event. Therefore, the command 
structure described in Case Study A does not normally apply here. 
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The interaction between different markets and the agencies involved is a key issue here. 
Because of the close proximity between the markets, business premises on the high 
street and public transport venues, any significant changes in one place could have a 
knock-on effect on others and on the area as a whole. Also, should an emergency arise, 
all businesses and the agencies involved would need to work together in a well co- 
ordinated manner to deal with the situation. Working groups are set up to address issues 
of common concern, co-ordinate responses and develop area-wide contingency plans. 
3.2.3 The Crowd Safety Problems 
There are two main safety problems in the area: (i) crowding/congestion and (ii) 
conflicts between pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Although crowding and related 
problems were also found in Case Study A, because of the differences in the nature of 
the venues and their spatial layout, both the reasons for the problems and their extents 
can be quite different. In this particular case, the reason for the problem is not due to the 
concentration of large crowds as such. Whilst the large numbers of visitors during the 
weekends is clearly a contributory factor, they tend to be more spread out and therefore 
are not the sole cause for concern. The total capacity of the area, though insufficient, is 
also only a part of the problem. A key contributory factor to crowding in the area is its 
spatial layout. Because of the old industrial setting upon which this place is developed, 
the layout of the area and its old buildings are even more inadequate than that in the 
street festival in Case Study A. There are a number of pinch points and narrow 
passageways that severely restrict flow capacities in the area. Large crowds and crowd 
pressure therefore build-up rapidly at both sides of the pinch points. In some parts of the 
area, the crowding problems are exacerbated by venue features such as uneven 
underfoot conditions (e. g. cobble stoned streets, potholes) and steep slopes. They could 
also lead to other hazards such as tripping and slipping. Such problems are not 
uncommon in old venues and historical places. 
Another key concern is conflict between vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Because of the 
overall traffic situation in the larger area, road traffic is allowed to pass through the area 
even at weekends. This together with other factors such as visitors' behaviour (i. e. the 
manner in which they cross the roads and standing/walking on the carriageway), 
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aggressive driving behaviour, motorcycles and bicycles weaving in between traffic, the 
road layout (e. g. the need for drivers to get in lane quickly or compete for position) and 
narrow pavements at some places have given rise to the danger of road traffic accidents 
and people being knocked down by vehicles. The road junctions on the high street also 
lead to a build up of crowds waiting to cross the road, thus contributing to the crowding 
problem. 
Some of the problems identified in Case Study A also exist here, they include illegal 
street trading, street performers, illegal parking, street furniture, railings, pavement 
kerbs, ramps, obstruction by stationary crowds outside train stations or at bus stops and 
long queues cutting across pedestrian flow paths. Other hazards found primarily in the 
markets can also be seen in workplaces elsewhere. They include unstable structures, 
unsafe electrical wiring/installation, unsecured cables and the use of hazardous items 
and substances such as open fire barbecue and LPG gas. 
3.3 Discussions 
In their analysis of the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster, Jenkins et al (1991) 
concluded that the situation in sporting events such as that in Hillsborough is a lot more 
complex and diffused than in an industrial situation. As far as a safety management 
system is concerned, these situations require close co-operation and communication 
between the various parties involved and consideration to be given to many external 
constraints. This is also true in the case of many other public venue operations. The 
two case studies have highlighted some of the differences between operating a major 
public venue and running a workplace. In general, the differences are in terms of the 
nature of their operations, the work activities and therefore the safety hazards that exist. 
In an office or an industrial environment, the work activities often include processing 
information, documentation, substances and materials. The health and safety hazards 
found in such a place often arise from the work practice, work environment, equipment 
and machinery and the substances and materials that are being handled. The hazards are 
usually well understood and, in many cases, rather obvious. Furthermore, people who 
are most exposed to the dangers are the employees. Operating a public venue, in a way, 
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is about processing large numbers of human beings. Therefore, the dangers can arise not 
only from the venue itself and the presence of hazardous hardware and substances but 
also from crowd dynamics, human behaviour and their interactions with the physical 
environment and with the ways in which they are managed. As previously pointed out 
in Section 1.7.1, human behaviour in a public venue environment is less constrained 
than behaviour in a work environment. Also, a lot more people are likely to be exposed 
to dangers in a public venue than in a workplace. 
3.3.1 Operational Issues 
The case studies also show that there are more operational constraints in a major public 
venue than in other types of workplaces. One of the key factors for this is the 
involvement of outside bodies. In a workplace, ensuring health and safety is clearly the 
responsibility of the employer. It seldom involves outside organisations. But public 
venue operations often involve the inputs of different bodies. In Case Study A, as well 
as many other street events, there are even uncertainties as to who has overall 
responsibility for ensuring crowd safety. It has to be said that this is not typical of public 
venues as a whole. In Case Study B, for example, responsibilities are much better 
defined. But even for a stand-alone venue, the activities of the nearby venues, events 
and businesses could, in some cases, also have an impact on its operation. A lack of 
commitment or willingness to co-operate by outside bodies and businesses could result 
in tremendous constraints on what can be done to improve safety. But such co- 
operation cannot always be guaranteed for political, operational and/or financial reasons. 
There appears to be more practical constraints on what can be done to improve safety in 
a street venue than in a normal workplace. Apart from a lack of co-operation from other 
bodies, the fact that there is no direct control over the number of people attending also 
poses a major constraint. Another problem is that the street environment is not 
designed, nor is it suitable, for the gathering of large crowds. The situation can be worse 
if old historical settings are involved, as demonstrated in Case Study B. Apart from a 
lack of space to accommodate the volume of visitors, the scope for changing the venue 
design and its layout to make it more suitable are almost non-existent. The only means 
of ensuring crowd safety therefore is through crowd management alone. Having to rely 
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solely on crowd management is a handicap from the crowd safety management 
viewpoint and is not the ideal way of tackling the problems. 
Case Study A has further highlighted some of the practical constraints facing the police 
(or those who are responsible for the management of crowds) in a street event. A 
delicate balance also has to be struck between improving safety and other aspects such 
as: 
" Political consideration - e. g. police relations with members of the public, this 
could affect the effectiveness of police operations in all areas, not just managing 
crowds. 
" Measures that could cause other problems - whilst this is also a problem for other 
venues and workplaces, the police in this case are particular concerned about the 
possibility of an apparent "hostile" measure triggering a public order incident. 
" Costs, resources, etc. - these constraints are by no means unique to public venues, 
they are also applicable to most workplaces. 
3.3.2 Crowd Safety Issues 
The case studies have highlighted some of the crowd safety problems that could exist in 
a major public venue. These hazards must be clearly identified if the risk assessment is 
to be suitable and sufficient. 
In general, there are two types of problem. The first is what can be described as a 
general health and safety hazard. Tripping, slipping, unstable structures, substandard 
electrical installation, the mix of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, the use of LPG gas and 
open fire grills in high crowd density areas are just some of the examples found in the 
case studies. Other such hazards may include unguarded machinery in public areas, 
sharp protruding objects and falling hazards. These hazards are often associated with 
physical objects, such as unsafe venue features and the presence of hazardous items or 
substances. In this respect, they are similar in nature to those found in a workplace. In 
general, the link between this type of hazards, their causes and consequences is quite 
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obvious and straightforward to establish. They tend to be relatively easy to identify in 
the eye of a trained health and safety assessor. What is required is a comprehensive and 
systematic hazard identification method to ensure that all objects and substances that 
could cause significant harms are considered. 
The second types of problems are those associated with the presence of large crowds and 
their behaviour. People can be harmed by a build-up of excessive crowd pressures (e. g. 
crushed against each other in the crowd or crushed against objects such as walls) or due 
to the loss of body balance (e. g. a pile-up of people, being trampled by others or being 
pushed over and falling from a height). The reasons for and the extent of this type of 
problem tend to vary between circumstances. They are often influenced by an array of 
factors such as crowd size, capacity, crowd dynamics, spatial layout, crowd distribution 
and crowd behaviour and activities. For example, the crowding problems in Case Study 
A are different from those in Case Study B because of the involvement of different 
combinations of factors. They also differ from the overcrowding problem occurred in 
the Hillsborough Disaster where the most immediate cause was the mismatch between 
crowd size and holding capacity - although other factors such as weather condition also 
came into play (Lord Justice Taylor, 1990). Other examples include pushing, surging 
and vigorous crowd movement which can be seen in places like football grounds, pop 
concerts and street celebrations. 
Apart from hazards relating to the build-up of crowd pressure, there are also problems 
which are made worse by the high crowd density. They include congestion, pinch 
points, obstructions and cross flows. These problems are by no means unique to major 
public venues. Instead, they can be found all the time in everyday life, for example, on a 
high street or in a building. Usually, they would cause no more than inconvenience and 
frustration. However, these problems could become much more safety critical if they 
occur in an environment involving the movement of large crowds. Again, the likelihood 
of people being harmed as a result and the extent of harm tend to vary from place to 
place and from time to time depending on the circumstances. 
Similarly, tripping and slipping can also be found in other workplaces but the 
consequences tend to be more severe if they occur in a crowded environment. Problems 
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like drunkenness and aggression do not normally present any significant safety threats 
except to those who are involved, but could become more serious in a crowded 
environment. 
Compared with hazards associated with a physical object, hazards associated with the 
presence of large crowds are less straight forward to spot. For example, large numbers 
of visitors, pinch points and cross flows on their own do not necessarily pose a danger as 
such. Both the case studies and experience suggest that crowding related problems are 
often the result of a combination of factors rather than a single factor. Depending upon 
the circumstance, both the likelihood of harm and its severity could vary from not 
significant to very substantial. Therefore, hazard identification for crowd safety cannot 
be done superficially. Crowd safety hazards do not necessarily associate with specific 
objects or substances and not all hazards are immediately obvious. Hence, a suitable 
and sufficient hazard identification method should encourage assessors to take a step 
back, consider the circumstances and the various factors involved and try to foresee 
what could go wrong. It should not restrict thought but it should prompt assessors to 
exercise their imagination and their experience and local knowledge about their 
operations, their venues, the crowds and their behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A SURVEY OF PUBLIC VENUES 
A public venue survey was conducted to find out how crowd safety is assessed in 
practice, what sort of constraints and difficulties face the assessors and what techniques 
or tools are used in the assessment. The literature review in Section 2.6 has already 
generated some information, but it was felt that more was required to provide a valid 
picture of current practice. Therefore, the survey aims to establish a better 
understanding of the assessors' needs and how the crowd safety risk assessment 
methodology could meet such needs. 
It is also worth noting that most of the materials covered in the literature review were 
documented prior to or just after the introduction of MHSWR (and its risk assessment 
requirements). Since then some public venues have attempted to apply risk assessments 
to the crowd safety context. The second aim of the survey is, therefore, to obtain more 
up to date information on current practice. A third aim is to identify good practice, 
which can be incorporated into the methodology. 
The survey findings, together with the literature review in Chapter 2 and the case studies 
in Chapter 3, would help the author to develop a model of the tasks involved in a crowd 
safety risk assessment (Chapter 5), to address the research questions in Section 1.6 and, 
subsequently, to establish a set of criteria to set out what is a suitable and sufficient risk 
assessment for crowd safety and for the development of a crowd safety risk assessment 
methodology. 
4.1 Designing the Survey 
The aim of the survey was not to generate statistical data. Instead, it set out to collect 
information on current practice. As such, it took the form of direct conversations with 
people who are involved in the management and assessment of crowd safety. The vast 
majority of the participants were from public venues, others worked for the enforcing 
authorities. Interviews were carried out to discuss the following issues: 
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0 Operational issues - the main safety problems or concerns that exist in the venues 
where the interviewees work. 
0 Current practice - what the interviewees do to assess crowd safety and and, specific 
techniques or tools used. 
0 Practical constraints - what problems or constraints interviewees had experienced 
when assessing crowd safety and when using these techniques or tools. 
0 The application of risk assessment to crowd safety - interviewees' views on what 
a suitable and sufficient crowd safety risk assessment should entail. 
" Assessors' needs - what support and guidance the interviewees would like to see 
to assist them in their assessments. 
Past experience suggests that public safety can be a sensitive issue to many public venue 
managers. In order to encourage more people to take part and for them to be more 
forthcoming with information, it was decided that the interviews should take the form of 
informal discussions. This would also enable details and the rational behind the current 
practice to be discussed and explored in the interviews. 
4.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
Two versions of the questionnaire were developed to provide a structure to the 
interviews. The first version was intended for public venue managers or assessors. The 
second version was produced for interviews with enforcing authority personnel. The 
two questionnaires are essentially the same, although the wordings are different in some 
of the questions to reflect the nature of the jobs of the interviewees. They are shown in 
Appendices A and B respectively. 
Each questionnaire is made up of two parts. Part A covers issues concerning current 
practice. The questions were designed to obtain information about how interviewees 
plan for and assess crowd safety in their venues and what they see are the benefits and 
pitfalls of the assessment methods they used. Part B of the questionnaire is only 
applicable to those who have carried out risk assessment, as defined in the MHSWR, or 
have used specific techniques to identify hazards or evaluate risks. The questions were 
103 
designed to generate in-depth discussions on the application of risk assessment in crowd 
safety. 
Questions 1 and 2 ask interviewees to identify their main operational concerns and the 
reasons for the concerns. The questions are to serve four purposes. Firstly, they provide 
a useful introduction to the interview. Secondly, they help to identify the type of safety 
problems most relevant to different venue types and to establish how important they are 
in relation to each other. Thirdly, they give an insight into non-crowd safety concerns 
(e. g. public disorder, crime), which could have an impact on their practice. Fourthly, by 
establishing the reasons for the concerns, the author would have a better understanding 
on the thinking behind the setting of operational priorities. 
The remaining questions in Part A aim to find out how crowd safety assessment and 
planning was done in various venues. Question 3 is an introductory question to turn 
interviewees' attention from the previous discussions back to crowd safety. Question 4 
aims to establish an overview of the planning and assessment process involved, whereas 
Question 6 looks at each assessment stage. As discussed in the literature review in 
Section 2.6, a key problem associated with crowd safety assessment is that valuable 
information on what went wrong previously is lost or overlooked. What information is 
available to the assessors may also influence what assessment methods are used. 
Question 5 sets out to investigate this and also to look at how information is used in the 
assessment process and if it is used effectively. Finally, Question 7 invites interviewees 
to pass their comments on the benefits and pitfalls of the assessment methods they used. 
Question 8 in Part B invites interviewees to discuss any problems or constraints they 
encountered when trying to adopt the risk assessment principles to assess crowd safety. 
Under the MHSWR, employers are required to carry out a suitable and sufficient risk 
assessment. However, as previously stated, due to the differences in the nature of their 
operations, existing risk assessment guidance that is intended for ordinary workplaces 
could be unsuitable for crowd safety. Hence, Question 9 aims to gauge the viewpoint of 
the interviewees on what is a suitable and sufficient risk assessment for their specific 
venues and for crowd safety in general. Question 10 invites interviewees to suggest how 
a risk assessment methodology specifically for crowd safety may assist and support their 
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assessment needs. Finally, to round off the interview, Question 11 invites interviewees 
to pass on any further comments on crowd safety risk assessment. 
The questions used in the interviews were designed to be general and open-ended for 
two reasons. Firstly, both the literature review in Chapter 2 and the case studies in 
Chapter 3 show that all public venues are different. As such, questions designed to 
cover a wide variety of operations, safety problems and assessment methods have to be 
non-specific. Secondly, the questions are intended as "prompters" to encourage detailed 
and unrestricted discussions during the interviews. 
4.1.2 Selection of Public Venues for the Surve 
Another issue that needed to be resolved is who should take part in the interviews. In 
order to gain a reasonably accurate picture of the situation, the interviews should cover a 
wide variety of public venues. For this purpose, the public venue categorisation scheme 
drawn up in an earlier study by Au et al (1993) was adopted. It was selected because 
under this scheme, venues are categorised according to the nature of their operation and 
the types of activities that normally take place - two of the key factors affecting crowd 
safety. Furthermore, no other categorisation schemes of this kind can be found in the 
literature review. The five categories of public venues are as follows: 
" Transport venues. 
" Sports venues. 
" Shopping venues, exhibition venues and trade fairs. 
" Fairground, festivals and leisure parks. 
" Shows and entertainment venues and pop concerts. 
Ideally, equal numbers of interviews should be conducted in each of the five venue 
categories. But in practice this was restricted by which venues were able and willing to 
take part. 
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Apart fron the venue type, it was also necessary to take into consideration venue size 
when selecting venues for the survey. This is because although the same risk 
assessment principles should apply to venues of all sizes, the needs for support and 
assistance could vary depending upon the scale of the problems they face and the 
resources available. For example, the case studies in Chapter 3 show two types of 
crowd safety problems: general health and safety hazards and hazards associated with 
the presence of large crowds or high crowd density. But hazards associated with crowd 
density are much less likely to be a prime concern in smaller venues where only 
relatively small numbers of visitors are expected. A simple and straightforward risk 
assessment methodology is probably enough. For large venues where both types of 
hazards exist, however, different methods and techniques might be required. It is the 
latter type of venue which is of particular concern to this thesis. 
A further issue that needed to be addressed was how many venues the survey should 
cover. Obviously, the more venues covered by the survey, the more "accurate" its 
findings will be. However, this has to be weighed up against the time and resources 
required to set up the interviews and the number of venues agreeing to take part. 
Arranging for an interview can be very time consuming, it often involves identifying the 
appropriate person(s), making many contacts to seek agreement and arranging a date and 
time for the interview and travelling to interviews. This is often exacerbated by the 
complex structure in some venue owner organisations and the amount of time the 
relevant persons have to spend away from their usual places of contact. 
In the event, a total of 15 interviews were carried out. All interviewees were from major 
venues that handle large numbers of visitors. They included four transport venues, three 
sports venues and an enforcing authority (sports), two shopping/exhibition venues, three 
fairground/leisure parks and two shows/entertainment venues. The following lists the 
public venues and the enforcing authority who took part in the survey: 
Transport Venues 
1. Heathrow Airport. 
2. King's Cross Thames Link. 
;. London Underground (Jubilee Line). 
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4. Tyne and Wear Metro System. 
Sports Venues 
5. Cheltenham Racecourse. 
6. Football Licensing Authority. 
7. Leeds United Football Club. 
8. Silverstone Circuits. 
Shopping Venues, Exhibition Venues and Trade Fairs 
9. MetroCentre. 
10. National Exhibition Centre. 
Fairground, Festival and Leisure Parks 
11. Alton Towers. 
12. Camelot Theme Parks. 
13. Loughborough November Fair. 
Shows and Entertainment Venues and Pop Concerts 
14. Cambridge Corn Exchange. 
15. Stall Moss Theatre. 
4.2 The Survey Findings 
4.2.1 Operational Concerns 
Table 4.1 shows the main operational concerns identified in the interviews and the 
reasons for the concerns. They include evacuation, crowding problems, general health 
and safety, major incidents, public disorder, crime, traffic and customer care/enjoyment. 
Most are relevant to crowd safety, the rest concern other aspects of venue operations. 
Crowding related problems and evacuation appear to be the most common concerns, 
identified by eight and six of the venues interviewed respectively. These are followed 
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by general public safety and major incidents, which were mentioned five times and three 
times respectively. 
Table 4.1: Summary of Main Operational Concerns and their Reasons 
Main Concerns Reasons for the Concerns Venue Types 
Emergency evacuation requirements imposed by fire certificate transport 
Emergency evacuation so that the venue can be exempted from certain transport 
legal requirements and hence reduce operational 
costs 
Emergency evacuation not specified, but could be because of past disaster transport 
(e. g. the King's Cross fire) 
Emergency evacuation occurred a few times in the past transport 
Emergency evacuation do not know how people will react sports 
Emergency evacuation venue was a known target for bomb attacks shopping/ 
exhibition 
Crowding/congestion venue is operating at its capacity transport 
Crowding legal requirements, crowding causes delays and transport 
disruptions (i. e. operational problems) 
Crowding a major venue nearby increases the demand on one transport 
station at times; another station is just too small to 
cope with occasional peaks 
Crowding/congestion experience this problem in peak periods, problem transport 
exacerbated by delayed trains 
Space for visitors to view and insufficient space for visitors to move around sports 
move around during their stay and problems at the departure 
stage 
Crowding/congestion problems exist near some rides; emergency vehicle fair/leisure park 
access blocked 
Crowd control/provision of free customer care, received complaints regarding long fair/leisure park 
flows and movement queues (occasionally) 
Crowding types of visitor; nature of the event shopping/ 
exhibition 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Main Operational Concerns and their Reasons 
Main Concerns Reasons for the Concerns Venue Types 
Management of health and safety The MHSWR shopping/ 
exhibition 
Public safety in general general desire to provide a safe environment shopping/ 
exhibition 
Public safety image of the venue; good for business fair/leisure park 
Public safety types of visitor; things that some artists do that shows/ 
could encourage undesirable behaviour; do not 
entertainment 
know how people will behave 
Welfare of the public past and existing problems largely due to old shows/ 
buildings 
entertainment 
Major incidents do not know exactly what is going to happen sports 
Fire safety previous experience shopping/ 
exhibition 
Ability to deal with a problem image of the venue; good for business fair/leisure park 
Traffic management/access for insufficient road access sports 
emergency vehicles 
Crimes, esp. car crimes previous incidents sports 
Public disorder previous incidents, types of visitor, nature of the sports 
game 
Customer care and enjoyment image of the venue; good for business fair/leisure park 
Those concerns that are crowd safety related include crowding, public safety, evacuation 
and major incidents. The first two types of crowd safety related problems are broadly in 
line with those highlighted in the case studies in Chapter 3; namely, hazards associated 
with the presence of large crowds and general health and safety hazards. Most of the 
interviewees gave crowd safety related problems as their main concerns. To what extent 
this was due to people trying to give the "correct answer" is unclear. Nevertheless, their 
willingness to take part in a research project on crowd safety despite their busy schedule 
suggests in some ways that the subject is of some importance to them. 
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Amongst those who identified crowd safety related issues as their main concerns, the 
reasons given for their concerns are past/existing problems, operational reasons, legal 
requirements, uncertainty on what could happen/how people would behave, the desire to 
provide a safe environment and maintain a good image of the venue. For the public 
venue owners, operational reasons and legal requirements are the two factors that have 
probably the most direct impact on their business. It is therefore perhaps not surprising 
that they are amongst the top answers given. What is of interest, however, is that 
"past/existing problems" is actually by far the most mentioned reason for concerns. This 
has served to confirm what has been said earlier in the thesis (e. g. the literature review in 
Section 2.6). Namely, that the current practice is reactive in nature and assessments are 
often influenced by experience and previous problems. This also suggests that crowd 
safety problems may be more serious than people may have believed when, overall, past 
and existing problems are seen as more important reasons for concern over crowd safety 
than operational and legal reasons. 
Uncertainty on what could happen, how people would behave. etc. was mentioned three 
times by two interviewees as a reason for their concerns. Such concerns are often 
associated with circumstances that are relatively rare, e. g. a major incident. Some venue 
managers realised that however rare they may be, these circumstances could arise and 
are therefore feeling anxious about not knowing what to expect and not being able to 
predict what problems there could be. For example, evacuation was a main concern to 
one of the interviewees, simply because of his uncertainty about how people may behave 
in these situations. Unable to predict what could happen in rare events was also 
identified as one of the main problems many assessors have experienced when 
estimating risk. This will be discussed in more detail later in Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5. 
A general desire to provide a safe environment and to maintain a good image was given 
four times by three interviewees as their reasons for their concerns on crowd safety 
related problems. This suggests that some venues have adopted a more positive attitude 
towards crowd safety and do not see it merely as a legal requirement that needs to be 
fulfilled or a problem that has to be dealt with. For example, one interviewee sees 
crowd safety as an important part of customer care. This, in turn, helps to promote the 
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image of the venue and its business. Similarly, in another venue, crowding is seen as an 
important issue not because of any previous safety problems per se but because of the 
perceived business needs to provide a pleasant environment where visitors can move 
around freely. 
A more in-depth examination into the reasons given for crowd safety related concerns 
has also given an insight into the types of hazards that cause the concerns. They include: 
" Mismatch between venue capacity and crowd numbers. 
" Visitor behaviour. 
0 Inadequate venue design. 
" Problems associated with movements of large crowds, including pinch points and 
obstructions. 
4.2.2 Current Practice 
The current practice on crowd safety assessments amongst the public venues surveyed 
can be categorised into the following two categories: the experience-based approaches 
and the risk assessment approaches. The former refers to those already described in the 
literature review in Section 2.6.2. They are often non-systematic and rely heavily on 
experience, past incidents and previous problems. These are the traditional methods of 
assessment. The latter refers to approaches that are in line with the risk assessment 
principles set out by the HSC (1992) and the HSE (1994). Amongst the fourteen venues 
interviewed (i. e. excluding the enforcing authority), the numbers of venues using the 
former and latter approaches are six and eight respectively - although the sampling 
methods adopted in selecting these sites means that no generalisation to the wider 
population is possible. Also, at the time of the interview, one of those using the former 
was in the process of adopting risk assessment. 
Although the number of venues that have already adopted a risk assessment approach is 
greater than those who were still using the experience-based approach, a significant 
proportion of them (i. e. three) could only manage a partial assessment. For example, in 
one venue, assessment was made on the building alone. Such an assessment will only 
cover physical hazards posed by the building itself and the items within it. Other 
hazards such as those associated with large crowds and crowd behaviour will be missed. 
Therefore, it cannot be regarded as an adequate assessment. In another venue. it was 
reported that the crowd safety part of their assessment could not proceed beyond the 
hazard identification stage. 
Given the relatively small sample size of the survey, it is impossible to say categorically 
why some venues use risk assessment but not others. However, a number of interesting 
factors have emerged from discussions with the interviewees. Firstly, it is believed that 
legal requirements which have the necessary mechanism in place to ensure compliance 
is a major factor for making some public venues adopt the risk assessment approach. 
An example of this is train stations where the Railways (Safety Case) Regulations 1994 
apply. Under the regulations, a station owner has to prepare and secure the acceptance 
of a safety case, of which risk assessment is a vital part, before starting to operate. 
Therefore, the needs for the owner to conduct a risk assessment on all key aspects of his 
operations (including crowd safety) become imminent. As a result, all three of the rail 
transport venues interviewed have made a risk assessment or were in the process of 
doing so. 
Secondly, there seems to be a link between availability of health and safety expertise to 
the venue owner organisations and the approach used. Those who have used risk 
assessment or were in the process of doing so all have available to them one or more of 
the following: in-house safety officers, advice and guidance from the parent 
organisations and external health and safety consultants. In most of the remaining 
public venues, the responsibility of assessing crowd safety falls to people who have 
other demanding duties to perform (e. g. venue manager, event promoter) and have none 
of the support mentioned above. 
Thirdly, it appears that a lack of understanding or a misunderstanding of risk assessment 
and how it works might have something to do with the use of the traditional experience- 
based approach. This and the second factor above are, to some extent, related. Whilst 
in general, professional health and safety practitioners and experts tend to have a good 
112 
grip on risk assessment, others seem to have difficulties in understanding it. It is those 
who did not have the relevant knowledge and expertise on risk assessment who tend to 
use the experience-based approach. This impression was reinforced by comments made 
by one of the interviewees. At the time of the interview, he was responsible for all 
safety and risk matters in an organisation that owns a variety of public venues. He 
pointed out that when risk assessment was first introduced in the organisation shortly 
after the MHSWR came into force, the greatest difficulty he experienced was to help 
venue managers understand what risk assessment is and correct any misconceptions. 
There was also a reluctance to change to risk assessment. He believed that this was 
mainly due to a lack of understanding. Furthermore, to overcome this difficulty had 
been a very time consuming process. 
4.2.3 Experience-based Approach 
The characteristics of such approaches and their pitfalls have already been discussed in 
Section 2.6 and therefore will not be repeated here. What is worth noting is that because 
of their heavy reliance on past problems and incidents, a lot of emphasis has been placed 
on gathering information from different sources. The ways in which this is achieved are 
laudable and could form a useful part of the risk assessment process. The following 
paragraphs outline some of the information gathering methods used by these venues. 
Debriefing is the most popular way to gather information on previous incidents and to 
identify problems. Information and experience can be exchanged through meetings with 
people throughout the venue owner organisation and with other agencies. In particular, 
brainstorming was identified by two interviewees as an effective way of bringing 
together different experience and viewpoints. Also, routine monitoring and inspections, 
feedback from external agencies, feedback from the front line staff and comments and 
complaints from the visitors can provide valuable material for hazard identification. 
Another way of improving the information gathering process is by setting up a reporting 
system so that problems identified are recorded and are made to the relevant persons. A 
reporting system can take many forms. For example, log books, comment cards, 
checklists, etc. were used by front line staff in some venues to record any problems. In 
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another venue, duty managers who are in charge of particular operations are required to 
produce post event reports. They, together with the comments and complaints from the 
visitors, are then analysed regularly. It was also suggested that the information gathered 
can be used to build up a bank of experience and a history of past problems which could 
be of great value to future assessment. Some problems and comments are immediately 
dealt with, others are considered later in future planning. This way, the operation is 
constantly assessed so that any problems and significant changes in circumstances can 
be quickly spotted and improvement can be made where necessary. 
The experience-based approaches tend not to have a formal risk evaluation method per 
se. Establishing how serious a problem is and what further measures are required are 
often ad hoc decisions made based on personal judgement. At times, the following 
factors are taken into consideration: the nature of the problems, the dangers they pose, 
whether they can be dealt with quickly or require a longer term solution, whether any 
realistic measures can be found, safety vs. the needs for the venue to remain attractive to 
visitors, costs and new problems caused by the implementation of remedial measures for 
the original problems. 
4.2.4 Risk Assessment Approaches 
Table 4.2 outlines the important features of the approaches adopted by the eight public 
venues where risk assessment has been used to assess crowd safety. All of them are in 
line with the principles in the MHSWR ACoP (HSC, 1992). The assessment can 
therefore all be described in terms of the same basic assessment stages. However, the 
methods used for each stage of the risk assessment vary from venue to venue. The 
differences are particularly obvious in hazard identification and risk evaluation stages of 
the assessment. The rest of this section therefore focuses on the methods used at these 
two stages. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of Risk Assessment Methods used by Various Venues 
Venues - F-Hazard Identification Risk Evaluation Other Information 
Transport In terms of area (e. g. Mainly subjective, A general public safety 
forecourt), feature but also use assessment which applies to all 
(e. g. stairs, escalators, accident data buildings to ensure a common 
etc. ) and specific 
" Risk: H/M/L 
set of standards throughout. 
issues (e. g. disabled The following are recorded in " persons) " Priority: 1/2/3 tabular format: location/ 
hazards; existing control 
measures; risks; action 
required and priority; person 
responsible. 
" Actions required are 
categorised into immediate, 
long term or further research. 
Transport Go through various Hazard Grade A to " Assessment covers all aspects 
parts of the venue; D of the system, including crowd 
also consider what safety. 
could happen outside " The importance of hazards and 
the actions required are 
decided based on: hazard 
priority; value for money; 
seriousness of problem; 
whether it is a high profile 
problem. 
" Solutions that involve policy 
changes are dealt with at 
corporate level. Venue feature 
changes are dealt with locally. 
If re-development is needed, 
the exact action required will 
be decided by the relevant 
dept. (e. g. Engineering). 
Transport HAZOP technique Unable to estimate " Assessment covers all aspects, 
risks incl. crowd safety. 
" Use established techniques e. g. 
HAZOP and Fault Tree 
Analysis. 
" Assessment consists of two 
parts: the I S` part is to decide 
which hazards require further 
analysis; the 2"d part is detailed 
assessment of certain hazards. 
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Table 4.2: Summary of Risk Assessment Methods used by Various Venues 
Venues Hazard Identification Risk Evaluation Other Information 
Shopping/ Through inspections Subjectively A health and safety 
Exhibition and health and safety By trained staff and 
assessment. 
meetings. H&S advisors in a Conducted by an external 
H&S meeting consultancy firm, no info. on 
the detailed approach. 
" Assessment includes: 
description of activities; 
description of risks; measure 
rating and actions required. 
Fairground/ First, identify types of " Risk rating: I to 5 " The following are recorded 
Leisure Park problem. (i. e. very unlikely to using a tabular format: hazard; 
very likely) activity (e. g. arrival at park, 
" If necessary, break entrance area, etc. ); risk and 
them down into finer " Risk only reflects actions. 
elements; e. g. fire likelihood of hazard 
hazard will be broken " Benchmark against other 
down into fire at major venues, e. g. NEC, the 
shop, at catering area, police, major airports and 
etc. Then assess each Disney World in Florida, for 
element setting performance targets 
and helping to identify the 
actions required. 
Fairground/ " Consider all aspects " Risk: H/M/L " The following are recorded 
Leisure Park of operation; e. g. the using a tabular format: items 
equipment & of interest/concern; whether 
machinery; the rides, the items on the checklist are 
employees' tasks; the applicable or not and/or risks; 
general public; actions. 
storage; etc. " The actions required are 
"A checklist type decided based on training, 
assessment form is experience, local knowledge 
used for each of and "feel". 
those. 
Show Mainly focus on the Effect of hazard: 1 General risk assessment 
buildings because to 3 (i. e. low to (mainly on staff H&S). 
they are old and thus high) Assessment includes 
cause a lot of 
" Estimate risk: I to 3 description of hazards, problems estimate effect of hazard, 
" Also look at specific estimate risk and method of 
hazard types such as control. 
the use of stage 
effects, back stage 
H&S 
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Table 4.2: Summary of Risk Assessment Methods used by Various Venues 
Venues Hazard Identification Risk Evaluation Other Information 
Show " Through checking " Rating scales for "A tabular form is used which 
building, post-show likelihood & has the following columns: 
report, comments and severity area/item; causes; results 
complaints from staff (consequences); severity; 
and customers " 
Risk = likelihood likelihood; risk rating; existing 
rating x severity measures; recommendations 
rating for future improvement; 
changes to procedures; 
training needs and general. 
" If an incident occurs after 
existing measures are in place, 
then it is insufficient. 
Otherwise, assume it is 
sufficient. 
" Additional measures are 
decided mainly through 
brainstorming; but will call in 
external experts to help if 
necessary. 
Hazard identification methods 
Several hazard identification methods and techniques were mentioned in the interviews. 
The most popular method involves going through each part of the venue in turn to look 
at what hazards could arise. This is in accordance with the guidance given by the HSE 
(1994) and others (e. g. British Safety Council, 1993), which is intended for workplaces 
in general rather than the public venue environments. Only a few venues have adopted 
different methods or used additional tools. In one case, hazards are identified in terms 
of different areas of operation (e. g. traffic management, admission of visitors). Another 
venue reported the use of a HAZOP type technique whilst a third venue used a set of 
checklists to assist their hazard identification. 
Different venues also take different factors into consideration when identifying hazards. 
As already pointed out on several occasions throughout the thesis, hazards could arise 
from a variety of factors such as venue design and crowd behaviour. The survey shows 
that emphasis was given to different factors by different venues. What factors are 
accounted for in the assessment are perhaps restricted somewhat by the hazard 
identification methods used in the first place. Given that the most popular method 
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involves examining the venue, it is perhaps not surprising that the factor that receives 
most attention is building and its physical features (e. g. stairs, escalators). Six of the 
eight venues who used risk assessment are known to have taken this particular factor 
into consideration. The second most considered factor is hazardous objects; such as 
hazardous substances or items and machinery (e. g. rides in a fairground). The presence 
of people with special needs (e. g. the disabled) is another factor taken into consideration. 
What is of concern, however, is that although what the visitors do and their behaviour 
are usually amongst the main contributory factors to hazards, there is only one venue 
whose hazard identification involves some form of description of visitors' activities. 
The differences in hazard identification methods and the different factors being 
accounted for, to some extent, reflect the differences in the nature of operation between 
venues (and hence the types of hazards they have encountered). It follows that a crowd 
safety risk assessment methodology should be sufficiently flexible to cater for such 
differences. These differences also highlight a fundamental problem currently facing the 
assessors. Namely, a lack of risk assessment guidance suitable for crowd safety. As a 
result, assessors have to improvise using guidance intended for workplaces in general. 
Whilst their methods may be sufficient for identifying physical hazards associated with 
the venue building and objects, the survey shows that they are clearly insufficient to 
account for hazards associated with the presence of large visiting crowds and their 
behaviour. 
The survey also shows that hazards associated with the presence of large crowds (i. e. the 
"human factors") are not sufficiently straightforward to be identified even by 
experienced venue managers -a point already raised in the case studies. The 
combination of unsuitable methods and the complexity in the identification of crowd 
related hazards often leads to serious omissions. Many interviewees have recognised the 
inadequacy of their methods but are unable to find a better alternative. 
To overcome this problem, the risk assessment methodology ought to be better 
structured, more specific to crowd safety and cover both physical hazards and hazards 
associated with the presence of large crowds. Also, because of the relatively complex 
nature of crowd safety problems, additional guidance or tools, such as the HAZOP type 
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keywords used by one of the venues, could be useful in helping to reduce serious 
omissions in hazard identification. A HAZOP type tool, for example, may also help to 
encourage lateral thinking. In turn, this may encourage venue managers to question their 
existing core beliefs, become more open minded, reduce mind-set and improve 
management foresight and, particularly, their ability to identify potential safety problems 
that may not have occurred before in their venues. 
Risk evaluation methods 
With the exception of one venue, where it was reported that the assessors were unable to 
carry out assessment beyond the hazard identification stage, all other venues estimate 
risks qualitatively by means of rating. But different rating regimes have been used by 
different venues. The most commonly adopted and the simplest regime is one where the 
risk of a hazard falls into one of three levels, usually high, medium or low. Again, this 
is in line with the advice given in HSE guidance booklet: 5 Steps to Risk Assessment. 
As for other venues, risks were graded from A to D in one case and from one to five in 
another. In the latter, risk was expressed in terms of the likelihood of a hazard (i. e. from 
very unlikely (1) to very likely (5)). Its severity was not reflected in this regime. In fact, 
amongst the various rating methods used, only one where both likelihood and severity 
are assessed explicitly. Under this regime, the assessors have to rate each hazard for its 
likelihood and its severity separately. The overall risk is then determined by multiplying 
the two ratings. 
The findings here have given rise to two points of interest. Firstly, some of the venues 
interviewed appear to be of the view that the basic "high/medium/low" rating regime is 
probably too crude for their purposes and has opted for something more sophisticated. 
What is of interest is that a similar situation can also be found in the general health and 
safety scene where alternative risk rating schemes have been proposed. Details on some 
of the alternative schemes are discussed in the review of the existing risk evaluation 
methods and techniques later in Section 6.4. This appears to suggest that whilst the 
basic HSE regime may be sufficient for some workplaces, others feel the need for more 
consideration and finer categorisation to reflect the wider variations of the risks in their 
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workplaces. This often resulted in risk rating schemes that are more sophisticated and 
more complex to use. 
Secondly, it is arguable whether any of the regimes mentioned are appropriate to the 
assessment of crowd safety. Apart from one venue, none of the methods used require 
the assessors to explicitly consider both the likelihood and the severity of a hazard. The 
case studies in Chapter 3 show that the risk posed by similar hazards could vary in 
different venues and under different circumstances. The variations could be significant. 
For example, a change in the circumstance could affect how likely something is to occur 
or how severe the consequence would be or both. Furthermore, as reported above, there 
were some misconceptions amongst the interviewees on what is meant by risk. Some 
interviewees tend to equate risk with chance and disregard what consequences the 
hazard could have when estimating risks. Experience suggests that this is also true 
amongst the wider venue assessor population. A methodology that requires the 
assessors to explicitly judge the likelihood and the severity could help to reduce this 
problem. 
Methods on deciding risk reduction measures 
The methods used to decide what further remedial actions are required and to prioritise 
them also vary between venues, but to a lesser extent. The decisions on what remedial 
actions to take are made subjectively based on experience. Priority is set according to 
the perceived seriousness of the problems (i. e. their risk levels). Some venues also take 
into account other factors such as costs, value for money, best practice, relevant 
standards or guidance, whether it is a "high profile problem" and what effect these 
actions may have on other parts of the venues and other operational needs. The pros and 
cons of some of these factors are already discussed in the literature review on alternative 
approaches in Section 2.3.3 (e. g. cost-effectiveness, target setting). One venue reported 
that it benchmarks itself against other major venues and organisations. Benchmarking 
can be used to measure how well one does and for setting criteria and performance 
targets. For example, by using the response time of the emergency services as a 
benchmark, a venue can decide how fast it needs to be to respond to an incident. This 
would also help the assessors to determine whether existing arrangements are sufficient. 
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However, it cannot be used as a basis for comparing which hazards are more important 
and prioritising what remedial measures to take first. 
In some venues, the identification of remedial actions were done by the assessor on his 
own. In other venues, this was done collectively through meetings or brainstorming. In 
the case of one organisation, which owns a number of venues, it was reported that local 
changes were decided at the venue level but any significant changes in the procedures 
and venue design were considered at the corporate level. 
Alternative approaches for multi-venue owners 
It is worth noting here that some venue owners have adopted what can be referred to as a 
"two-tier" risk assessment approach. They are usually owners of venues where one-off 
events are held either as a normal part of or in addition to their operations. The first tier 
is a general/high level risk assessment. It focuses on problems that are common to most 
circumstances (e. g. poor venue design, crowd flows and aspects of emergency 
management/egress). The second tier assessment looks at problems that are specific to 
individual events. For example, problems associated with visitors' behaviour tend to 
vary between visitor types and therefore have to be considered in the context of each 
event. The main benefit of this approach is that instead of carrying out a full-scale risk 
assessment every time an event is to be held, the assessors only have to focus on things 
that are not covered in the general assessment or where its findings are not applicable to 
the particular event being assessed. 
Multi-venue owners (i. e. those who own a number of similar venues) could also benefit 
from using a similar approach. A general assessment, which addresses the problems 
that are common to most venues, can be done at the corporate level. Venue managers 
can then modify the general assessment and focus on problems that are specific to their 
own venues. This would reduce the workload on venue managers and place less 
reliance on their ability to carry out sufficient risk assessment whilst retaining their local 
knowledge and experience. It also helps to ensure that common standards are applied 
throughout the owner organisation. 
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4.2.5 Problems and Constraints Facinv Risk Assessors 
Setting aside the time needed for the assessment is a common problem for many 
interviewees. This is especially so for those who have to carry out the assessment in 
addition to their main or normal duties. Out of the eight venues where risk assessment 
has been carried out, five have identified this as one of the major problems facing them. 
However, many of them also recognised the benefits of a thorough risk assessment and 
believed that it is a worthwhile exercise. This problem calls for a methodology that is, 
on the one hand, sufficient in addressing all significant crowd safety risks that could 
exist in a venue but, on the other hand, kept simple to use. Furthermore, because every 
venue is different, it is important that the methodology should also be sufficiently 
flexible to allow assessors to take into account in the assessment their experience and 
information which they gain from the day-to-day running of the venue. 
Apart from keeping the methodology simple, the survey has identified two other 
possible ways of reducing this problem. Unfortunately, both methods are only suitable 
to some venues. The first one is to make the assessment during a quieter period. Such a 
practice has already been adopted in two of the venues interviewed. The second method 
is to develop a general risk assessment that reflects the core hazards and risks. Each 
assessor can then apply it at his own venue/sector. An example of this is the two-tier 
approach described in Section 4.2.4. Another example is the use of a hazard checklist 
and a standard risk assessment form. At least two venues have carried out their 
assessment this way. This approach is largely in line with the suggestion in paragraph 
20 of the MHSWR ACoP. Obviously, it is suitable only to owners of a number of 
similar venues or if similar things could go wrong in different parts of the venue. 
As far as risk assessment methodology is concerned, the problems encountered by the 
interviewees mainly concern hazard identification and risk estimation. No significant 
problems on other parts of the assessment were reported. However, it was suggested by 
one interviewee that the methodology should also address the issue of acceptability of 
risk, i. e. whether a particular risk can be contented with or if something has to be done 
about it. 
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Hazard identification is regarded by many as the most important part of the risk 
assessment because any hazards that are not identified will not be assessed, thus leaving 
a gap in the assessment. Yet, five of the eight venues surveyed have encountered 
difficulties. Some of them considered this to be the most difficult task to do. As 
previously discussed, the main problem is omission. It could be due to the inadequacy 
of the hazard identification methods currently in use to account for the types of hazards 
that are common in public venues but are rare in ordinary workplaces. 
Another reason for the omission is that many assessors find it difficult to assess 
behaviour. Three of the five interviewees who have experienced difficulties in hazard 
identification explicitly pointed to this factor. In the words of one interviewee, visitors' 
behaviour is not as "assessable" as the other factors such as the physical hazards. Apart 
from inquiry reports on major accidents and disasters, there is little information in the 
literature on visitor behaviour, what causes it and what hazards could arise as a result. 
In an attempt to look at how behaviour may be affected, Au et al. (1993) have developed 
a crowd behaviour model. Figure 4.1 shows the model. In this model, behaviour is 
considered to be a continuous process that is made up of the following four key 
elements: 
0 To sense - i. e. to obtain information from the surrounding environments. 
0 To interpret - i. e. to consider the meaning of the information received. 
0 To plan - i. e. to decide upon the actions required in response to the interpreted 
situation. 
0 To act - i. e. to execute the plan or decision. 
In addition, the behaviour of individuals combines and interacts with each other to give 
a collective or group response to a situation. 
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Figure 4.1: Model of Crowd Behaviour in Public Venues (Au et al., 1993) 
Factors Affecting Individual Behaviour 
1.1 Environment 
ý. 
Sense 
1.2 Availability & Clarity of Information 
2.1 Content of Information 
2.2 Information Source 2. 
2.3 Knowledge, Experience & Expectations 3110 Interpret 
3.1 Knowledge & Experience 
32 Goals & Objectives 
3. 
3.3 Alternative & Choice Decide 
3.4 Consequences 
3.5 Mental Condition & Emotion ýL. 
4.1 Physical Condition of the Individual 
4 
Act 
4.2 Venue Physical Characteristics 
4.3 Venue Characteristics at any time 
Influence on Collective Behaviour 
Individual 
Common Objectives & Desires Behaviour 
e. g. common desires, habit, curiosity 
General Circumstances 
e. g. venue/event type, crowd type, atmosphere, the 
accepted norms. 
Interactions Between the Behaviour of Individuals Collective 
e. g. credibility of the first individual, acceptability of 
Behaviour 
the actions, group bravado, camaraderie. 
Hence, factors affecting crowd behaviour are categories in terms of: 
0 Factors affecting the physical ability of people obtaining and receiving information 
(e. g. see, hear, etc. ) from the surroundings. This would normally depend on what 
and how much information is available, its clarity and environmental factors such as 
lighting level, glare, noise, echoes, etc. 
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" Factors affecting how the information is interpreted. Interpretation of information is 
a cognitive process that could be affected by the content of the information (e. g. is it 
sufficient, general or specific, open to misinterpretation? ), where the information 
comes from (e. g. how serious people are likely to take it and are they going to trust 
it, comply with it, ignore it or take it to mean something else? ) and the people 
themselves (e. g. experience on similar events/situations and expectation of what is 
to happen). 
" Factors affecting decision-making. This is also a cognitive process whereby people 
decide what to do next or the responses required to the information. This could be 
affected by a wide range of factors such as what people's knowledge and experience 
tell them, their goals and objectives (i. e. what they come here for, what they want to 
do, what immediate needs and desires they may have and whether, and to what 
extent, what people are required to do complement or contradict their goals and 
objectives), what the alternatives and choices are (e. g. other things to do instead of 
queuing for a busy ride, alternative routes to take, etc. ), what people think are the 
consequences of doing or not doing certain things and the mental and emotional 
state of the people (e. g. aggressiveness, fright, emotional fever, etc. ). 
0 Factors affecting their physical ability to execute whatever they decided to do. This 
would often depend on the physical ability of the people themselves (e. g. influence 
of alcohol, injury, etc. ), the venue design (e. g. layout, space and capacity, etc. ) and 
any temporary features and characteristics (e. g. maintenance and construction, 
temporary barriers and fencing, weather conditions, emergency situations, etc. ). 
" Factors influencing the transition from individual behaviour to collective behaviour. 
They may include any common objectives and expectations the crowd as a whole 
have, the convention and acceptable norms, the atmosphere, group bravado, "follow 
the leader", etc. 
Whilst the model provides some ideas as to how crowd behaviour could be affected in 
general, more work is still needed to establish how best this could be applied to predict 
behaviour in specific venues under specific circumstances. At present, a crowd safety 
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risk assessment is restricted somewhat by our inability to accurately predict behaviour. 
However, it is worth noting that it is not the aim of this research project to investigate 
crowd behaviour as such but rather to develop a methodology that helps the assessors to 
capitalise the existing knowledge and experience they have on visitor behaviour in their 
risk assessments. 
It is believed that a risk assessment methodology for crowd safety could help to reduce 
omission in two ways. Firstly, it provides a systematic framework to ensure that 
considerations are given to all significant parts of the venue and aspects of its operation 
and, secondly, it provides suitable tools, such as checklists or keywords, to prompt or to 
encourage assessors to think of the possible hazards. Such a tool would enable a more 
comprehensive and better-organised examination of the various factors affecting safety. 
It would also help assessors to identify hazards that have not happened before and could 
therefore be particularly useful to assessors of new venues. 
Risk estimation also gives rise to some concerns to three of the interviewees. For some 
hazards, this can be done based on experience, accident data and other data and figures 
(e. g. those gathered for statistical or marketing purposes). However, the problem arises 
when they have to deal with hazards that have low likelihood but high severity (e. g. a 
major incident). By their nature, these hazards are out of the "ordinary" and may have 
never happened before. This leaves the assessors with nothing to work on. To tackle 
this problem, one venue looked at relevant incidents elsewhere and tailored them to its 
specific circumstances. Another venue reported that assumptions would have to be 
made where information or data was unavailable. 
4.3 Conclusions and Discussions 
The survey has highlighted a number of problems associated with the current practice in 
crowd safety assessment. It has also identified the constraints and difficulties facing the 
assessors and, consequently, the help and assistance they require to conduct a suitable 
and sufficient risk assessment for crowd safety. Several good practices have also been 
revealed in the course of the survey, this information could be useful for later on in the 
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development of the risk assessment methodology for crowd safety. The following 
summarises and discusses the key findings of the survey. 
A total of fourteen venues and one enforcing authority took part in the survey. Together, 
they cover a wide range of venue types. Although the sample size may be too small for 
it to be wholly representative, it has given an insight into the needs of the assessors and 
has generated valuable information for the research. The survey also represents what is 
probably the best that can be achieved in data gathering given the research constraints 
highlighted in Section I. S. The focus of the survey, as with other aspects of this thesis, 
is on major venues that generate large numbers of crowds. 
Crowd safety and related problems are the most important operational concerns amongst 
the participating public venues. Crowding, in particular, is the most mentioned concern. 
Past and existing problems are the main prompter for the concerns. This finding serves 
to confirm once again the important role previous experience has played in assessment 
and planning in public venues. Further examinations suggest that the types of hazards 
that give rise to the concerns include the mismatch between venue capacity and crowd 
size; visitor behaviour; inadequate venue design; and problems concerning movements 
of crowds and the pinch points and obstructions created by them. These findings, 
together with those of the case studies, highlight the types and nature of crowd safety 
hazards that could arise in public venues. What is also of interest about this particular 
finding is that the vast majority of the hazards that give rise to interviewees' concerns 
over crowd safety are those associated with the presence of large crowds rather than 
physical hazards (also see Section 3.3.2). Yet, as shown in the later part of the survey, it 
is hazards due to the presence of large crowds that assessors find most difficult to assess. 
Amongst the fourteen public venues surveyed, six of them were using an experience- 
based approach along the line of those described in the literature review in Section 2.6.2. 
The other eight venues have assessed crowd safety in a manner that is largely in line 
with the risk assessment principles set out in the MHSWR ACoP (HSC, 1992). The 
availability of health and safety expertise to the venue owners appears to be a factor. 
What is worth bearing in mind is that not all public venues (including the major venues) 
have access to qualified health and safety practitioners. In many cases, assessments are 
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carried out by operational personnel (e. g. venue managers) whose background, expertise 
and, thus, the main duties are not in safety. This could have a significant bearing on 
assessors' needs from the crowd safety risk assessment methodology \-ie«point. 
Discussions with the interviewees have also revealed that there appears to be a lack of or 
incorrect understanding amongst many on what risk assessment is. The experience of 
one of the interviewees serves to confirm this view. Responsible for all safety and risks 
matters in an organisation that owns a variety of public venues, this interviewee reported 
that the greatest difficulty was to make his venue managers understand risk assessment 
and to deal with misconceptions. 
The experience based approach that relies on individuals' local knowledge, experience 
and information on past problems has been the traditional method for assessing crowd 
safety. No evidence has been found from the literature review or the survey to suggest 
that such assessments were anything other than ad hoc in nature. Through talking to the 
interviewees, however, it becomes more apparent that these are important not only to the 
experience based approach but also to risk based assessment as well, especially given 
that there are no data or universally applicable guidance on how large crowds and visitor 
behaviour may contribute to crowd safety risks. This reinforces one of the conclusions 
drawn from the case studies (i. e. Section 3.3); namely, what is required is an assessment 
method that enables the assessors to capitalise on their knowledge and experience about 
their specific venues in a systematic and comprehensive manner. 
Amongst the eight public venues that carried out risk assessment on crowd safety, the 
vast majority of them use methods that are in line with those recommended for 
workplaces. The case studies in Chapter 3 have already highlighted the differences in 
risks between public venues and workplaces. Many have reported problems concerning 
hazard identification and risk evaluation. For hazard identification, the main problem is 
that, by and large, the emphasis of the assessment has been on physical hazards (i. e. 
those associated with the building, hazardous materials/substances/items, etc. ). 
Interviewees generally find it difficult to account for the hazards associated with the 
presence of crowds. The behaviour of the visitors is a particularly difficult area to 
address, 60% of those who said that they had experienced difficulties in hazard 
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identification explicitly pointed to behaviour. Only one of the eight venues that carried 
out risk assessment explicitly considered visitor activities during hazard identification. 
This is perhaps a further indication that the existing risk assessment methods are not 
suitable for crowd safety. Many interviewees reported that although they recognised the 
inadequacy of their methods, they were unable to find a better solution. Their main 
concern is with omissions. Any hazards that are not identified will not be assessed, thus 
leaving a gap in the assessment resulting in necessary remedial actions not being taken. 
Another danger is that omissions in risk assessment may give a false sense of security to 
venue managers and the front line staff. They could become ill-prepared for the hazards 
associated with behaviour and hence could be wrong-footed should visitor behaviour 
become problematic. 
In terms of risk evaluation, what is of interest is that all except one venue evaluate risk 
qualitatively by means of rating. The remaining venues reported that they were unable 
to assess crowd safety risks beyond hazard identification. Not even the railway 
operators, who use QRA for other aspects of their operations, assess their stations 
quantitatively. Beyond that, however, there is little agreement between venues on which 
rating regime is most appropriate. One method is to categorise risks into three rating 
levels (e. g. high, medium or low risk). Once again, this is in line with the guidance 
given for workplace risk assessment. Other venues have expanded their rating scale to 
four or five points to reflect the complexity of the problems. The main concern about 
these methods is that they do not require assessors to consider likelihood and severity 
explicitly. Given the problem reported earlier on people's misconceptions over what 
risk and risk assessment are, a single rating scale for the overall risk could be a recipe 
for human errors. In fact, the survey has found that, at least in one venue, risks were 
definitely expressed in terms of likelihood only, thus failing to comply with the risk 
assessment principles given in the literature in Section 2.2. Another concern associated 
with a single rating scale for risk is demonstrated in the survey where interviewees 
reported that they had problems dealing with hazards that have low likelihood and high 
severity. As discussed in the literature review in Section 2.7, this should not be a 
problem if risk evaluation requires the assessors to devise risk through estimating 
likelihood and severity separately. This way, the final risk, devised from both estimates, 
should be able to cater for a whole range of likelihood and severity levels. This problem 
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also serves to reinforce the argument, also in Section 2.7, that crowd safety risk 
assessment needs to be more vigorous than what the existing guidance has provided, 
which is intended for the ordinary workplaces. Whilst a single risk rating scale may be 
appropriate for many workplaces, a more sophisticated method is required to cater for 
the more "extreme" cases that may occur in public venues. However, amongst the eight 
public venues that have undertaken risk assessments for crowd safety, only one of them 
have used a risk evaluation method that explicitly requires the estimate of both 
likelihood and severity. 
Table 4.3 summarises the problems and constraints experienced by the interviewees and 
highlights some of good practices revealed in the course of the survey. It also identifies 
what the assessors need in order to overcome the problems and constraints in different 
parts of risk assessment. 
Table 4.3: Summary of Problems, Good Practice and Assessor Needs 
Assessment Problems and Constraints Good Practice Assessor Needs 
Stages 
Overall To set aside the time for the A "two-tier" approach to "A simple assessment 
assessment. This is risk assessment or carry method that is not too 
especially so for those who out assessment during time consuming to do. 
have to carry out the quieter periods 
assessments in addition to 
their normal duties e. g. to 
manage the venues. 
Heavy reliance on past Brainstorming "A pro-active method 
problems that encourages users to 
exercise imagination & 
prompt thoughts on 
what could go wrong. 
Failure to understand or Training/explanations 
misconceptions over the of the concept of risk 
concepts of risk and risk and risk assessment 
assessment. principles. 
"A step-by-step guide to 
risk assessment. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of Problems, Good Practice and Assessor Needs 
Assessment Problems and Constraints Good Practice Assessor Needs 
Stages 
A lack of guidance/data on Information gathering "A method that enables 
how large crowds & methods e. g. debriefing users to better utilitise 
behaviour could affect brainstorming, venue their local knowledge 
safety inspections, monitoring, and experience. 
comments/complaints, 
front line staff inputs, 
exchange information 
with meeting relevant 
bodies and agencies, 
incident reporting, etc. 
Hazard Omissions; esp. hazards A method appropriate 
Identification associated with large to the types of hazards 
crowds and behaviour; encountered in public 
emphasis on physical venues. 
hazards only 
" Some forms of crowd 
dynamic & behavioural 
hazard "prompters". 
Different venues face eA flexible method that 
different hazards cater for different types 
of venues. 
Risk Some tend to equate risk " Training/information on 
Evaluation with chance the concept of risk. 
" To consider likelihood 
& severity explicitly. 
Problems dealing with low Estimate likelihood & 
likelihood but high severity separately to 
consequence hazards devise the overall level 
of risk. 
Ad hoc judgements on Some consider factors Guidance/principles for 
significance of problems & such as costs, value for risk prioritisation, e. g. 
what needs to be done money, what effect the ALARP. 
actions may have on other 
parts of the venue, etc. 0 
To consider tackling the 
causes of hazards or 
Benchmarking their consequences. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT TASKS 
The interview survey reported in Chapter 4 was aimed at establishing the types of 
approach and the techniques used by venue management in assessing risk concerning 
crowd safety. The present chapter is concerned with utilising the information generated 
so far to set out the strategies and activities involved in crowd safety risk assessment 
using a task analysis approach. The aims of the analysis are firstly, to highlight the 
needs of the assessors in terms of successfully completing a suitable and sufficient 
hazard identification, risk evaluation and risk assessment in general. Secondly it is to 
identify what assistance and support a crowd safety risk assessment methodology should 
aim to provide. The task analysis is a proposal for the risk assessment tasks that should 
be carried out, based on the risk assessment principles in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, rather 
than an analysis of what assessors do currently. This chapter describes the analysis and 
its rational. The analysis was carried out in two parts. The Hierarchical Task Analysis 
(HTA) technique was used firstly to systematically describe the overall risk assessment 
task in terms of its goals and sub-goals. This was followed by a Tabular Task Analysis 
where lower level sub-tasks were analysed to establish what is required in order to 
successfully accomplish them. The two parts of the analysis are presented in Sections 
5.1. and 5.2 respectively. Based on the analysis and the findings in previous chapters, a 
set of criteria for the development of the methodology was then drawn up. They are 
presented in Section 5.3. 
5.1 Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
HTA was used to break down the assessment task into more manageable sub-tasks. 
This particular technique was chosen because it enables the examination of the task in 
terms of its goals and sub-goals, thus allowing analysis to be conducted on what the 
assessors should aim to achieve without pre-empting the specific task activities 
involved. 
Figure 5.1 presents the top three levels of the HTA of the risk assessment task. The full 
HTA is given in text format in Appendix C-1. 
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Figure 5.1: HTA of the Crowd Safety Risk Assessment Task 
o. o CONDUCT A CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSNBNf 
Plan 0: 1 Ehen (2 &3 in any oia ölen 4 then (5 
regJaty or in rase of sigrificant c anges/pxotierrs) 
to Identify hazards ^ zo Decide wfio rright 3. o Evaluate risks 4.0 Record findings 5. o Review & revise 
be harmed & how ý, _..... _...... ,, __.. _..,... _... _ assessment 
Plan 1: In any order Plan 3: 3.1 then 3.2 Plan 4: In any order 
Plan 2 21 then 22 then 3.3 Plan 5. " 51 then 52 
then 5.3 
1.1 identify hazards 2.1 Ic tify visitors Wfio 3.1 Estimate risks 4.1 Sftw that proper 5.1 Decide alien to 
associated with poor night be pa t1olarly checks mere made renew 
. irerxie design vtlrlerable 
3.2 Prioritise risks 
4.2 Shaw that 52 Decide Mare in the 
1.2 Identify hazards 22 Consider tbv reasorla 1e Mons assessment need to be 
associated with visitors' Visitors might be have been taken 3.3 Idertti(y rear ial 
re sad 
acboities & behevioir ýed actions 
5.3 Modify assessment 
1.3 Identify hazards amordingly 
due to poor cu d 
safety management: 
1.4 Identify hazards 
due to dsnVtions to 
domtot operations 
At the top of the HTA, the overall goal of conducting a crowd safety risk assessment 
was broken down into several sub-goals: 
" Identify hazards. 
" Decide who might be harmed. 
" Evaluate risks. 
" Record findings. 
Review and revise assessment. 
This was done based on the HSE framework on risk assessment and the risk assessment 
principles described in Section 2.2.2. Each sub-goal represents the key objective that 
risk assessors in any safety contexts should aim to achieve. 
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Beyond the top two levels, there are no fixed rules about how a risk assessment should 
be conducted (HSC, 1992). Indeed, a review of existing risk assessments later in 
Chapter 6 shows that a variety of methods and techniques are used in different contexts. 
This suggests that a risk assessment method that is suitable to one application may not 
necessarily be appropriate to others. QRA is a good example. This type of method has 
been widely used in the high hazard industries and in some applications within the 
railway industry. But, for reasons highlighted in the literature reviews (in Section 2.3.4 
and Section 2.7), it is deemed unsuitable for many other applications. 
The rest of the HTA is, therefore, more crowd safety specific, taking into consideration 
the kind of safety issues that are particularly relevant to public venue operations, such as 
those identified in the case studies and venue survey in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
The analysis also takes into account existing guidance and current thinking on 
qualitative risk assessment (e. g. Kletz, 1988a; MoD, 1991; Royal Society, 1983 and 
1992; HSC, 1992; British Safety Council, 1993 and HSE 1995) and the author's own 
experience on previous crowd safety assessment for public venues. The following looks 
at the HTA of each of the five top level sub-goals in more detail. 
5.1.1 Identify Hazards 
Many assessors involved in the venue survey regarded hazard identification as the most 
important part of risk assessment in that any hazards that are not identified here will not 
be assessed. This could result in serious omissions in the assessment. In order to ensure 
an adequate and sufficient hazard identification, the assessors must be able to identify all 
hazards that could have a significant effect on crowd safety. Some form of taxonomy of 
crowd safety hazards is therefore needed for the development of the HTA and, possibly, 
the assessment methodology itself. Such a taxonomy can be found in a recent research 
report by Au et al (1993). The research covered a wide range of public venues including 
sports grounds, shopping centres, concerts, transport venues, outdoor events and others. 
Based on a series of interviews and observations carried out at these venues, the report 
has identified the factors that could affect crowd safety and suggested that crowd safety 
problems are often due to a combination of the following categories of contributory 
factors: 
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" Inadequate venue design or design limitations 
" Visitors' behaviour. 
" Breakdowns in crowd management (including staff errors). 
" Equipment failures. 
" Undesirable circumstances. 
A sufficient hazard identification would therefore require assessors to give adequate 
considerations to all these factors. This requirement is reflected in the HTA under Task 
1.1 where its sub-goals are defined in terms of these factors. It is worth noting that the 
last two factors were included under the heading of "interruptions to normal operations". 
The rest of this branch of the analysis sets out what assessors should aim to do in order 
to identify the hazards associated with each factor. These sub-goals include identifying 
the main sources of hazards and deciding what hazard(s) could subsequently arise. 
5.1.2 Decide Who Might be Harmed 
Not all hazards affect everyone who is exposed to them. For example, a piece of 
machinery may be perfectly safe for its operators but some of its design features could 
pose safety hazards to those who maintain it or vice versa because of the different ways 
in which a maintenance person and an operator interact with the machine. Also, some 
everyday items that pose little or no risks to most adults could become hazardous to 
young children (e. g. tiny objects and medicine containers). The society we live in 
demands these people also need to be protected from such hazards. 
Similarly, in public venues, some people are particularly vulnerable to things or 
situations that are not normally hazardous to the vast majority of the visitor population. 
For example, young children or disabled persons could find manoeuvring through high 
(but not dangerous) crowd density areas, stairs and steep slopes more difficult and 
hazardous than other visitors. The aim of this part of the assessment is therefore to 
determine whether the hazards affect the visitor population as a whole or whether they 
tend to affect certain types of visitors. The information generated here can be used at a 
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later stage of the risk assessment to help to determine whether a more focused remedial 
measure is more appropriate. 
The venue survey revealed that, in practice, this part of the assessment was either not 
carried out at all or carried out in conjunction with hazard identification (i. e. Task 1). 
However, for the purpose of the analysis, this is treated as a separate task so as to enable 
the author to identify whether extra assistance or support is required to fulfil this part of 
the assessment. 
5.1.3 Evaluate Risks 
This part of the assessment has been broken down into three sub-goals: estimate the risk 
associated with each hazard, evaluate risks for the prioritisation of remedial actions and 
identify the measures required to reduce risks. As stated in the literature review in 
Section 2.2.1, risk should reflect both the likelihood of hazard and the magnitude of the 
consequences should it occur. As such, risk estimation should involve the estimation of 
the likelihood and severity of each hazard and then determine how much risk the 
hazards pose to safety based on their likelihood and severity. They are included as 
Tasks 3.1.1 to 3.1.3 respectively. 
As QRA is neither possible nor appropriate to crowd safety assessment, risk estimation 
can only be done subjectively. Based on the findings of the venue survey and from the 
literature, a number of factors that need to be considered have been identified. For 
likelihood estimation, they include past experience, information on previous accidents 
and near misses and relevant guidance. These factors are listed under Task 3.1.1. For 
severity estimation, consideration should be given to human costs of an accident (i. e. 
human suffering such as anxiety and stress, injuries and death) and costs to the venue 
owner (e. g. increased insurance costs, prosecutions, loss of revenue and adverse 
publicity). They are listed under Task 3.1.2. The above factors should also be taken 
into consideration when deciding on what actions to take in order to keep the risks as 
low as reasonably possible (i. e. Task 3.3). 
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Ideally, actions should then be taken to eliminate all risks. But absolute safety is simply 
impossible to achieve in reality. Furthermore, it is important to realise that what can be 
done in practice is very often restricted by financial, resource and other constraints. This 
is a fact of life that applies not only to public venues but also industries and other 
aspects of everyday life (e. g. HSE, 1992a). In recognition of this, all that the law 
requires is therefore to take reasonably practicable measures to keep the risk as low as 
possible. This involves setting priorities and deciding what is reasonably practicable 
(i. e. Task 3.2). 
Priority setting would involve, first of all, deciding whether, with reference to the 
provisions already in place, the risks posed by the hazards are still unacceptable and then 
setting out the relative importance of the remaining hazards according to the safety risks 
they pose. They are represented in the analysis as Tasks 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. The 
prioritisation would enable assessors to ignore the trivial risks and concentrate on those 
hazards that need to be addressed most. 
5.1.4 Decide What Remedial Actions are Required 
Task 4 in the HTA is to determine what actions need to be taken to minimise the risks. 
This would involve firstly the identification of ways in which the risks could be 
minimised (Task 4.1) and then deciding what are the most appropriate action(s) to take. 
The general requirement (HSE, 1994) is to take whatever actions necessary, in order of 
preference, to completely eliminate the risks (e. g. by removing the sources of the 
hazards), reduce the risks as much as possible or control the harm (e. g. by protecting 
those who are particularly vulnerable to it). Therefore, the identification of possible 
remedial measures would require a good understanding of what causes the hazards in 
the first place and the harm to people exposed to them (see Tasks 4.1.1 to 4.1.5). 
Where there are a number of options available, decisions have to be made on the most 
appropriate remedial actions. This can he a complex decision involving subjective 
judgement to weigh up the financial and other costs of implementing the measures 
against the benefits. As such, it is difficult to precisely define what sub-goals are 
involved. However, the venue survey has revealed a number of main factors which the 
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assessors would have to take into account. They include the priority of the risks, the 
effectiveness of the measures, other problems that could be introduced as the results of 
taking the actions, the direct and indirect costs of taking the actions and other trade-offs 
that have to be made (e. g. reduction of visitors' enjoyment, making the event less 
attractive, etc. ). These factors are listed under Task 4.2.1. 
5.1.5 Record Findings 
The MHSWR requires all employers with five or more employees to record the 
significant findings of their assessment. This requirement applies to the vast majority of 
public venues. In general, the assessors should show on the assessment records that a 
proper check was made and that reasonable precautions have been taken to ensure 
public safety. The former can be achieved by recording the significant hazards 
identified in their assessment, indication of their risks and the population which may be 
affected. Where necessary, the assessors should also cross-reference to other documents 
and records where detailed information can be found. The latter can be achieved by 
recording any existing control measures in place, any actions to be taken and, if it has 
been decided that no further actions are required, the reasons for such a decision. Again, 
the assessors should, where necessary, cross-reference to other documents and records 
for more detailed information. They are listed in Tasks 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. 
5.1.6 Review and Revise Assessment 
The MHSWR also requires employers to review and, where necessary, revise their risk 
assessment to ensure that it remains valid. To accomplish this task, decisions have to 
be made on the timing of the review (Task 6.1) and, where necessary, which parts of the 
assessment need to be revised (Task 6.2). Appropriate modifications then have to be 
made to the affected parts in order to ensure that the assessment is up-to-date with the 
current safety situations (Task 6.3). 
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5.2 Tabular Task Analysis 
A tabular analysis was then carried out to examine in detail each lower level sub-task. 
The aim was to establish, firstly, what the assessors need to be able to achieve in order 
to accomplish each sub-task and the overall crowd safety risk assessment task 
successfully, what are the problems of the assessment and, thirdly, what help and 
support the crowd safety risk assessment methodology could provide to address these 
problems. The tabular format was chosen for its suitability for such detailed analysis. 
Task analysis can be used for a wide range of applications, such as design evaluation, 
training need analysis, job design and reliability analysis. A full analysis can cover all 
aspects of a task, which is unlikely to be necessary in every application (Stammers and 
Shepherd, 1995). What is therefore required is to decide what aspects we need to look 
at in this particular analysis. 
Whether a task can be successfully accomplished depends on a combination of factors. 
Shepherd (1989), for example, has identified four categories of contributing factors: the 
training received, the equipment to do the task, the information required and the material 
provided. Whalley (1987), on the other hand, has identified a total of 146 "performance 
shaping factors" that could influence the reliability of human performance. At the top 
level, these performance shaping factors grouped under the following categories: 
0 Process: sub-categorised into technology, chemistry and process material. 
" Personnel: sub-categorised into training, experience, mental model, personality and 
health. 
" Ergonomic: sub-categorised into environment, personnel interactions, man-machine 
interface, equipment and work demands. 
Obviously, not all factors are relevant to every task type. Risk assessment is primarily a 
cognitive/analytical task often carried out as a desk-top exercise. Therefore, factors 
such as equipment, technology, chemistry, material and man-machine interface are of 
little or no relevance. Factors such as personality, health, environment, personnel 
interactions and work demands could be relevant but they cannot be provided for by 
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means of a risk assessment methodology or a guidance document. As such, they are 
also not considered in this analysis. The types of factors that are covered in the analysis 
include knowledge (including training that can be provided by means of a risk 
assessment methodology), experience, information and procedural matters. 
Figure 5.2 shows an extract of the analysis. The full tabular task analysis is presented in 
Appendix C-2. 
Figure 5.2: Tabular Analysis of the Crowd Safety Risk Assessment Task 
TABULAR ANALYSIS OF THE CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT TASKS 
TASK: IDENTIFY HAZARDS 
Task Sub-task Task requirements Potential problems implications to crowd safety risk 
no. description assessment methodology 
1.1 Identify hazards 
associated with 
poor design 
1.1.1 Consider each part Ensure that all parts of the venue This could be difficult to achieve for large "A systematic and structured method of 
of the venue are considered (procedural) venues with complex layout hazard identification. 
Guidance on how to deal with large 
and complex venues. For example, 
divide venues into smaller, more 
manageable parts (e. g. functional 
areas) and assess each part in turn. 
1.1.2 Identify undesirable Ensure that all significant hazards Too much emphasis on what happened in "A "hazard prediction" type method/one 
& design features & are identified (procedural) the pass, insufficient effort to predict what that encourages forethought is required 
1.1.3 the hazards/harms could go wrong; Experience-based (e. g. HAZOP). 
that could arise approaches only focus on past " The hazard identification process must 
experience & hence not sufficiently be systematic and structured. 
comprehensive 
Identify any problematic designs or " Omissions - most hazards of this type " The hazard identification method need 
designs that could cause problems are relatively obvious but some are to be though provoking (e. g. a HAZOP 
(knowledge, experience & info. ) less obvious type method or keyword prompters). 
Assessors forgotten about certain Adequate information gathering, e. g. 
past problemslncidents venue inspections, observations and 
Info. on near misses & past problems monitoring, comments and complaints. 
do not always reach the assessors Method that encourages inputs from 
the front line staff. 
Identify any non-compliance with It is reasonable to assume that competent 
regulations, standards & guidelines assessors/venue managers are all aware 
(knowledge) of the relevant regulations, standards, etc. 
1.2 Identify hazards 
associated with 
visitor's activities 
& behaviour 
1.2.1 Identify undesirable Ensure that all significant hazards " Omissions - this type of hazards are " The hazard identification method need 
& activities/behaviour are identified (procedural) usually difficult to account for (also to be though provoking, assistance 
1.2.2 & the hazards/harms see case studies & venue survey in needs to be given to prompt assessors 
that could arise Chapters 3 and 4) (e. g. HAZOP type keyword prompters). 
Experience-based approaches only " Systematic hazard identification. 
focus on recent experience &, hence, " As all venues are different, hence there 
may not be sufficiently is a certain degree of reliance on 
comprehensive venue specific experience: hazard id. 
The tabular analysis has five columns of information. The first two columns contain a 
list of sub-tasks and their task numbers. The third column looks at what the assessors 
need to achieve to accomplish each of the sub-tasks (i. e. task requirements). This part of 
the analysis focused on knowledge and experience, information requirement, assessment 
methods and procedures. The fourth column highlights the problems the assessors may 
encounter when fulfilling the needs. This is partly based on information gathered in the 
venue survey in Chapter 4. The fifth and final column identifies what implications these 
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problems could have on crowd safety risk assessment methodology and the help and 
support the methodology could offer to fulfil the task requirements. 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of the main task requirements and the potential problems 
in achieving them. 
Table 5.1: A Summary of Task Requirements and the Problems Involved 
TASK REQUIREMENTS POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
Ensure that all parts of the venues are covered in the This could be difficult to achieve esp. for large 
assessment. venues with complex layouts. 
Ensure that all significant hazards are identified and Concentrate too much on past problems and 
be able to recognise those designs, venue features, not enough forethought on what could go 
activities/behaviour, substances, etc. that could wrong. 
cause significant harms to people. The experience-based approaches are not 
sufficiently comprehensive for reasons that are 
already given in Section 2.6.2. 
" Incomplete information - assessors may not 
have sufficient interaction with visitors or first 
hand experience on what happens on the 
ground. 
" Info. on some near misses, past problems, etc. 
may not reach the assessors. 
" Omissions. 
" Mind set/unduly influenced by factors such as 
personal experience, hot topic of the day, 
politics, etc. 
" Assessors often find it difficult to account for 
hazards associated with the presence of large 
crowds and, esp. crowd behaviour (also see 
venue survey in Chapter 4). 
Make accurate and reliable estimates of risks. Assessors may not have daily interaction with 
the visitors and first hand experience about 
what actually happens on the ground. 
" High level of uncertainty; i. e. a lack of data, 
statistics, etc. 
" QRA is unsuitable for reasons already given in 
Sections 2.3.4 & 2.7. 
" Qualitative assessments tend to have a lower 
level of reliability & consistency. 
" Different interpretations of the words used in 
qualitative assessments, such as high/ 
medium/low risks. 
" Risk estimation scheme too crude or too 
sophisticated to adequately reflect the full 
spectrum of risk. 
141 
Table 5.1: A Summary of Task Requirements and the Problems Involved 
TASK REQUIREMENTS POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
Make accurate and reliable estimates of risks. Misconceptions over the concepts of risk and 
(cont. ) risk assessment (also see Section 4.3 venue 
survey). 
Risk estimation should take into account any Incomplete information - assessors may not 
precautions that are already in place & past have sufficient day-to-day contact or front line 
experience. interactions with the visitors. 
" Info. on some near misses, past problems, etc. 
may not reach the assessors. 
Ensure that risk reduction decisions are valid and Ad hoc decisions. 
justifiable. 
" Decisions unduly influenced by personal 
experience, hot topic of the day, politics, etc. 
Identification of remedial measures should be Only tackle the symptoms, not the cause of the 
rational; according to the HSE principle (1994), problems. 
actions need to be taken, where practicable & in 
order of preference, to eliminate the hazards or to 
Ad hoc decisions/rely on gut feelings. 
minimise the extent of risk. Unduly influenced by own experience, hot 
issue of the moment, politics, etc. 
Demonstrate that all significant risks have been Omissions in risk/risk assessment record. 
considered. Record all risk reduction actions or 
reasons for non-action. 
Make sure that risk assessment is always valid. Out of date risk assessment/assessment fails to 
reflect changes in circumstances, work 
practices, etc. 
From the tabular task analysis, a number of key requirements for the development of the 
methodology were established. They include: 
9A systematic hazard identification method is particularly important assessing 
complex problems such as crowd safety. Being able to identify all significant risks 
is a key requirement in risk assessment. A structured and systematic approach will 
help to minimise the chance of missing something important. 
" There should be guidance in the methodology on methods for dealing with complex 
venues. As part of a structured and systematic approach to risk assessment, the 
current best practice is to divide a complex system into smaller, more manageable 
sub-systems. This is very much in evidence in Human Factors (i. e. task analysis) 
and in industries where complex systems are involved. For public venues, one way 
of doing this is to break them down into smaller, more assessable parts or functional 
areas (Au et al., 1993). Further discussions can be found in Section 6.1.2. 
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" The importance of information gathering needs to be highlighted. There should also 
be guidance on methods of information gathering included as part of the overall risk 
assessment and planning methodology. Information is key to risk assessment and 
decision-making. Relying on one's own experience alone is insufficient, as 
discussed in Section 2.6.2. Venue inspection, observations, incident reporting, input 
from front line staff and customer feedback, discussions with other relevant bodies, 
etc. are useful information gathering methods identified in the venue survey. 
" Risk assessment (hence crowd safety planning) should be pro-active, not simply re- 
active. The aim of a risk assessment is to establish what could go wrong as well as 
what went wrong in the past. Whilst past experience is a valuable source of 
information, it is vital that assessors should not restrict their thoughts on what 
happened in the past alone. It needs to be sufficiently forward looking. 
0 Some form of hazard identification tool kit to provide additional help to assist 
assessors to account for crowd related hazards is important. As illustrated in the 
case studies in Chapter 3, crowd safety can be a complex problem. The venue 
survey in Chapter 4 has highlighted the difficulties assessors found in identifying 
crowd related hazards and the associated problem of omission. 
" The methodology should include a systematic risk estimation scheme with an 
explicit requirement to estimate both likelihood and severity. This is essential to 
overcome the misconception many of the assessors have over risk (i. e. risk = 
chances). It is also important to ensure that risk estimation is done in a rational 
rather than an ad hoc manner and to reduce any undue influences such as "the hot 
issues of the moment" and politics. 
" There should be a requirement to consider what precautions are already in place and 
to assess their effectiveness during risk estimation. Existing precautions can be 
regarded as "counter-risk contributory factors" and therefore need to be taken into 
account when estimating risks. If an existing precaution is highly effective and the 
residual risk is already very small, there may not be any need for further actions. 
Resources can be better used to tackle the more important risks. 
0 The risk estimation scheme should be sufficient to reflect the full spectrum of crowd 
safety risks that could arise in a major public venue, ranging from the very low risks 
to the very serious. 
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" The risk estimation scheme should aim to improve reliability and consistency of risk 
judgements. More thought is still required on how this can be best achieved (e. g. 
carefully chosen and clearly defined words). 
9 The risk assessment method should require/encourage assessors to think about what 
causes a hazard and its consequences. For a complex problem, understanding the 
problem is important for identifying the correct remedial measures. Crowding due 
to different contributory factors/reasons may require different solutions. Where it is 
not possible to tackle the cause of a problem, knowing the consequences would help 
to identify means to protect people from the harm it causes. The severity of the 
consequences is also a key consideration in risk estimation. 
0 Decisions on risk reduction measures should be risk based to avoid ad hoc decisions 
and undue influences. Some form of guidance on TOR could be useful. 
"A comprehensive "tool" for recording risk assessment is required (e. g. a sample risk 
assessment record form). 
9 There should be general guidance on when to review and revise risk assessment. 
5.3 Discussions and Criteria for the Development of a Risk Assessment Method 
for Crowd Safety 
By systematically examining the tasks involved in assessing crowd safety risks, the task 
requirements and the potential problems that could prevent assessors from successfully 
completing their tasks, the task analysis has identified a large number of methodological 
issues. It is clear from the list in the previous section that in order to assist assessors to 
achieve a suitable and sufficient risk assessment for crowd safety, a systematic method 
for hazard identification must be provided. In addition, guidance, tools and other help 
are also required especially for hazards associated with the presence of large crowds and 
behaviour. Less help is required for the identification of physical hazards. In terms of 
risk evaluation, a risk estimation scheme is clearly required to guide assessors through 
the process. As highlighted previously in the venue survey, there is a need to explicitly 
require assessors to consider both likelihood and severity when estimating risks. This 
requirement has been reinforced in the analysis. Another important issue concerning 
risk estimation is how to improve the reliability and validity of the judgements people 
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make on risks. Literature review suggests that qualitative assessments in general tend to 
have a lower level of reliability and validity. The need for the risk estimation scheme to 
adequately cover the whole range of crowd safety risks, from the very minor risk to the 
highly significant risks, is also an important requirement. When deciding what actions 
need to be taken, the main problems appear to be ad-hoc decisions, undue influences and 
the tendency to tackle the symptoms rather than the underlying causes. The assessment 
method should, therefore, be designed to restrain assessors from going down these 
routes. Finally, to satisfy the legal requirement and the risk assessment principles 
identified in Chapter 2, tools and guidance are required on recording the assessment and 
ensuring that it remains valid. 
By pulling together the findings from the literature reviews, the case studies, the venue 
survey and the task analysis, it becomes possible to identify what the risk assessment 
methodology needs to provide in order to help assessors to conduct a suitable and 
sufficient assessment for the types of crowd safety risks that could arise in major public 
venues, to tackle the issues associated with the assessment of such risks and to address 
the need of and the operational constraints facing the assessors. From these, a list of key 
criteria for the development of a crowd safety risk assessment methodology is drawn up 
below. 
Overall requirements 
The crowd safety risk assessment methodology should take into account the following. 
(a) It should comply with the risk and risk assessment principles highlighted in 
Section 2.2 and the legal requirements set out in the relevant legislation (in 
Section 2.1); i. e. risk should reflect both likelihood of harm and its severity and 
the methodology should enable the identification all significant risks, 
prioritisation of measures to be taken and be appropriate to the nature of the 
work in public venues; it should, therefore, consist of, broadly, hazard 
identification and risk evaluation. 
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(b) It must be more robust than the risk assessment for an ordinary workplace (such 
as an office or a light industrial environment) because of the nature of the risks 
and who might be affected; but for the same reason, it need not to be as 
sophisticated as that for the high hazard industries. QRA methods are deemed 
unsuitable and, perhaps, unnecessarily complex for crowd safety. 
(c) It should be simple and easy to use and suitable to be used by people with 
relevant H&S knowledge as well as those who are from an operational 
background. For the latter group, there is also a need to correct any 
misconceptions over risk and risk assessment. 
(d) It must be applicable to existing as well as new public venues. 
(e) It should take into account the lack of crowd safety failure data and stress the 
importance of information gathering as part of the overall approach to good risk 
assessment and planning. The inclusion of good practices in information 
gathering is beneficial. 
(f) It should cater for the time constraints facing many assessors; the inclusion of 
advice on time saving measures, such as conducting assessments during quieter 
times of the year or a "two-tier" approach, should make risk assessment more 
practicable to many public venues. 
Hazard identification 
(g) It should provide a systematic method for hazard identification that caters for the 
different hazards that could arise in different venues. 
(h) It should enable assessors to account for physical hazards and hazards associated 
with the presence of large crowds. The latter hazard type (and particularly 
visitor behaviour) is less predictable and most assessors find them very difficult 
to identify. Some form of hazard identification tool is required to overcome this 
difficulty. It may be useful to encourage assessors to consider the key hazard 
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contributory factors/crowd safety hazard taxonomy such as venue design, visitor 
behaviour, crowd management, hazardous substances and items and disruptions 
to normal operation (including equipment failures, delays and undesirable 
circumstances). 
(1) It must be proactive and forward looking in order to overcome any mind-sets on 
past problems and over-reliance on personal experience; the provision of some 
forms of "prompters" to encourage assessors to predict what could go wrong is 
beneficial, this may be in the form of a checklist, keywords, etc. 
(j) It should provide guidance on how to deal with complex venues. One way of 
doing so is to break it down into smaller, more manageable parts. 
(k) Encourage inputs from other sources; e. g. the involvement of the front line staff, 
the outside bodies involved and, possibly, external expertise. 
Risk evaluation 
(1) It should provide a systematic risk based evaluation method. There should be an 
explicate requirement on assessors to estimate both likelihood and severity. 
(m) It should be sufficient to cover the full spectrum of crowd safety risks highlighted 
in the case studies in Section 3.3.2, i. e. ranging from risks that present no 
significant threats to major disasters such as Hillsborough. 
(n) It should enhance the reliability and consistency of the risk estimation process; the 
provision of some forms of likelihood and severity criteria/categorisation (or any 
other suitable means). Using clearly defined words should help to achieve this. 
(o) It should provide a scheme that enables the assessors to work out the risk level 
based on the estimated likelihood and severity. 
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(p) It should require assessors to take into consideration the precautions that are 
already in place. 
Deciding what remedial actions to take 
(q) It should require/encourage the assessors to think about what causes the hazards in 
the first place and to identify the consequences when determining the appropriate 
remedial measures for each significant risks. 
(r) It should provide guidance or other suitable tools to help assessors to prioritise 
measures to be taken. Such decisions should be risk based to avoid ad hoc 
decisions and undue influences; some forms of guidance on TOR may be useful. 
(s) It should highlight the need to also consider whether a risk reduction measure 
could introduce any new problems elsewhere. 
Others 
(t) It should suggest a format for recording assessment or provide a sample `risk 
assessment record form'. 
(u) It should provide general guidance on when to review an existing assessment and 
on the circumstances under which a revision of the assessment may be required. 
Presentational issues 
(v) It should provide a glossary of the key terms (e. g. hazard, risk) and explain the 
concept of risk and risk assessment principles. 
(w) It should be written in a "down to earth" manner, avoiding the use of technical 
jargon with which some assessors are likely to be unfamiliar. The provision of 
examples to illustrate how the methodology works could be useful. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ADMINISTRATION OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD -A REVIEW OF 
SPECIFIC ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES AND TOOLS 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 have examined the nature of crowd safety risks, the tasks of 
assessing crowd safety risks, the needs of the assessors and associated issues. A set of 
criteria for crowd safety risk assessment has been established. This chapter will review 
how these criteria can be best fulfilled. A review has already been carried out in Section 
2.4 on some of the risk assessment methods, techniques and tools currently employed in 
or proposed for applications elsewhere in other contexts. This chapter is to look at these 
techniques and tools and discuss how relevant they may be in fulfilling the criteria and 
addressing the risk assessment and practical issues identified in previous chapters. The 
aim of this chapter is also to see what can be learnt from risk assessments elsewhere. 
Once again, the main focuses are on hazard identification and risk evaluation. 
6.1 Hazard Identification 
6.1.1 The Criteria and the Issues 
The key requirements for hazard identification are that it should be systematic and that it 
should account for all significant safety hazards. In crowd safety, such hazards generally 
include physical hazards as well as hazards associated with the presence of large crowds 
and their behaviour. An adequate and sufficient hazard identification process should, 
therefore, be able to deal with all these hazards. It has been established, through the 
venue survey, that the latter hazards are especially difficult to identify. How best to help 
assessors to overcome this difficulty is an issue that needs to be addressed. It has also 
been demonstrated in the case studies in Chapter 3 that hazards tend to vary from venue 
to venue. Venue specific circumstances and experience are therefore important for 
hazard identification. However, whilst taking into account past experience, hazard 
identification should also be proactive and forward looking in order to identify any new 
hazards that may not have occurred before. This is particularly important for new 
venues and venues that have just undergone significant modification. It can also be 
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beneficial to take on board a range of views and experience, such as those of the front 
line staff and emergency services. How to combine all these in a hazard identification 
process is another issue that needs to be looked at. 
The existing qualitative risk assessment methods are for general health and safety in the 
ordinary workplaces, such as offices and shop floors. Many of the hazard identification 
methods are loosely structured (e. g. walkthrough/venue inspections, safety meetings and 
debriefings/reviews) and are found in the venue survey to be inadequate particularly in 
identifying crowding and behaviour related hazards for public venues. It can be argued 
that because of the complexity of crowd safety hazards and the extent of the risks (i. e. 
crowd safety risks could affect a large number of visitors whereas most health and safety 
hazards in an ordinary workplace tend to affect the individuals involved), a more robust 
method is required. On the other hand, there is a need for the method to be simple and 
easy to use as many assessors are not full-time safety risk professionals and have to carry 
out risk assessments in addition to their normal duties as operational managers or event 
organisers. Time constraint is also a factor. Consequently, striking a balance between a 
more robust method and one that is simple and easy to use is also something that needs 
to be considered when deciding on a hazard identification method. 
Finally, the size of some venues and the complexity of their layouts mean that it may no 
longer be appropriate to assess the entire venue all in one go. In other contexts where an 
assessment is carried out on a complex system or task, the assessor often has to first 
break a system down into a number of smaller sub-systems or sub-tasks before assessing 
each sub-system or sub-task. A similar method will have to be found to enable assessors 
to break down a complex venue in order to make the assessment more manageable. 
6.1.2 Hazard Identification Techniques and Tools 
Dealing with complex venues 
Section 2.4.3 considered how a complex engineering system, operation or human task 
can be broken down into smaller and more manageable components for risk assessment. 
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A common feature amongst them is that their components are clearly definable and the 
relationships between individual components and how they interact are well understood. 
But for public venue operations, things are not as clear-cut. Although in an earlier study 
Au et al (1993) has suggested that risk assessment could be made through examining the 
human activities involved (and their interaction with venue design, crowd management, 
the circumstances, etc. ) in a manner similar to task analysis for human operations, this is 
likely to be extremely difficult and cumbersome to achieve in practice. The suggestion 
was made based on the notion that visitors' activities and behaviour are a main factor 
affecting crowd safety, just as operator activities and human errors are to the safety and 
success in the workplace. However, unlike in the workplace where people's activities 
are very much defined and restricted by the tasks they are employed to do and the 
procedures they have to follow, visitors in public venues do not have such restrictions 
and they are much freer to do what they desire to. Defining their activities in the ways 
described in Section 2.4.3 can be a major problem. This also means that, in practice, 
there can be a whole host of activities going on at any one time. For many venues, there 
could be different mixes of activities at different times in different places. The sheer 
variety of activities, in itself, can make the detailed analysis of each activity impractical. 
But apart from what visitors do per se, the interaction between different activities can 
also be an important issue. For example, in the two public venues used in the case 
studies in Chapter 3 there are certain times where there are people arriving and departing 
at the same time. Similar situations can also be found in other venues including 
transport venues, shopping malls, exhibition centres, fairgrounds and others. The 
interaction between the arriving and the departing crowds can lead to problems such as 
excessively high crowd volume and cross flows along the routes. Furthermore, visitor 
behaviour can also be influenced by a wide variety of factors, such as weather 
conditions. For these reasons, it is concluded that to break down visitor activities along 
the lines of the methods identified in Section 2.4.3 is not a viable option for this 
particular application. 
What is more definable, however, is the geographical make up of a public venue; i. e. the 
different areas of the venue. A public venue is often made up of different "sectors". 
They are situated in different areas or at different parts of the venue and are used for 
different functions. For example, the access routes to the venue, the forecourt, the 
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concourse, the check-in/ticket area, the main stadium/viewing area etc. are all different 
aspects of a public venue. For the purpose of this thesis, they are called "functional 
areas". As they are designed to serve different purposes, these functional areas are likely 
to each have their own distinctive characteristics, visitor activities and, hence, the types 
of hazards. For example, crowd flow is likely to be more of an issue on the access 
routes than inside the viewing, area, whereas queues are more 
likely to CICV'elop in the 
check-in/ticket area of the venue. It is therefore feasible that a complex venue can he 
broken clown not in terms of visitor activities but into smaller I'unctional areas instead. 
Risk assessment can be made by systematically examining each area, its design and 
layout, the types of activities that are likely to take place and their interactions. This is 
roughly in line with the guidance given by the IISE (1994) for workplace assessment - 
i. e. to walk around and look afresh at what could reasonably he expected to cause harm. 
Iclentifiii c. sa/ I1' lxr: arcls 
The review in Section 2.4.4 has identified several techniques and tools that are in use or 
being proposed for hazard identification In other contexts. 
They Include brainstorming, 
structured brainstorming such as I IA/OP, human error analysis, the "walkthrough type 
approaches and the use of checklists or keywords. These methods and techniques all 
have their benefits and pitfalls. I-IAZOP (especially IIA7_. OP 11), human error analysis 
and logic diagrams are all well established, highly structured and very systematic and 
thorough. But they could he time consuming and resource intensive to du. I Iumaºi error 
analysis and logic diagram, in particular, require the object of the assessment (i. e. tasks, 
engineering systems, etc. ) to be broken down into well defined elements in the manner 
described in Section 2.4.3. As discussed above, this is not viable in crowd safety. Also, 
they are often carried out by specialists (stich as human tictors specialists and safety and 
reliability engineers) and require certain expertise that the vast majority Of' public venues 
do not possess. In comparison, method study, brainstorming and vvalkthrough methods 
are relatively simple, easy to use and inexpensive to carry out, but they 'ore not as 
systematic and comprehensive. Significant hazards could therefore be missed. 
Checklists, on the other hand, tend to be more comprehensive but, at the Saufe time, they 
are very specific and thought restrictive. Checklists are also more Insensitive to ; luv' 
changes in the work practice and circumstances. IIA/OP and the keyword approach, 
Iý-, 
however, is not restricted to a particular situation, workplace or set of circumstances. It 
is useful in that it prompts assessors to also think about what could go wrong in the 
future rather than just searching the past. It is therefore a structured and a forward 
looking hazard identification method. But it remains the case that a full blown HAZOP 
(again, HAZOP II in particular) is time consuming and costly to do and requires some 
specialist expertise. 
Whilst the existing hazard identification methods and tools may not be entirely suitable 
for the crowd safety for one reason or another, there are a few features of these methods 
that could be useful and relevant and from which something could be learnt. Firstly, the 
systematic approach and the comprehensiveness of the HAZOP type techniques, human 
error analyses, logic diagrams and methods of this kind are particularly useful for 
detailed in-depth investigations for complex systems/activities. Secondly, the relative 
simplicity of the walkthrough type methods means that they are generally less time 
consuming to do and that they can be done in-house without acquiring specialist 
expertise. This could therefore encourage more venues to take up risk assessment. 
These methods also tie in better with some of the things many venues are already doing 
to assess crowd safety (see venue survey in Chapter 4). Thirdly, the ability of HAZOP 
and brainstorming to be pro-active and forward looking is particularly useful for new 
venues and for the frequently changing nature of venue operation in general and visitor 
behaviour in particular. Such methods are also good at drawing together different 
viewpoints and experience. Finally, the thought provoking nature of the keyword 
approach, HAZOP and brainstorming can be especially beneficial for crowd safety 
where things are not as nicely defined as in the case of an engineering system or human 
task activities in the workplace. They are also sufficiently non-restrictive to be 
applicable to a wide variety of venue operations. 
Despite their useful features, human error analysis, logic diagrams and checklists are 
fundamentally unsuitable for crowd safety. Human error analysis relies on the output of 
a task analysis. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, in public venues where visitor 
activities are wide ranging, it becomes extremely difficult to define activity in the same 
way as work activities are defined in task analysis. Another key difference between 
work activities and visitor activities is that the former take place where the 
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circumstances are not frequently changeable. For the latter, as illustrated in the case 
studies in Chapter 3, even the same activity could give rise to different hazards in 
different parts of the venue at different time and in different circumstances. In public 
venues, the circumstances can vary from time to time (e. g. times of day, weekdays vs. 
weekends, time of the year, the types of visitors, the nature of the performance, arrival 
vs. departure, etc. ). This makes human error analysis or similar methods, which involve 
analysing each activity for all possible circumstances, extremely complicated and very 
clumsy to do. Logic diagrams are used to define how different factors could contribute 
to a hazard. Although they could help the assessors to have a better understanding of the 
hazards (and hence more able to identify the most appropriate remedial measures), the 
techniques are intended mainly for engineering processes where the functions of plant 
components are well defined and the manner in which failures could occur is relatively 
restricted and hence more predictable. It is doubtful whether they are workable in the 
crowd safety context where visitors' behaviour can be influenced by the interaction of so 
many factors. The manner in which crowd safety "failures" could occur is much more 
wide ranging. Checklists are prescriptive in nature and this gives rise to a number of 
problems when applied to crowd safety. Firstly, they tend to restrict the thoughts of the 
users to specific problems, issues or items on the checklist. Whilst they may be useful 
for audit purposes, checklists are generally much less suitable for predictive assessment. 
Secondly, any significant changes in the circumstances could easily render a checklist 
invalid. Thirdly, a hazard checklist intended for all types of public venues is likely to be 
extremely long and cumbersome and hence virtually unusable. 
6.2 Risk Evaluation 
6.2.1 The Criteria and the Issues 
A main criterion for a risk evaluation method is that it should be systematic to provide a 
rational basis for decision-making. An explicit requirement within the method is for the 
assessors to take into account both the likelihood of the hazard causing harm to people, 
and the severity of the consequences is also essential. This is because, firstly, it is an 
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important and fundamental concept of risk as applied to risk assessment and, secondly, 
it is one which is widely misunderstood, as shown in the venue survey. 
As in other similar methods and tools that enable/assist people to pass judgements on an 
issue, an event or the quality of an item or services, a key issue in risk evaluation is how 
to ensure that risks are estimated in a valid and reliable manner. This issue is 
particularly important for qualitative risk assessment where risks cannot be quantified 
and estimates have to be made by judgements. Another important criterion is that the 
risk evaluation method has to be sufficient to reflect the full spectrum of crowd safety 
risks. Because of the complex nature of crowd safety problems, the risks they pose to 
people's safety and well being could be wide ranging. Like crowd safety hazards, the 
risks associated with these hazards can also be different in different places at different 
times and in different circumstances. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the risk of, for 
example, a fast moving crowd or a tripping hazard may have a minimal impact on safety 
in one case but could turn into a disaster with multiple fatalities in a different 
environment and set of circumstances. A suitable risk evaluation method should 
therefore cover the whole range of risks (or how people could be affected) and also 
allow meaningful distinctions to be made between the variety/different levels of risks 
within the range. This issue is addressed later in Section 7.3.4. 
6.2.2 Risk Evaluation Techniques and Tools 
The review of existing risk assessment methods in Section 2.4 shows that rating is used 
universally for qualitative assessment. Risk rating has the potential to satisfy all criteria 
identified in Section 5.3. It enables assessors to determine and categorise how important 
the hazards are so that they can be prioritised. It is also easy to use, it is not time 
consuming to do and does not require any specialist expertise. What is perhaps of more 
interest and hence worth a further examination is the "semi-quantified" methods. 
Section 2.4 has already pointed out that in mathematical terms, the notion of using what 
is essentially subjective ratings in mathematical calculations and then mixing them with 
real numbers to give an overall risk value is fundamentally flawed. Also, because of the 
involvement of mathematical formulae and their apparent sophistication, the semi- 
quantified methods can mislead people into treating the overall risk values in terms of 
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real numbers, rather than just an indication of the level of the risks. This is particularly 
so for public venue assessors and managers whose understanding of mathematics and 
probability is rather limited or has become somewhat rusty. There are also other 
problems associated with this kind of method: 
(a) These risk rating schemes are very arbitrary. For example, in the example given in 
Section 2.4, a rating of 5 is allocated if an accident could happen once a year and a 
rating of 10 is given if it could occur once a month. This seems to suggest that the 
latter is twice as "risky" as the former. If the risk rating scheme is meant to truly 
reflect the risk involved, the latter should be given a "value" which is 12 times as 
much as the former (i. e. once a month = 12 times a year). In another part of the 
scheme, the MPL scheme appears to suggest that, for example, losing two limbs 
or both eyes (i. e. rating = 45) is 1.5 times as serious as losing one limb or an eye 
(rating = 30) or it is nearly as bad as a fatality (rating = 50). Whether one would 
agree with such an analysis depends on personal views and is subject to dispute. 
But what it shows is that the rationale behind the allocation of these likelihood and 
human suffering "values" appears to be highly arbitrary with little or no means of 
justification. 
(b) In general, the use of figures in a rating scheme could be confusing and could lead 
people to perceive the scale as an interval scale or a ratio scale, even where they 
are merely intended to indicate a ranking. 
(c) The use of actual numbers as an indicator of severity is inappropriate to public 
venues where there are large numbers of people. For certain hazards, such as 
overcrowding, it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict exactly how many people 
would be harmed. Any figures given are likely to be highly speculative. 
On the basis of the above, the inevitable conclusion is that semi-quantified methods are 
fundamentally flawed and unsuitable for the evaluation of crowd safety risks. 
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6.3 Conclusions 
The review of the existing risk assessment methods, techniques and tools has not found 
anything that is directly applicable to crowd safety risk assessment. But much can be 
learnt from the ways in which risks are assessed elsewhere. This exercise has identified 
a number of useful features and ideas that could be adopted to satisfy the criteria set out 
in Section 5.3. 
In hazard identification, for example, the use of keywords and HAZOP type techniques 
could help to ensure that this part of the risk assessment is systematic, comprehensive, 
thought provoking and brings together different experience and viewpoints. Amongst 
the risk evaluation methods found in this exercise, rating appears to be most relevant to 
qualitative assessment. It is also the most widely used method. However, this exercise 
also identified many risk rating schemes where subjective rating is treated as or used in 
combination with real numbers to generate a numerical risk value. Whilst such methods 
may look more sophisticated and impressive, they are mathematically flawed. 
To summarise, Table 6.1 compares the methodological issues highlighted in the criteria 
in Section 5.3 with the methods, techniques and tools discussed in this Chapter. This is 
to provide an overview of how these issues are currently addressed in other contexts. 
Table 6.1: A Comparison of Criteria and Existing Methods, Techniques and Tools 
Criteria and Methodological Issues for Existing Methods, Techniques & Tools 
Hazard Identification & Risk Evaluation 
A systematic and comprehensive method for HAZOP, guidewords/keywords, checklists, task 
hazard identification. analysis, human error identification techniques, logic 
diagrams. 
Dealing with hazards associated with the Human error identification techniques, human error 
presence of large crowds and, in particular, classification schemes, task analysis, Human 
behaviour. HAZOP/keywords. 
Proactive and forward looking method so as to HAZOP, brainstorming, keywords. 
prevent mind-sets and over-reliance on past 
experience alone. 
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Table 6.1: A Comparison of Criteria and Existing Methods, Techniques and Tools 
Criteria and Methodological Issues for Existing Methods, Techniques & Tools 
Hazard Identification & Risk Evaluation 
Dealing with complex systems. Task analysis, divide up a process into stages, divide 
up a plant into plant components, walk-through. 
Encourage the involvement of front line staff HAZOP, brainstorming. 
and other relevant persons. 
A systematic risk evaluation method with an QRA, human reliability techniques, some risk rating 
explicate requirement on considering both schemes, semi-quantified risk assessment. 
likelihood and severity. 
Covering the full spectrum of risks ranging from QRA, human reliability techniques. For risk rating 
those that present no or very little real threats to and semi-quantified schemes, it depends on the 
major disasters. detailed designs. 
Reliability and consistency of risk estimation. QRA, human reliability techniques. 
A scheme for establishing the overall risk level QRA, human reliability techniques, some risk rating 
based on the estimated likelihood and severity. schemes, semi-quantified risk assessment. 
"Residual" risks , 
i. e. take into account any - 
precautions that are already in place. 
Deciding what needs to be done and the Legislation, standards, ALARP, cost benefits 
prioritisation of remedial measures. analyses. 
This review has generated useful information on current wisdom and current practice in 
risk assessment. What is now required is to build on the various ideas, techniques and 
tools identified here and develop a method and associated techniques and tools that are 
suitable and appropriate to crowd safety risk assessment and address the needs of the 
assessors in different public venues. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DEVELOPMENT OF A PROTOTYPE CROWD SAFETY 
RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
The investigation into the application of risk assessment to crowd safety has examined 
the nature of the risks that can arise in a public venue (Chapter 3) and has analysed the 
tasks involved in assessing these risks (Chapter 5). It has also looked at the practices 
adopted in many venues for crowd safety assessment and planning and the constraints 
and practical difficulties facing public venue assessors (Chapter 4). The information 
has enabled the assessors' needs to be identified and a set of criteria to be established 
(Section 5.3). At the same time, a look at how risk assessments are conducted in other 
contexts (Section 2.4) has highlighted features of the existing methods, techniques and 
tools that could help to address the assessors' needs and fulfil the criteria (Chapter 6). 
Detailed design of a risk assessment methodology for crowd safety can now proceed. 
This chapter describes the development of a prototype methodology and the rationale 
behind it. 
7.1 An Overview of the Methodology 
As the first step towards the development of the prototype, Table 7.1 summarises the 
key criteria and how they could be fulfilled. On the basis of the research findings, an 
overall method for crowd safety risk assessment and techniques and tools for specific 
risk assessment tasks are developed. 
Table 7.1: Key Criteria and Potentially Suitable Risk Assessment Methods 
KEY CRITERIA T SUITABLE METHODS 
Overall methodology The risk assessment principles set out by 
" Must comply with the legal requirements. the HSE and others in Section 2.2. 
" Must be suitable and appropriate to the " Build on existing guidance (described in 
nature of public venue operations and the Section 2.5); they are simple, readily 
crowd safety risks that could arise. available in the public domain &, hence, 
" Should be sufficiently robust. are familiar to most assessors. 
" Should be simple & easy to use. 
" Should be non-time consuming to do. 
" Applicable to new and existing venues. 
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Table 7.1: Key Criteria and Potentially Suitable Risk Assessment Methods 
KEY CRITERIA 
Hazard identification 
" Should be systematic & comprehensive. 
" Should be pro-active and forward looking 
" Should enable/help assessors to account 
for all significant hazards, incl. physical 
hazards and hazards associated with the 
presence of large crowds and especially 
those concerning behaviour. 
" Should be sufficient to deal with complex 
venues. 
" Encourage wherever possible inputs from 
other sources, e. g. the front line staff. 
Risk evaluation 
" Should be systematic. 
" Should reflect both likelihood & severity 
of consequence and enable 
establishment of the overall risk on that 
basis. 
" Should be sufficient to cover the full 
spectrum of crowd safety risks, ranging 
from very small risks to major disasters. 
" Enhance the reliability and consistency of 
the risk estimation process. 
SUITABLE METHODS 
" The break down of a complex system into 
sub-systems and components; possibly 
according to the geographical make up of 
a venue/functional areas. 
" The systematic and comprehensiveness 
of HAZOP type approach and other such 
techniques for detailed in-depth analyses 
of a complex system/set of activities. 
" The simplicity of the "walk through" type 
approach, e. g. venue inspections/audit. 
" The pro-active, forward looking & thought 
provoking nature of HAZOP type 
approach, brainstorming and keywords. 
" The ability of HAZOP type approach and 
brainstorming to draw together different 
views and experience. 
Qualitative approaches such as 
" Risk rating. 
" Verbally/assessment by words (Section 
2.3.4). 
" Risk matrix or simple equation to 
combine likelihood and severity. 
" QRA and semi-quantified techniques are 
unsuitable for reasons given in Sections 
2.3.4 & 6.2 respectively. 
Decide remedial measures Identification of causes & consequences 
" Should be a risk based decision. during hazard identification (as in human 
" Should enable prioritisation of risks and error analysis and similar techniques). 
remedial measures. Risk-based approach (Sections 2.3.3 & 
" Should require/encourage assessors to 2.4). 
take into consideration the causes and " ALARP principle and TOR framework 
the consequences of the risks. (Section 2.3.2). 
In accordance with the risk assessment principles set out in Section 2.2, the prototype 
methodology covers all key elements of risk assessment, from hazard identification to 
reviewing and revising the assessment. In order to develop a suitable risk assessment 
for crowd safety, the methodology and the assessment methods for each element were 
designed to: 
" comply with the risk assessment principles and the relevant legal requirements; 
" fulfil the criteria set out in Section 5.3; 
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0 deal with all significant risks associated with crowd safety in public venues, 
such as those highlighted in the case studies in Chapter 3; and 
0 address the needs of the assessors and the problems and constraints they face, as 
identified in the literature review in Section 2.6 and the venue survey in Chapter 
4. 
The general guidance on risk assessment given by the HSC and HSE (e. g. HSC, 1992; 
HSE, 1994) was used to form the foundation of the prototype methodology. This was 
supplemented with ideas drawn from risk assessments elsewhere in other contexts and 
modified to make it appropriate to crowd safety risks. The HSC/HSE guidance by the 
HSC/HSE was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, it is very much in line with the risk 
assessment principles. Secondly, it ensures that the prototype will comply with the 
relevant legal requirements. As the main enforcing agency of these requirements, the 
HSE can be regarded as the authority on this matter. Thirdly, the guidance is easy to 
use. It is designed for office environments, general industrial premises and the like 
where assessors face similar constraints as venue assessors, such as resource and time 
constraints and insufficient expertise for sophisticated risk assessments. Fourthly, this 
guidance is readily available and therefore should be familiar to any competent safety 
practitioner or assessor. Finally, variations of the risk assessment method given in the 
guidance have been applied to a wide range of applications. For example, fire safety 
(e. g. Home Office, 1994), railways (HSE 1994c), fairgrounds and amusement parks 
(HSE, 1997) and in government departments (HSE, 1996a). 
"Tools" were developed specifically to provide help in certain assessment tasks. They 
included a set of keywords for hazard identification, a complete risk rating scheme for 
risk evaluation and a form for recording risk assessment findings. The methodology 
was presented in the form of a guidance document that guides the reader through each 
part of the assessment. The first draft of the document is presented in Appendix D. It 
consists of two sections: an introduction to risk assessment and the crowd safety risk 
assessment methodology. The venue survey in Chapter 4 found that there were a 
general lack of understanding and misunderstanding amongst venue assessors on risk 
and risk assessment. Therefore, the purpose of the introduction section is to explain 
what a risk assessment is all about. It also defines the key terms used in the document 
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and provides the necessary background information and advice (e. g. who should carry 
out the risk assessment, recommend the involvement of others such as front line staff 
and other bodies involved). The methodology section contains a complete assessment 
methodology with associated guidance and recommendations, assessment "tools" and 
work examples. The document was then subjected to a series of appraisals, described 
in Chapters 8 and 9. 
7.2 The Overall Approach to Crowd Safety Risk Assessment 
The literature review in Section 2.2 has identified the following four basic elements of 
a risk assessment: 
" Hazard identification. 
" Consequence analysis. 
" Risk estimation/evaluation. 
" Decision making for risk management. 
By examining the nature of crowd safety risks, it becomes apparent that merely 
finding out what hazards are may not be enough for risk evaluation and decision 
making. Crowd safety is a complex problem; this is of evidence in numerous studies 
and from the experience of many people (e. g. Williams & Hopkinson, 1976; Hillier & 
Hanson, 1984; Canter, 1985; Sime, 1988 & 1993; Proulx, 1991 & 1991a; Moore, 
1992; Au et al, 1993; the Building Research Establishment, 1993; Cullen & King, 
1993; Wanless & Stanton, 1994). The case studies in Chapter 3 and past incidents 
(e. g. Fennell, 1988; Lord Justice Taylor 1989 & 1990; Donald & Canter, 1990; 
Bokhary, 1993; Dicky, 1993) have shown that crowd safety problems could be caused 
by a variety of factors such as crowd size, crowd dynamics, spatial layout, crowd 
distribution, behaviour and activities, external factors, etc. What is important about a 
complex problem is that its risks and the solution are not necessarily immediately 
obvious. For a tripping hazard, a piece of machinery or a hazardous substance, the 
dangers are clear for all competent safety practitioners to see, and the solution is 
usually obvious. For a complex problem, however, it is necessary to analyse and 
162 
establish a good understanding of the problem in order to appreciate the risks and 
identify the appropriate solution. 
In this regard, parallel may be drawn between crowd safety and human errors. Firstly, 
human activities, behaviour and their interaction with the environment are significant 
to both cases. Secondly, in human error, a "not done" (e. g. operator fails to do a task 
that he ought to do) could also be due to a whole host of reasons. Various taxonomies 
were developed by different authors to account for these reasons; e. g. error-producing 
conditions (Williams, 1988) and performance shaping factors (Whalley, 1997). These 
are all methods for identifying what contribute to the errors, or the error causes. It is 
important to understand what causes the error, for different contributory factors would 
require different solutions. Therefore, in human error, the analysis methods require 
the identification of not only what errors could arise but also their causes (Kirwan, 
1994). A similar requirement can also be found in assessment methods for complex 
systems (e. g. fault tree, event tree and root cause analysis). For the same reason, there 
should be a similar requirement in crowd safety risk assessment to identify the 
cause(s) of the hazards. 
Apart form identifying the causes, it is also necessary to identify any precautions that 
are already in place. In some cases, the risk posed by a hazard may have already been 
controlled to varying degrees by deliberate measures or the circumstance. This needs 
to be taken into account in risk assessment. Existing precautions could also have an 
impact on deciding what further actions need to be taken to reduce risks. 
The crowd safety risk assessment methodology should therefore contain the following 
steps: 
Step 1: Identify hazards. 
Step 2: Identify causes, consequences and who might be harmed. 
Step 3: Decide whether existing precautions are adequate. 
Step 4: Evaluate risks. 
Step 5: Decide what further actions might be required. 
Step 6: Record assessment findings. 
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Step 7: Review and revise assessment. 
Steps 6 and 7 are in line with the HSE guidance (HSE, 1994 & 1998). They are here to 
make the risk assessment complete and ensure that the methodology complies with the 
legal requirements. Step 7 is also to ensure that the risk assessment remains "alive" and 
valid and any changes in venue design, practice, the circumstances, etc. that could affect 
the risks are adequately taken into account. 
These seven steps represent a logical sequence of assessment; namely, to find out what 
problems could arise and why; to establish who and how people might be harmed; to 
identify what precautions are in place that may have already controlled or reduced the 
risks; to work out what the residual risks are; to decide what more needs to be done, to 
record the findings and to review the assessment when necessary. 
The principles of this methodology are the same as risk assessments elsewhere and those 
identified in Section 2.2 of the literature review. The key difference between this and 
the HSE approach (1994 and 1998) is that the former also requires assessors to identify 
the causes and consequences of hazards (i. e. Step 2). The reason for identifying the 
causes has already been explained in a previous paragraph. The identification of 
consequences would give assessors additional guidance for determining the severity of a 
hazard and thus its risk. More details about this and other steps of the risk assessment 
methodology will be discussed in the remaining parts of this chapter. 
7.3 Methods for Specific Crowd Safety Risk Assessment Tasks 
Much effort has been devoted to the details of the prototype methodology to ensure that 
it is appropriate to the nature of crowd safety risks and addresses the assessors' needs 
identified earlier. The main focus was on hazard identification (Step 1) and risk 
evaluation (Step 4), as they were found to be the two key areas of risk assessment where 
the assessors require the most help. 
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7.3.1 Identify Hazards 
The hazard identification method in the prototype methodology document consists of 
two key elements: (i) if the venue is large and complex, it should be broken down into 
a number of smaller and more manageable sectors, then (ii) decide what hazards could 
arise at each sector. The idea behind this is essentially the same as that of other 
hazard identification methods elsewhere, i. e., to divide a large and complex system or 
process or human operation into smaller elements and then to account for hazards in 
each element. 
Deciding on a suitable hazard identification method 
Section 6.1.2 has explained why it is best to account for hazards in terms of venue 
sectors. What is still required is a method which can best assist the assessors to 
account for the types of hazards that could arise in public venues. It is important that 
the method should not only be theoretically sound but also practical and easy to use, 
i. e. criterion (c) identified in Section 5.3. Trade-offs have to be made between what is 
best in theory and what is usable to the majority of the end users of the methodology. 
This means that consideration must be given to the various constraints identified in 
the survey and what crowd safety assessors are capable of using. It is this philosophy 
that underlines the development of this and other parts of the methodology. 
At the initial stage of developing the hazard identification method, consideration was 
given to adopting a highly structured method similar to HAZOP II (i. e. the version of 
HAZOP for detailed assessment of complex systems). The review on existing hazard 
identification methods has pointed to a HAZOP type technique as one that processes 
the most features required to fulfil the criteria. The main benefits are that firstly it is 
highly systematic and comprehensive; secondly it is pro-active and thought provoking 
and therefore encourages forward looking and foresight; and thirdly it brings together 
different views and experience. HAZOP II is a highly structured method. It consists 
of two sets of keywords to assist the assessors to pinpoint specific hazards. They are 
the "property words" which identify the different properties of the system component 
concerned (e. g. temperature, pressure) and the "guide words" which outline how these 
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properties could deviated from the design intention. Under this method, a hazard can 
be described through a combination of property word and guide word (e. g. "pressure" 
and "too much"). Adopting the same feature, a "combined keywords" approach was 
developed. The keywords are shown in Figure 7.1 and details are given later in this 
section. The "combined keywords" approach was the hazard identification method 
given in the prototype methodology. 
However, it is worth mentioning that the decision for using the "combined keywords" 
approach was reversed and the hazard identification method was significantly revised 
in the later versions of the methodology. Following the user trials in Section 8.3 and 
upon subsequent consideration, it was concluded that such a method is probably over 
complicated for the users and too refined to apply to public venues operations. There 
could be two reasons for this. The first reason is similar to that discussed in Section 
6.1.2 for task analysis and human error analysis. Namely, a highly structured method 
is only suitable where things (e. g. a system, a component, an operation) can be clearly 
defined, their functions well understood and, perhaps more importantly, the manners 
in which a failure could occur are limited and can be described through a short list of 
keywords. For example, for an engineering failure, temperature and pressure can only 
be either too high or too low. A valve can either be failure to open/close or open too 
much/not enough. However, as previously discussed in this thesis, the "failure 
modes" for crowd safety can be much more wide ranging. In order to try to capture all 
these wide ranging failure modes, the initial "combined keywords" approach ended up 
with several sets of keyword combinations for physical/venue design hazards, hazards 
concerning the presence of large crowds and crowd behaviour and safety management 
related hazards. When applied in practice, it was found that such an approach simply 
made the hazard identification method cumbersome and time consuming to use. 
The second reason is that the vast majority of assessors are not familiar with this type 
of highly structured method. HAZOP II is intended for engineers but venue assessors 
tend to deal with problems of a very different nature and they work in a different way. 
To cope with problems that are, in general, more wide ranging, less predictable and 
less well understood, as revealed in Section 2.6 and the venue survey in Chapter 4, 
hazard identification has often been done in a loosely structured/unstructured manner. 
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Whilst there are shortfalls with the current practice and there is scope for a better 
structured and more systematic method, a big leap forward from their current position 
to a highly structured and highly refined method is a totally new concept involving a 
huge change in convention. This is likely to have some adverse implications. For 
example, it may be far too daunting for many assessors. Consequently, they may 
simply dismiss it as an overcomplicated method unsuitable for their applications. 
Another danger is that assessors may revert to what they are familiar with and apply 
the method incorrectly. These problems were of evidence in the user trials in Section 
8.3. Whilst it may seem that such problems are only practical issues unrelated to what 
is best in terms of risk assessment, it is well worth noting that, from a human error 
view point, unfamiliarity is regarded the biggest error contributory factor (i. e. 
Williams, 1988). A method that causes human errors when applied will not fulfil the 
requirement that risk assessment should identify all significant risks, no matter how 
theoretically superior it may seem. 
Eventually, a keyword approach not dissimilar to that used in HAZOP I (intended for 
a more high level assessment, e. g. during conceptual design) is adopted. Although it 
is less refined, the keyword approach is still reasonably systematic and 
comprehensive, and it is forward looking in nature. At the same time, it is more 
suitable for systems that are loosely defined. It is fairly simple, easy to use, much 
more compatible with existing practice and therefore does not involve a steep learning 
curve. Consequently, it could be more widely adopted and with less danger of the 
method being incorrectly applied. It is also less time consuming and resource 
intensive to do. The keywords can be used as prompters in a HAZOP I type 
brainstorming approach, thus retaining the benefit of the initial method in terms of 
bringing together different views and experience in risk assessment. 
The revised method could still be a bit more time consuming than the non-systematic 
methods currently in use in many venues. However, the extra effort required may be 
marginal once assessors are familiar with the method. Also, it is applicable to 
existing as well as brand new venues, thus fulfils criterion (d) in Section 5.3. 
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Develop keywords for hazard identification 
This sub-section looks at the development of the keywords for the original "combined 
keywords" approach. As mentioned in previous paragraphs above, subsequent to the 
user trials of the methodology this was changed to the more conventional single set of 
keywords type approach. Although the method itself had been changed thus resulting 
in a more concise set of keywords being produced, some of the keywords remain the 
same. The rationales behind the keywords for either approach also remain unchanged. 
Namely, (i) they are to provoke thoughts and to prompt assessors to think about what 
hazards could arise in their particular venues; and, to achieve this, (ii) they are generic 
rather than prescriptive and are intended to direct thoughts into different directions or 
types of hazards; and hence (iii) they cover all significant types of hazards that could 
arise in a public venue. 
The keywords were developed based on the findings in Chapter 3 and information on 
crowd safety from other sources. For example, major incident reports (e. g. City of 
Cincinnati Task Force on Crowd Control and Safety, 1980; Taylor, 1990; Bokhary, 
1993), the venue survey in Chapter 4, records of venue visits and interviews carried 
out for a previous research (i. e. Au et al, 1993), guidance document (e. g. Committee 
on Public Safety and Crowd Control, 1990; Home Office/Scottish Office, 1990; HSC 
et al, 1993; National Outdoor Events Association, 1993; HSE, 1996; HSE 1997) and 
other publications (e. g. Canter, 1985; Proulx, 1991; Sime, 1991; Sime, 1993; Au et al, 
1993a; Dickie, 1993; Au and Carey, 1994; Dickie and Meghji, 1994 and Wanless and 
Stanton, 1994). It was concluded that, generally, crowd safety hazards could arise 
from the following factors: (i) venue layout and features, (ii) visitors and their 
behaviour, (iii) adequacy of crowd safety management, (iv) presence of hazardous 
substances or items and (v) disruptions to normal operations. 
The "venue feature keywords" and "hazard keywords" shown in Figure 7.1 are given 
to help assessors to account for hazards associated with the venue design. The former 
identifies the features that could be found in a venue whereas the latter describes how 
these features could give rise to a safety hazard. Hazard identification can be done by 
applying suitable combinations of the venue features keywords and hazard keywords 
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(e. g. "Place" - "Insufficient capacity", "Entry/exit point" - "obstruction: access", etc. ). 
Similarly, a set of "behavioural keywords" was developed to help assessors to account 
for hazards associated with the visitors and their behaviour. It is also shown in Figure 
7.1. This set of keywords describes the types of activities and behaviour that have the 
potential to cause harm. Again, the identification of such hazards and where they may 
arise can be done through combinations of venue feature keywords and behavioural 
keywords. 
Figure 7.1: Hazard Identification Keywords 
VENUE FEATURE HAZARD KEYWORDS BEHAVIOURAL KEYWORDS 
KEYWORDS 
Place 
Access route 
Entry/exit point 
Flooring/underfoot conditions 
Slope, stairway, escalators, 
lifts, etc. 
Step, kerb, ramp, etc. 
Bank and edge 
Wall, pillar, post, bollard, 
fence, etc. 
Furniture/street furniture 
Facilities 
Information source 
Maintenance or construction 
work 
Insufficient: capacity 
Insufficient: quantity 
Insufficient: quality 
Obstruction: access 
Obstruction: view 
Pinch point/funnelling effect 
Unguarded 
Uneven distribution 
High crowd density 
Disruption to a stationary 
crowd 
Rapid crowd flow 
Cross flows 
Disruption or obstruction to 
a crowd flow 
Non-compliance 
Dangerous behaviour 
Aggressive behaviour 
People with special needs 
The principle behind this "combination of keywords" approach works the same as the 
HAZOP II technique described earlier in this section. This was an initial attempt to 
impose a firm structure to hazard identification in order to make it more systematic 
and comprehensive. The problems with such a highly structured method have already 
been discussed. However, these problems were not fully recognised at the time when 
this prototype was developed. The focus was to incorporate into the methodology the 
highly systematic and comprehensive features that make HAZOP II such a successful 
technique. The problems only became apparent after the method was evaluated using 
actual assessors. This was subsequently replaced by a single set of keywords. 
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As discussed in the literature review in Section 2.3.5, apart from the "technical" 
aspect such as crowd dynamics, crowd behaviour and physical aspects, the 
management aspect is also an important consideration. For example, Smith (1999) 
argued that many failures and crises merge from an organisation's system of 
management and Pidgeon (1997) suggested that many disasters in large scale 
technological systems cannot be described purely in technological terms. To cater for 
the management factors, a list of safety management keywords was also included in 
the methodology. They are shown in Figure 7.2. 
Unlike those concerning the venues and the visitors, hazards arising from poor crowd 
safety management can affect the entire venue and, therefore, cannot be addressed by 
means of venue features. A different approach was adopted where a different set of 
keywords was used. The aim of the keywords was to highlight the key issues that 
need to be considered during risk assessment and planning. 
Figure 7.2: Safety Management Keywords 
SAFETY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Staff roles and responsibilities 
Command and communication 
Co-operation and co-ordination with other bodies 
Monitoring of crowds 
Staffing levels 
Staff selection and training 
The keywords in Figure 7.2 cover many of the safety management issues identified in 
earlier research by Au et al (1993); i. e., structure, communication, monitoring, liaison, 
and staffing. These issues are more specific to everyday public venue operations and, 
therefore, are more suitable as keyword prompters. Nevertheless, considerations were 
also given to the more generic management issues such as those highlighted by Elliott 
and Smith (1993). From their case studies of four football ground disasters, they 
identified management beliefs/mindset, costs, inter-organisational communication and 
culture as the four important factors affecting crisis incubation. Similarly, in the 
wider context of crises in organisations and man-made disasters, Smith (1995) 
170 
identified four principal organisational elements; they are: strategy, stricture/ 
organisation, culture and core beliefs/assumptions. 
In the context of crowd management, the issues of organisational structure and inter- 
organisational communication are covered in the keywords "roles and 
responsibilities" and "command and communication". The latter includes issues such 
as command and communication structure and means of communication. As many 
public events involve many agencies and bodies, "co-operation and co-ordination with 
other bodies" is also an important aspect of structure and communication. 
"Monitoring of the crowds" is a safety management issue that is relevant specifically 
to crowd safety; although in a wider context, monitoring is a part of an information 
gathering system; which helps to keep people informed about the crowds, their 
behaviour, how they interact with the venue and any particular problems and 
incidents. Reason (1998) argued that information and keeping people informed is a 
key factor to improving safety culture. 
Currently, crowd management is a hands-on and labour intensive business that cannot 
be "automated". Technology (e. g. CCTV) can assist and make the tasks of managing 
crowds easier and more efficient, but essentially the success of the operation relies 
very much on the staff. "Staffing level" is therefore an important issue. "Staff 
selection and training" is also important in ensuring that people have the abilities and 
know-how to do their parts in managing crowd safety. Again, in the wider context, 
Smith (1995) highlighted the issue of staff recruitment and training as a possible 
factor to break the cycle of compliancy and barriers to learning within an organisation. 
The tendency for managers to select people who share the same views could make it 
difficult for them to accept any challenges to their core belief, as those "organisational 
irritants" will not be present within the organisation in sufficient number to question 
the underlying logic of the managerial decisions taken. 
No keywords or other assessment tools are provided for the identification of hazards 
associated with hazardous substances/items and disruptions to normal operations. In 
the case of hazardous substances, this is because guidance is already available in other 
HSE publications (e. g. guidance on COSHH). This guidance is equally applicable to 
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public venues. In the case of disruptions, it is because the deviations that could take 
place and their effect on operations and safety tend to be venue specific. Hence, for a 
methodology intended for a wide range of venues, only general guidance and a list of 
possible scenarios were provided. 
7.3.2 Identify Causes, Consequences and Who Might be Harmed 
Although the identification of causes and consequences (i. e. Step 2) is not required in 
many existing methods, it is believed that its inclusion will make the assessors give 
more thought about the nature of the hazard and to obtain a better understanding of it. 
Information about the causes and the consequences of a hazard will better equip them 
to estimate the risk and decide remedial measures in Steps 4 and 5 of the assessment. 
For example, the identification of causes would prompt the assessors to think about the 
underlying cause of a hazard, thus helping them to identify remedial actions that do not 
only superficially deal with the symptom but also address the source of the problem. 
The identification of consequences can serve two purposes: to enable the assessors to 
estimate the severity of a hazard in a less ad hoc manner and to help them to identify 
the measures needed to protect people against the harm. To consider who might be 
harmed can also help the assessors to decide whether any visitor groups require more 
attention and/or special safety provisions. 
The possibility of providing some form of assistance, such as keywords or a checklist, 
for the identification of hazard causes was considered. However, this idea was ruled 
out eventually because the factors affecting crowd safety are venue specific and wide 
ranging. They can also vary in different circumstances. Therefore, it is not possible 
to capture all potential factors. Even if this were possible, a comprehensive set of 
keywords or a checklist is likely to be far too big to be useful in practice. Perhaps it is 
also worth noting that there is no such provision in HAZOP. However, in the case of 
human error analysis, there are schemes available for the identification of error 
causes; e. g. the performance shaping factors classification and Potential Human Error 
Cause Analysis (PHECA) system (e. g. Whalley, 1987; Whalley, 1998 and Kirwan, 
1995). Factors or error mechanisms are categorised and presented in hierarchical 
form in both schemes. In crowd safety, a summary of "contributory events" is also 
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given by Au et al (1993). They are grouped into five categories; namely, equipment 
failures, design limitation, staff errors, combined activities and undesirable 
circumstances. Both the human error schemes and the summary of crowd safety 
contributory events are huge. Whilst useful for people to cross reference to if deemed 
necessary, they are far too big to be a part of an assessment methodology. 
7.3.3 Decide Whether Existing Precautions are Adequate 
To keep the risk assessment simple, Step 3 enables the assessor to disregard the trivial 
risks and those that are already adequately controlled. Criteria are provided to help 
them to exclude from the assessment those hazards that are either extremely unlikely 
to occur or do not cause any real harm to people. Step 3 also requires the assessors to 
identify any measures that are already in place and the circumstances, so that their 
effect is also taken into consideration when estimating risks. 
7.3.4 Evaluate Risks 
The risk evaluation stage is where the assessors establish how serious the hazards are. 
Following the literature review in Section 2.3, it has been concluded (Section 2.7) that 
decision making on safety provisions should be risk-based. The risk based approach, 
together with the ALARP principle and the TOR framework will provide guidance to 
enable assessors and venue owners and managers to decide the level of care required 
to make their venues as safe as reasonably practicable to the visitors. This is also in 
line with the HSC guidance (1992) on the legal requirements on risk assessment. 
Risk evaluation should, therefore, be done in terms of likelihood of harm and severity 
of the consequences. As it is impossible to quantify likelihood and severity, the QRA 
techniques, though well established, cannot be applied to crowd safety. Amongst the 
other techniques reviewed in Section 2.4 and discussed in Section 6.2, semi-quantified 
methods are very arbitrary and fundamentally flawed. Instead, rating is thought to be 
the most appropriate method for risk evaluation. It has already been widely used in all 
sorts of applications including risk assessments. It is a method that is well understood 
and familiar to everyone. Rating also has the potential to fulfil all the risk evaluation 
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criteria set out in Section 5.3. A risk rating scheme was therefore developed. In line 
with the risk based approach, the scheme contains two separate rating scales, one for 
estimating likelihood and the other for estimating severity. 
An issue that is still outstanding and needs to be resolved is how big each of the rating 
scales should be. As identified in previous chapters, the key criteria are that they' 
should be big enough to cover the full spectrum of risks but small enough to make it 
simple, easy to use and enhance consistency and reliability in risk estimation. There 
appears to be no consensus on how big the scale should be or what the appropriate 
number of anchor points should be in a risk evaluation rating scale. Reviews of 
current practice and existing techniques (in Sections 2.4 and 2.6 and Chapters 4 and 5) 
have found that existing rating scales range from three to six points. A three-point 
scale appears to be the favourite. It is suggested by the regulators (HSE, 1989; HSC, 
1991; HSE, 1992c) and by others (e. g. Cohen, 1982; Kletz, 1988a) alike that risks 
should fall into one of three levels; e. g. low, medium and high. Applying the ALARP 
principle and the TOR framework, this could mean that at the bottom level, the risks 
are small or negligible and require little or no further mitigating actions. At the top 
level are the high risks that should not be tolerated and something has to be done 
about them. In the middle are risks that are significant and require some attention. 
A three-point scale is simple and it is easy to use. More importantly, the gap between 
each of the three anchor points should be sufficiently large to ensure consistency and 
reliability when judging/estimating risks. However, the issue is whether three anchor 
points are sufficient to cover the full spectrum of eventualities and to enable clear and 
meaningful distinctions to be made between different levels of likelihood or severity. 
With this in mind, it was necessary to consider how different levels of likelihood can 
be reasonably distinguished and, for severity, what the possible outcomes are if people 
get harmed. 
Should a hazard be realised causing harm to people, the outcomes can be expressed in 
terms of the following. Firstly, how many could be affected; i. e. whether it affects 
individuals or results in a number of people being harmed at the same time. Secondly, 
what harm it would cause to those affected. The harm people may suffer has to be 
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expressed in such a way that it minimises ambiguity. Hence, the following categories 
of harm were identified: (i) no real harm done; (ii) injuries that only require first aid 
treatment; (iii) injuries that require hospitalisation; and (iv) fatalities. This is largely 
in line with how injuries and health problems in the workplace are categorised under 
the RIDDOR regulations. Combining the two, there are a minimum of five possible 
outcomes; i. e. ranging from no real harm, individual requiring first aid treatment, etc. 
to multiple fatalities. 
The categorisation of likelihood is more arbitrary. Unlike harm and injuries, it is not 
possible to express precisely how likely that something is to happen except in terms of 
mathematical probability. It can be argued that a three-point scale of high, medium or 
low likelihood, similar to that described a few paragraphs ago, is sufficient. However, 
it can equally be argued that likelihood rating should also include very rare occasions 
(i. e. a 4-point scale), for example, for a stadium situated underneath a flight path. It is 
not inconceivable that a plane may fall from the sky and hit it although the chance of 
this occurring when it is occupied must be very small. Perhaps a similar argument can 
also be made for having a five-point scale to include something that is almost certain 
to happen sooner or later. 
In the event, a 4-point scale for likelihood and a 5-point scale for severity were used. 
This was based on the rating scales adopted in some existing methods (e. g. Ministry 
of Defence, 1991; Au et al, 1993). It may be argued that, ideally, a3 or 5-point scale 
could be used for likelihood estimation. But a trade-off has to be made to ensure that 
the risk rating scheme will fit in with the ALARP principle used later for determining 
the cause of action required for each hazard (see Section 7.3.5). 
Rating is subjected to biases. The most common problems are the leniency effect and 
the halo effect. The leniency effect refers to the unwillingness of the respondents to 
be critical and hence the tendency of not selecting from either end of the rating scale. 
The halo effect is where the respondents have already decided that certain entities are 
better or worse than others and subconsciously adjust their rating to demonstrate this 
(Sinclair, 1995). The requirement to determine risk levels by considering likelihood 
and severity separately should help to reduce the halo effect. In addition, to safeguard 
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against this and the leniency effect, rather than assigning a number or an alphabetical 
label that carries no meanings, each anchor point is given a descriptive label (such as 
"likely", "possible" and "catastrophic", "severe", etc. ) so that each point on the rating 
scale signifies something different. As discussed in Section 2.3.4, Moore (1993) has 
argued that words do not have a generally agreed or accepted meaning, they are useful 
only if the writer and the readers agree on the meanings ascribed to them. Therefore, 
to underpin the meanings of the labels and to further avoid these biases, a definition is 
also assigned to each anchor point. All definitions are written in such a way to avoid 
arbitrary judgement. For example, the severity rating anchor points are defined in the 
manner described previously (e. g. no real harm, injuries requiring first-aid treatment, 
etc. ). The definitions for the likelihood rating scale reflect both past experience about 
the hazards and how likely it is to occur in the future. This is designed to prevent any 
over reliance on experience and past incidents for the likelihood estimation. 
The second part of the risk evaluation is to bring together the likelihood and the 
severity rating to establish an overall risk level. To achieve this, a "risk matrix" with 
the likelihood rating on one side and the severity rating on the other was used. No 
figures are used throughout the evaluation method. Section 6.2 has already discussed 
some of the problems associated with semi-quantified methods. Similarly, the reason 
for avoiding the use of figures all together is that people tend to perceive them as real 
numbers and put values to either the rating or the risk level. 
7.3.5 Decide What Further Actions Might be Required 
Having determined the level of risk for each hazard, the aim of Step 5 is to decide 
what actions need to be taken to manage the risks. The remedial measures will 
depend upon the nature of the risks, the causes and consequences identified in Step 2. 
The issue is how to prioritise these measures and hence what actions to take. The 
literature review in Section 2.3 has discussed some of the basis for decision making. 
It suggests that the ALARP principle appears to be more appropriate overall to crowd 
safety. On the basis of this principle, Figure 7.3 is given in the prototype 
methodology to help assessors to decide the appropriate level of care for each risk: 
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Figure 7.3: Interpretation of Risk Levels Given in the Methodology Document 
Risk Level Interpretation 
A Intolerable risk. Immediate action(s) must be taken to eliminate the 
hazard or to eliminate its source, regardless of the cost. 
B Should not be tolerated unless risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost 
is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained. 
C Should not be tolerated unless the cost of risk reduction exceeds the 
improvement gained. 
D Broadly acceptable risk. But risk reduction should still be made if an 
inexpensive measure can be found. 
- Trivial risk. No further actions required. 
7.3.6 Record Assessment Findings and Review and Revise Assessment 
In terms of Steps 6 and 7, there are no differences between the crowd safety risk 
assessment and a general health and safety risk assessment. The same requirements 
apply and the difference in the nature of the operation should have no significant 
effect on these parts of the assessment. As such, the guidance given here simply 
echoes that already given elsewhere (e. g. the "5 Steps to Risk Assessment" booklet 
published by the HSE (1992)). In addition, a sample "Crowd Safety Risk Assessment 
Record Form" is provided for recording the assessment findings. It is attached at the 
back of the methodology document. 
7.4 Conclusions 
The prototype crowd safety risk assessment methodology was developed based on 
information generated in previous chapters. In the course of the development, there 
were several methodology issues that need to be addressed; particularly with regard to 
the overall method and those concerning hazard identification and risk evaluation. In 
terms of the overall method, it was decided that it should follow the principles and use 
the guidance set out by the HSC/HSE as basis of the prototype; the same principles 
were also adopted by most existing risk assessment methodologies in other contexts. 
At the same time, it was also felt that assessors would benefit from the inclusion in the 
methodology of an extra assessment step of identifying the causes and consequences 
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of a hazard. The information generated in this step should help assessors to better 
identify the remedial measures that tackle the source of a problem and to give them 
additional guidance for determining the severity of a hazard, and hence its risk. The 
prototype therefore consists of seven steps: identify hazards; identify causes. 
consequences and who might be harmed; identify existing precautions and decide if 
they are adequate; evaluate the remaining risks; decide what remedial measures are to 
be required; record the findings of the risk assessment; and review and revise the 
assessment. 
A key issue in hazard identification was to find a method which could best assist the 
assessors to account for the types of hazards that could arise in a public venue context. 
The method has to be theoretically sound and workable in practicable. The review in 
Chapter 6 has revealed several highly structured methods that are comprehensive and 
very systematic. HAZOP was found to be most suitable in terms of fulfilling most of 
the criteria set out in Section 6.3. HAZOP II in particular is highly structured and is 
suitable for detailed assessments. However, upon further consideration and bearing in 
mind the nature of venue operations and the current practice, it is concluded that such 
a method could be unduly complicated when applied to the crowd safety context and 
would be too daunting for most assessors. In the event, the less structured and more 
conventional keyword approach was adopted. This involves the use of keywords as 
"prompters" to provoke thought on what problems could arise at different parts of a 
public venue. When used by a team of people in a brainstorming, the keywords can 
provide the necessary keyword prompters for a HAZOP I type assessment. HAZOP I 
is often used at the design stage when things are loosely defined, whereas HAZOP II 
tends to be used on things that are well defined and the functions of the system or the 
operational activities are well understood. 
Keywords were then developed based on information obtained in the two case studies 
in Chapter 3, the venue survey and a review of past projects, major accident reports, 
guidance document and technical papers on crowd safety and related subjects. Three 
sets of keywords were developed initially to assist the assessors to account for hazards 
associated with venue design, visitor behaviour and crowd safety management. A list 
of possible scenarios was also provided to help the assessors to think about problems 
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that could arise following a disruption to the normal operations. The remaining key 
hazard contributory factors; namely hazardous substances/items are already covered in 
other guidance and therefore not to be repeated in the prototype methodology 
document. 
A review of the existing methods and techniques suggests that rating schemes are by 
far the most widely used qualitative method for risk evaluation and it has the potential 
to fulfil all of the risk evaluation criteria set out in Section 5.3. The issue is how big 
the rating scale should be. 3-point scales appear to be most popular amongst the 
existing methods. Such a scheme is also recommended by the regulator (i. e. the HSE) 
for workplace risk assessment. However, it was concerned that this may be too crude 
for crowd safety risks. The key criteria are that the rating scale should be sufficient to 
cover the full spectrum of eventualities and enable clear and meaningful distinctions 
to be made between different levels of likelihood or severity. Considerations were 
therefore given to establish how likelihood can be categorised and, for severity, what 
the possible outcomes are if people get harmed. In the event, a 4-point rating scale for 
likelihood and a 5-point scale for severity were used. In order to minimise bias due to 
the "leniency" effect and the "halo" effect, a description of likelihood or severity was 
assigned to each anchor point. No figures were used in the rating to avoid them being 
mistakenly perceived as real numbers and turned the method into a "semi-quantified" 
approach. Similar to other qualitative methods elsewhere, a risk matrix system was 
developed to bring together the likelihood rating and severity rating to give an overall 
risk level. 
The methodology was presented in the form of a guidance document and is shown in 
Appendix D. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EVALUATION OF THE PROTOTYPE CROWD SAFETY 
RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY DOCUMENT 
Following the production of the prototype crowd safety risk assessment methodology 
document, a series of tests were carried out to appraise it. The appraisal programme 
contains two key elements: (i) evaluation to determine what improvements can be made 
to the prototype methodology and the document in which it is presented, and (ii) 
verification of the methodology to prove that it inspires a better crowd safety risk 
assessment. Figure 8.1 gives an overview of the appraisal programme. 
Figure 8.1: An Overview of the Appraisal Programme 
Prototype Public Safety Risk Assessment Guide I 
Usability Test 
Revise Text 
Evaluation 
Combined Validity and 
Usability Test 
Produce Draft 
Assessment Guide 
Comparison Between New 
and Existing Methodology 
Verification of 
Methodology 
Fine Tune 
Assessment Guide 
End 
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The appraisal programme consists of the following: a usability test; a combined validity 
and usability test and a comparison between the new and existing methodologies. The 
first two tests formed the evaluation part of the appraisal programme. The methodology 
document was revised after each test. The final document was then subjected to the 
third and final test for verification. This chapter concentrates on the evaluation of the 
prototype methodology document. In particular, Section 8.1 discusses the constraints 
associated with the appraisal. Section 8.2 looks at the design of the evaluation 
programme, Sections 8.3 and 8.4 describe the usability test and the combined validity 
and usability test respectively and presents their findings. The verification part of the 
appraisal programme will be covered later on in Chapter 9. 
8.1 Methodological Constraints 
The evaluation of the prototype methodology can serve two purposes: to identify scope 
for further improvement and to minimise the effect of any variables that are irrelevant to 
the research question in hand. In this case, it is the user interface issue (i. e. how the 
methodology is presented). The interest of this research project is on how useful the 
methodology is rather than how user-friendly the methodology document is. But, the 
two issues are often intertwined and need to be separated for the verification. Also, the 
user interface aspects of the methodology must be of a high quality for it to be found 
useful in practice. 
Ideally, the evaluation should involve a representative sample of the end-users, i. e. the 
crowd safety assessors, in user trials and obtain their feedback afterwards. However, the 
feasibility of this method depends upon two factors: (i) the availability of assessors as 
trial subjects, and (ii) the resources available for the evaluation. The former was proven 
to be the decisive factor in the case of this research. Getting enough assessors to give a 
representative sample of all venue types is always difficult, if not impossible. And for 
those who were willing to take part, many were unable to devote the time required for a 
füll-scale user trial. Another consideration is that it is necessary to reserve assessors for 
the verification process. Using assessors who were already exposed to the "noise" (of 
the user-interface issues) in the evaluation could bias their judgement on the usefulness 
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of the proposed methodology during the verification. This further reduced the number 
of suitable subjects for the evaluation. Because of these reasons, crowd safety assessors 
were in short supply and had effectively become the most valuable commodity in the 
context of the appraisal. How to make the best use of them to cover not only the 
evaluation but also the verification parts of the appraisal programme becomes a key 
logistic concern. 
Given the circumstances, an alternative approach has to be found so that the limited 
number of assessors available to the author is used most effectively. It also needs to 
accommodate those assessors who are unable to take part in the full user trials. The use 
of novice subjects, such as university students, was considered. However, this is 
unlikely to yield satisfactory results because the methodology document is intended for 
"expert users"; i. e. assessors who are already familiar with their venues and the sort of 
crowd safety problems that could arise there. It is not intended as a "knowledge 
provider" for novices. As such, those who take part in the evaluation must have some 
understanding of what is being assessed. Otherwise, the use of novice subjects would 
put in doubt the validity of the evaluation findings. The importance of having subjects 
who reflect the user population has been stressed by many authors (e. g. McClelland, 
1995). 
In the event, it was decided that the solution should be to design an evaluation 
programme which contains two tests: a usability test followed by a combined validity 
and usability test. The aim of the usability test is to examine the user interface aspect of 
the methodology document so that the necessary improvements can be made before 
subjecting it to full user trials. The rational behind this is to use human factors experts, 
who are not in short supply, to screen out as many usability problems as possible. This 
is so that in the combined validity and usability test, the crowd safety assessors can 
focus primarily on the technical aspect of the methodology and not being distracted too 
much by any major presentational problems. 
In order to get round the problem of assessors not being able to spare the time required 
for a full user trial, it was decided that the combined validity and usability test should 
contain two separate parts carried out in parallel: i. e. user trials for those who can devote 
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the time and a questionnaire survey for those who cannot. The advantage of a 
questionnaire survey is that those who take part do not have to set aside a specific chunk 
of time for the user trial. Instead, they can comment on the methodology at their own 
pace on their own time. Although a questionnaire survey is not the most ideal 
evaluation method, the author felt that it is a worthwhile trade-off to make in order to 
include the viewpoints of those who would otherwise be unable to take part. In this 
respect, the quality of the evaluation can only be enhanced by including the survey. The 
assessors recruited for the user trials and the questionnaire survey were from the authors' 
personal contacts and contacts from the HSE. 
8.2 Designing an Evaluation Programme 
Sanders and McCormick (1987) pointed out that evaluation should be carried out under 
conditions representative of those where the product is to be used and with subjects 
representative of the users. With this in mind, the ideal evaluation method for the 
prototype methodology document would be a user trial. This should involve actual 
crowd safety assessors to try out the methodology document and use it to carry out trial 
assessment on their own venues. Observations, "talk-through", debriefing/discussions, 
follow-up interviews, questionnaires and analysis of risk assessment records are some of 
the methods that can be employed during and after the trial to collect information about 
the prototype (e. g. its usability, difficulties, advantages, disadvantages, assessors' 
preferences, etc. ). In practice, however, the feasibility of carrying out a significantly 
large number of user trials was undermined by the constraints identified in Section 8.1. 
An alternative approach has to be found whereby a sufficient evaluation can be carried 
out on a less than ideal number of user trials. There are two aspects of the prototype 
methodology document: the methodology itself and how it is presented. One way of 
overcoming the problem is to evaluate them separately. It was therefore decided that the 
prototype methodology document should be tested for its usability first so that its 
presentational/user interface could be improved before subjecting it to the full scale user 
trials involving crowd safety assessors and actual venues. The rational for this decision 
is, again, explained in the previous section. 
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8.2.1 Usability Test 
Guidance and checklists (e. g. Hartley, 1985; Department of Trade and Industry, 1989; 
Plain English Campaign, 1993) are available to help authors to make their texts more 
user friendly. They can be applied here to check the usability of the prototype 
methodology document. But in addition, it was also important to put the document to 
the test by independent specialists. The heuristic evaluation technique (Nielsen and 
Molich, 1990) was therefore selected for this purpose. 
Originally designed to evaluate user interface of computer-based systems, heuristic 
evaluation is an established and a simple technique. It involves the use of evaluators to 
judge adequacy of a design prototype; they do so based on a set of usability principles 
(the heuristics). Despite its simplicity, it can be highly capable providing sufficient 
evaluators are used. Also, it is believed to be one of the most cost-effective evaluation 
techniques (Nielsen, 1992; Lansdale and Ormerod, 1995). It compares favourably with 
other techniques such as checklists and walkthrough approaches and can be at least as 
effective as user trials (McClelland, 1995). Apart from cost effectiveness, a major 
advantage to this particular research project is that it does not require the involvement of 
crowd safety assessors. Instead, human factors/usability specialists were used in the 
evaluation. 
Some modifications were made to the original technique so that it becomes more 
appropriate to the evaluation of a paper-based document. They include converting the 
list of heuristics and adding a glossary of the heuristics. Section 8.3 will look at the 
modified technique in detail. Based on their findings, the prototype was revised. 
When applied to this particular research project, the heuristic evaluation has one 
possible drawback. Whilst the evaluators should be able to pick up most of the usability 
problems, they would do so in a largely human factors or usability viewpoint. Usability 
problems that are likely to emerge only when actually applying the methodology and 
those associated with convention within public venue sectors may not be identified 
under this method. The revised document was therefore subjected to the combined 
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validity and usability test where both the validity of the methodology and its usability 
were evaluated by actual assessors. 
8.2.2 Combined Validity and Usability 
In this test, actual assessors were used to try out and comment on the revised 
methodology document. It aims to find out how workable (i. e. validity) and how "user- 
friendly" (i. e. usability) the methodology was. In order to maximise the number of 
assessors involved in the evaluation, it was decided that this test should consist of two 
separate parts carried out in parallel: a set of user trials and a questionnaire survey where 
assessors were simply asked to study the methodology document and comment on it by 
filling in a questionnaire. Although questionnaire survey was not the best evaluation 
method, it was a worthwhile trade-off to make in order to include the viewpoints of 
those who were unable to take part in the user trials. 
8.3 The Usability Test 
In this test, a total of six human factors specialists were employed as evaluators to 
evaluate the user friendliness of the prototype methodology document, using the 
heuristic evaluation method. They were: 
" Joanna Foulkes Human factors consultant of several years experience 
" Julie Goodfield Human factors consultant of several years experience 
" Magdalen Page Managing Director, ICE Ergonomics 
" Margaret Ryan Human factors consultant of several years experience 
" Mike Joy Management and training consultant of several years 
experience. 
" Dr Andrew Shepherd Senior Lecturer, Dept. of Human Sciences, 
Loughborough University 
Each specialist was sent a copy of the document and an instruction sheet. The 
instruction sheet contained the following: 
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0 information about the research, methodology document and who the intended 
users are; 
. instructions on what to do; and 
0 the heuristic list and glossary, shown later on in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 respectively 
The evaluators were asked to read the methodology document, apply the heuristics 
provided on the list to evaluate the document and report as precisely as possible, and in 
their own words, any non-compliance to the heuristics and other usability problems they 
had identified. They were also asked to be specific about where the problems were 
found and suggest remedial measures. 
8.3.1 The Modified Heuristic Evaluation Method 
Because the heuristic evaluation method was originally intended for evaluating user 
interface of computer-based systems, modification was made to make it more suitable 
for the evaluation of text. The key feature of the heuristic evaluation method is the 
keyword prompters called "heuristics" (i. e. usability principles). Nielsen and Molich 
(1990) have proposed the following heuristics which can be applied when evaluating the 
interface: 
" Simple and natural language. 
" Speak the user's language. 
" Minimise user memory load. 
" Be consistent. 
" Provide feedback. 
0 Provide clearly marked exits. 
" Provide shortcuts. 
" Good error messages. 
" Prevent errors. 
Molich and Nielsen also give a füll glossary of the heuristics in the same paper. Some 
of them are user interface specific and are not applicable to text evaluation. On the other 
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hand, there are issues that are relevant to the usability of text but are not included here. 
A modification to the heuristic list is therefore necessary before it can be utilised in this 
test. Firstly, three of the original heuristics were removed from the list, they are 
"provide feedback", "provide clearly marked exits" and "good error messages". This is 
because these heuristics address the kind of interactive features which are irrelevant to 
paper-based interface (i. e. text). The remaining heuristics concern the presentation of 
information which are relevant to both computer-based user interfaces and paper-based 
interfaces. They have therefore been kept on the list. 
The next step was to add to the list usability principles that are appropriate to the 
evaluation of text. Hartley (1995) pointed out that readers come to text for many 
reasons and they might wish to read in detail, skim, search and look back/ahead. Wright 
(1981) also recommended that the text should be well structured to allow readers to 
jump about, to look for specific information and to consult it only when they have a 
query. Similarly, in our context, assessors might use the guide in a number of ways. 
Initially they might want to find out more about risk assessment and how it can be 
applied to crowd safety. They might then use it more extensively to assess their venues. 
Some might also use it to find out how they can improve their existing assessment or to 
identify ways of tackling any problems they have experienced (e. g. how to assess 
behaviour, how to estimate the risks of a rare event). Once they become familiar with 
the methodology, the readers might refer to the document for specific information or a 
quick consultation. To enable users who might use the document for different purposes 
to find their way around easily and to locate specific information quickly (i. e. to "allow 
quick search and easy navigation") is an important usability principle and should 
therefore be included in the new heuristics list. 
Usability issues are identified and checklists for evaluating text are provided in different 
literature sources (e. g. Broadbent, 1977; Wright, 1981; Hartley, 1985; Pintrich et al, 
1986 and Department of Trade and Industry, 1989). Many of them are vile-based. They 
cover a variety of usability topics, ranging from information organisation to typographic 
considerations. For our purpose, only those that are not in the original heuristic list were 
looked at. They can be summarised as follows: 
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" Provide accurate and comprehensive information. 
" Provide appropriate information - should take into account users' capability and 
limitations in physical, cognitive and psychological domains. Should also identify, 
the problems users might encounter when applying the information and suggest 
appropriate solutions. 
" Avoid ambiguity - provide understandable and clear information. 
" Provide well structured information - so that the users who use the document in 
different ways can navigate easily. This includes signposting, cross referencing, etc. 
" Provide visible and legible text - typographical considerations such as appropriate 
text size, spacing, line length, margins, etc. 
" Give suitable illustrations - use illustrative materials (e. g. pictures, examples) to help 
clarify the message, they should be placed appropriately and clearly distinguishable 
from the main text. 
The first two of the above concern both the usability and the validity of the methodology 
document and cannot be adequately evaluated without actually applying it. They were 
therefore assessed later in the user trial part of the combined validity and usability test. 
The third principle is essentially the same as "allow quick search and easy navigation" 
mentioned previously. This and the remaining four principles were added to the list. 
Table 8.1 shows the revised list of heuristics used in this test. A glossary of the 
heuristics is provided in Table 8.2. It is partly based on that given by Molich and 
Nielsen (1990). 
Table 8.1: Heuristics Used in the Usability Test 
Simple and natural language 
Speak the user's language 
Minimise the user's memory load 
Be consistent 
Allow quick search and easy navigation 
Avoid ambiguity 
Provide shortcuts 
Prevent errors 
Provide visible and legible text 
Give suitable illustrations 
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Table 8.2: A Glossary of the Heuristics Used in the Usability Test 
Simple and natural language Text should not contain irrelevant or rarely needed 
information. Break up long sentences and untangle complex 
sentences. All information should appear in a natural and 
logical order. 
Speak the user's language Use language which is appropriate for the intended users. 
The information should be given clearly in words, phrases and 
concepts familiar to the users. 
Minimise the user's memory The users' short-term memory is limited. They should not 
load have to remember affiliated information from one part of the 
text to another. Essential information should be visible or 
easily retrievable whenever appropriate. Complicated 
information should be simplified. 
Be consistent Should maintain consistency of the organisation of 
information, the view point, the wording, and the style and 
format. Users should not have to wonder whether different 
words or situations mean the same thing. 
Allow quick search & easy Should cater for the different needs of the users and allow 
navigation them to read in detail, to skim, to search, to look for a specific 
piece of information and to consult it only when they have a 
query. They should be able to locate the information they 
want and find their way around easily. 
Avoid ambiguity Information should be presented in a clear and precise 
manner. Avoid wording which could be interpreted in a 
number of ways. 
Provide shortcuts Detailed information which is helpful to users who are 
unfamiliar with the subject matter is often too cumbersome to 
the expert users. The text should allow the latter to skip the 
'unnecessary" information. 
Prevent errors Avoid using text and illustrative materials which could lead to 
a misunderstanding of the information. 
Provide visible & legible text Typographical considerations such as text size, spacing, line 
length, margins, etc. 
Give suitable illustrations Use illustrations (e. g. pictures, tables, graphs, examples, etc. ) 
to help clarify the message. Illustrative materials should be 
placed appropriately and should be clearly distinguishable 
from the main text. 
Having developed a heuristic list, the next phase was to determine who would be the 
evaluators and how many were required. An evaluator can be categorised according to 
his degree of expertise into one of three categories. They are (i) novice, (ii) "regular 
specialists" who understand the usability issues involved and (iii) "double specialists" 
who have expertise in usability issues in general and are familiar with the specific 
context in which the design is to be used. Nielsen and Molich (1990) suggested that for 
regular specialists, between three and five evaluators would be needed to identify a 
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reasonably high proportion (74% - 87%) of the usability problems. For double 
specialists, three of them would find around 90% of the problems. A similar target can 
also be achieved when using six regular specialists. On that basis, it was decided that 
six regular specialists should be invited to act as evaluators. All of them are human 
factors specialists with an understanding of the usability issues involved. Most of them 
also have experience in designing or evaluating text. 
8.3.2 The Results 
The usability test generated some valuable findings and, thus, enabled the author to 
improve the usability of the guide before engaging actual assessors in the next part of the 
evaluation. Table 8.3 below summarises the main findings of the test. They are 
presented in terms of the heuristics given in Table 8.1. 
Table 8.3: Main Findings of the Usability Test 
HEURISTICS COMMENTS FROM EVALUATORS 
Simple and natural Most evaluators think that the language used is very readable and 
language is in plain English. But one evaluator believes that it assumes too 
high a level of literacy - it may be appropriate to experts dedicated 
to this sort of thing. People who are not familiar with risk 
assessment would skip reading it after the first few paragraphs. 
Speak the user's There are a few terms which would benefit from defining (e. g. 
language "undertaking", "engineering devices" and "pinch point"). 
" The paragraph numbers do not serve the user's navigation. 
Assessment steps should be numbered. If paragraph numbers are 
needed, they should be small and unobstructive. 
Minimise the user's The use of pronouns at times adds to the user's memory load. 
memory load " " and the latter to refer to a " The use of words such as the former 
point listed earlier in the text could add to the user's memory load. 
Be consistent The "area" used in the risk assessment examples could be 
standardised, e. g., "forecourt" has been used in most examples. 
But the areas used in examples 4 and 6 are the "sector 1" and the 
"yellow zone". This may make users wonder why they are chosen. 
" The assessment stages should be numbered to correspond to the 
numbers in Figure 1. 
Avoid ambiguity " The title BACKGROUND is ambiguous and could be specific. 
Consider using PURPOSE. 
" The instruction to "break down the venue... " (para. 32) may be 
ambiguous, since it may not be necessary to do this. Consider 
saying instead "Make sure you are working with areas that you can 
handle: break the venue into more manageable areas if necessary". 
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Table 8.3: Main Findings of the Usability Test 
HEURISTICS COMMENTS FROM EVALUATORS 
Allow quick search Placing the paragraph numbers in a margin may facilitate 
& easy navigation navigation. 
" The contents page may benefit from a "list of insets" to improve way 
finding. 
" Could be useful to "colour code" each risk assessment step. 
Allow quick search The document would benefit from some additional text (e. g. in 
& easy navigation paragraphs 26 &/or 27) which describes how the methodology 
(cont. ) takes the reader through the risk assessment procedure, i. e. use of 
examples, insets, steps, etc. - To include a section on "How to use 
this document" 
" Whilst the document is well written, it is still a hard process to 
suddenly pick up. It might be useful to give some advice to the 
reader, e. g. along the lines of: flick through the document and get a 
feel for what's involved; think of a venue you know and read the 
document with this in mind; keep referring to the flow chart and 
check the overall stage of assessment you are "currently doing"; 
don't feel overwhelmed, it becomes much easier with practice. 
"A concise introduction setting out the purpose of the document 
would be clearer, to include: scope; glossary; what is risk 
assessment; who does it. 
" The definitions (pages 1& 2) should be laid out more clearly, 
probably with the specific term as a hanging indent and bold, with a 
short paragraph of definition, followed by a short paragraph of 
supplementary notes. 
" No signposts to help, no hierarchical structure. Providing 
paragraph heads, overviews etc. would help. 
Provide shortcuts Some paragraphs (e. g. paras. 16-25) could be introduced by their 
keywords (in bold) followed by the explanation. There is a lot to 
read here and much could be simplified. 
Prevent errors None of the comments received concern this issue. 
Provide visible and The headings "Step 1: Identify hazards", etc. could benefit from 
legible text being made more obvious and more distinguishable from the sub- 
headings. 
The contents page could benefit from being in a larger font. 
" The assessment process sections (especially the headings) require 
greater emphasis within the style of the document to improve quick 
search and easy navigation. 
Give suitable " All insets are shaded in 10% grey. A darker shade would be 
illustrations needed so that they stand out better from the main text. 
" The insets would achieve greater effect if they were indented from 
the main body of the text. 
" The reader would benefit from the inclusion of a "reference" section 
detailing the publications referred to within the text. This may be 
particularly relevant as the text refers to the legal requirements 
imposed upon the venue owner. 
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Table 8.3: Main Findings of the Usability Test 
HEURISTICS COMMENTS FROM EVALUATORS 
Give suitable It might help to provide an illustration of the output of the process at 
illustrations (cont. ) the point when the assessment process is first described (i. e. para. 
26). 
Give suitable Figure 1 is very good and clear and should be used more forcefully. 
illustrations (Cont. ) The reader should be invited to explicitly study Fig. 1 for a few 
minutes. It would provide a good overview for what is to follow. 
" Consider repeating a smaller version of Fig. 1 throughout the 
document highlighting the part of the method currently under 
consideration. 
Others It is not particularly clear how the Safety Management Assessment 
section fits in with Hazard Identification. Perhaps this would be 
better located within Step 2: causes and consequences. 
" Re: who should carry out the assessment. There seems to be 3 
main roles: 1. those who are legally responsible; 2. the assessors; 
3. the "informants". These should be brought out clearly at the 
start. 
In addition to Table 8.3, there are also minor comments concerning specific paragraphs 
and text (i. e. typographical errors, wordings). Based on these findings, the methodology 
document was revised. But because of a lack of proper printing facilities, comments on 
some aspects of the document design (e. g. colour coding for different assessment steps) 
cannot be implemented in the revised document. It has to be noted that because of the 
project timescale and delayed response from some evaluators, the author had to start 
revising when only four sets of comments were received. As such, some of the above 
findings were not implemented in this revision. Since then, the remaining two sets were 
received and considered together with the findings of the combined test. The revised 
methodology document (i. e. the second draft) is shown in Appendix E. 
8.4 Combined Validity and Usability Test 
Actual assessors from various public venues took part in this test to conduct a frill 
evaluation on the revised methodology document. This test aimed to examine the 
validity of the methodology and to identify any remaining usability problems. The 
validity of the methodology depends on two things: firstly, whether the methodology 
complies with the risk assessment principles set out in the relevant Approved Code of 
Practice and guidance document by the HSC/HSE (e. g. HSC, 1992; HSE 1994) and, 
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secondly, whether it is suitable and sufficient for the assessment of crowd safety risks in 
public venues. The former was verified through expert judgement; i. e. the revised 
methodology document was sent to the HSE for comments and approval. Therefore the 
test concentrated on the latter and on usability. As discussed in Sections 8.1 and 8.2.2, 
they were evaluated through user trials and a questionnaire survey, described in Sections 
8.4.1 and 8.4.2 respectively. 
8.4.1 User Trials 
The subjects 
Actual assessors whose work duties include assessing crowd safety were invited to take 
part in the user trials. They were asked to assess crowd safety risks using the revised 
methodology document. In order to ensure that the subjects are representative of the 
user population, they should ideally come from public venues of all types and sizes. If 
this were to be satisfied, ten assessors would be needed (i. e. 5 venue types x2 venue 
sizes (large/small)). However, the financial and time constraints of the project and a 
shortage of assessors mentioned in Section 8.1 made this impossible to achieve in 
practice. In the event, assessors from five different public venues/bodies took part in the 
user trials. They included the police, one transport venue, two theme parks and one 
event organiser. Although this is not impeccable, it represents the best possible effort to 
select subjects who broadly resemble the user population. The names of the venues and 
organisations participated in the this part of the appraisal programme are given as 
follows: 
" Alton Towers. 
" Camelot Theme Park. 
" Event Management. 
" Metropolitan Police Service. 
" Tyne and Wear Metro. 
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The trials 
The author visited each venue/organisation separately to conduct the user trial. Before 
each visit, the subject was given a briefing note and a copy of the revised methodology 
document. He was asked to study the document briefly prior to the trial. This is to 
minimise any "learning effect" that could take place due to subjects still trying to 
familiarise themselves with the document. 
In the trials, subjects were asked to carry out a trial risk assessment on a small part of 
their venues using the methodology document. Depending upon their existing practice, 
they could conduct the trial assessment either on their own or as a team. 
The venues used for the trials 
Although using the same (real or fictional) public venue for every trial would ensure 
consistency and allow better control over the trials, it was decided that the subjects 
should be allowed to assess their own venues for several reasons. Firstly, a good 
understanding of the venue being assessed and its operations is essential to the risk 
assessment, the use of a venue unfamiliar to the subjects would at worst render them 
unable to do the assessment or, at best, could lead to an significant increase in the time 
and effort required to do the trial. Secondly, this is so that the subjects can get 
something out of the trial too; i. e. the findings generated in the risk trial assessment 
would be of relevance to them. This should help to attract more assessors to participate 
and make the subject more involved in the trials. Thirdly, this would provide an 
opportunity for the author to look at how adaptable the methodology is to different 
venue types. Finally, as all venues are different in their layouts, natures of operation, 
visitors, etc., it is impossible in practice to select or create a venue that is "typical" and 
representative of all venue types. 
As such, the subject's own venue was used in each user trial. In order to ensure that the 
trial can be completed within a reasonable duration of time, each subject was asked to 
select in advance an area of his venue on which he wished to carry out the trial risk 
assessment. 
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The measures 
Information about the validity and usability of the revised methodology document was 
obtained by means of the following methods: direct observation, talk-through and 
questionnaire/discussions at the end of each user trial. 
A direct observation was made in each trial to look for any inadequacy in the 
methodology and any difficulty in applying it. Where deemed necessary, the assessor 
was also asked to talk through or explain some of the activities either when they took 
place or afterwards. In addition, this test would benefit from obtaining information 
directly from the subjects themselves. Hence, they were invited to comment on the 
guide after the trial. In order to ensure that comments were given in a structured manner 
and yet to allow free response from the subjects, a questionnaire consisting of a series of 
open ended questions was used. It covers all risk assessment stages (e. g. identify 
hazards, etc. ). Comments were invited on the methodology and its presentation, any 
problems experienced at each stage, things which the assessors particularly liked or 
disliked and any improvement that could be made. The briefing notes and the 
questionnaire used in this test are included in Appendix F. 
Another means to gather information is by analysing the outputs of the subjects; in this 
case, the risk assessment records. This method was not taken up because proper 
analyses of the records require a good understanding of the venues being assessed, 
which the author did not possess. 
8.4.2 Ouestionnaire Surve 
In an effort to obtain comments from a wider audience, a questionnaire survey was also 
carried out in parallel to the user trials. It targeted assessors and other relevant people 
who were unable to take part in the trials. Assessors from nine venues were invited to 
take part. They include one transport venue, two sports venues, two shopping/exhibition 
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venues, one fairground, one show/entertainment venue, one enforcing authority and one 
local authority. 
Each participant was sent by post a copy of the revised methodology document and a 
questionnaire. The questionnaire used here is also shown in Appendix F and was very 
similar to that used in the user trials. Again, open ended questions were used to allow 
free response. The survey participants were asked to study the document and give their 
comments and suggestions by answering the questions in the questionnaire. A stamped 
addressed envelope was also enclosed for returning their findings. The names of the 
venues and organisations participated in the questionnaire survey are given as follows: 
" Cheltenham Racecourse (i. e. The Steeplechase Co. (Cheltenham) Ltd. ). 
" The Football Licensing Authority. 
" King's Cross Thames Link. 
" Leeds United Football Club. 
" Loughborough Market and Fair. 
" The MetroCentre. 
" The National Exhibition Centre (NEC Ltd. ). 
" Stall Moss Theatre Ltd. 
" City of Westminster. 
8.4.3 Results of the User Trials 
This was a fruitful exercise which generated valuable feedback on both the methodology 
itself and its presentation. The information generated here and from the questionnaire 
provided a good basis for a further revision of the methodology document. 
In general, the document was well received and the methodology worked well. 
However, a number of problems were identified. In particular, the trials highlighted a 
key methodology issue which the author had been trying to address earlier; namely, the 
degree of sophistication. It has already been established earlier in Section 5.3 that the 
methodology should be simple enough for people whose experience in risk assessment 
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may be not much more than the "5-Steps" approach (i. e. HSE, 1994; HSE, 1998). But 
at the same time, it also needs to be sufficiently sophisticated to enable assessors to 
account for and assess the often complex crowd safety hazards. Whilst this is fine in 
principle, it is still necessary to establish where exactly this balance should lie. The 
degree of rigidity of the methodology was another issue highlighted. The benefits and 
pitfalls of a highly structured method such as HAZOP and human error analysis 
techniques were discussed in Section 6.1. There appears to be no hard and fast rules for 
their application. Also, these issues need to be addressed separately for each assessment 
step, a sophisticated and highly structured method may be workable for some steps but 
not others. The user trials therefore provide an opportunity to find out where the balance 
should be drawn. 
The part of the methodology with which subjects had the most difficulty was hazard 
identification. In order to find out what caused the difficulties, in-depth discussions 
were held with the subjects at the end of the trials. The results of the discussions 
suggested that over-sophistication was the most probable cause that led to confusion and 
misuse. In particular, the idea of using combinations of keywords to identify hazards 
seemed to be the main source of the problem. As already discussed in Section 7.3.1, the 
idea was similar to the HAZOP II technique (e. g. Kletz, 1984; Charsley, 1995), which 
has been successfully applied to evaluate evacuations (Gould & Au, 1995; Gould, 
1996). But in crowd safety, it was found that whilst this was more acceptable to the few 
assessors who have had some knowledge of the more complex risk assessments (e. g. the 
safety manager of a rail operator where QRA is used to assess some other areas of its 
operation), it was a much alien idea to the majority. Therefore, they were unable to 
apply the method correctly, unless substantial additional training is provided. 
Another possible reason for the problem is that the suggested method was still too 
structured and is therefore unsuitable for crowd safety where things cannot be well 
defined -a point already discussed 
in Section 6.1. Both groups of assessors believed 
that the prototype method should be replaced by something simpler. Suggestions given 
by subjects included the use of just a single set of keywords or a "question and answer" 
type approach. 
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Another part of the crowd safety risk assessment methodology where most development 
had been made is risk evaluation. As in hazard identification, the method suggested in 
the document is more complex than that given in many other guidance documents in the 
public domain (e. g. British Safety Council, 1993; HSE, 1994; HSE, 1998). But in this 
case, all subjects found it very useful and easy to use. However, one subject, whilst 
acknowledging its value, pointed out that he would prefer to use the existing 
"high/medium/low risk" approach (e. g. HSE, 1994) on the basis that his assessors were 
more familiar with it. 
The trials also set out to investigate the usability of the methodology document. Despite 
the changes made to the document following the usability test, several usability 
comments were received following the trials. This reinforced the point made earlier in 
this chapter that some usability issues are identifiable only by actual assessors after 
trying it out on a realistic setting. 
The general view was that the document, especially the earlier assessment steps, was too 
"heavy" to read. One subject pointed out that despite his extensive safety and risk 
assessment background, he had to read the document twice before he could appreciate 
the information it contained. A similar remark was also made by one of the reviewers in 
the questionnaire survey. The "heaviness" of the document could be due to the over- 
sophisticated hazard identification method. The danger is that the heavy reading could 
put people off reading the entire document altogether. 
A similar concern was also raised by an evaluator in the usability test. He believed that 
it was due to the language which assumes too high a level of literacy. This is in conflict 
with other evaluators who believed that the language was generally readable and in plain 
English. This was investigated further through in-depth discussions with the subjects. 
These discussions suggested that the main reason was the over-sophisticated hazard 
identification method. Bearing in mind the background and experience of most 
assessors, the proposed method is vastly incompatible with their perceptions of how the 
hazard identification should function. A second reason concerned the continuous use of 
text in the guide. One subject suggested that this could be improved by introducing 
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diagrams and colours to break up the text and make the guide look more interesting. 
Unfortunately, this could not be implemented due to limited publishing facilities. 
The following lists the key findings of the user trials. They are presented in terms of the 
different risk assessment steps and presentation issues. 
Overall approach 
" It had been established through observations and discussions that people have 
different preferences in the order of doing things. Whilst some preferred to firstly 
identify all hazards then identify the causes and consequences of each one of them 
and so on, others would like to deal with one hazard at a time (i. e. identify the 
hazard, then its causes and consequence, etc. before moving on to the next hazard). 
It should be pointed out in the methodology document that either preference is valid. 
0 If the assessment is to be carried out by a team of assessors, a good chairperson is 
very important. This was in evidence in two of the trials where they started off 
without a chairperson. As the trials progressed, the chairmanship was resumed and 
the assessment became more organised, effective and comprehensive. This point 
should be emphasised in the methodology document. 
Identify hazards 
9 The keywords were found to be effective in general. It prompted thinking and also 
prompted some assessors to ask themselves questions which they had not thought of 
in the past. 
" Some assessors had identified a variety of hazards from a single keyword. Whilst 
this is encouraging, some of the hazards could be identified again from a different 
keyword - this could also happen in the HAZOP technique. This might cause 
confusion amongst some assessors as to what to do with these hazards. Guidance to 
address this issue has already been given but it is necessary to ensure that it is given 
in the appropriate part of the methodology document. 
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Most assessors had difficulty in understanding how the hazard identification 
keywords are meant to be used. In particular, they found the concept of applying 
combinations of keywords very confusing. However, once it was explained, many 
reported that they are useful and thought provoking. Nevertheless, they would prefer 
this part of the methodology document to be simpler and less confusing. A few 
suggestions were given, including the use of a series of questions, a single set of 
keywords or a combination of both. 
A glossary of keywords was available at the back of the document but this was not 
always used. Although this was not a problem in most cases, occasionally keywords 
were applied in a different way from intended (e. g. "place"). Despite this, however, 
they still served to prompt hazard identification but, in the view of the authors, their 
effectiveness was reduced. Also, it was reported by one assessor that some of the 
keywords did not fit in with his specific context. A review of the keywords would 
therefore be required to ensure that their meanings are immediately obvious to most 
assessors (e. g. to replace "place" by "open space"). 
Some assessors tended to stick with the keywords provided, which are general in 
nature, rather than to describe in their own words the specific hazards they had 
identified from them. This problem could be reduced by emphasising that they are 
just prompts and by including some brief guidance on the record form advising 
assessors to describe the specific safety problems they have identified in their 
venues. 
The hazard identification method should also address interfaces between two areas. 
There was some doubt as to whether safety management issues should be regarded 
as hazards, control measures or causes. 
Evaluate risky 
" The risk rating scheme worked extremely well in all user trials. The assessors 
reported that they liked the scheme and found it very useful. 
" Likelihood categories were defined in terms of whether the hazard had happened 
before and how likely this could happen in the future. It was designed to encourage 
assessors to consider the past history of the venue. However, two problems had 
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been identified. First of all, there should be a distinction between hazards that have 
happened only once or twice and those that have happened several times in the past. 
It is reasonable to give a higher likelihood rating to the latter (e. g. the former should 
be given a "possible" whilst the latter could be a "likely"). Secondly, for a new 
venue or where there have been significant changes recently, a hazard that has never 
happened before would have little/no bearing as to how likely it is to happen. Some 
modifications will therefore be required on the likelihood definitions. 
Decide further actions 
0 One assessor pointed out that when identifying what actions are required, they 
should be realistic actions rather than a wish list. This point needs to be included in 
the document. 
" Another assessor believed that if no actions were to be taken, it is important to 
mention the reason(s) for this. 
Record findings 
" It was suggested that in addition to the existing form, a follow-up form should also 
be provided so that the venues could use this to make sure that actions are followed- 
up. 
9 It was suggested by one assessor that there should be a separate column for "who 
might be harmed". Another assessor suggested that there should be a column for 
allocating responsibilities (i. e. an "Action By" column). 
Presentation issues 
" Most assessors believed that the document is about the right size. 
" Many assessors found the document too "heavy" to read. One assessor pointed out 
that he had to read it a second time before he began to understand and appreciate the 
method. Another reported that he had difficulties in applying the methodology 
document at first and that he believed it would take time to digest. 
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9 Most assessors found the risk assessment flow diagram (i. e. Figure 1 of the 
document) and the examples useful. This, again, coincides with comments from a 
number of evaluators in the previous test. 
" The mixture of the main texts (which consist of the guidance) and the insets (which 
consist of a step-by-step guide) could at times be confusing to the users. The use of 
a colour for the insets could help to reduce this problem. Alternatively, the author 
would have to consider physically separating the main guidance from the step-by- 
step guide. 
9 It was suggested that as many assessors could carry out their assessment using only 
the assessment record form (and use the rest of the document for reference only), it 
may be beneficial to put some brief guidance on the form itself. This would be 
similar to the form provided in the "5 Steps to Risk Assessment" leaflet (HSE, 
1994). 
" It could be helpful to include in the "intention of the guide" a list of venue types for 
which this document is intended. It could make the readers feel that the 
methodology document is relevant to their venue. 
" Include pictures, drawings, diagrams, etc. in the methodology document. This 
would break up the text, make it more interesting to read, less formal and less 
boring. 
0 Subjects were found flipping through the pages to look at the keywords and the risk 
rating scheme. This can be improved by including a set of "pull-out" keywords and 
risk rating scheme at the back of the methodology document. 
8.4.4 Results of the Questionnaire Survey 
The response rate to the questionnaire survey was disappointing. Questionnaires were 
sent out to nine venues/organisations, but only four sets of comments were received. 
They were from a sports venue, a transport venue, a local authority and an enforcing 
authority. As a result, the findings of the survey were not as comprehensive as those 
from the trials. However, given the timescale of the project, the author had to proceed 
with the revision of the methodology document. 
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The feedback received, although limited, was encouraging. In general, the methodology 
document was found to be, in the words of the reviewers, comprehensive, informative. 
helpful, easy to follow and workable. It provided a logical approach to risk assessment 
and would be useful especially at a time when risk assessment is a topical issue. 
However, it could be rather time consuming to follow throughout the exercise but this 
was considered by some as necessary if a safety culture were to be developed. One 
reviewer arranged for his staff to assess a number of premises using the document and 
reported that a comprehensive assessment was obtained which produced an assessment 
true to the known risks of the trial premises. 
The infonnation obtained from the survey was less critical of the methodology than that 
generated from the trials. Much of the comments received focused on specific points 
and paragraphs in the document. With regard to the methodology issues, the main 
criticisms were that it could be quite time consuming to do and was difficult to 
understand at first reading. These responses are broadly in line with some of the 
problems identified earlier. It is worth noting that many of the problems identified in the 
user trials were from observations on how the participating assessors applied the 
methodology. In the questionnaire survey, however, the author was not present when 
the review took place and was therefore unable to establish whether the methodology 
was applied correctly - in two of the user trials, the assessment started off smoothly 
when the assessors identified hazards by going through each keyword separately rather 
than applying suitable combinations of keywords. The incorrect use of the methodology 
(especially the hazard identification part of the assessment) may help to explain the 
much better review from the survey. It is also not possible to establish the extent to 
which the "being polite" factor might have affected some of the comments. 
The following lists the main findings of the questionnaire survey. Again, they are 
presented in terms of the different risk assessment steps and presentation issues. 
Identify h<1Z(rf ds 
9 "Audience profile" is missing from the hazard keyword 
list. This is important 
especially for multi-purpose venues where the audience can 
be entirely different. 
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0 
The addition of this keyword may assist in making management aware of the need to 
research the profile of an artist/group and if necessary review their assessment for 
any particular event. 
There is a need to examine hazards under normal operational circumstances as well 
as minor upsets and major emergencies. This need should be emphasised. 
There is a need to brief employees on hazards at regular intervals. 
To carry out venue inspections and to observe crowds (i. e. paragraph 32) is more 
than useful but it is essential if a thorough understanding of performance is required. 
Identify causes and consequences 
" One reviewer found that this part of the document was harder to understand but the 
problem was not specified. 
Estimate risks 
" One reviewer believed that assessors would need some hazard ranking training in 
order to estimate risk and to prioritise actions. However, the findings of the user 
trials above appear to suggest otherwise. 
" The methodology document refers to a trivial risk as being one which is remote or 
does not cause real harm (i. e. paragraph 56). It was suggested by one reviewer that 
there are circumstances where both these requisites would have to be met for the risk 
to be determined as trivial. Particularly with large crowds, the risk of harm may be 
significant even though the likelihood is remote. 
It is worth pointing out that during the development of the method, the author had 
carefully considered this issue and decided against giving a higher risk rating to a 
hazard purely on the basis that it could cause more harm. This is because HSC 
(1991) has already set out that risk should reflect both the likelihood of harm and its 
severity, and there have been no suggestions either by the HSC/HSE nor by other 
creditable sources that any preference should be given to either risk property. This is 
also in evidence in practice in the high hazard industries where a lot of thought has 
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been given to issues concerning risks and risk assessment. Here, the risk of a hazard 
is calculated through a straightforward multiplication between its probability or 
frequency (i. e. the likelihood) and the costs of the consequence (i. e. the severity). 
Under this formula, if the probability/frequency is extremely low, the risk would 
effectively be trivial regardless of the costs. The same principle has also been 
adopted in Defence Standard 00-56/1 (MoD, 1991) for the classification of risk 
concerning computer and programmable electronic system elements of defence 
equipment. 
Decide and prioritise further actions 
" In controlling the risk, consideration should be given to the provision of contingency 
plans which are fully understood and practised by staff. 
Record findings 
" The record sheet given in the methodology document is straightforward to use. 
Review and revise assessment 
It was pointed out that the need for a re-assessment when changes occur is 
imperative. This should apply not only to structural changes but also to changes in 
management procedures and outside influences. 
Others 
" There may be a need to further emphasise the point that as with many other safety 
areas the need for appropriate competency is essential. 
" Whilst acknowledging the point about the duty of the venue owner (i. e. paragraph 
16), one reviewer added that consideration should also be given to the appointment 
of one single person to act as co-ordinator who is of sufficient experience to 
understand safety issues and able to evaluate all issues raised. He pointed out that in 
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football, the relevant authority has pressed for the appointment of safety officers to 
fulfil this task. 
Presentation issues 
9 In general, the guide is easy to follow and should not be difficult to understand 
provided it is used by a competent and experienced person. As risk assessment 
becomes more understood and sophisticated, it could act as a reference with 
continuing referral. 
" The guide is comprehensive and provides a general overview to all crowd 
circumstances. There are however more specific documents for particular venue 
types, e. g. the Green Guide and the Pop Concert Guide, which will need to be read 
in conjunction for specific cases. 
" Given that the subject of crowd safety risk assessment is not fully understood, the 
guide has been constructed using as much information as is available and as such, 
provides the best available form to the subject. 
" Most of the methods were hard to understand at the first read - as a trained accident 
investigator and a hazard ranker, he had to read the guide twice to get a grip with it. 
But if the assessors can understand the method described, the risk assessment 
method will not be difficult to apply. 
8.4.5 Further Changes to the Methodology Document 
Based on the results of the user trials and the questionnaire survey, a number of changes 
were made to the methodology document and the third draft document was produced. 
The most significant changes include: 
1. Keywords used in hazard identification were revised. The over-sophisticated 
approach of using combinations of keywords was replaced by a much simpler 
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approach using only a single set of keywords. The new set consists of a mix of 
previous and new keywords. 
2. The definitions of the anchor points used for risk evaluation have been revised to 
reflect the future likelihood of something happening. This is to avoid confusion 
being created by mixing past experience and prediction of the future in the same 
definition. It also makes the definitions more appropriate for brand new venues and 
venues that have not had much operating time to generate sufficient experience and 
reliable information on past incidents. 
3. Instead of estimating the likelihood of a hazard occurring, readers are now required 
to estimate how likely it is to occur and cause harm to people. This is because in 
public venues, there are many hazards that, most of the time, do not lead to any real 
harm. For example, obstruction to movement and cross flows occurs very often in a 
busy venue. Whilst they have the potential to cause harm, that potential is realised 
only in some circumstances. The observations of the user trials found that some 
assessors took it quite literally when asked to estimate how likely a hazard is to 
occur. This could result in grossly overestimating some risks and thus putting other 
hazards which actually pose a higher risk lower down in the priority list. 
4. In addition to the sample risk assessment record form, a "follow-up" form is also 
given in the third draft document. This can be used by venue owners to monitor the 
actions decided in the risk assessment. 
The following gives a full list of the key changes made to the second draft. The third 
draft is presented in Appendix G. 
Identify hazards 
" The previous keyword approach had been replaced by a much simpler approach 
which consists of only a single set of "hazard keywords". To achieve this, there was 
a need to strike a balance between ensuring the 
keywords provided sufficient 
coverage of hazards arising from different factors (e. g. venue 
design, behaviour, etc. ) 
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and restricting the set to a reasonable size. An approach with too many keß words 
would be time consuming to use and could put some people off adopting it. In 
extreme cases, the keywords could become highly specific and the set could turn 
into something of a checklist. This would, of course, restrict thought and thus work 
against the intention of the technique. 
In the event, the simplified approach has a total of sixteen keywords. Whilst 
keeping some of the previous keywords (e. g. "dangerous behaviour"), others had to 
be replaced because of the above consideration. The new keywords describe 
problems that could arise rather than how they could come about (e. g. to replace 
previous keywords such as "insufficient: capacity", "uneven distribution", etc. with 
"crowding/congesting"). 
9 The new keywords have been worded in such a way that the meanings are 
immediately obvious to most people. 
" The readers have been advised to describe the hazards they identify in their own 
words. This has been included as part of a step-by-step example of hazard 
identification (i. e. Inset 1). 
" Advice about what to do if the same hazard is identified from different keywords has 
been included. 
" Readers are also advised to consider the five main hazard contributory factors, i. e. 
venue design, visitors' behaviour, crowd safety management, hazardous substances 
or items and interfaces between different areas. 
" The need for assessors to examine hazards under normal operational circumstances 
as well as minor upsets and major emergencies has been addressed. 
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Evaluate risks 
" Likelihood categories are now defined in terms of how likely something is to happen 
in the future. Reference to whether it occurred in the past has been removed. 
However, a paragraph has been added to point out that past history could give some 
indication about the future likelihood. A distinction between hazards that have 
happened only once or twice and those that have already occurred a few times has 
also been made in the paragraph. This should make the likelihood definitions 
suitable for venues who have a wealth of past data as well as those where there is 
little or no past history. 
9 Instead of estimating the likelihood of a hazard occurring, readers are now required 
to estimate the likelihood in terms of how likely it is to occur and cause harm to 
people. This is because in public venues, there are many hazards which, most of the 
time, do not lead to any real harm. For example, obstruction to movement and cross 
flows occurs very often in a busy venue. Whilst they have the potential to cause 
harm, that potential is realised only in some (relatively rare) circumstances. The 
observations of the user trials found that some assessors took it quite literally when 
asked to estimate how likely a hazard is to occur. This could result in grossly 
overestimating some risks and thus putting other hazards which actually pose a 
higher risk lower down in the priority list. 
Decide further actions 
0 It has been pointed out that the actions identified should be realistic, not a wish list. 
Record findings 
" As many people would use only the record form to prompt them what to do next 
during the assessment, a brief guide has been added to the form. It also reminds 
people to think about whether any visitors are particularly vulnerable to certain 
hazards. 
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"A follow-up form has been included in the Appendix of the document so that the 
venue owners can use it to keep track of the actions (e. g., who by, deadline, progress 
of actions, etc. ). 
Review and revise assessment 
0 It has been stated that readers should review their assessment when there is a 
significant change. This includes structural changes, changes in management 
procedures and outside influences. 
Usability issues 
" The "Introduction" sections were simplified and shortened. Changes were also 
made to the language so that it assumes a lower level of literacy. 
" The size of the main text was increased in order to make it more legible and to break 
up the continuous texts over several pages. 
" Several second level headings were added to the text to allow easy navigation. 
"A brief overview of the risk assessment method was included. 
" If the assessment is to be carried out by a team, a competent chairperson is vital. 
This point has been emphasised in the document. 
" Some people prefer to identify all hazards first before evaluating the risks whilst 
others prefer to assess one hazard first before moving to the next hazard. It has been 
pointed out in the document that either approach is acceptable. 
"A list of venue types for which the guide is intended has been included. 
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0 It has been pointed out that the document was intended for public venues in general 
and that specific guidance is available for certain venue types (e. g. the Green Guide. 
the Pop Concert guide). Readers may need to refer to those documents for specific 
advice as well. 
8.5 Conclusions 
The prototype crowd safety risk assessment methodology document in Chapter 7 was 
evaluated for its validity and its usability. Given that this is a practical document to 
provide guidance, advice and support to help assessors in their assessment of crowd 
safety risks, the ideal evaluation method would therefore be user trials carried out under 
realistic conditions with actual assessors as subjects. But because of a shortage of 
assessors, an alternative approach had to be found. After much careful consideration, an 
evaluation programme was designed. It consists of two key elements: a usability test 
and a combined validity and usability test. The latter, in turn, was made up of user trials 
and a questionnaire survey. This was to maximise the number of assessors involved in 
the evaluation and include the viewpoints of those who were unable to take part in the 
user trials. 
The usability test concentrated on the user-interface aspect of the methodology 
document. The idea was to get rid of as many significant usability problems as possible 
through this test before subjecting the document to tests involving actual assessors. 
Although the author can use guidance, checklists, etc. to evaluate texts, it is essential 
that the document should be evaluated by an independent person. In the event, six 
human factors specialists were employed as evaluators and the heuristic evaluation 
method was used. Some modification was made to the method in order to make it more 
suitable for the evaluation of text. The results of the usability test are summarised in 
Table 8.3. The prototype document was revised to produce a second draft methodology 
document, shown in Appendix E. 
The revised methodology document was then subjected to the combined validity and 
usability test. Assessors from five public venues and organisations took part in the user 
trials part of the test. This was not ideal but it represented the best possible effort to find 
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subjects who broadly resembled the user population. In each trial, the subject(s) was 
asked to carry out a trial risk assessment on a part of his venue. Evaluation was done by 
means of direct observation, talk-through (when deemed necessary) and questionnaires 
and informal discussions afterwards. The user trial was found to be a very fruitful 
exercise. The results of the user trials suggested that the part of the methodology with 
which subjects had most difficulty was hazard identification. It is believed that this is 
because the method suggested was over-sophisticated. The use of combinations of 
keywords is an alien idea to most assessors and what they were used to do. A 
substantial amount of additional training on how to apply the method would be needed 
in order for it to be effective. But given the large user population, this is impractical. 
The risk evaluation method suggested in the revised document was also more 
complicated than that given in many other guidance documents. However, in this case, 
the subjects found it very useful and easy to use. This is probably because the suggested 
method uses rating schemes, which are already familiar to the assessors. 
Overall, the methodology document was found to be too "heavy" to read. This was 
largely because of the over-sophisticated hazard identification method. But it was also 
suggested that the language used in the document assumed too high a level of literacy. 
The response rate of the questionnaire survey was disappointing. Out of the nine venues 
who agreed to take part, only four sets of comments were received. They were less 
critical to the methodology than the trial findings. Many comments concern specific 
points and paragraphs in the document. The main criticisms were that the methodology 
could be time consuming to apply and the document was difficult to understand at first 
reading. This is in line with the findings of the user trials. 
Following the user trials and the questionnaire survey, the second draft methodology 
document was revised once again to produce the third draft document. This is shown in 
Appendix G of this thesis. The methodology document was then ready to be verified. 
212 
CHAPTER 9 
VERIFICATION OF THE CROWD SAFETY 
RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
This chapter looks at the final part of the appraisal programme in Figure 8.1. The aim 
is to verify the crowd safety risk assessment methodology presented in the third draft 
document by showing that it compares favourably with published guidance currently 
available to crowd safety assessors. Also, it is to show that the use of risk assessment 
in general can improve on crowd safety assessment. The merit of the methodology 
can be verified by comparing the performance of the subjects doing the same 
assessment using different methods. Ideally, this ought to be done through empirical 
tests using a representative sample of the end user population (i. e. actual public venue 
assessors) as subjects. However, this cannot be achieved due to a number of 
constraints. Section 9.1 looks at these constraints. Instead, the verification was done 
in two parts: a set of controlled experiments using novice subjects and a small number 
of user trials to gauge the opinions of actual assessors. The former allows 
comparisons to be made between the performance of subjects using different methods 
to be made in an objective manner. Therefore, it forms the main part of the 
verification. In the latter, a questionnaire was used to obtain the subjective judgement 
of a small sample of the end user population. The questionnaire is shown in 
Appendix H of this thesis. 
Section 9.2 looks at the issues involved in the design of the experiment, including the 
selection of a suitable published risk assessment method against which the third draft 
crowd safety risk assessment methodology was compared. Section 9.3 describes the 
experiments and the results are presented in Section 9.4. The design of the user trials 
and the results are discussed in Sections 9.5 and 9.6 respectively. 
9.1 Methodological Constraints 
Ideally, the verification should be done by carrying out an empirical test to compare 
the performance of subjects using different methodologies. But as in the evaluation 
programme, the verification programme is also impeded by the lack of actual 
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assessors, limited resources and, more importantly, from an experimental design point 
of view, the need to get rid of other irrelevant variables or "noises" that could also 
affect subject performance. 
Again, as in the case of the evaluation programme, the verification test should involve 
a representative sample of the crowd safety assessor population and, because the 
proposed methodology is intended for a wide range of public venues, it should also 
cover as many different venue types as possible. But above all, it is vital for the 
validity of the test that the different methodologies the subjects were asked to use 
should be the only variable affecting performance. Other factors that could also affect 
performance must be kept constant. User interface is one such variable that should 
have already been minimised during evaluation. For the other variables, as the task 
analysis in Chapter 5 shows, knowledge and experience of the subjects on crowd 
safety and the type of venue being assessed are important "performance shaping" 
factors affecting hazard identification in particular and, perhaps to a lesser extent, risk 
evaluation. How familiar the subjects are with the risk assessment methods used in 
the test will also have a significant bearing on their performance. To what extent age 
and gender might affect performance is unclear. But they can be taken care of by 
ensuring an equal distribution of gender and age groups between experimental groups 
who try out different methodologies. 
Ensuring the subjects have a similar knowledge and experience, however, is more of a 
problem if actual assessors are to be used. Not only that assessors from different 
venues will have varying levels of knowledge and experience, what they know about 
crowd safety will also vary and tend to be venue specific - i. e. only relevant to their 
types of venue operations. As the case studies in Chapter 3 demonstrate, the situation 
in one venue could be very different to that in another. This kind of knowledge and 
experience is not easily transferable. As such, the learning curve will be very steep for 
some subjects and much less for others; depending upon how similar the venue being 
assessed is to the one they know. The validity of the verification test would be in 
doubt if performance were to be measured at a point where some or all of the subjects 
are still at their learning curves. 
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Given the above, it seems that many tests would have to be carried out on each 
different venue type and each experimental group should contain subjects with a 
similar variation of backgrounds and levels of experience. A substantial amount of 
training will also be needed to help the subjects to get over the learning curve. This 
would be impossible to set up because of the following reasons: 
0 Costs - The costs involved in financing the tests may include travel expenses for 
the author and the subjects, room hire, meals and training costs. Given the 
number of tests that need to be carried out to cover all venue types and the 
number of subjects involved, it is likely to be huge and well beyond the means 
of the project budget. 
0 Time - Crowd safety assessors are often heavily involved in operational matters 
too. Past experience suggests that they are very busy and difficult to get hold of. 
Therefore, it would take many months (or more) to set up and carry out such a 
large number of tests. Bearing in mind that there were only two years full 
funding available for the entire research project, the time needed for the 
empirical tests is too high in relation to the project timescale. 
" Effort - The participating assessors will require to be trained and to take part in a 
number of tests. The workload of most assessors would prohibit them from 
devoting such effort. It is also unlikely that many public venues are willing to 
devote the amount of human resources the test demands. 
" Shortage of assessors - The problems concerning a serious shortage of assessors 
as subjects have already been discussed in the previous section. 
An alternative is to carry out the test on the same venue using assessors from the same 
(or very similar) background and with similar experience as subjects. But this too is 
deemed as unpractical (and not practicable) due to the shortage of assessors. 
Therefore, in order to ensure the validity of the verification, it was decided that the 
test should be done through controlled experiments using novices as subjects instead. 
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In addition to the experiments, it is also beneficial to carry out field trials to gauge the 
opinion of the end users and to find out whether they think the proposed methodology 
is better then the methods they currently use. This provides a supplementary source of 
information to the experience findings. Therefore, a set of user trials was also carried 
out to obtain subjective judgements from the actual assessors. It is worth noting that 
because only a small number of trials were possible due to a lack of assessors, their 
results can only provide secondary proof to verify the crowd safety risk assessment 
methodology. The experiments remain the main part of the verification programme. 
9.2 Designing the Experiments 
In designing the experiments, there are four important issues need to be addressed. 
They are (i) what other method(s) should be used to compare against the crowd safety 
risk assessment methodology, (ii) what performance indicator(s) to measure, (iii) who 
the subjects should be in the experiments, and (iv) which venue(s) should be used. 
The last two issues are interrelated and were therefore addressed together in Section 
9.2.3. 
9.2.1 Selection of Other Assessment Methods 
The literature review in Section 2.6 and the venue survey in Section 4.2 have revealed 
that many assessment methods had been used by different venues. Clearly, testing 
each of these methods one by one against the crowd safety risk assessment 
methodology, though desirable, is unrealistic in practice. What is therefore required is 
to select an assessment method(s) that is representative of other existing methods. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. the aim of the verification is to 
compare between conventional crowd safety assessments, risk assessment and a risk 
assessment that are specifically designed for crowd safety. Conventional assessments 
are generally unstructured and experience-based. There is no particular guidance for 
this type of assessments. Risk assessment generally refers to methods that are in line 
with the risk assessment principles highlighted in Section 2.2. The MHSWR ACoP 
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(HSC, 1992) provides the formal guidance for this type of assessments. The 
methodology that is most closely associated with it is the "5-Steps to Risk 
Assessment" method suggested by the HSE (1994). Although the exact methods used 
by different venues vary, the survey has found that they are based on the same basic 
principles and methodology. Many venues have made modifications to the basic 
methodology for their own operations; e. g. different emphasis given to different 
hazard types by different venues. Because of their differences, what is suitable for 
one venue may not be appropriate to another. Therefore, to compare the crowd safety 
risk assessment methodology against each of the different methods in use was deemed 
inappropriate. It would also be too resource intensive, time consuming and hence 
impracticable to do given the relatively large number of such methods. Hence, it was 
decided that the "5-Step" method should be used in the experiments to represent risk 
assessment in general. Another reason for selecting the "5-Step" method is that it is a 
recognised method from an authoritative source. It forms the basis of many other risk 
assessment guidance documents readily available to assessors; e. g. general health and 
safety (British Safety Council, 1993), fire safety (Home Office & Scottish Office, 
1997), fairgrounds and amusement parks (HSE, 1997) and outdoor events (NOEA; 
1993). 
The comparison between some of the individual methodologies adopted by different 
venues and the crowd safety risk assessment methodology was made subjectively in 
the user trials instead. 
9.2.2 Measuring Performance 
Performance can be measured in terms of the time taken to complete a given task(s) 
(i. e. speed) and/or in terms of the quality or quantity of the task outputs (e. g. accuracy, 
consistency, number of items produced, etc. ). For the experiments, however, the 
author believes that the time required to complete the risk assessment is not a good 
indicator of how useful the methodology is for the following three reasons: 
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0 It is not the intention of the methodology to enable a quicker assessment. 
Instead, it is to help assessors to carry out a risk assessment that is more 
appropriate to the crowd safety context. 
0 Given the large numbers of people who could be harmed, it is important that 
crowd safety risk assessment should be sufficiently thorough. A methodology 
that is more thorough could be preferable even though it takes longer to 
complete. 
0 There has been growing concerns over crowd safety following the Hillsborough 
Disaster. Despite the shortcomings in safety improvements discussed in Section 
2.3.5, more and more venue owners, managers and assessors begin to give 
crowd safety a higher priority. The prosecutions following the Hillsborough 
Disaster also serve to illustrate how serious it could be for the organisation, the 
agency and the individuals involved if things go wrong. As such, exactly how 
long it takes to do the risk assessment is no longer the prime concern providing 
it is not excessively time consuming. Instead, what is of more interest to many 
is to have a methodology that is useful and appropriate to their operations and 
their needs. 
Therefore, it was decided that the verification should focus on the outputs of the test 
(i. e. the risk assessment findings) instead. The parts of the methodology where 
significant development was made were hazard identification and risk evaluation. 
Although there was also development made to other parts of the assessment (e. g. 
crowd safety risk assessment record forms), it was relatively minor and the main 
features of those parts remained very similar to many of the existing methods and 
largely echoed what has already been given in the existing guidance. Therefore, the 
verification of the crowd safety risk assessment methodology was carried out through 
measuring the outputs of the subjects in hazard identification and risk evaluation. 
In both hazard identification and in risk evaluation, it was impossible to measure the 
accuracy of the outputs due to a lack of recognised criteria. Hence, the performance 
indicators used in the experiments were the number of hazards identified and the 
consistency of the estimated risks. 
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9.2.3 Selection of Subiects and Venues 
Section 9.1 has already explained why novice subjects have to be used. The question 
that still needs to be addressed here is whether anyone who are novices to public 
venue operations and risk assessment methods are suitable as subjects or whether it is 
more beneficial to recruit people who have certain background knowledge and/or a 
certain quality. The case studies in Chapter 3 show that many crowd safety problems 
are associated with visitor activities and how they interact with the venue. As such, it 
is believed those who have some background knowledge about people and behaviour 
are more suitable subjects for testing the methodologies. On that basis, undergraduate 
students from Department of Human Sciences, Loughborough University were used. 
An added advantage of using them as subjects was that they can be recruited on mass 
(i. e. the whole class). 
The task analysis in Chapter 5 shows that a good knowledge of the venue being 
assessed is vital for the success of the crowd safety risk assessment task. 
Furthermore, the revised methodology as well as other methods were all intended for 
people who know the venues they assess. It was therefore decided that a venue that 
was familiar to all of them should be used. On this basis, the multi-purpose 
Loughborough Student Union Building was selected for the experiment. 
9.3 Experiments to Verify the Methodology 
The focuses of the verification were on the hazard identification and risk evaluation 
parts of the methodology where significant development had been made. Two 
experiments were conducted. Experiment I examined the validity of the hazard 
identification method. Subjects were asked to identify the hazards that could arise in 
the Loughborough Student Union Building using different methods. Experiment 2 
looked at the reliability of the methodology. This is particularly relevant to risk 
evaluation where it is done qualitatively. In this experiment, subjects were given a set 
of hazards that can be found in the Student Union Building and were asked to estimate 
their risks, again using different methods. The subjects had to repeat the same task a 
few weeks later to see how consistent their findings were. A secondary purpose 
in 
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both experiments was to establish whether there is any significant improvement in 
performance if the assessment is done by team effort rather than by individual 
assessors on their own. 
Experiment 1 
For the purpose of the experiment, the subjects were asked to focus their hazard 
identification on areas within the Student Union Building only. In order to ensure that 
subjects were familiar with the building, a briefing was given immediately prior to the 
experiment to give the subjects some background information about the venue and its 
operations. 
In the experiment, subjects were asked to identify any hazards that could arise in the 
building. A plan of the building was provided for the exercise. They were then 
randomly allocated to one of the following four experimental groups; each group was 
given different methods to use: 
0 Group A- simulating the conventional crowd safety assessments, there was no 
structure to the assessment and the subjects in this group received no guidance. 
0 Group B- each subject was given a copy of the "5 Steps to Risk Assessment" 
booklet by the HSE. It contains the risk assessment principles upon which most 
of the existing health and safety risk assessment methods are based. 
" Group C- subjects using the relevant parts of the revised methodology. 
" Group D- same as Group C except subjects were randomly grouped into small 
teams of three and were asked to carry out hazard identification by team effort. 
Subjects' performance was measured in terms of the numbers of hazards they had 
identified. A comparison between Groups A to C enabled the author to establish 
whether the methods used for the assessment would lead to any significant differences 
in performance. 
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The hazard identification method in the crowd safety risk assessment methodology is 
based on the HAZOP technique that is designed to facilitate assessments by a team of 
assessors. Because of this, the methodology itself also recommends that assessments 
should be carried out through team effort where possible. Therefore, a comparison 
between the performance of Groups C and D would provide an indication on whether 
significant improvements could be gained if the assessment was carried out by team 
effort. 
Experiment 2 
Subjects who took part in Experiment 1 also participated in Experiment 2. The aim 
was to see if the use of different methodologies has any effects on how reliable they 
are in evaluating risks. It was measured in terms of consistency between individuals 
within each experimental group and consistency over times. The subjects were re- 
grouped into one of the following three groups: 
" Group B- subjects using the "5 Steps to Risk Assessment" leaflet produced by 
the HSE. 
0 Group C- subjects using the new crowd safety risk assessment methodology. 
0 Group D- subjects working in teams of three using the new methodology. 
Group A was abolished because the conventional assessments do not have any formal 
risk evaluation procedures. Also, it would be impossible to estimate risk levels 
without any guidance in the first place. Thus, subjects originally in Group A were re- 
allocated to the above groups to increase the sample size of each group. 
The experiment was carried out in two parts. The purpose of Part I was to examine 
consistency within each group. This was measured by comparing the output of the 
individual subjects/teams within each group. In this part of the experiment, subjects 
were each given a list of 15 hazards that could be present in a show/concert held in the 
Student Union Building. They were asked to estimate the risk associated with each 
hazard using the risk rating schemes given in different methods. This was held on the 
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penultimate week prior to the University Easter vacation. Part 2 was to look at 
consistency over times. This was done by comparing the outputs generated here 
against those produced in Part 1. Subjects were invited back on week 2 after the 
vacation for this part. They were allocated to the same groups as before and were 
asked to do the same risk evaluation tasks on the same set of hazards. 
Groups B and C were compared to see whether the outputs generated using the 
methodology are more reliable than those from using the "5-Steps" risk assessment 
approach. Similarly, the outputs of Groups C and D were compared to see whether 
assessment by team effort led to better reliability. 
9.4 Results of the Experiments 
9.4.1 Experiment 1- Hazard Identification 
A group of 43 undergraduate Human Sciences students were recruited as subjects. As 
described in the previous chapter, they were divided into four groups. The subjects in 
the first three groups (i. e. Groups A to C) worked individually whilst those in the last 
group (i. e. Group D) worked in teams of three. In total, there were 29 individuals or 
teams in the four groups - eight in Group A and seven in each of the other groups. For 
identification purposes, the outputs of each individual subject/team were given a code 
(i. e. A-1 to A-8, B-1 to B-7, etc. ). To enable a valid comparison to be made, each 
experimental group should have an equal number of samples (i. e. seven). Therefore, 
one set of outputs was removed randomly from Group A before the results were 
analysed. 
The numbers of hazards identified by the seven subjects/teams in each group are listed 
in Table 9.1. The group mean scores are given at the bottom of the table. 
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Table 9.1: The Numbers of Hazards Identified by Subjects in Each Group 
Mean 
Std Dev 
Group A Group B Group C Group D 
5 18 14 20 
9 5 14 20 
13 9 18 13 
9 11 9 5 
10 7 25 15 
9 9 12 19 
6 7 8 20 
8.71 9.43 14.29 16.00 
2.63 4.24 5.79 5.60 
Comparison between new and existing methods 
The effect of different hazard identification methods on subjects' performance can be 
examined by comparing how many hazards were identified by subjects in Groups A, 
B and C. Table 9.1 shows that there was a considerable amount of variation in each 
of the three groups (and Group D). The standard deviations range from just over 30% 
of the mean score in Group A to 45% in Group B. In Group C, the standard deviation 
is around 41% of the mean score. The large standard deviations could be due to two 
reasons. Firstly, all subjects are new to both crowd safety and risk assessment. The 
"double" learning curve involved may magnify the differences in individuals' ability 
and consequently serve to exacerbate the variation in each experimental group. This 
may also explain the considerably smaller standard deviation in Group A where no 
assessment methods were given. 
Secondly, in order to get together a sufficiently large number of students for the 
experiment, an arrangement was made to use an entire class of second year students as 
subjects. This did not only enable the author to test all subjects at the same time but 
also made the test more manageable given that subjects had to come back after the 
same duration of time for the second part of Experiment ?. The down side, however, 
could be that the level of motivation of the subjects recruited in this way may vary 
more than if the more traditional recruitment method of advertising 
for volunteers has 
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been used. The variation in motivation may in turn lead to a larger variation in 
performance. 
Results 
The mean scores in Table 9.1 show that subjects who used the "5-Steps" approach 
managed to identify more hazards than subjects in the "conventional assessment" 
group (i. e. Group A), suggesting that some improvements could be gained even just 
by using the general risk assessment. At the same time, there was a marked difference 
in performance between subjects who used the methodology (i. e. Group C) and the 
other two groups. On average, subjects in Group A and B identified 8.71 and 9.43 
hazards respectively. But subjects in Group C who used the methodology scored a 
mean of 14.29 hazards. The subject who had achieved the highest score in the 
experiment also came from this group. This result suggests two things: (i) that the 
methodology does not only help its users to identify more hazards but also the 
improvement in hazard identification is substantial: and (ii) that the hazard 
identification method given in the "5-Steps" approach is much less effective. The 
latter helps to confirm what was said in the previous chapters that existing guidance is 
insufficient when applied to the crowd safety context. 
A One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA test) was carried out to establish whether 
the result is significant. Details of the ANOVA test is shown in Figure 9.1 below. It 
shows that there is less than a 5% chance that the differences in mean scores are due 
to something else other than the different methods used in the experiment (i. e. p< 
0.05). It can therefore be concluded that as far as hazard identification is concerned, 
the methodology is far superior than the existing "5-Steps" approach and the 
conventional assessments. 
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Figure 9.1: One-way ANOVA Test on the Data from Groups A to C 
EXPT. 1 One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA test) - Groups A to C 
Ho Different risk assessment methods used by the subjects have no 
systematic effect on their performance. 
H, The performance of subjects is affected by the assessment methods 
used in the direction suggested by the mean scores. 
Data Table: 
X =Ex 
Mean 
F- = 2933 
nA=7 
n6=7 
nc =7 
N =21 
Group A Group B Group C 
5 18 14 
9 5 14 
13 9 18 
9 11 9 
10 7 25 
9 9 12 
6 7 8 
61 66 100 
8.71 9.43 14.29 
k =3 
T= (EX)2/N = 2453.76 
B= s[(Ex; )2/n1l 
= 2582.43 
Source Table: 
EX = 227 
Source df SS ms Fp 
Between 2 128.67 64.33 3.30 <0.05 
Within 18 350.57 19.48 
Total 20 479.24 
Therefore, reject Ho. 
Another way to analyse the results of Experiment 1 is by means of frequency 
distribution, i. e. the number of subjects in each group who managed to identify so 
many hazards. From Table 9.1, the number of hazards identified by subjects in the 
three groups ranges from 5 to 25. Table 9.2 shows the distribution of scores over this 
range, it is represented in graphical form in Figure 9.2. 
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Table 9.2: Distribution of Scores in Experiment 1 
No. of Hazards Group A Group B Group C 
5 or less 1 1 0 
6-10 5 4 2 
11 - 15 1 1 3 
16-20 0 1 1 
21 or more 0 0 1 
Figure 9.2: Graph showing the Distribution of Scores in Groups A to C 
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Table 9.2 shows that more subjects in Group C identified a higher number of hazards 
than the other groups. At the lower half of the range, only two of the seven subjects in 
this group scored ten or less whereas the figures in Groups A and B are six and five 
respectively. The majority of the scores in Groups A and B are between six and ten 
hazards whilst the mode in Group C falls in the next range, i. e. between 11 and 15. 
The graph in Figure 9.2 shows a similar story. The score distribution curves for 
Groups A and B both bias towards the left of the graph (i. e. the lower end of the 
range). They both peak at the "6 - 10 hazards" range although the Group B curve is 
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better spread across the range. The curve for Group C, on the other hand, is more 
towards the centre of the graph and with a higher frequency than the other two groups 
at the top half of the range. This indicates a better performance overall by subjects in 
this group. The analysis of the frequent distribution serves to confirm the conclusion 
drawn earlier from analysing the mean scores. 
Comparison between individual and team approaches 
A second analysis was carried out on Groups C and D to establish whether subjects 
who worked together in small teams performed better in hazard identification. In 
terms of the mean scores, the results in Table 9.1 show only a slightly better 
improvement for those working in small teams. But the frequency distribution shown 
in Figure 9.3 appears to tell a different story. The curve for Group D biases more 
towards the top end of the range, suggesting a better performance. An ANOVA test 
was therefore carried out on the data to see whether it is significant. This is shown in 
Figure 9.4. 
Figure 9.3: Graph Showing the Distribution of Scores in Groups C and D 
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Figure 9.4: One-way ANOVA Test on the Data from Groups C and D 
EXPT. 1 One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA test) - Groups C and D 
Ho No difference in the number of hazards identified between subjects who 
work on their own and those who work as small teams. 
H, Subjects who work as small teams identify more hazards than those who 
work on their own. 
Data Table: 
X =Ex 
Mean 
cx2 = 3610 
nc =7 
np =7 
N= 14 
k =2 
Group C Group D 
14 20 
14 20 
18 13 
9 5 
25 15 
12 19 
8 20 
100 112 
14.29 16.00 
T= (EX)2/N = 3210.29 
B= E[(Ex; )2/n; ] 
= 3220.57 
Source Table: 
EX = 212 
Source df SS ms Fp 
Between 
Within 
1 
12 
10.29 10.29 0.32 >0.05 
389.43 32.45 
Total 13 399.71 
T-test using the build-in function in Microsoft Excel. 
p=0.29 
p>0.05, therefore cannot reject Ho. 
It shows that the differences in scores between Groups C and D are insignificant. 
There is a more than 5% chance that the null hypnosis for the test could be true and 
the evidence is simply insufficient to support the conclusion that the differences seen 
in Table 9.1 are due to the "team work" factor. 
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The result from this part of Experiment 1 is inconclusive. The ANOVA test suggests 
that there is a chance that the "team work" approach may not give a significantly 
improved performance in hazard identification under experimental conditions and 
when the methodology is used. But this does not necessarily mean that the team 
approach is of little or no value. What is worth noting is that in the experiment, the 
assessment teams were formed by people from the same background - i. e. all team 
members are Human Sciences students who are novices to public venue operations. 
This is necessary in order to ensure that all independent valuables (e. g. the level of 
knowledge on crowd safety) are kept constant across the experimental groups. As 
such, the experiment cannot reproduce one of the key benefits of the team approach; 
namely to bring together people from different backgrounds (e. g. venue designers, 
operation manager, safety specialist, front line staff, etc. ) and different viewpoints. 
This particular benefit is important and well recognised and it is a prominent feature 
in established techniques such as HAZOP. 
9.4.2 Experiment 2- Risk Evaluation 
As mentioned in Section 9.3, Experiment 2 was carried out in two parts. Part 1 was to 
test the consistency between subjects within the same experimental groups. Part 2, 
which took place a few weeks later, was to generate a second set of data on the same 
tasks. Findings in Part 2 were then compared with those of Part 1 to test the 
consistency of the subjects' findings over a period of time. The same class of Year 2 
students was used. However, several of them dropped out of this experiment because 
they had to leave after Experiment 1 or took part in Part 1 but failed to return for Part 
2. In addition, three subjects failed to follow exactly the risk rating scheme given to 
them (e. g. allocate a "high/medium" rating instead of just a high or medium or low 
rating). In the event, there were six sets of estimates in each group. Furthermore, one 
subject did not give an estimate on Hazard 9 in the second part of the experiment. 
Instead of excluding the entire set and thus reducing the sample size in each group for 
that particular hazard to five, it was decided that all estimates on Hazard 9 should be 
disregarded. Again, a unique code was given to each subject/team for identification 
purposes. 
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The two risk evaluation methods being tested have different numbers of anchor 
points. In Group B where the "5-Steps" approach was used, subjects were asked to 
estimate risks in terms of high, medium or low (i. e. 3 anchor points). In Groups C and 
D, subjects were asked to estimate risks in terms of likelihood and severity, risks are 
then categorised into five levels using the matrix provided. Therefore, the findings of 
the different groups cannot be compared directly. In order to overcome this problem, 
each set of hazards were ranked in accordance with the risk ratings allocated by the 
subject. The risk rating allocated by each subject/team of subjects and the equivalent 
ranking can be found in Appendix I. 
Consistency within a group 
Kendall Coefficient of Concordance, W, was used to calculate consistency between 
subjects in each group in both parts of the experiment. The Chi-Square method was 
then used to establish if the results are significant. Detailed calculations for Groups B, 
C and D are given in Appendix I-1,1-2 and 1-3 respectively. Their results are 
summarised in Table 9.3 below. 
Table 9.3: Levels of Consistency within Group 
Group B Group C Group D 
Concordance Significance Concordance Significance Concordance Significance 
W=0.347 p=0.012 W=0.386 p=0.005 W=0.509 p=0.0002 
All concordance coefficients are significant (i. e. p<0.05). The results suggest that 
none of these groups were very consistent (Note: W=1 for a perfect match between 
subjects). But subjects in Group C who used the methodology were more consistent 
between themselves than those using the "5-Steps" approach (Group B). It also shows 
that the team approach adopted in Group D led to a further, more obvious increase in 
concordance. 
230 
Consistency over time 
The calculations to determine the level of consistency over time are also shown in 
Appendix I. In order to enable a comparison to be made between the findings of each 
group in Parts 1 and 2 of the experiment, the sums of ranking (i. e. Rj) established in 
the Kendall coefficient calculations were used. The 14 hazards were then re-ranked 
according to Rj to give the verdict of each group as a whole. Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficient (i. e. rs) was used to establish the correlation coefficient 
between the group ranking in Part 1 and that in Part 2. The results of the analyses are 
summarised in Table 9.4 below. 
Table 9.4: Levels of Consistency over Time 
Group B Group C Group D 
Correlation Significance Correlation Significance Correlation Significance 
rs = 0.81 p<0.0005 rs = 0.53 p<0.05 rs = 0.69 p<0.005 
The correlation coefficients in Table 9.4 are all significant (i. e. p<0.05). The result 
shows that subjects in Group B generally produced more consistent findings over time 
than those in Groups C and D. It also shows that Group D produced more consistent 
estimates than Group C. 
On the surface, this appears to suggest that the "5-Steps" approach is a more reliable 
method, in terms of consistency over time, than the crowd safety risk assessment 
methodology. But there is another possibility; namely that subjects from all 
experimental groups changed their minds when they re-evaluated the hazards in Part 2 
but the methodology, which has a more sophisticated rating scheme and a bigger 
rating scale, is more sensitive to the changes. This notion is probable given the 
subjects' lack of knowledge on crowd safety. In other words, they were dealing with 
concepts with which they were unfamiliar. Cole (1990) suggests that this could have 
two possible effects on the results of the experiment. Firstly, instead of assessing the 
overall situation, subjects were more likely to make their assessment based on 
memory of specific episodes (e. g. what happened when they were there last time). 
Naturally, different subjects would have remembered different episodes (or, to put it 
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another way, different segments of the overall situation) and could result in 
differences in the perception of risk. This helps to explain the generally low 
concordance across all groups (Table 9.3). The team approach adopted in Group D 
may have enabled the memories of different episodes to be pulled together to give a 
more global picture for the evaluation. This may explain why Group D achieved 
higher concordance and was more consistent over time than Group C. It follows that 
actual assessors, who have a much better knowledge and understanding of the overall 
situation, should produce more reliable risk estimates than the novice subjects used in 
this experiment. 
Secondly, the experiment could have alerted the subjects to crowd safety issues that 
were new to them. As such, when re-visiting the venue after Part 1 of the experiment 
(e. g. for the end of term disco), they would have noticed new things (consciously or 
sub-consciously) that they failed to notice previously. As a result of the new 
knowledge acquired, their risk perception would have changed when they came back 
for the second part of the experiment. 
In theory, the above should have an equal effect on all three experimental groups. But 
the author believes that the methodology is inherently more vulnerable to these factors 
because: 
(i) The risk evaluation method given in the methodology is considerably more 
sensitive and is therefore much more receptive to different opinions and changes 
of mind. The "5-Steps to Risk Assessment" approach has three different levels 
of risk to choose from, whereas the risk evaluation method has five possible 
outcomes from a total of 20 possible combinations of likelihood and severity. 
Therefore, a change of prediction is more likely to be reflected in the final risk 
rating under the new methodology. In this respect, the result in Table 9.4 has 
actually highlighted a key benefit of the methodology, i. e. it is more capable of 
picking up any changes in the circumstances identified by the assessors that 
could have a safety implication. 
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(ii) The risk evaluation method in the methodology is also more complex than that 
given in the "5-Steps" approach. Subjects in Group C and D therefore could 
have encountered a steeper learning curve than subjects in Group B. Whilst 
Group B might have already been familiar with its method by Part 2 of the 
experiment, the subjects in Groups C and D may still need more time for the 
learning curve to settle down. 
(iii) Inevitably, the risk estimates given in Part 2 were influenced by the subjects 
remembering what answers they gave previously. It is therefore not surprising 
that subjects who used a method which is more straight forward and consists of 
only three possibilities were likely to give more consistent answers than those 
who used a method that has five risk levels and 20 possible combinations of 
likelihood and severity. 
9.5 User Trials to Obtain Assessors' Judgement 
This is the part of the verification programme where actual assessors were used and 
where direct comparisons were made between the crowd safety risk assessment 
methodology and some of the methodologies that were in use at the time. The aim is 
to obtain subjective opinions from them on how the methodology compared with the 
other methodologies. 
The trials carried out here were essentially the same in design as those in the 
combined usability and validity test described in Section 8.3 - i. e. subjects were asked 
to try out the crowd safety risk assessment on selected parts of their own venues. 
However, a different questionnaire was used. The new questionnaire, shown in 
Appendix H, invited the participants to comment on each part of the methodology, to 
judge how useful it was and to compare it with the methodologies they were using in 
their organisations. Two 5-point rating scales were used in the questionnaire for the 
judgement and the comparison. 
A key benefit of this approach is that it was conducted in realistic settings. The 
participants were allowed to carry out the trial assessment in a manner that is 
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consistent with their usual practice and on a venue with which they are familiar. This 
approach also allowed the methodology to be tested for different venue types and 
operations. 
The venues used in the trials 
Subjects were asked to carry out the trial assessment on their own venues or one with 
which they were familiar. As in the case of the combined validity and usability test, 
the reasons were: (i) the needs for the subjects to have sufficient knowledge on the 
venue being assessed, (ii) the needs to make the trials as acceptable and attractive as 
possible to those who may take part, and (iii) the impossibility to find or create a 
"typical" venue. 
The first reason is particularly important as it could affect the validity of the 
comparison. A risk assessment methodology is only here to help the assessor to make 
the most of his knowledge and to ensure that his assessment is systematic. It does not, 
for example, tell him what hazards could arise in his venue. Therefore, unless he 
knows about the venue being assessed, its operation and the kinds of problems that 
could arise, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for him to make a suitable and 
sufficient risk assessment regardless of the method used. In other words, if the same 
venue was to be used for all trials, how much the participants know about the venue 
rather than which method was used could become the dominant performance shaping 
factors. 
The subjects 
Actual assessors were invited to take part in the trials. Again, the availability of 
subjects and the financial and the time constraints of this research project mean that 
only a small number of trials were possible. In the event, assessors from five 
venues/organisations were invited to try out the methodology. They include two 
transport venues, a sports ground, a police force and a pop concert venue. A list of the 
venues/organisations who took part is given below. 
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" Heathrow Airport Limited. 
" Leeds United Football Club. 
" London Underground Limited. 
" Metropolitan Police Service. 
" Nynex Arena. 
The trials 
A separate user trial was held for each venue/organisation. All subjects were given a 
copy of the revised methodology document (i. e. the third draft) prior to the trials. They 
were advised to study the document in advance in order to reduce any "learning 
effect" that could take place in the trial. On the day of the trial, the subjects were 
asked to conduct a trial crowd safety risk assessment on parts of their own venues. 
Afterwards, they were invited to comment on the methodology and to compare it 
against their existing methodologies by completing the questionnaire in Appendix H. 
In order to minimise any bias that might be introduced by the presence of the author, it 
was left with the participants for them to fill in and send back later on. 
9.6 Results of the User Trials 
Four questionnaires were received from the five venues/bodies who took part in the 
trials. The reason why the remaining venue failed to return its questionnaire is 
unclear. Furthermore, the entire page 2 of one of the questionnaires received was left 
uncompleted. As such, judgement on Steps 2 and 3 of the methodology (i. e. "identify 
causes and consequences" and "decide whether existing precautions are adequate") is 
missing from this particular questionnaire. 
The judgement of the participating assessors is summarised in Tables 9.5 and 9.6. 
Table 9.5 shows the verdicts of the assessors on how useful each part of the 
methodology is and Table 9.6 shows their judgement on how it compares with their 
existing risk assessment methods. It has to be noted that because of the small sample 
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size, the results should be treated merely as a snap shot of the opinions of some 
assessors. Also because different venues have used different methods to assess crowd 
safety, the comparisons shown in Table 9.6 are between the new methodology and a 
pool of existing methods rather than a single method as in the case of the experiment. 
Despite the small sample size, this part of the verification has produced some rather 
encouraging results. All participating assessors found the methodology and the vast 
majority of its contents to be useful or very useful. Most of them also found the 
methodology either better or much better than the risk assessment methods that were 
already in use in their venues. 
Table 9.5: Opinions of Assessors on the Usefulness of the Methodology 
Very 
Useful 
Useful Fairly 
Useful 
Not very 
Useful 
Useless 
Identify hazards 4 0 0 0 0 
Identify causes & consequences * 1 1 1 0 0 
Decide if existing precautions are 2 0 1 0 0 
adequate * 
Evaluate risks 3 1 0 0 0 
Decide further actions 2 2 0 0 0 
Record findings 3 1 0 0 0 
Review and revise assessment 0 4 0 0 0 
Overall 2 2 0 0 0 
* only 3 sets of opinions have been obtained 
Table 9.6: Judgement on How the Methodology Compares with Existing 
Methods 
Much 
Better 
Better About the 
Same 
Worse Much 
Worse 
Identify hazards 0 3 1 0 0 
Identify causes & consequences * 0 3 0 0 0 
Decide if existing precautions are 0 2 1 0 0 
adequate * 
Evaluate risks 2 1 1 0 0 
Decide further actions 0 3 1 0 0 
Record findings 0 3 1 0 0 
Review and revise assessment 0 1 3 0 0 
Overall 1 2 1 0 0 
Only 3 sets of opinions have been obtained 
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In terms of how useful the methodology is, "hazard identification", "risk evaluation" 
and "record findings" are the top three sections that received the best rating. In all 
cases, 75% or more of the participating assessors gave them the top rating (i. e. very 
useful). As stated in Section 9.2.2, hazard identification and risk evaluation were 
where significant development was made. In the case of "record findings", a risk 
assessment record form and a follow-up form were also developed to help the users to 
carry out and record their assessment more systematically. This compares well with 
other sections of the methodology where the development made there was relatively 
minor. The number of assessors who gave the top rating to these sections ranges from 
zero for the "review and revise assessment" section to two (out of three) for the 
"decide if existing precautions are adequate" section. 
In terms of how good the methodology is in comparison to the existing methods, only 
the "risk evaluation" section has achieved the top rating (i. e. much better). 50% of the 
assessors who took part said it was much better than their existing methods and a 
further 25% said it was better. The hazard identification method and the "record 
findings" section were also highly rated. Three out of four assessors judged that they 
were better. However, it is somewhat disappointing that their rating was not 
significantly better than the other parts of the methodology. A possible reason for the 
assessors not giving the hazard identification method a better rating is that some of the 
hazard keywords may not be directly relevant to their specific applications, since they 
are intended for a wide variety of public venues. The use of loosely defined keywords 
could also be a reason for the method not achieving a better rating. Unlike the risk 
evaluation method which is based on the same "risk rating scale scheme" principles as 
the existing methods, the keyword approach is a new and quite different concept to 
what the assessors are used to. It is therefore possible that the learning curve involved 
during the user trials could have made the keyword approach appear less beneficial 
and less attractive to them at the time. 
Both the hazard identification and the risk evaluation methods have received good 
comments. In the case of hazard identification, all four participating assessors 
commented in the questionnaire that they found the keywords useful. But two of them 
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did highlight a potential danger that some people might follow the keywords too 
rigidly and effectively turn them into a checklist. It was therefore suggested that the 
methodology document should stress that these keywords were not a checklist. 
Similarly in risk evaluation, two suggestions were made with regard to the risk rating 
scheme. Firstly, it was suggested that level "E" instead of "-" could be used to 
represent trivial risk. Secondly, a fifth category should be added to the existing four 
likelihood categories. Some consideration has already been given to the size of the 
likelihood rating scale in Section 7.3.4. It was decided that although a fifth likelihood 
category may be desirable, a trade-off had to be made here to enable the rating scheme 
to fit in with the ALARP principle at the following stage of the assessment. 
Other parts of the methodology have also received good ratings. In particular, all four 
assessors praised in their comments Table 5 of the methodology document, where the 
ALARP principle is adopted to provide a basis for decisions on what actions are 
required. 
Although the sample size is too small for the user trial results to be statistically 
significant, the subjective judgement obtained here nevertheless provides extra 
evidence to support the view that the methodology is more superior to and more 
suitable for crowd safety risk assessment than the existing methods. 
9.7 Conclusions 
The verification of the crowd safety risk assessment methodology was conducted by 
means of two controlled experiments and a set of user trials to gauge the subjective 
judgements of a small sample of actual assessors. In the experiments, although the 
methodology was only compared to one existing risk assessment method; i. e., the "5- 
Steps to Risk Assessment" approach by the HSE, the HSE approach forms the basis of 
most of the existing methods used by and the guidance available to the assessors. It is 
therefore reasonably representative of the current best practice in terms of crowd 
safety risk assessment. The user trials, on the other hand, allowed direct comparisons 
to be made against several risk assessment methods currently in use by different 
venues. 
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The first of the two experiments (i. e. Experiment 1) shows that on average, subjects 
who used the methodology had managed to score significantly higher than those who 
used the "5-Steps" method and those doing conventional assessment. An ANOVA 
test carried out on the data shows that this finding is statistically significant, 
demonstrating that the crowd safety risk assessment methodology has led to improved 
performance in hazard identification. Subjects using the general risk assessment 
method were also found to perform better than those doing the conventional 
assessment. A second analysis carried out on the distribution of scores confirms the 
finding. Frequency distribution shows that more subjects in the group using the 
methodology identified a larger number of hazards than the other groups, again 
suggesting that the methodology compares well against the "5-Steps" method and the 
conventional assessment as far as hazard identification is concerned. However, it has 
to be said that although all three methods of assessment rely on assessors' knowledge 
and experience, it can be argued that the conventional assessment may rely more 
heavily on knowledge and experience, on the basis that there was no guidance or any 
other form of assistance provided. As a counter-argument, however, the guidance 
given in the "5-Steps" method is only very general in nature. There was no specific 
advice given to the subjects on what hazards to look for. For this reason, it is argued 
that there is no obvious evidence to suggest that the lack of knowledge and experience 
affected the subject group doing conventional assessment significantly more than the 
group using general risk assessment. 
The experiment results are in line with the findings of the user trials. In terms of how 
useful the methodology is, the hazard identification method received the top rating 
from all participating. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that because of the small 
sample size, the user trial findings can only be regarded as providing an insight into 
what the actual assessors think of the methodology. In terms of how good the 
methodology is compared to a number of existing methods, three out of four assessors 
judged that it is better than the methods they were using at the time. However, it is 
somewhat disappointing that the judgement given to this part of the methodology is 
not much better than those given to other parts where less development was involved. 
A possible reason for this is that assessors were unfamiliar with the keyword approach 
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adopted in the methodology and the learning curve involved could have made it 
appear less beneficial and less attractive. 
Experiment 1 also gave an opportunity to find out whether there are any significant 
benefits in doing hazard identification through team work. The performance of two 
experimental groups, one worked individually (Group C) and the other worked in 
teams of three (Group D), was compared. The result is inconclusive. The frequency 
distribution graph in Figure 9.3 shows that apart from one team in Group D which 
scored particularly badly, the curves for both groups resemble a normal distribution. 
The curve for Group C peaks at the "11-15 hazards" range whereas the Group D curve 
has a steeper gradient and peaks at the "16-20" range. In terms of the mean scores, the 
raw data appears to show that Group D had achieved a higher score than Group C. 
However, the difference is marginal and furthermore it is found to be insignificant in a 
subsequent ANOVA test. The reason for the experiment failing to show any 
significant improvements when subjects were working in teams could be because, 
under the experimental condition, the assessment teams were formed by members 
with the same background. This does not simulate a key benefit of the other 
techniques that also involve team working, e. g. HAZOP; namely, the benefits of 
bringing together people with different backgrounds and viewpoints. 
Experiment 2 was conducted in two parts to test consistency within each experimental 
group as well as consistency over time. In Part 1, where consistency within group was 
tested, no groups managed to achieve a high concordance. But in comparison, Group 
D, where subjects worked in small teams of three, achieved a considerably higher 
level of consistency than Group C, where subjects were working on their own using 
the methodology. Group C is, in turn, slightly better than Group B where the "5- 
Steps" method was used. This indicates that the methodology has led to more reliable 
outputs in terms of concordance, but the level of reliability can improve further if a 
team approach is adopted. 
In Part 2 of the second experiment, the correlation coefficients in Table 9.4 show that 
subjects in Group B gave more consistent findings over time than their counterparts in 
Groups C and D. Between Groups C and D, subjects in Group D were found to be 
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more consistent over time than those in Group C. It is believed that a learning effect 
that may have taken place in the few weeks between Parts 1 and 2 of the experiment 
could have affected the results. Another factor that needs to be taken into account 
when examining the results is that the methodology has a rating scheme with bigger 
rating scales and a higher number of possible outcomes than the "5-Steps" approach 
(i. e. Risks A to E as opposed to H/M/L risks). It is therefore more sensitive to any 
change of mind or change of perception by the subjects. By the same token, however, 
it can equally be argued that the methodology is also more receptive to changes in the 
circumstances and other factors that could affect safety. It is therefore more capable 
of reflecting through the evaluation any resultant changes in risks. 
The risk evaluation method has also received much praise from the assessors who 
took part in the user trials. Three out of four of them found the method very useful 
and two of them thought that it was much better than their existing methods. 
Overall, the verification programme has shown that the crowd safety risk assessment 
methodology compares favourably with the "5-Steps" approach and with the existing 
methods used by some venues. In the experiments, those who used the methodology 
are found to perform better in hazard identification and also achieve a higher level of 
concordance in risk evaluation. In the user trials, most participants have considered 
the methodology better than the risk assessment methods they were using at the time 
for crowd safety assessment. However, consistency over time is a potential shortfall 
of the methodology. The experiments have shown that subjects using the "5-Steps" 
approach appear to produce more consistent risk estimates over time than those using 
the methodology. What is uncertain is that to what extent this is an inherent problem 
caused by bigger risk rating scales and more potential outcomes in the methodology, 
or if this was because the methodology is more receptive to either changes in risks or 
in the perception of risks by the subjects. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
10.1 Summary of Research 
The conventional methods of assessing crowd safety in public venues tend to be rather 
ad hoc, highly subjective and rely heavily on the personal experience of the assessors. 
This has resulted in crowd safety management and planning being reactive rather than 
proactive in dealing with problems; i. e. they are restrictive to dealing with known past 
problems and lacking foresight to prevent new problems from arising. Also, decision 
making and priority setting tend to be based on personal judgements rather than 
objective assessments of the situation. This approach to crowd safety assessment is 
considered unsatisfactory as significant problems could be missed out and it does not 
provide a sufficiently rational basis for decision making and planning. 
It is believed that the pitfalls with the conventional methods can be improved through 
risk assessment. Risk assessment is a systematic activity that enables people to 
examine their undertakings and establish how risks could arise and their impacts on 
those who may be affected in a structured and more rational manner. Essentially, it is 
a tool that helps people to make informed decisions on how to manage risks. Risk 
assessment is well established, particularly in the area of workplace health and safety, 
and has become an essential part of safety management and planning. It has been 
employed in a range of applications, ranging from the high hazard industries, such as 
nuclear plants, to more conventional places of work, such as factory shop floors and 
offices. Its benefits are well known and well recognised. There is scope for also 
applying risk assessment to non-work environments; the literature review in Chapter 2 
has highlighted some of the work carried out in these areas. 
A key requirement in risk assessment is that, to remain valid, it needs to be 
appropriate to the nature of the work and the nature and extent of the hazards. To this 
end, a review of the existing risk assessment guidance and methods available to 
assessors in public venues has revealed that they are inadequate in satisfying this 
requirement. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to investigate and explore how risk 
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assessment can be applied to crowd safety and to provide more support for decision 
making in crowd safety planning and risk management. Through the development of 
a suitable risk assessment, this thesis demonstrates that risk assessment can be applied 
to crowd safety to improve the current situation. 
It is important to recognise that whilst the risk assessment principles are the same, the 
ways in which they can best be applied to a particular context vary. Even in the work 
environments, differences in the nature of work and the nature and extent of hazards 
mean that different risk assessment methods are used in different places of work. For 
example, quantified risk assessment may be appropriate to the high hazard but not in 
the manufacturing industry. Even within the same industry, the different nature of 
work calls for different risk assessment methods. The railway industry, for example, 
utilises both quantified and qualitative risk assessment methods for different aspects 
of their operations. 
The differences between public venue environments and workplace environments are 
even more profound and fundamental. For example, "human factors" are important in 
both types of environments, but the workplace is a much more controlled environment 
than public venues in terms of activities and behaviour. The works and the processes 
of work shape activities and behaviour in the workplace. There are clearly defined 
tasks, procedures and practice, which help to govern what people do. People are 
much freer to do as they wish in public venues, and their activities are more wide- 
ranging and not as definable. The presence of large crowds also poses a unique set of 
hazards that are not normally encountered in the workplace; e. g. overcrowding. These 
differences can have a very significant impact on the risk assessment methodology. 
Therefore, the first issue this thesis needed to address was the nature of "work" and 
the nature and extent of hazards in public venue environments. It is essential to 
establish an understanding of the issues before a suitable method(s) can be found to 
assess them. 
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Information Gathering and Background Research 
There are a number of constraints that restrict the methods that can be used to conduct 
the research. Firstly, crowd safety is a new area for research with plenty of experience 
but very little published research knowledge. Secondly, it is a complex problem with 
many interrelating and interacting factors affecting the outcomes, as illustrated in the 
two case studies in Chapter 3. Also, these factors tend to vary from venue to venue 
and in different circumstances. Thirdly, for reasons given in Section 1.4, the means to 
test and validate crowd safety are restricted. Because of these constraints, the research 
method adopted in this thesis is different, in a number of ways, from the methodology 
one would normally expect for an empirical research project. One key difference is 
how data and information are gathered. In order to establish the nature of work and 
the nature and extent of hazards in public venues, much reliance has to be placed on 
front line experience. A lack of published information means that literature review 
alone is not a suitable means of researching the subject. Instead, case studies and a 
venue survey were carried out, in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. They provided the 
main sources of information and compensated the lack of literature information in the 
public domain. 
The case studies have highlighted some of the crowd safety issues that could arise in a 
major public venue. They showed that, in general, there are two types of safety 
hazards. The first type is the general health and safety hazards, which are often 
associated with physical features and items. These hazards are by no means unique to 
public venues as they can also be found in the workplace as well as in many other 
places; although in a large crowd, the extent of these hazards can be significantly 
higher. But the main distinction between the workplace and public venues in terms of 
the nature of hazards is in the second type of hazards; namely, those associated with 
the presence of large crowds. These hazards are usually related to the "human 
factors" such as interactions between individuals in a large crowd, the interactions 
between people and the venue, and behaviour. The subsequent venue survey has 
found that it is these human factors that gave the assessors the most concerns and 
posed the most problems in terms of risk assessment. In fact, only one out of the eight 
public venues that used risk assessment was able to give some considerations to the 
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activities of the visitors. This finding has highlighted an important inadequacy in the 
existing methods for risk assessment when applied to assess crowd safety. 
In terms of risk evaluation, the survey found unanimously that every assessor uses the 
rating method. This finding is in line with that of the literature review, in Section 2.4, 
which shows that rating is the only method used or suggested for qualitative risk 
assessments. Quantified methods are unsuitable, as there is not the data available for 
this kind of assessment. The other possible risk evaluation method is ranking. This 
too is considered unsuitable because it does not give any indication of how much risk 
a particular hazard poses. 
However, beyond the consensus that rating is the most suitable method for evaluation, 
there is a great deal of variation amongst the assessors in exactly how risk rating is 
carried out. The rating methods currently in use range from a single three-point rating 
scale for the overall risk to risk rating regimes that explicitly take into account the key 
considerations such as likelihood and severity. What constitutes a suitable risk rating 
method for crowd safety remains an outstanding issue. In addition, for risk rating is 
essentially a process of passing judgements on risks, the validity and reliability of the 
judgements is also a key issue. Another issue highlighted in the survey is how to deal 
with high-magnitude low-probability events, such as a freak accident or disaster. The 
question is whether there are any justifications for treating the likelihood of an event a 
more dominant factor than its severity or vice versa in risk evaluation. The final issue 
is one that is of a more practical nature, namely the misinterpretation of the meaning 
of risk by some assessors. This could be because everyday use of the word risk tends 
to equate it with chance or likelihood. Misinterpretation was in evidence amongst the 
assessors who took part in the venue survey. 
A key benefit of gathering direct information through case studies and venue survey is 
that it provides the opportunity to get a full picture of the operations involved and raw 
information that enables in-depth investigations and analyses to be carried out. It also 
enables researchers to develop a different line of enquiry to further explore those 
issues that are not thought of in advance but are deemed relevant at the time. 
However, the potential pitfall is that the information is venue specific and focuses on 
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the experience of a few. There is a danger that it may not sufficiently reflect the 
situations in other public venues. To reduce this danger, care was taken in the survey 
so that a variety of different public venues were selected for this exercise. 
In addition to the nature of work and the nature and extent of hazards in public venue 
operations, another important line of investigation concerns the tasks of the assessors. 
This is to ensure that not only the risk assessment is suitable to the kind of hazards 
that can be found in public venues for mass gatherings but it addresses the needs of 
the assessors who undertake it as well. Hence, attention of the research has also been 
given to the assessors and their risk assessment tasks. Part of the survey was devoted 
to identify the practical issues facing the assessors. These issues have to be taken into 
account if a workable solution is to be found to improve the management and 
planning of crowd safety. The issues highlighted in the survey are summarised in 
Table 4.3. What is of particular interest amongst the findings is the issue of time 
constraints; i. e. the amount of time an assessor can devote to risk assessment is often 
limited, especially if he also has operational duties to perform. It can be argued that, 
in the long run, whilst it may be desirable in theory to carry out a detailed risk 
assessment based on quantified data, it may still not be practicable to do so if the time 
constraints remain. This prompts a wider question of what is an appropriate method 
of risk assessment for crowd safety or, more precisely, how simple or sophisticated it 
should be. What is clear from the literature is that risk assessment has to be 
appropriate to the nature and extent of the hazards. But beyond that, there are no 
fixed rules or guidance. Hence, a review was also carried out of the risk assessments 
elsewhere to look at how this and other issues identified so far have been addressed. 
This is further discussed below. 
To investigate the task of assessing crowd safety risks, and in particular, the question 
of what would enable the assessors to successfully accomplish their tasks, established 
task analysis techniques were deployed in Chapter 5 as a research tool. By examining 
the task in this way, it was possible to identify where and what assistance or support 
are required to enable the assessors to conduct a suitable and sufficient assessment of 
crowd safety risks. A systematic examination of the task also gave a different angle to 
the research, thus enabling the identification of further issues of relevance and 
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questions not highlighted in the case studies or the survey. An example is the issue of 
validity and reliability in risk evaluation, which was identified only through task 
analysis. By pulling together the findings from the task analysis, the case studies and 
the survey, a specification was drawn up detailing what the requirements are in terms 
of addressing the various issues identified and the needs of the assessors. This was 
given in Section 5.3. 
Administration of Risk Assessment Methods 
The next phase of the research was to look at how various risk assessment issues and 
assessors' needs can be addressed. A review of the risk assessments elsewhere was 
conducted and the findings are given in Section 2.4, as part of literature reviews. The 
implications of the findings to crowd safety risk assessment were discussed in Chapter 
6. As previously mentioned, the aim of the review was to obtain information that may 
help to identify possible means of addressing the issues. The review looks at the risk 
assessment methods, techniques and tools used in or suggested for a variety of other 
applications. Even though nothing can be found that is directly applicable to crowd 
safety per se, much has been learnt from these assessments that can help to address the 
issues relevant to crowd safety. 
Looking at the different risk assessments, what is noticeable is the variety of methods 
in existence. What is also noticeable is the huge difference in the level of assessment 
adopted for different contexts. At one end of the scale are the very sophisticated QRA 
methods involving the use of fault tree and event tree modelling. At the other end are 
the much simpler qualitative assessments, intended for workplaces such as offices and 
light industrial premises. It is argued that, as they are, neither of the two method types 
is suitable for crowd safety for the following reasons: 
(i) Nature of work and hazard - Crowd safety hazards are much more complex than 
those in the ordinary workplace, although some hazards are similar in nature to 
each other. At the same time, they may have some similarity in complexity with 
the kinds of hazards in, for example, the nuclear industry, but are very different in 
nature. 
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(ii) Extent of risk - Past incident data shows that the results of 
failing to ensure crowd 
safety can range from a few casualties to hundreds of fatalities. Compared to the 
high hazard industry where QRA is used, crowd safety is more "low hazard". Yet, 
it is much more "high hazard" than the common work environment. 
(iii)Practicality - Even if QRA type methods were more desirable in principle, it is 
currently not a viable option due to resource and time constraints and the lack data 
to support such an assessment. Another issue that needs to be resolved before 
QRA is ever achievable is how to account for the activities in public venues, 
which are not very definable. There is a further discussion on this particular issue 
below. 
Therefore, it is concluded that an appropriate level of risk assessment for crowd safety 
should lie between the two types of methods. It has to be more detailed and intensive 
than the simple risk assessments for the common workplaces, but there is no 
justifiable requirement, nor the means, for it to be as detailed and sophisticated as the 
QRA methods. 
For hazard identification, of particular interest are the methods and tools for assessing 
complex systems or human activities. A common feature of these methods is the 
requirement to break down a complex engineering system or a set of complex human 
tasks into smaller elements. None of the existing methods for doing so (e. g. the uses 
of system flow diagrams and task analysis) are believed to be applicable to crowd 
safety because, as previously mentioned, human activities in public venues are much 
less definable than system components and work activities. Nevertheless, using the 
same principle, it is possible to break down a complex venue in terms of its make up. 
The concept of "functional areas" was identified for this purpose. 
There are several established methods, techniques and tools for identifying hazards in 
complex systems and human activities; for example, HAZOP and brainstorming, the 
various human error analysis techniques, keywords, checklist. etc. All of them have 
different features and characteristics. Chapter 6 has highlighted the features of those 
methods that have the potential to encourage a systematic and proactive assessment 
and to resolve the difficulties in dealing with "human factors" and behaviour related 
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hazards. It has also ruled out those methods that are inappropriate to the nature of 
work and hazards in crowd safety. The outputs of the review were fed into Chapter 7 
where features of the existing methods were incorporated into a prototype method for 
crowd safety hazard identification. Brainstorming, HAZOP and keyword approaches 
received particular interest as they possess the quality required for a comprehensive, 
systematic and proactive assessment of complex problems. A common element of 
these methods is the keyword prompters. Keywords for crowd safety hazards were, 
therefore, developed based on the case studies and survey findings. They are generic 
keywords covering crowd and behaviour related hazards as well as the more general 
health and safety type hazards that can be encountered in public venues. 
In terms of risk evaluation, the review has found that rating is by far the most widely 
used qualitative risk evaluation method. But as previously discussed, the outstanding 
issue is the detailed design of the rating method. To this end, methods used in other 
contexts have provided little direction or guidance. What is clear, however, is that the 
"semi-quantified" type of methods was ruled out as they are mathematically flawed. 
The development of the risk evaluation method in Chapter 7, therefore, focused on the 
detailed design of a risk-rating regime. It was decided that the regime should consist 
of separate ratings for likelihood and severity and risk can be determined from the two 
ratings through a likelihood-severity matrix. In doing so, it allows a wide spectrum of 
risk types to be accounted for whilst limiting each rating scale to a sensible size; a 
large rating scale can be difficult to use and can have implications on the consistency 
of the findings. It also enables assessors to evaluate "extreme" events that are high- 
magnitude low-probability (and vice versa) without any artificial adjustments to make 
likelihood or severity a more dominating factor than the other. Such adjustments are 
hard to justify, as the research has not found any significant evidence to suggest that 
likelihood is more important than severity (or vice versa). Requiring the assessors to 
think about likelihood and severity separately will also help to reduce misconception. 
Another key feature of the method is the assignment of text description to each of the 
likelihood and severity ratings. This is to provide guidance to the assessors in order to 
introduce a more objective element to the evaluation and thus enhance the validity and 
reliability of their evaluations. 
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Evaluation and Verification 
Having developed a prototype methodology for crowd safety risk assessment, it was 
necessary to evaluate it to identify scope for improvement. Ideally, the evaluation 
should involve a representative sample of the assessors. This is important because, 
firstly, the assessors are the intended users of the methodology and, secondly, they 
have the necessary experience to pinpoint any problems and inadequacy the prototype 
may have. However, as highlighted earlier in this chapter, the availability of assessors 
for the evaluation, and for the subsequent verification programme, is a key constraint 
of this research. To minimise the effect of this problem, the evaluation programme 
consists of the following components: 
(i) A "pre-evaluation" usability test - As there were only limited assessors available 
for evaluating the prototype, it was important to maximise . ghat they could 
contribute to the evaluation. To prevent assessors being distracted by "side 
issues" such as readability and the user-interface issues, this test is designed to 
iron out as many significant usability problems concerning the presentation of the 
methodology as possible. This was done using the heuristic evaluation method 
with human factors specialists employed as evaluators. 
(ii) User trials - This is the main part of the evaluation whereby assessors were asked 
to try out the methodology in order to test its validity and usability. Observations, 
informal discussions and a questionnaire were the techniques used to exact 
findings from the trials. 
(iii) Questionnaire survey - The user trials were time consuming to do and, hence, not 
every assessor involved in the evaluation was able to participate in the trials. The 
aim of the survey was to capture the views and comments of those assessors who 
were unable to take part in the trials and, thus, provided additional information for 
the evaluation. 
The results of the evaluation indicated that the hazard identification method was over- 
sophisticated and difficult to use for the assessors. The use of combinations of hazard 
keywords was an alien idea for most assessors and there was a mis-match between the 
assessors' expectation and the proposed method. Hence, there was much difficulty in 
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applying the method. Although an alien idea does not necessarily render it a bad idea, 
subsequent review of the method has revealed that at least part of the difficulty arose 
from the fact that the prototype method still has the pre-requirement to define the 
character of venue and the activities. For example, to identify the hazard, it was still 
necessary to define, though at a more reduced level, what venue features and aspects 
of crowd activities are involved before considering what problems associated with 
these features and activities could arise (i. e. their "failure modes"). In principle, this 
means that hazard identification is better structured and more comprehensive. But the 
user trials suggested that even such a level of definition could still be a problem for 
many venues. 
The methodology was revised accordingly after the evaluation. Amongst the changes 
made, the most important modification was the abandonment of the "combinations of 
keyword" approach for hazard identification. This was replaced by a HAZOP I type 
keyword approach, as it is more suitable for situations where things are really not very 
definable. It is also a simpler method and is easier and less time consuming to use. 
The risk evaluation method, on the other hand, appeared to work very well although it 
is also more complex than the single rating methods used by the assessors. Relatively 
minor problems were identified concerning specific aspects of the proposed method. 
But, by and large, there were no fundamental changes to the original method. 
The final draft of the risk assessment methodology for crowd safety was subjected to a 
verification programme. This was carried out by means of controlled experiments and 
user trials to compare the final draft with an established method representative of the 
existing methods used by many venues. As before, the unavailability of assessors was 
a major constraint to how verification can be conducted. There were also other related 
issues that needed to be considered. For example, the differences between public 
venues and, hence, the varying knowledge and experience of their assessors, make 
comparing like with like impossible to achieve. The time and effort that would be 
required of the participating assessors and the running costs also make it not viable to 
carry out empirical tests involving large numbers of assessors. Hence, undergraduate 
students were used instead as subjects in a set of controlled experiments. The benefits 
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are two-fold. Firstly, a sufficient number of subjects can be found for the 
experiments. Secondly, all subjects had a similar level of knowledge and experience, 
which enables comparisons to be made on equal terms in this respect. Nonetheless, it 
is recognised that inputs from the assessors are also important at this stage as they are 
the intended users and they hold the experience and the intimate knowledge about the 
venue and its operations necessary for a comprehensive assessment. Thus, a number 
of user trials were also carried out in parallel to the experiments in order to obtain the 
verdicts from the assessors. 
Another research constraint is that there are no "correct answers" per se against which 
risk assessment findings by the subjects can be compared to determine how they well 
perform, as risk is about uncertainty and future happenings. Therefore, indirect 
methods of measuring performance were employed. In hazard identification, it was 
measured in terms of the number of hazards that one can identify. For risk evaluation, 
the focus was on establishing the validity and the reliability of the evaluations. More 
specifically, it measured the consistency between individuals' evaluations of the same 
hazard and the consistency of the evaluations by the same individual on the same 
hazards at different times. 
The findings of the user trials were very favourable to the methodology. All assessors 
involved regarded the proposed hazard identification and risk evaluation methods as 
either useful or very useful. Compared to the methods they were using at the time, the 
majority found the proposed methods either better or much better. Whilst the results 
gave some indications on how the assessors thought of the proposed methods, it has to 
be noted that they are merely subjective judgements from a small sample of assessors. 
More substantial evidence was required, and this was provided through the controlled 
experiments. 
In terms of hazard identification, the results of the controlled experiments showed that 
subjects using the proposed method identified a larger number of hazards. The results 
are sufficiently significant to conclude that the use of the method can lead to improved 
performance in hazard identification. Also, by adopting a keyword approach that is so 
similar to the HAZOP I (structured brainstorming) approach, it would be interesting to 
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also see if it leads to further improvement if subjects worked in a small team, as in the 
case of a HAZOP study. However, the findings showed that team working did not 
appear to result in any significant improvements. Nevertheless, what is worth noting 
is that this result does not necessarily mean that there were no significant benefits to 
be gained with team working. One of the key requirements for a HAZOP type study 
is that the team should consist of people with different backgrounds, knowledge and 
concerns. This was not simulated in the experiments, as it was not possible to do so 
with the existing subject group. 
In terms of risk evaluation, there were mixed findings. The results of the experiments 
have shown that subjects using the proposed method are more consistent with each 
other's evaluation findings, and this consistency between evaluation findings 
improved further when subjects worked in small teams. However, it has also found 
that subjects using the proposed method were less consistent over time; i. e. they 
produced different evaluations on the same hazards at different times. There are a 
number of factors that may help to explain this result. Firstly, the proposed method 
has larger rating scales and a higher number of risk levels. This means that there are 
more choices to choose from and, hence, more scope for giving a different answer. 
This factor could affect consistency between individuals as well as consistency over 
time. Secondly, because of the larger rating scales used in the proposed method and 
also because the proposed method is generally more complex, it is less likely that 
subjects would remember in the second part of the experiment what answers they gave 
previously. To what extent better reliability of the alternative method was achieved 
due to subjects remembering their previous answers is not entirely clear. The third 
factor is that subjects may have a change of mind between the first and second parts of 
the evaluation experiment. This is possible because of the "learning effect"; i. e. as 
crowd safety was new to all subjects in the first part of the experiments, subsequent 
visits to the student union building (i. e. the venue used for the experiments) could 
result in them learning about crowd safety in the building. Consequently, the learning 
effect could lead to changes in the perception and evaluation of the risks. It is 
possible that the lower level of consistency achieved in the proposed method is 
actually an indication that it was more sensitive to changes, either in risks or risk 
perception, and reflects such changes better in the findings. 
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Overall, the verification programme has shown conclusively that the methodology in 
the final draft can lead to improved performance in hazard identification. But it is less 
conclusive with regard to risk evaluation. Consistency of the evaluation findings over 
time is a concern. It is possible that the proposed method has actually led to a drop in 
consistency over time. But equally, it could be because the proposed method is more 
sensitive to changes in risks or risk perception and it is more difficult for the subjects 
to remember what answers were given in the first evaluation. If true, the former can 
be particularly beneficial as risk can change between different venues and from time 
to time. Further investigations are required into these factors. 
10.2 Discussion and Conclusions 
It is important to recognise that the research described in this thesis merely represents 
the first step towards achieving a systematic, comprehensive and objective method of 
assessing crowd safety risks to enable informed decision making. The direct product 
is an assessment methodology for examining the complex crowd safety issues that can 
arise in public venues. The key parts of the methodology are the hazard identification 
and risk evaluation methods. The methodology has proven to be more effective in the 
assessment of crowd safety in places of mass gathering, in the respect that people 
using it are likely to identify more hazards. It is clear that much benefit can be gained 
for making the assessment method more suitable and appropriate to the nature of work 
and hazards. The methodology has also proven to generate findings that are more 
valid, in the respect that people are more in agreement with each other's evaluation of 
risks. However, it also appears that the methodology produces findings that are less 
reliable, in the respect that more people are likely to come up with a different risk 
evaluation at different times. But as discussed above, there is still some uncertainty as 
to exactly what the contributory factors to this are and the extent of their influence. 
Apart from the direct achievements in the course of developing the methodology, the 
investigations into the nature and extent of hazards in public venues have also led to 
an improved understanding of the crowd safety risks and how they can be captured 
and accounted for in risk assessment. In particular, the hazard identification keywords 
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have provided the taxonomy of the kinds of crowd safety hazards that could arise in a 
public venue of mass gathering. It is believed that the research work has also served 
to cast a light on how risk assessment is possible in non-work related contexts where 
the hazards can be different and the activities are difficult to define. 
Overall, the research work possesses the following characteristics that distinguishes it 
from other research studies in many respects: 
" It is unique in its application. Although risk assessment is well established, there 
has been little attempt to apply it to the public environments where the activities 
involved are much more wide-ranging and less definable. This thesis has shown 
that the safety problems that could exist in such an environment can be complex 
and distinctively different from many other environments or contexts where risk 
assessments have been used. It follows that a different risk assessment is required 
to assess these problems. The thesis has described a way in which alternative risk 
assessment methods could be developed. 
0 It ventures into territories that have not received too much research attention in the 
past, i. e. crowd safety. Even though people have been managing large crowds for 
a long time, there have been very few research studies into the subject. The area 
of risk assessment is much better researched and more established but traditionally 
the focus has been on quantified methods. More recently there has been more 
attention devoted to quantitative methods. The lack of research, and the richness in 
practical experience has presented a unique challenge to the research 
methodology. This means that the research has to place a heavier reliance on 
information in the field to take advantage of the wealth of experience out there. 
This thesis has described an approach for researching into a subject area where 
there is plenty of experience but little research. It has also illustrated how an 
analytical tool such as task analysis may also be used as a research tool to form 
part of this information gathering process. 
0 As a part of the overall research methodology, it explicitly sets out to establish the 
practical considerations associated with the management and assessment of crowd 
safety (i. e. through a venue survey and, to a lesser extent, task analysis). The lack 
of research is only one reason for this. Fundamentally, rather than being an 
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empirical research, the research aimed to bridge the gap between the risk 
assessment principles and its application to produce a practical solution to a set of 
complex problems that could affect the safety of many. To this end, the thesis has 
combined the theory and past research on risk assessment with key considerations 
such as the legal requirements, the existing guidance and current practices, and the 
practical issues and constraints facing the assessors. In fact, it is worth noting that 
from the experience of this research, the inclusion of these practical considerations 
has enriched and enhanced the research. 
" It involved the end users throughout the research. The research methodology has 
accommodated a significant amount of venue assessor involvement. Their inputs 
are not only vital at the information gathering stage, but they were also invaluable 
in the evaluation of the risk assessment methodology. In particular, where there 
could be alternative solutions to a problem, as in the case of hazard identification, 
it is often those who have the first hand experience who hold the key that helps to 
find the answer as to which is the more suitable solution overall. As a direct result 
of assessors' inputs in the evaluation, the hazard identification method suggested 
in the prototype was revised. Unfortunately, the question of whether the prototype 
method or the revised HAZOP I type method produce better performance was not 
tested in the research. However, when comparing the user trials in the evaluation 
against the user trials in the verification (i. e. after the method was revised), there is 
qualitative evidence to suggest that the latter is probably more suitable overall at 
present when it is applied to real life situations by actual assessors. Nevertheless, 
in the long run, it will be most interesting to establish whether a more structured 
and sophisticated method, such as that suggested in the prototype, is more or less 
superior to the relatively simple method currently recommended for the type of 
hazards encountered in public venues. 
As a ground laying research into an area that has received very little research attention 
in the past, this research has dealt with the topic of crowd safety risk assessment at a 
more general level. It has covered a wide range of issues but has not investigated all 
of these issues in great depth. It is hoped that the work completed in this thesis will 
pave the way for further research and improvements in crowd safety and crowd safety 
risk assessment in the future. 
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Furthermore, this research has focused largely on the "technical" aspects of risk 
management; i. e. the use of risk assessment as a means to assist managers to identify 
appropriate technical solutions for controlling crowd safety risks. The final draft of 
the methodology does not explicitly address the management factors such as 
management beliefs/mindset, costs, inter-organisational communication and culture. 
As previously highlighted in Section 2.3.5, relying on technical solutions alone may 
be insufficient to ensure safety. Some researchers (e. g. Elliott and Smith, 1993; 
Smith, 1995) have even suggested that over-reliance on technical solutions alone 
could lead to management complacency and serve as a barrier to learning. There is a 
further potential danger that over-reliance on technical solutions might lead to venue 
managers completely ignoring the issue of safety and leaving it to the technical 
experts (e. g. safety officers). When assessing the role of technical experts in risk 
management, some researchers have also argued that over-reliance on technical 
experts could become problematic if the issue is "trans-scientific" in nature or if it lies 
outside the accepted boundaries of knowledge and cannot be scientifically proven. At 
its most complex, this could become a social-political conflict (e. g. Calman & Smith, 
2001). With this in mind, it is worth exploring further whether the use of risk 
assessment could be counter-productive. 
The main focus of risk assessment is to identify potential problems, evaluate their 
risks and identify suitable means to control them. As the risk assessment 
methodology, as it stands, does not address management factors directly, it is possible 
that a manager could be lured towards searching for technical solutions rather than 
addressing the underlying shortfalls in their management system. The assessment 
methodology, which explicitly requires the identification of the causes of complex 
hazards, should help to encourage venue managers to identify the underlying causes 
and devise remedial measures to deal with the causes rather than just the symptoms. 
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that the methodology may be insufficient in 
encouraging assessors to identify some of the management issues such as the social, 
historical and economic factors. Further work will be required in this area. Also, 
once the assessment is completed and the necessary changes are implemented, venue 
managers could have a false sense of security that the safety risks are under control 
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and, so, relax their vigilance. It is possible that they may fail to consider, for example, 
whether the changes could give rise to new problems or whether the management 
system is adequate in facilitating the changes. 
On the other hand, a systematic and comprehensive risk assessment would help to 
make venue managers more aware of the problems that could arise and the risks 
involved. In this respect, this could help to reduce management complacency and 
mindset. The hazard identification method developed in this research was designed to 
encourage lateral thinking, which would help managers to develop new perspectives, 
question their existing beliefs and improve management foresight. The risk 
evaluation method requires assessors to take a step back and evaluate in a more 
objective manner the risks in terms of the likelihood and the severity of harm. It 
follows that if the likelihood and severity are deemed to be high, then priority should 
be given to tackling the problem even in the absence of hard evidence of significant 
risk. 
From past crises and disasters in crowd safety and other contexts, it appears that all 
too often evidence of significant risk only becomes apparent to the management in the 
wake of major disasters. As previously discussed in Section 1.4, fortunately in crowd 
safety, such disasters are relatively rare although the consequences can be very severe. 
Thus, the opportunities for learning from past disasters are very limited. Nevertheless, 
some evidence-based learning is still possible from past information such as 
incident/injury records, post event reports, customer complaints, de-briefings of front 
line staff, etc. For example, the analysis of accident records, match reports, etc. in the 
football industry by Elliott et al (1997) serves to show that evidence-based learning 
using past information is possible in some sectors. Worker participation in safety 
management is another possible source of information for risk assessment (Smith, 
1996). Calman & Smith (2001) also argue that recognition should be given to other 
forms of knowledge, such as that held by the workers, users, consumers, local groups 
and those charged with implementing policy. They argue that uncertainties may be 
better understood by reference to this wider body of knowledge. The involvement of 
"lay" persons (as well as professionals) is particularly important with respect to issues 
that are not purely scientific (Irwin, 2001). Obviously, the extent of evidence-based 
258 
learning would very much depend upon the quantity and quality of the information 
each venue has collected. Learning from the experience of others can be another 
valuable source of information for risk assessment. Unfortunately, for many public 
venues, there is a general lack of data for evidence-based learning. For example, 
currently there appears to be no public forum whereby venue managers can exchange 
information and share experience. With limited evidence-based learning, there is a 
particular concern that assessors and managers might be less likely to identify new 
hazards that have a low likelihood of occurrence. As Reason (1998) pointed out, if 
people see nothing, they presume that nothing is happening, and that nothing will 
continue to happen. He concluded that in the absence of frequent bad events, the best 
way to induce and sustain a state of intelligent and respectful wariness is to gather the 
right kind of data. The problem of a lack of data and information is well illustrated 
when Medvedev, a leading Soviet nuclear engineer, explained why the Moscow-based 
Nuclear Safety Committee did not act to halt the electrical generation experiment, 
which led to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. 
It was almost as if they had conspired not to intervene. Why? The fact was that 
there was a conspiracy of silence. Mishaps were never publicized; and as 
nobody knew about them, nobody could learn from them. For 35 years people 
did not notify each other about accidents at nuclear power stations, and 
nobody applied the experience of such accidents to their work. It was as if no 
accidents had taken place at all: everything was safe and reliable. ("The Truth 
about Chernobyl" by G. Medvedev, 1991, New York, Basic 
Therefore, developing a system of information gathering, analyses and dissemination 
within an organisation and a public database of incidents and near misses are also very 
important for risk assessment. 
10.3 Further Research 
This final section of the thesis looks at some of the issues and areas that would benefit 
from further research and development. 
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The first issue that needs to be addressed is how to improve reliability in risk 
evaluation. The second related issue concerns the gathering of information about 
crowd safety to enable a more objective evaluation of the risks. The lack of 
researched knowledge on the risk factors and limited evidence based learning are 
some of the problems that need to be tackled in order to reduce the reliance on 
subjective judgements of the assessors and, hence, improve reliability. The third area 
that requires further investigation is how much a venue owner should do to tackle the 
risks. This issue has not been properly resolved in this research. The fourth issue is 
whether risk assessment is better if it is performed by an individual assessor or by 
team effort. These issues are all concerned with the tools and techniques of the 
methodology and its implementation. The final issue concerns the wider area of the 
organisational management aspects of risk management. This research has not 
directly addressed the organisational management factors, which could be an 
underlying cause to the incubation of crisis and disasters. Whether a risk assessment 
methodology that fails to explicitly address these management factors is counter- 
productive and, if so, how this can be resolved is an interesting area for further 
research. The remaining sections of this chapter will discuss all these issues further. 
Improving Reliability in Risk Evaluation 
One question immediately arising from the current research is the reliability of the risk 
evaluation method. As already discussed, the experimental results in Section 9.4 have 
shown that the subjects' evaluations of risks under the proposed method appear to be 
less reliable over time. The thesis has highlighted a few possible reasons for this but 
it is not entirely clear to what extent these factors may have affected the outcomes of 
the experiment, and whether there were any other factors involved. For example, it 
would be interesting to establish the extent that the "learning effect", as opposed to 
the relative complexity of the method, had on the experimental results. If learning 
effect is found to be a significant factor, then it is likely that reliability can be better 
maintained if the evaluation is undertaken by actual assessors, who have more 
experience and are more knowledgeable about the venues under assessment. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the apparent lack of reliability shown in the 
experiment could be a sign that the method is more sensitive to changes in 
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circumstances. A method that is more sensitive to the learning curve and changes in 
risk perception can also be good for new venues and events where initially there is 
usually limited venue specific experience and knowledge. However, if the "learning 
effect" is not a significant factor, then it will be necessary to establish the true 
reason(s) for the drop in reliability and to identify the ways in which reliability could 
be improved. This may involve, for example, having to reduce the size (or the 
number) of the rating scales currently used in the proposed method. In which case, 
difficult decisions would have to be made to find the balance between reliability, 
validity and the ability to cover the full spectrum of eventualities and clearly 
distinguish different levels in terms of their likelihood and severity. 
Understanding the Risk Factors and Evidence Based Learning 
Making adjustments to the mechanism of the risk evaluation method will probably 
only deal with symptoms of the reliability problem. Another way of improving 
reliability is to tackle the underlying cause; namely, the subjective nature of the 
evaluation. Even though the proposed methodology promotes a more systematic and 
rational approach, risk evaluation is still essentially a matter of subjective judgements, 
expressed through ratings. It is believed that, in the long run, the way to further 
improve the validity and reliability of the evaluation is to make it a more objective 
process, whereby evaluations are based more on "hard information" or predictions 
about the crowds and the venues. Subjective judgements are more likely to be 
influenced strongly by personal perception as well as by factors that are not 
necessarily related to safety; e. g. commercial interest, political pressure, public 
opinions, the "hot" issues/concerns at the time, etc. Although in practice these factors 
are important considerations, it is more appropriate to deal with them later when 
deciding how the risks are to be managed, rather than to mingle them with the safety 
issues. Therefore, risk assessment ought to focus on safety alone. Only after the risks 
to safety are established can they be considered together with the other factors to 
facilitate decision making in planning and risk management. 
For the purpose of this section, the term "hard information" refers to crowd and venue 
characteristics such as crowd size, density and movement; visitor type, behaviour and 
261 
activities; venue layout and features, etc. Such information is relatively easy to obtain 
in practice, normally through planning, intelligence gathering, operational experience, 
observations, CCTV footage/photographic images. Advances in computer modelling 
also make it possible to make predictions on such things as crowd distribution, areas 
of high-density and crowd dynamics (e. g. Hillier, 1996). Risk evaluation based on 
crowd and venue characteristics that are specific to the venue/event under assessment 
is likely to be much less subjective, and hence more reliable. However, the question 
that needs to be addressed is how these characteristics can be translated into risk, or 
how they can be used to provide an indication of the risk involved. Further research is 
required in this area. 
One way of addressing this question could be to look at these characteristics in terms 
of how and to what extent they can affect crowd safety risks, or "risk factors". For 
example, crowd density can be seen as a risk factor in that the higher the density, the 
higher the risk it is likely to pose. Similarly, the size of the crowd, visitor type, 
whether they are stationary or moving, the speed of movement, whether it is a single 
direction or multi-direction flow, venue characteristics, etc. are also factors that could 
have an effect on the overall risk (Au et al, 1993). By understanding the relationship 
between these factors and crowd safety risks, it would then be possible to use the 
information and prediction about the crowd and the venue in a more objective manner 
to evaluate what they could mean in terms of the risks they pose. A similar method of 
evaluation (i. e. using risk contributory factors) is used in the field of human reliability 
assessment (e. g. Williams, 1988). Currently, our understanding of this relationship is 
limited and is based on individuals' experience rather than researched knowledge. To 
improve our understanding, much more research needs to be done on the dynamics 
and the behaviour of crowds and how they may contribute to risks. Just as in human 
error, the different crowd safety risk factors could interact with each other and there is 
still much to find out. We need to establish, for instance, why there appears to be less 
risk of people being seriously injured or killed by crushing on a metro train than in a 
pop concert even though the packing density on the train during peak hours can be 
higher. There are also many other examples of mass gathering, but not all of them 
turn into a disaster. Understanding what makes a crowded situation go wrong is an 
important part of this line of research. 
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Learning from past evidence could also help to improve risk assessment, both in terms 
of a more objective risk evaluation and improved hazard identification. However, as 
discussed previously in Section 10.2, the opportunities for evidence-based learning are 
currently very limited. There is a potential danger that people may not have enough 
experience to make the correct judgement when it comes to risks that have a high 
severity but a low likelihood of occurrence. More data and case studies of past 
incidents and near misses are, therefore, needed to be collected to facilitate better risk 
assessment. 
The research work suggested above will not only be useful for risk evaluation, it will 
also better equip us to identify the suitable remedial measures to deal with the risks. 
Determining Appropriate Risk Management Measures 
Another area of risk assessment that needs looking into is decision-making for 
planning and risk management purposes. Having identified and evaluated the risks, 
the question is what should be done about the risks. There are two parts to this 
question. The first part concerns what remedial measures are required to tackle the 
hazards. This will vary depending on the causes and nature of hazards. The other part 
of this question is how much we need to do to manage the risk and, in particular, what 
the basis should be for making such a decision. This is an area that requires further 
examination. For the sake of completeness, the current methodology given in 
Appendix D has included a scheme for the interpretation of risk levels to determine 
the extent of actions required. This is also shown in Figure 7.3 of Section 7.3.5. The 
scheme was based on the principles of tolerability, acceptability and ALARP from the 
HSE (1992c) for the nuclear industry. Although the principles have become the 
convention in the safety field in general, their application to crowd safety has not been 
properly researched and is not verified in this thesis. Also, whilst the scheme is 
suitable for the nuclear and other similar industries where tolerability and 
acceptability criteria can be set in terms of the risk of a certain amount of 
exposure/dose received, it may not be appropriate for crowd safety. In the nuclear 
industry, the risk of someone receiving an excessive amount of exposure can be 
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determined more objectively through QRA and the criteria on what is an excessive 
amount can be set based on medical knowledge and evidence. But the same cannot be 
said for crowd safety. Under the current methodology, the basis for saying that a level 
A risk is intolerable and a level D risk is broadly acceptable, etc. is unsubstantiated 
and rather arbitrary. What the appropriate basis is for making risk management 
decisions in crowd safety needs to be looked at in more detail. 
Risk management is a central topic of debate (e. g. Royal Society, 1992). Essentially, 
it is about putting together rational arguments making justifiable decisions on how 
much one ought to do to deal with the risks. There are many factors involved and 
numerous issues need to be taken into account when making risk management 
decisions. Apart from safety risks, other issues relevant to crowd safety may include 
social-political factors, such as public risk perception and public attitudes towards any 
trade-offs and inconvenience that may result from the risk reduction measures. For 
example, how much reduction in entertainment value are people prepared to accept for 
the sake of safety and how would people react to disruptions to road traffic if main 
roads are closed to improve safety at and near an event? The need for taking into 
consideration the social-political issues is highlighted by some of the criticisms on a 
purely risk-based approach to risk management decision making. For example, it is 
argued that such an approach is not sufficiently sensitive to public concerns and 
opinions (Kletz, 1988) and does not relate benefit clearly enough with tolerability 
(Royal Society, 1992). What the social-political issues are in crowd safety and how 
(and to what extent) they should be taken into consideration in risk management 
decision making could be an interesting area of research and debate particularly for 
social scientists. 
Another possible area of research is the modification of the methodology for specific 
venue types. The current work is intended for public venues in general. However, as 
the case studies in Chapter 3 have demonstrated, every venue type is different in their 
nature of operations, visitor composition, visitor activities and so on. As such, 
hazards that are significant in one type of public venue may not be a problem in 
another, and the extent of the risk they pose could also vary from venue type to venue 
type. Therefore, it could be beneficial to use the current methodology as the basis for 
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developing more specific risk assessment for specific venue types to address the kinds 
of safety issues or problems they encounter. 
Risk Assessment by Individuals vs. Team Effort 
Whether a risk assessment performed through team effort is better than by individuals, 
(and why) is an interesting issue to explore further. This thesis has touched upon this 
issue through the experiments in Chapter 9. The results appear to show that the 
former is better when it comes to risk evaluation, but the results for hazard 
identification are inconclusive. A main difference between the experiments and how 
the team effort approach is intended to work is that all of the subjects in the 
experiments have a similar background in terms of crowd safety. Similar techniques 
involving team effort require that the team should include people from different 
backgrounds who have different roles to play in ensuring the safety of the overall 
system. Experience suggests that team effort should normally lead to improved 
performance. Whether this would equally apply to crowd safety is worth further 
investigation. A related question is whether the reliability and validity of risk 
evaluation can be further improved if the team consists of people from different 
backgrounds. From a practical viewpoint, there is also the question of whether or not 
there are sufficient benefits to make risk assessments by a team worthwhile, given that 
it can be more difficult to organise and costly to run. As a further development to the 
current methodology, it will therefore be interesting to look at these questions. From 
an implementation viewpoint, other questions that need addressing include who 
should be in the assessment team and what the optimum size of the team is. The 
assessment may not work as well if the team is too small. On the other hand, a team 
that consists of too many people will not only be costly to run, it could also be 
counter-productive. 
Organisational Management 
Smith (1999) has argued that many failures and crises emerge from the organisation's 
system of management (e. g. culture, core belief, ineffective communication, etc. ) and 
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that the potential for failures is often built into the system by management practice, 
protocols and processes. Although the assessment methodology, which promotes 
lateral thinking, may help to prompt the assessors to take a step back to consider such 
issues during their assessments, it does not provide any specific help in enabling the 
identification of the underlying management issues that could lead to the incubation of 
crisis. The relationship between organisational management and incubation of crisis 
and the danger of relying on technical solutions alone has been the subject of various 
research projects. However, the questions are: (i) to what extent they are relevant to 
crowd safety; (ii) whether a "technical" risk assessment that does not directly address 
the management factors is still helpful or could it be counter-productive in some 
respects and give venue managers a false sense of security; and, (iii) how technical 
solutions can be addressed in conjunction with management issues or how 
management factors can be best captured in risk assessment so that they receive 
proper attention, as highlighted in Section 2.3.5. These are some of the outstanding 
issues that would require more thought. 
Final Remarks 
To conclude, the research work described in this thesis has taken the first step towards 
facilitating a more rational and justifiable decision making process for planning and 
risk management. There are still many issues that need following up and plenty of 
scope for further development, particularly in the subject of crowd safety. Although 
people have been practising it for many years, very little research has been done. One 
of the top priorities for future research should, therefore, be to improve our knowledge 
and understanding about crowds. Another priority is to establish the relationship 
between crowds and risks and how this relationship can be captured in risk 
assessment. Those issues discussed in this chapter are identified as a result of the 
current work for moving towards addressing these priorities. As this line of research 
progresses, more issues will be identified and more effort will be required before the 
ultimate goal of achieving an objective risk assessment, described earlier in this 
chapter, can be reached. 
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APPENDIX A 
Public Venue Interview Questionnaire 
VENUE OWNER INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. Current Practice 
1. What are your main operational/safety concerns (e. g. congestion/ 
overcrowding, emergency evacuation, other aspects of safety, public disorder, 
crime, etc. )? 
2. How did you arrive at the above? 
3. What plans (and procedures) do you have in place to address your crowd 
safety concerns (e. g. congestion, emergency response, etc. )? 
4. Please describe your safety assessment and planning process. 
5. How is information (e. g. from existing guidance, discussions with others, 
comments from staff and visitors, past incidents, exercises, etc. ) fed into your 
assessment and planning process? 
6. What do you do to achieve the following (e. g. the approach adopted, any 
specific techniques or tools used, etc. ): 
" to identify safety hazards 
" to determine whether or not they are significant. Also, what are the criteria, 
acceptable risk levels, etc.? 
" to determine whether existing measures and plans are sufficient 
" to identify any additional measures required (including modification of 
plans) and things that need to be improved 
" [For venues which require a licence to operate] to meet any safety related 
terms and conditions specified by the licensing authority. Also, what are 
they? 
7. In your opinion, what are the benefits and pitfalls of the assessment 
method(s) mentioned above? (Also, have you considered doing the above in 
any other ways? ) 
B. Risk Assessment 
Under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR), 
employers are required to assess the risks to their employees and others who may be 
affected by their undertakings. This also applies to public venues. The Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) recommends that a risk assessment should: 
" look for hazards 
" decide who might be harmed and how 
" evaluate the risks arising from the hazards and decide whether existing 
precautions are adequate or more should be done 
" record your findings 
" review your assessment from time to time and revise it if necessary. 
8. From your experience, what are the constraints and problems associated with 
conducting crowd safety risk assessment in public venues such as yours? 
9. How did you decide what is a suitable risk assessment to your specific 
venue(s)? Also, what do you think is a "suitable and sufficient" risk 
assessment for public venues which, on the one hand, can enable the 
assessors to address the sometimes complex crowd safety problems and, on 
the other hand, is simple and easy enough to use? 
10. Given Q8 and Q9 above, to what areas do you think the crowd safety risk 
assessment methodology should pay more attention in order to best address 
your needs? (I. e. what support or assistance in the form of assessment 
techniques and guidance would you like to see? ) 
11. Do you have any other comments on crowd 
APPENDIX B 
Enforcing Authorities Interview Questionnaire 
ENFORCING AUTHORITIES INTERVIEW 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
A. Current Practice 
1. What are the main operational/safety concerns of the venues/events under 
your authority (e. g. congestion/overcrowding, emergency evacuation, other 
aspects of safety, public disorder, crime, etc. )? 
2. How did they arrive at the above? 
3. When dealing with a licence application (or renewal), what do you do to 
determine the terms and conditions which the applicant should meet? 
4. How is information (e. g. from existing guidance, discussions with others, 
comments from staff and visitors, past incidents, exercises, etc. ) fed into the 
above? 
5. What plans (and procedures) do the venue owners/event organisers have in 
place to address their crowd safety concerns (i. e. congestion, emergency 
response, etc. )? Also, are they part of the terms and conditions? 
6. In addition to meeting the terms and conditions set out by you, do the venue 
owners/event organisers also carry out some form of planning and safety/risk 
assessment? If NO, go to Q 9. 
7. What are the planning and safety/risk assessment process(es) they usually 
adopt? In particular, what do they do to achieve the following (e. g. the 
approach adopted, any specific techniques or tools used, etc. ): 
" to identify safety hazards 
" to determine whether or not they are significant. Also, what are the criteria, 
acceptable risk levels, etc.? 
" to determine whether existing measures and plans are sufficient 
" to identify any additional measures required (including modification of 
plans) and things that need to be improved. 
8. In your opinion, what are the benefits and pitfalls of the assessment 
method(s) mentioned above? (Also, have they considered doing the above in 
any other ways? ) 
9. In your opinion, should they carry out additional planning and/or assessment? 
If so, what planning and safety/risk assessment process(es) would you 
prefer? 
B. Risk Assessment 
Under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (MHSWR), 
employers are required to assess the risks to their employees and others who may be 
affected by their undertakings. This also applies to public venues. The Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) recommends that a risk assessment should: 
" look for hazards 
" decide who might be harmed and how 
9 evaluate the risks arising from the hazards and decide whether existing 
precautions are adequate or more should be done 
" record your findings 
" review your assessment from time to time and revise it if necessary. 
10. From your experience, what are the constraints and problems associated with 
conducting crowd safety risk assessment in public venues such as those 
under your authority? 
11. What do you think is a "suitable and sufficient" risk assessment for public 
venues which, on the one hand, can enable the assessors to address the 
sometimes complex crowd safety problems and, on the other hand, is simple 
and easy enough to use? 
12. Given Q10 and Q11 above, to what areas do you think the crowd safety risk 
assessment methodology should pay more attention in order to best address 
the needs of the public venues? (i. e. what support or assistance in the form of 
assessment techniques and guidance would you like to see? ) 
13. Do you have any other comments on crowd safety risk assessment? 
APPENDIX C 
Analysis of the Tasks Involved in the Assessment of Crowd Safety Risks 
APPENDIX C-1 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
0.0 CONDUCT A CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT 
Plan 0.0: 1.0 -> (2.0 & 3.0 in any order) -> 4.0 -> (5.0 regularly or if there are 
any significant changes or after any significant problems have 
been identified) 
1.0 IDENTIFY HAZARDS 
Plan 1.0: In any order 
1.1 Identify Hazards Associated with Poor Venue Design 
Plan 1.1: 1.1.1 -> (1.1.2 -> 1.1.3 -> repeat until the whole 
venue has been considered) 
1.1.1 Consider each part of the venue 
1.1.2 Identify undesirable design features (e. g. pinch points) 
1.1.3 Identify hazards presented by each of the above design 
featu res 
1.2 Identify Hazards Associated with Visitors' Activities/Behaviour 
Plan 1.2: 1.2.1 -> (1.2.2 ->repeat for all activities) 
1.2.1 Identify visitors' activities and likely undesirable behaviour 
1.2.2 Identify hazards due to each activity/behaviour 
1.3 Identify Hazards due to Inadequate Crowd Safety Management 
(e. g. staff errors, poor communication, etc. ) 
Plan 1.3: 1.3.1 -> (1.3.2 -> repeat for all inadequacies) 
1.3.1 Identify areas of inadequacy 
1.3.2 Identify hazards due to each inadequacy 
1.4 Identify Hazards due to Disruptions to the Normal Operation 
Plan 1.4: 1.4.1 -> (1.4.2 -> repeat for all scenarios) 
1.4.1 Identify scenarios (e. g. equipment failures, cancellation of 
services, delays, adverse weather conditions, accidents, 
etc. ) 
1.4.2 Identify hazards that could arise under each scenario 
2.0 DECIDE WHO MIGHT BE HARMED AND HOW 
Plan 2.0: 2.1 -> 2.2 
2.1 Identify Visitor Group(s) who might be Particularly Vulnerable 
2.2 Consider How Visitors might be Harmed 
3.0 EVALUATE RISKS 
Plan 3.0: 3.1 (for all hazards) -> 3.2 -> 3.3 
3.1 Estimate the Risk Associated with each Hazard 
Plan 3.1: (3.1.1 & 3.1.2 in any order) -> 3.1.3 -> repeat for all 
hazards 
3.1.1 Estimate likelihood of each hazard 
" Take into account past experience 
" Take into account any relevant historical data on 
accidents and near misses 
" Consider relevant intelligence reports (if any) 
" Consult relevant guidance and other sources of crowd 
safety knowledge 
" Take into account any existing safety measures 
3.1.2 Estimate severity of each hazard 
" Consider the human costs 
" Consider other costs and adverse consequences 
" Take into account any existing measures and any other 
factors (e. g. the circumstances under which the hazard 
takes place) that could mitigate the harm 
3.1.3 Estimate the risk posed by each hazard 
" Estimate the risk level based on the estimated likelihood 
and severity of the hazard 
3.2 Prioritise Risks 
Plan 3.2: 3.2.1 -> 3.2.2 
3.2.1 Determine acceptability of risks 
Plan 3.2.1: 3.2.1.1, repeat for all identified hazards 
3.2.1.1 Compare the risk level against a set of criteria 
3.2.2 Prioritise unacceptable risks 
3.2.2.1 Compare all unacceptable risks to determine their 
relative importance 
3.3 Identify Remedial Actions Required to Reduce Risks 
Plan 3.3: 3.3.1 -> 3.3.2 
3.3.1 Identify possible ways to reduce each unacceptable risk 
Plan 3.3.1: (3.3.1.1 & 3.3.1.2 in any order) -> 3.3.1.2 -> 
3.3.1.4 -> 3.3.1.5 -> repeat for all 
unacceptable risks 
3.3.1.1 Consider the causes and consequences of hazard 
3.3.1.2 Consider who might be harmed and how 
3.3.1.2 Identify any ways to get rid of the hazard altogether 
3.3.1.4 Identify any ways to reduce the risk 
3.3.1.5 Identify any ways to control the harm or to protect 
those who are particularly vulnerable 
3.3.2 Decide on the most suitable remedial actions to take 
Plan 3.3.2: 3.3.2.1 -> 3.3.2.2 
3.3.2.1 Analyse risk reduction options 
" consider how much risk the action of concern 
could help to reduce 
" consider how important these risks are 
" consider how effective each action could be in 
controlling these risks (e. g. eliminate the hazard 
altogether, reduce the risk or control its harm? ) 
" consider whether it would create other problems 
elsewhere 
" consider what other trade-off or drawbacks there 
are (e. g. the cost of implementing the action, 
adverse effects on other aspects of operation, 
etc. ) 
3.3.2.2 Decide what actions to take (to achieve the best 
overall result) 
4.0 RECORD FINDINGS 
Plan 4.0: 4.1 -> 4.2 
4.1 Show in the Record that a Proper Check was Made 
Plan 4.1: 4.1.1 -> (4.1.2 where appropriate) 
4.1.1 Record all significant information generated in the 
assessment, including significant hazards, the risks they pose 
and proposed remedial actions 
4.1.2 Cross-reference to other documents or records for details 
4.2 Show in the Record that Reasonable Precautions Have Been 
Taken to Ensure Crowd Safety 
Plan 4.2: (4.2.1 & 4.2.2 in any order) -> (4.2.3 where 
appropriate) -> (4.2.4 where appropriate) 
4.2.1 Record any measures that are already in place to control the 
risks 
4.2.2 Record any actions to be taken to reduce the risks 
4.2.3 Record reasons for not taking more action to control the risks 
4.2.4 Cross-reference to other documents or records for details 
5.0 REVIEW AND REVISE ASSESSMENT 
Plan 5.0: 5.1 -> 5.2 
5.1 Decide When to Review 
5.2 Decide What needs to be Revised/Amended 
5.3 Modify Assessment Accordingly 
APPENDIX C-2 
Tabular Task Analysis 
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INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
1. Large crowds are a normal part of the operation of many public venues. From a 
commercial point of view large numbers of visitors may be desirable. But excessive crowding 
and poor safety provisions could lead at worst to injury or death and at the very least to 
frustration, dissatisfaction and reduced enjoyment 
2. The Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 (HSW Act) places a duty on the employer 
to ensure the health and safety of his employees (Section 2) and persons not in his employment 
who may be affected by his undertaking (Section 3). When applied to a public venue where the 
work activity involves the attendance of crowds, the employer has a duty to safeguard the health 
and safety of such crowds and to ensure that the risk to which they are exposed is as low as is 
reasonably practicable. 
3. Under Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 
(MHSWR), the employer is also required to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the 
risks to the health and safety of his employees and others who might be affected. In the public 
venue context, this means the public venue owner should assess the risk his undertaking poses 
to employees and others, including the visiting crowds. 
SCOPE 
4. This guide is intended to help the public venue owner to assess the safety risks his 
undertaking poses to the visitors. It explains what a risk assessment is and gives practical 
advice and examples on how to carry out the assessment. 
5. This guide is aimed at the assessment of risks to the safety of the visiting crowds. It 
should form a part of an overall health and safety risk assessment. In order to comply with 
Regulation 3 of the MHSWR, the public venue owner should also assess the health and safety 
risks to his employees and others who may be affected by his undertaking (e. g. contractors, 
tenants). 
DEFINITIONS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS GUIDE 
6. Crowd safety - the safety of members of the visiting crowds. It covers the safety of 
individual members as well as the crowd as a whole. 
7. Front line staff - members of the staff who have direct contact with the visiting crowds and 
whose works involve interacting with, managing and/or monitoring them (e. g. stewards, ticket 
collectors at turnstiles, etc. ) 
8. Hazard - anything which has the potential to cause harm to members of the visiting crowds. 
This could be (a dangerous property of) an item or a substance, a condition, a situation or an 
activity. 
9. Public venue -a place which opens to members of the public and where they assemble. It 
could be purpose built or otherwise, permanent or temporary, fixed or transient and indoor or 
outdoor. Examples of public venues include airports, railway stations, stadiums, shopping malls, 
exhibition halls, leisure parks, fairgrounds and sites that are used to hold one-off events (e. g. 
concerts, street festivals). 
10. Public venue owner -a person or an organisation which owns the public venue and/or can 
legally seek to control the number of people entering the venue and the activities within it. 
11. Risk - the likelihood that the harm from a hazard is realised and the extent of it (i. e. the 
number of people who might be exposed and the consequences for them). In the context of a 
risk assessment, risk should reflect both the likelihood that harm will occur and its severity. 
WHAT IS A RISK ASSESSMENT? 
12. Risk assessment is a systematic process which examines an undertaking and assesses 
the risks which could arise from it. In general, it involves identifying the hazards present and then 
evaluating the risks involved, taking into account whatever precautions are already being taken. 
The purpose of a risk assessment is to help the public venue owner to decide what additional 
actions need to be taken to eliminate the hazards or to reduce the risks. This will help him to 
comply with his duties under the HSW Act and other relevant health and safety law. 
13. Many public venue owners already carry out some form of risk assessment on a day-to- 
day basis. During the course of their operations, they will monitor the situation, they will 
recognise problems as they develop and they will introduce corrective measures by either taking 
immediate action there and then or by implementing longer term solutions. The MHSWR 
however requires that public venue owners should undertake a systematic examination of their 
venues and that they should record significant findings from that risk assessment. 
14. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Approved Code of Practice (ISBN 0 
11-886330-4) sets out the principles of a risk assessment. In particular, a suitable and sufficient 
risk assessment should: 
(a) identify all relevant hazards and address all significant risks; 
(b) enable the employer to identify and prioritise the measures that need to be taken; 
(c) be appropriate to the nature of the work and remain valid for a reasonable period of time; 
(d) address what actually happens rather than what is supposed to happen. Actual practice 
may differ from the procedures and this is frequently a route whereby risks creep in 
unnoticed; 
(e) ensure that all groups of employees and others who might be affected are considered; 
(f) identify those groups who might be particularly at risk; 
(g) take account of existing preventive or precautionary measures. 
15. Risk assessment is not a stand-alone process. Instead, it forms a part of the planning to 
ensure the smooth running of the operation. Its findings could help the venue owner to make 
policies, to set performance standards and to allocate resources. It can also help the venue 
owner to decide what changes should be made to his venue, what crowd management 
measures to take, the appropriate staffing levels and the need for future development. 
WHO SHOULD CARRY OUT THE ASSESSMENT? 
16. It is the duty of the public venue owner to conduct a suitable and sufficient assessment of 
the health and safety risks his venue poses to the visiting crowds. He may appoint one or more 
of his own employees as assessors to assist him in carrying out this duty and/or may enlist help 
or support from outside the organisation (e. g. a consultant). However, this does not absolve him 
from this duty. 
17. The public venue owner is also responsible for ensuring that a suitable and sufficient 
assessment has been carried out of the risks posed by other operations which take place in his 
venue. In a multi-occupancy situation where the activities of different occupants could affect 
each other and where there are safety issues which are of common concern, the risk 
assessment may need to cover the venue as a whole to be fully effective. This will require some 
degree of co-ordination and co-operation. 
18. The assessor(s) appointed by the public venue owner should be competent. In general, 
the assessor(s) should have: 
(a) a knowledge and understanding of the venue and its operation and the principles of risk 
assessment; 
(b) the capacity to apply the above to public safety risk assessment which includes identifying 
the public safety problems and assessing the need for action; 
(c) an understanding of relevant current best practice; 
(d) an awareness of the limitations of their own experience and knowledge; and 
(e) a willingness and ability to supplement their existing experience and knowledge. 
19. The public venue owner is solely responsible for ensuring that those he has appointed are 
competent and given adequate information and support (e. g. training, time and resources) 
to carry out their tasks. 
20. A crowd safety risk assessment may be carried out by individual assessors on his own or 
by a team of assessors. In the view of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), however, the 
latter is usually more desirable especially for large venues. This way, the assessment can 
benefit from the range of knowledge and experience which members of the assessment team 
can offer. It can also ensures that the risk assessment has taken into account different views 
and understanding. 
21. The size of the assessment team could vary, depending on the complexity of the venue. 
As a rule of thumb, it should have enough people to answer the majority of the queries that could 
arise in the assessment without recourse to further expertise. However, the team should not be 
too large. 
22. Therefore, for an existing public venue, the assessment team would normally consist of: 
(a) the venue manager - he is responsible for the venue operation, understands the overall 
situation and is in the position to make most decisions; and 
(b) appropriate members of the front line staff - they deal with the visiting crowds and 
therefore know what actually happens on the ground. They also have in-depth knowledge 
and experience of what problems could arise. 
23. Where the risk assessment concerns a public venue which is at its design stage or a new 
extension to an existing venue, the assessment team would normally consist of people from the 
venue owner and the designer organisations. The former will be responsible for operating the 
venue and can contribute in the identification of operational problems posed by the design. The 
later has the technical expertise to make proposals on the feasibility and to comment on the 
costs of a design solution to a potential problem. 
24. In addition, at some points in the assessment, it may be necessary to involve others from 
both within and outside the organisation whose expertise is needed or whose activities interact 
with the operation. It is up to the venue owner to decide how they should be involved (e. g. as a 
member of the assessment team, to participate in parts of the assessment or to co-ordinate and 
exchange information only when necessary). The following are examples of those who may be 
involved in the risk assessment: 
(a) other departments within the organisation from which some of the front line staff come 
(e. g. catering ); 
(b) the emergency services; 
(c) promoter or organiser of the event to be held in the venue; 
(d) major tenants (e. g. in a shopping centre or a transport venue); 
(e) operators of the transport systems used by many visitors; 
(f) the local authority planning or environmental health department; 
(g) specialists who can provide the necessary technical input to the assessment (e. g. where 
fireworks, laser or other special effects are used). 
25. There are no fixed rules about how the assessment team should work. But experience 
from other sectors (e. g. the high hazard industries) suggests a structured brainstorming session 
could be useful. It can provide an environment in which team members can bring their 
knowledge and experience to bear. The venue owner needs to appoint a chairperson who is 
competent in risk assessment and in chairing such meetings. His role will be to control and 
guide the team through the assessment. Depending on the size of the venue and the complexity 
of the operation, most public venues should be able to complete the bulk of their assessment 
between one and a few half-day sessions once they are familiar with it. 
A CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY FOR 
PUBLIC VENUES 
THE OVERALL RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
26. When carrying out a crowd safety risk assessment, you need to think about what hazards 
could arise and why, who might be harmed and how, whether the existing precautions are 
enough and, if not, what more should be done. The assessment should therefore consist of the 
following main steps: 
Step 1: Identify hazards 
Step 2: Identify causes, consequences and who might be harmed 
Step 3: Decide whether existing precautions are adequate 
Step 4: Evaluate risks 
Step 5: Decide what further actions might be required 
In addition, you should record all significant findings. There is a tabular form in Appendix A 
which you may find useful. From time to time, you should review and, if necessary, revise your 
risk assessment. Figure 1 gives an overview of the assessment process for quick reference. 
27. If you own a number of similar venues (e. g. railway stations) or if your venue contains a 
number of similar features (e. g. rides in an amusement park), you might produce a basic "model" 
risk assessment reflecting the core hazards and risks associated with these venues or features. 
This may be applied by managers at each venue or supervisors at each feature, but only if they: 
(a) satisfy themselves that the "model" assessment is broadly appropriate to their venues or 
facilities; and 
(b) adapt the model to the detail of the actual situations in their venues or features, including 
any extension necessary to cover hazards and risks not referred to in the model. 
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT PARAGRAPHS IN 
STAGES PROCESS THIS GUIDE 
1. Break down the venue into more manageable areas 32 
2. Look afresh at what hazards the venue itself could pose 33-36 
venue feature keywords, 
venue hazard keywords & 
Inset 1 
3. Think about what the visitors do and how they may 37-38 
behave venue feature keywords, 
STEP 1: 
behavioural keywords & 
Inset 2 
Identify Hazards 4. Assess your safety manag ment system 39 e 
safety management 
issues & Inset 3 
5. Identify hazards associated with the use of substances 40-41 
or items which could cause harm 
6. Look for possible disruptions to the normal or intended 42-46 
operation 
7. For each hazard, decide wjIat causes the problem 48-50 
STEP 2: 1 Identify Causes, 
Consequences 8. Think about who might be harmed and how 51 
and Who Might 
be Harmed 
9. Identify the precautions already in place and consider 52-53 
ST P 3: how effective they are 
Decide Whether 
Existing 10. Decide whether the precautions are enough 54 
Precautions are 
Adequate 
Ignore the trivial risks 
11. For each remaining hazard, estimate its likelihood 55-57 
and the severity of its consequences Figure 2&3 
STEP 4: 
Evaluate Risks 12. Estimate the risk level 58 
Figure 4&5& Inset 4 
13. Identify what more could be done to reduce the risk 59-60 
further 
STEP 5: 
Decide What 
Further Actions 14. If there is more than one set of possible solutions, 61-62 
might be decide which is the best option 
Reqýired 
63-65 
Record Assessment Findings 
Review and Revise Assessment 66-67 
Figure 1: Crowd Safety Risk Assessment Process 
STEP 1: IDENTIFY HAZARDS 
28. The aim here is to systematically identify all significant hazards which could arise in your 
venue. You may already be aware of some hazards. But it is also important to identify hazards 
that are not immediately obvious - for example, a latent hazard or a new hazard which arises due 
to, say, the introduction of a new feature. Any hazards which are not identified here will not be 
addressed and thus leave a gap in the risk assessment. 
29. Public safety hazards often arise from a combination of the following factors. You need to 
examine them, look for things that could go wrong and then decide what problems they could 
pose to public safety: 
(a) the venue (e. g. a pinch point), 
(b) the visitors (i. e. what they do and how they behave), 
(C) poor safety management (e. g. insufficient staff training), 
(d) the presence of hazardous substances or items (e. g. the use of a special effects), and 
(e) a deviation to the normal or intended operation (e. g. delays or cancellation of a service or 
a fire). 
30. Involve your front line staff. They might have noticed things which are not immediately 
obvious. Also, they might help to reveal what actually happens on the ground. At the very least, 
you should ask them what they think. However, it is much better to include them as part of the 
assessment team. For a major venue, you may need to carry out some form of brainstorming 
session (see paragraph 25). For a smaller venue, you can sit down with one or two experienced 
members of the front line staff and go through each part of your venue. 
31. Apart from a brainstorming session, it is often useful to carry out a venue inspection and 
an observation. This allows you to look afresh at what could cause harm. Past incident records, 
written comments from the front line staff, customer complains, safety audit reports, notes made 
in debriefing sessions, post event reports and so on could also provide the information needed to 
identify hazards. 
Break down the venue into more manageable areas 
32. It may be difficult to assess the whole venue at once especially if the venue is large. 
Therefore, it is worth breaking it down into a number of smaller and more manageable areas first 
and then examine each area in turn. You can do so according to the main function for which 
each area is used (i. e. into functional areas) or based on the system already used to distinguish 
different parts of the venue (e. g. colour zones in a shopping centre). 
For example: An airport terminal can be broken down into the following functional areas: 
access routes from a train station, from a bus station, from car park(s); 
forecourt; check-in area; concourse; passport control; departure lounge; 
gate rooms; etc.. 
A concert venue can be divided into the entrance/exit and concourse; the 
concert hall itself; bars and food outlets and the access routes linking these 
areas. 
A theme park can be broken down into the forecourt; the concourse and 
different attraction or ride areas. 
Look afresh at what hazards the venue itself could pose 
33. Examine the overall layout of the venue to identify: 
(a) if any popular areas, busy access routes, main attractions and popular facilities are 
situated too close together or intersect each other; and 
(b) if there is a convergence of several access routes into a single area or route. 
34. Examine the features in each area and find out what hazards they could pose. One way 
of doing this is to apply suitable combinations of the following venue feature keywords and venue 
hazard keywords. The former lists the types of feature you might find in each area. The latter 
describes how they may lead to a hazard. 
VENUE FEATURE KEYWORDS 
Place 
Access route 
Entry/exit point 
Flooring/underfoot condition 
Slope and stairway 
Step, kerb, ramp, etc. 
Bank and edge 
Wall, pillar, post, bollard, fence, etc. 
Furniture/street furniture 
Facilities 
Information source 
Maintenance or construction work 
VENUE HAZARD KEYWORDS 
Insufficient: capacity 
Insufficient: quantity 
Insufficient: quality 
Obstruction: access 
Obstruction: from view 
Obstruction: line of sight 
Pinch point/funnelling effect 
Unguarded 
Inset I advises on how to use these keywords. Examples of the application of some of the 
venue feature keywords is shown in Appendix B. A glossary of the venue hazard keywords is 
given in Appendix C. 
Inset 1: A step-by-step guide to the use of the venue feature keywords and 
HIC IIuluru Kevwur(I. 
(a) Select a relevant venue feature keyword; say, Place 
(b) Select the hazard keywords which are applicable to the selected venue feature keyword, 
say, Insufficient: capacity 
(c) Combine the venue feature keyword with each of the hazard keywords selected to identify 
how that particular venue feature may lead to public safety hazards 
For example: If you are assessing the forecourt of a amusement park, the 
keywords Place - Insufficient: capacity could mean that it is 
not big enough to cope with the number of people waiting to be 
checked in, seeing people off, etc. 
Flooring - Insufficient: quality could mean that the under 
floored condition is uneven, muddy, littered, etc. 
(d) Some keywords may not be applicable to your venue. Therefore, do not be surprised if 
they do not generate an issue. Just ignore them and move on. 
(e) Select the next relevant venue feature keyword and so on until all features in this area have 
been considered. 
See Example I 
Example I (using the suggested assessment form shown in Appendix A): 
Area: Forecourt 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSE 
Hazards Causes T- Consequences T- T Existi 
Part of the crowd may spill onto During peak hours, the 
the adjacent road and mingles number of people arriving 
with moving vehicles. exceeds the capacity of the 
forecourt. 
35. These keywords are here only to prompt you, the assessors, and to structure the hazard 
identification process so that it is systematic. You do not have to apply them rigidly and don't let 
them restrict your thought. Write down whatever you can think of from the keywords even 
though it may not seem to be the right place to do so. You may have also identified the 
immediate cause of a hazard here. Write it down as well (see Example 1). The aim here is to 
identify as many hazards as possible. Exactly where they are identified is not important. 
For example In the theme park example above, you may think of other related problems 
elsewhere from the keywords Area - Insufficient: capacity, such as the 
arriving crowds spilling onto to the adjacent road. Write this down as well if 
you think it poses a significant hazard. 
36. These keywords are for public venues in general. They are not meant to be exhaustive. 
You can add your own keywords to the lists, remove those which you think are irrelevant and 
refine them to meet your needs. 
Think about what the visitors do and how they may behave 
37. The aim is to identify those activities and behaviours which could lead to a hazard. Think 
about what the area is used for, who your visitors are, the circumstances they may be in (e. g. in 
a hurry, in a lively mood) and so on. There is no need to account for all activities and behaviour, 
just look for those which could cause a problem. You can probably identify much of what the 
visitors do from experience and from past problems. But it can also be useful to observe the 
crowds and note down the things which concern you. 
38. You may find the following venue feature keywords and behavioural keywords useful. 
The venue feature keywords are the same as those given in paragraph 34. The behaviour 
keywords describe the types of activity or behaviour which could cause harm. 
VENUE FEATURE KEYWORDS 
Place 
Access route 
Entry/exit point 
Flooring/underfoot condition 
Slope and stairway 
Step, kerb, ramp, etc. 
Bank and edge 
Wall, pillar, post, bollard, fence, etc. 
Furniture/street furniture 
Facilities 
Information source 
Maintenance or construction work 
BEHAVIOURAL KEYWORDS 
Uneven distribution 
High crowd density 
Disruption to a stationary crowd 
Rapid crowd flow 
Cross flows 
Disruption or obstruction to a crowd 
flow 
Non-compliance 
Dangerous behaviour 
Aggressive behaviour 
People with special needs 
Inset 2 advises on how to use these keywords to identify activities and behaviour that could lead 
to a hazard. Appendix D gives a glossary of the behavioural keywords. 
Inset 2: A step-by-step guide to the use of the venue feature keywords and 
uercuviulircu nevwuru3 
(a) Select a relevant venue feature keyword; say, Place 
(b) Select the behavioural keywords to describe the type of activity or behaviour which could 
take place there; say, Uneven distribution 
(c) Combine the venue feature keyword with each of the behavioural keywords selected to 
decide what problems such activity or behaviour may cause. 
For example: Place - Uneven distribution could mean that too many people 
choose to stay in the same area in, say, a large hall. This could 
lead to overcrowding. 
Facilities - Disruption or obstruction to a crowd flow could 
remind you of the situation where movement is blocked by 
people waiting for others nearby. 
From Place - Disruption to a stationary crowd, you could 
identify behaviour such as surging and people pushing their 
way through a packed crowd. 
(d) Ignore those hazards which you have already identified earlier and move on. Also ignore 
keywords which do not apply to your situation. 
For example: A path is obstructed by a stationary crowd in front of a nearby 
attraction. You may have already identified this earlier when 
examining the venue layout. 
You may have also thought of people entering a restricted area 
through a 
broken fence (i. e. Fence - Non-compliance) when you 
assessed this feature 
earlier 
(e) Select the next behavioural keyword and so on until all features in this area have been 
considered. 
See Example 2 
Example 2: 
Area: Forecourt 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSE 
Hazards Causes Consequences Existi 
Crowd movement is obstructed 
by people waiting for others 
nearby 
People try to cut through the 
crowd 
Assess your safety management system 
39. Look afresh at your safety management system. The following issues are particularly 
relevant to ensuring public safety. First, identify any shortcomings in each issue. Then consider 
how they could affect your operation in each area. 
SAFETY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Staff roles and responsibilities 
Command and communication 
Co-operation and Co-ordination with other bodies 
Monitoring of crowds 
Staffing level 
Staff selection and training 
Inset 3 advises on how this can be done. 
Inset 3: A step-by-step guide on how to assess your safety management system 
(a) Select a relevant issue; say, command and communication. 
(b) Decide what could go wrong; say, breakdown in communications. You may find a few 
shortcoming in each issue. 
(c) For each shortcoming, ask yourself how it could affect your operation. 
For example: As a result of a breakdown in communications, the arriving 
crowds are sent to the wrong entrance. 
(d) Decide what hazards could arise. 
For example: Severe congestion at that entrance and/or severe cross flows 
created by people turning back. 
(e) Select the next issue and so on until all issues that are relevant to your operation in the 
area have been considered. 
See Example 3 
Example 3: 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASS 
Area: Forecourt 
Hazards Causes - Consequences 7 Exis 
Severe congestion and/or Breakdown in communications 
cross flows at entrance X results in arriving crowd being 
incorrectly sent to this entrance 
Identify hazards associated with substances and items which could cause harm 
40. Your operation may involve the use (and storage) of substances and/or items which have 
the potential to cause harm to members of the public. If so, you need to identify the hazards and 
assess the risks created by them. First, identify what they are and where they are used and 
stored. The following are examples of the kinds of substances and items which could create 
hazards in a public venue: 
(a) substances which are hazardous to health and are covered by the Control of Substances 
Hazardous to Health Regulations 1994 (COSHH) (e. g. substances that are toxic, 
corrosive or irritant; have maximum exposure limits or occupational exposure standards; 
have chronic or delayed effects; or biological agents) 
(b) machinery (e. g. escalators, turnstiles, ticket machines, rides in a fairground or an 
amusement park, etc. ) 
(c) electric cables, generators, etc. 
(d) fireworks, special effects in a place of entertainment or a show (e. g. laser), etc. 
(e) open fire/naked flame (e. g. at a stall selling hot food) 
(f) moving objects (e. g. vehicles, trolleys, etc. ) 
41. Then, decide what hazards each substance or item could pose to the visitors. Think 
about where and when it is used and how visitors may be exposed to it. Address what could 
actually happen rather than what is supposed to happen. Take into account any human errors 
by staff who handle the substance or operate and maintain the item. Also think about the 
visitors' behaviour (see Example 4). Manufacturers' instructions or datasheets and accident 
records can also help you to spot hazards and to put risks in their true perspective. 
Example 4: 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSE 
Area: Sector 1 of the venue 
hazards Causes Consequences 7 Existi 
People pushed against 
unguarded mobile electric 
generators 
People knock over hot food 
equipment 
Look for potential disruption to the normal or intended operation 
42. The aim is to consider how your venue operation could be disrupted and what new 
hazards could arise as a result. A major disruption such as a major fire would call for a complete 
change of the mode of operation (e. g. from normal operation to an evacuation) thus introducing 
new hazards. Even a relatively minor disruption such as a train delay or cancellation could 
exacerbate a problem or turn the trivial into a significant hazard. 
43. First, identify the scenarios which could disrupt your operation. The following are some 
examples: 
(a) accident (e. g. traffic accident outside or within the venue) 
(b) closure of a part of the venue 
(c) closure of a nearby or related venue (e. g. the closure of an adjacent train station) 
(d) delay or cancellation of a service (e. g. flight delay) 
(e) disruption to the arrival/departure profile (e. g. severe traffic congestion on a main 
approach road) 
(f) emergency situation (e. g. a fire, bomb threat, structural collapse, toxic release, etc. ) 
(g) loss of utility (e. g. power cut) 
(h) public disorder 
(i) system or equipment failure (e. g. escalator stops, a jammed door or gate, etc. ) 
Q) weather (including a sudden change of weather and adverse weather condition such as 
too hot/cold, heavy rainfall/snowfall, high wind, etc. ) 
44. For a minor disruption which causes a slight deviation in parts of the venue, hazard 
identification could be relatively straightforward to do. Simply think about what effects each 
relevant scenario could have on the venue operation, on crowd movement, on people's 
behaviour and then identify the problems which could arise as a result (see Example 5). 
Example 5: 
Area: Forecourt 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSE 
Hazards Causes Consequences Existi 
Congestion on access route to Escalator(s) fail. 
the escalators. 
A severe traffic problem and Road work on one of the main 
increase in the scale of last approach roads to the venue 
minute rush. 
45. A detailed assessment would be necessary in the case of a major disruption where the 
operation required to ensure safety is very different from the normal operation. The 
assessment would involve examining the venue itself, the visitors, the safety management 
system and the substances and items in the vicinity. Again, the venue feature keywords, 
the venue hazard keywords, the behavioural keywords and the safety management 
issues could help you to assess the first three of the above. Hazardous substances and 
items can be assessed by considering how they could react in the circumstance and what 
hazards this could introduce. 
46. To write down what you have identified here, you may have to modify the assessment 
record form shown in Appendix A slightly to also indicate which scenario you are 
considering (see Example 6). 
Example 6: 
Scenario: A major fire at the store room 
Area: the "yellow zone" inside the venue 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSE 
Hazards Causes Consequences Existin 
Assess route X blocked by the 
fire 
(i. e. from the keywords Access 
route - Obstruction: access) 
Gates A and B could become a 
pinch point in an evacuation 
(i. e. from the keywords 
Entry/exit point - Insufficient: 
capacity) 
People do not leave the venue People stop to find out what is 
when the fire alarm is going on or carry on with 
activated. whatever they are doing. 
A certain chemical in the store The heat 
room could release fumes 
Electric cable could be The fire or the heat 
damaged 
STEP 2: IDENTIFY CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND WHO MIGHT BE HARMED 
47. The aim is to find out what causes the hazards or hazardous situations identified earlier, 
what danger they could pose and who might be affected. The identification of the cause(s) could 
help you to decide later on what actions need to be taken to get rid of the hazards. The 
identification of consequences and who might be harmed could help you to decide how to protect 
people against the harm and to estimate risks (see Example 7) 
Example 7: 
Hazards Causes Consequences Existi 
Part of the crowd spills onto the During peak hours, the number People, especially young 
adjacent road and mingles with of people arriving exceeds the children, could get 
moving vehicles. capacity of the forecourt. knocked down by 
" not enough ticket vehicles. 
counters 
" only a minority of the 
visitors buy tickets in 
advance 
" tickets are not processed 
quickly enough at the 
entrance 
Crowd movement is obstructed People waiting for friends, etc. Exacerbate the crowd 
by people waiting for others congestion problem in the 
nearby. area 
People try to cut through the To get to the toilets which are Severe cross flows 
crowd. often blocked by the main crowd especially when 
flow wheelchair users try to 
make their way to the 
disabled persons toilet 
People pushed against crowding and cross flows Burns. Toddlers and 
unguarded mobile electric in the area young children are 
generators some generators particularly vulnerable 
protrude slightly onto the due to their height 
access route 
People knock over hot food crowding and cross flows Severe burns to those in 
equipment in the area the immediate vicinity. 
" people being pushed Teenagers and young 
against the grills persons are particularly 
" people try to push their likely to be involved as 
way through the crowd they are more "lively" and 
tend to push each other 
around. 
Congestion on access route to " Escalator(s) fail Crowding problem which 
the escalators. " No alternative access routes could affect the 
or people not aware of their immediate area and 
existence possibly beyond 
A severe traffic problem and " Road work on one of the main Crushing at the 
increase in the scale of last approach roads to the venue entrance/turnstiles 
minute rush. " No alternative routes or people 
not aware of their existence 
For each hazard, decide what causes the problem 
48. Find out what causes a hazard. You may have already found the immediate causes 
earlier on in STEP 1. But don't stop there - there could well be other (underlying) causes that are 
equally important. It is worth bearing in mind that a hazard often arises due to a combination of 
reasons. Some of them may not be obvious. It could, for example, arise from the overall layout 
of the venue rather than the features you were assessing. It could be because of another 
problem elsewhere in the venue or what happens in another place. It is also possible that the 
problem is caused by a part of your operation which seems not directly linked to crowd 
management (e. g. how tickets are sold). 
For example: Access to and from the venue could be affected by the crowds leaving a 
nearby football match. 
In the previous example of crowd congestion in a forecourt, this could be 
caused by one or more of the following reasons: the forecourt is simply too 
small, the venue becomes more popular than originally designed for, not 
enough ticket counters, only a minority of the visitors buy tickets in 
advance, tickets are not processed quickly enough at the entrance and so 
on. 
49. If the hazard is caused by people's behaviour, it is important to consider what makes them 
behave in such a way. You will not be able to find a satisfactory solution to the problem if you 
simply dismiss this as the fault of the individuals concerned! 
50. If a hazard is due to a poor safety management system, you may have to look beyond 
those issues listed in paragraph 39. Think about the more "global" safety management issues 
(e. g. policy, safety culture, etc. ) and ask yourself whether you have done enough. You can find 
out more about safety management systems in HSE leaflet IND(G) 132L and the HSE 
publication entitled Successful Health and Safety Management (HS(G)65). 
Think about who may be harmed and how 
51. When identifying the consequences and who might be harmed, also think about how 
many people may be affected (i. e. whether it would harm a few individuals or most people in the 
vicinity) and whether any visitor groups are particularly vulnerable. Such visitor groups may 
include disabled persons, young children and elderly people who are often more likely to be 
harmed or are likely to suffer more when harmed. 
STEP 3: DECIDE WHETHER EXISTING PRECAUTIONS ARE ADEQUATE 
Identify the precautions already in place and consider how effective they are 
52. Some hazards may already be controlled in some way, whether by deliberate measures 
(e. g. by venue design, engineered devices, crowd management measures or operational 
procedures) or by the circumstances in which they are found. The aim is therefore to identify 
them and decide whether they are enough or whether more should be done. 
53. Think about how effective the existing precautions are. Again, you need to look at how 
they actually work, not how they are supposed to work. Also consider how your precautions may 
fail or become less effective. You could get caught out if you automatically assume that they 
would always work as intended! 
For example: The circumstances could change as a result of an incident elsewhere. 
Venue features and engineered devices could suffer from vandalism, wear 
and tear, component failures, etc.. 
Crowd management measures and procedures could be hampered by 
equipment failures, human errors, breakdown in communications, 
confusion in role and responsibility and so on. 
Decide whether the precautions are enough 
54. In order to find out whether the existing precautions are enough, you will need to carry out 
a preliminary risk evaluation. As a general guide, if after the existing precautions the remaining 
risk becomes trivial or if is no more than exists in a similar everyday situation, you can say that it 
is adequately controlled and no further actions will be needed . 
You can therefore ignore the 
hazard and exclude it from the rest of the risk assessment. Otherwise, the hazard is still 
significant and you need to evaluate it in detail (see STEP 4). As explained in Inset 4, a trivial 
risk is one which is extremely remote (i. e. it has never happened before and there are no 
reasons whatsoever to suggest that it will ever happen) or one which does not cause any real 
harm (i. e. no more than inconvenience to the visitors, discomfort, frustration and so on). When 
deciding how the risk compares with that in an everyday situation, you should compare like with 
like. You cannot ignore a hazard on the grounds that its risk compares favourably with that 
involved in, say, a dangerous sport! 
For example: In a street event, the pavement kerb often poses a tripping hazard. But, 
you could ignore it on the grounds that the risk is no more than that arising 
from walking along the high street on a normal Saturday afternoon. 
If the crowd density is much higher than that on the normal high street, so 
will be the risk. The above argument is therefore no longer valid and this 
hazard should be evaluated further. 
STEP 4: EVALUATE RISKS 
For each remaining hazard, estimate its likelihood and the severity of its 
consequences 
55. The aim is to decide for each significant hazard how much risk is involved after the 
existing precautions have been taken. The findings will enable you to establish how 
significant the hazards are and thus to prioritise any remedial actions required to control them. 
The evaluation of risk usually involves the following steps: 
(a) decide how likely the hazard is to be realised (i. e. estimate the likelihood); 
(b) decide how serious the harm is should the hazard be realised (i. e. estimate the severity); 
and 
(c) establish the level of risk based on the above. 
56. When estimating likelihood, it is important that you consider how likely the hazard is to 
occur and to cause harm, not just how likely it is to occur. This is because not all hazards cause 
harm all the time, the potential for a hazard to cause harm is realised only under some 
circumstances. In a risk assessment, we are only interested in the likelihood of someone being 
harmed. 
For example: Cross flows and obstructions do not normally give rise to a significant 
problem unless they take place in a busy area. 
57. When estimating severity, you need to take into account the circumstances under which 
the hazard takes place. 
For example: If people climb up to a height, the seriousness of the injury, should they fall, 
will depend on how high they manage to climb. Also, more people would 
be injured if this behaviour takes place where there is a packed crowd 
underneath. 
The severity (and the likelihood) of people mingling with moving vehicles 
will depend on whether it takes place on a busy main road with fast moving 
traffic or on a quiet side road where the vehicles move slowly. 
Establish the risk level 
58. As a general guide, Inset 4 gives a step-by-step description on how to evaluate risk. At 
the very least, you need to be able to decide whether the risks are intolerable, should be kept as 
low as reasonably practicable or are broadly acceptable. Providing this can be achieved, you 
can modify the likelihood categories, the severity categories and the number of risk levels given 
below to meet your specific needs. 
Inset 4: A step-bv-step guide to risk evaluation 
(a) To estimate likelihood, select a Likelihood Category (LC) from Figure 2 which can best 
describe how likely the hazard is to be realised. 
Category Definition 
Likely A similar problem has happened before (either here or elsewhere) 
AND there are no reasons to think that it will not happen in the 
foreseeable future. 
Possible Never happened before BUT there are reasons to suggest that it could 
happen. 
Unlikely Never happened before BUT could occur under exceptional 
circumstances. 
Very Unlikely Never happened before AND there are no reasons to suggest that it 
will. 
Figure 2: Likelihood Categories 
(b) To estimate severity, select a Severity Category (SC) from Figure 3 which can best describe 
how serious the consequence will be should the hazard be realised. 
Category Definition 
Catastrophic Multiple deaths/life threatening injuries. 
Major A single death/life threatening injury OR multiple injuries requiring 
hospitalisation. 
Significant A single injury which requires hospitalisation OR multiple injuries 
requiring first-aid treatment. 
Minor A single injury which may require some first-aid treatment; visitors feel 
anxious and are concerned about their safety. 
Negligible No real harm; no more than inconvenience, discomfort, frustration, 
etc.. 
Figure 3: Severity Categories 
(c) From the selected likelihood category and severity category, you can establish the risk level 
of the hazard from the matrix given in Figure 4. The interpretation of the risk levels is laid 
down in Figure 5. 
Likely Possible Unlikely Very Unlikely 
Catastrophic 
Major 
Significant 
Minor 
Negligible 
A A B - 
A B C - 
B C D - 
C D - - 
Figure 4: A Risk Classification Matrix 
Inset 4: A step-bv-step guide to risk evaluation (cont. 
Risk Level Interpretation 
A Intolerable risk. Immediate action(s) must be taken to eliminate the 
hazard or to eliminate its source, regardless of the cost. 
B Should not be tolerated unless risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost 
is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained. 
C Should not be tolerated unless the cost of risk reduction exceeds the 
improvement gained. 
D Broadly acceptable risk. But risk reduction should still be made if an 
inexpensive measure can be found. 
_ Trivial risk. No further actions required. 
Figure 5: Interpretation of Risk Levels 
See Example 8 
Example 8: 
1i 
Hazards 
Part of the crowd spills onto the 
adjacent road and mingles with 
moving vehicles 
Crowd movement is obstructed 
by people waiting for others 
nearby 
People try to cut through the 
crowd 
People pushed against 
unguarded mobile electric 
generators 
People knock over hot food 
equipment 
Congestion on access route to 
the escalators. 
A severe traffic problem and 
increase in the scale of last 
minute rush. 
Existing Precautions LC SC Risk Acti 
" the road is normally quiet P Si C 
with only a few vehicles at 
any one time 
" vehicles are slow moving 
U Mi - 
P Si C 
L Si B 
L Ma A 
Procedures to divert crowd U Mi D 
flows have been tried and 
tested many times in the past. 
" arrangements with the P Ma B 
police and a motoring 
organisation to receive 
information on any major 
road works well in 
advance. 
" well established 
procedures to warn coach 
parties of the road works 
STEP 5: DECIDE WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS MIGHT BE REQUIRED 
Decide what more should be done to reduce the risk further 
59. Identify what more should be done to eliminate each remaining hazard or to reduce the 
risk. Ask yourself: 
(a) whether you have done all the things that the law says you have got to do; and 
(b) whether generally accepted standards are in place. 
The law also says that you must do what is reasonably practicable to keep the venue safe. 
Therefore, your real aim is to make the risks as small as possible by adding to your precautions 
if necessary. Table 3 suggests the appropriate courses of action for each risk level. Priority 
should be given to hazards which pose the higher risks. 
60. First, consider what else can be done to get rid of the hazard altogether. This can usually 
be achieved by removing the source of the hazard or by tackling its causes. If this is not 
"reasonably practicable" to do (see Table 3), then think about how to control the risk (i. e. to make 
it less likely to occur or to cause harm, to reduce its severity and/or to protect people against 
harm). Guidance and good practices by other venues could help you to identify the remedial 
actions required. 
If there is more than one set of possible solutions, decide which is the best option 
61. If there are several possible actions, you may have to examine them in more detail to 
decide which of them to take. In general, you need to think about the level of risk posed, how 
effective the actions would be in controlling the risk, whether they could give rise to a problem 
elsewhere, how soon they can be put in place and whether the hazard needs to be addressed 
urgently or whether it is better to wait for a more permanent solution. You can of course take into 
consideration the cost-benefit factors such as the costs of taking those actions and how they 
may affect things like visitors' enjoyment and the attractiveness of the venue. 
62. Keep a record of what you have decided. If you believe that no actions are needed, it is 
useful to write down the reasons. It is also good practice to write down who is to carry out each 
action (see Example 9). 
Example 9 
Hazards 
Part of the crowd spills onto the 
adjacent road and mingles with 
moving vehicles. 
Crowd movement is obstructed 
by people waiting for others 
nearby 
People try to cut through the 
crowd 
People pushed against 
unguarded mobile electric 
generators 
People knock over hot food 
equipment 
Congestion on access route to 
the escalators 
A severe traffic problem and 
increasing the scale of last 
minute rush 
Precautions LC SC Risk Actions 
is normally quite P Si C " open more ticket 
a few vehicles at counters during peak 
time periods 
are slow moving " find ways to encourage 
advance purchase 
" review procedures on 
processing tickets 
actions on: Sales Manager 
U Mi D The above actions should 
help to reduce this problem. 
Therefore no further actions. 
P Si C Could relocate the toilets but 
the cost of doing so 
outweighs the improvement 
gained. No actions. 
L Si C " the generators should be 
guarded 
" ensure that generators 
are in line 
" closely monitor crowd 
flows and control access 
into this area when 
necessary 
actions on: Operation 
Manager and Duty 
Supervisors 
L Ma B " carry out inspection to 
ensure that all such grills 
are adequately guarded 
" relocate traders to 
another part of the venue 
" closely monitor crowd 
flows and control access 
into this area when 
necessary 
" stewards should 
discourage such "lively" 
behaviour in this area 
actions on: Operation 
Manager and Duty 
Supervisors 
s to divert crowd U Mi D No inexpensive action 
been tried and identified to reduce risk 
times in the past. 
ements with the P Ma C " publicise and advise 
and a motoring visitors to set off early 
ation to receive action on: Sales Manager 
tion on any major " increase staff level and 
well in advance. put in extra crowd control 
lished measures 
cedures " consider delaying the 
ach parties of the start of the event if the 
orks situation significantly 
deteriorates 
actions on: Operation 
Manager and Duty 
Supervisors 
RECORD ASSESSMENT FINDINGS 
63. If your undertaking has five or more employees, you are required by law to record the 
significant findings of your assessment. You should be able to show, through the record, that 
you have undertaken a suitable and sufficient assessment and that you have done what is 
reasonably practicable to reduce the risks. Significant findings usually include 
(a) the significant hazards identified in the assessment; 
(b) the existing precautions in place; 
(c) the remaining risks, including any groups of visitors who are especially at risk; 
(d) the conclusions of the assessment, including the actions you have identified to further 
reduce the risks. 
The record could be documented in writing or by other means (e. g. electronically) so long as it is 
retrievable for use by management or for examination. 
64. Some hazards may have already been addressed elsewhere. For example, if hazardous 
substances are used, your COSHH assessment should have addressed the risks. Also, some 
of the existing precautions may have already been described in other documents (e. g. 
procedures). There is no need to repeat this information in the record, you can simply refer to 
where it can be found. 
65. Keep the record for future reference or use. It helps to show that you have done what the 
law requires and can therefore help you if an inspector questions your precautions or if you 
become involved in any legal action (e. g. for civil liability). It also can also remind you to keep an 
eye on particular matters. Appendix A shows the tabular public safety risk assessment record 
form used throughout this guide. You may find it useful. Alternatively, you can develop your own 
form or record your assessment in another format if it suits you better. 
REVIEW AND REVISE ASSESSMENT 
66. Risk assessment is not a once-and-for-all activity. From time to time you need to review 
your assessment and revise it if necessary. A review can take place regularly (e. g. annually) or 
if there are developments which suggest that your assessment may no longer be valid, such as: 
(a) a significant change to your operation, to your venue, in visitor composition or in the 
circumstances (e. g. the introduction of new hazards due to activities elsewhere, renewed 
terrorist threats); 
(b) the detection of a significant problem; and 
(c) the occurrence of a major incident or a potentially serious near miss. 
67. If your operation concerns the staging of a regular event, ideally you need to start your 
review shortly after the event has finished. This is so that any problems and incidents which took 
place in the event are still fresh in people's minds. In any case, the timing of the review should 
be such that you have enough time before the next event to implement the new actions identified 
in the assessment. 
APPENDIX A 
CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT RECORD FORM 
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APPENDIX B 
EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF SOME VENUE FEATURE 
KEYWORDS 
KEYWORDS EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION 
Place viewing areas, a hall, rooms, an open space where people gather 
Access route designated/undesignated paths, corridors, junctions, turnings 
Entry/exit point including doors, gates, turnstiles 
Furniture/street furniture lamp posts, benches, plants/trees, decor, fountains, monuments 
Facilities toilets, food and drink outlets, stalls, litter bins, check-in desk, ticket 
machines 
Information source information display boards/monitor screens, public address systems, 
enquiry desks, signs, notices 
APPENDIX C 
GLOSSARY OF THE VENUE HAZARD KEYWORDS 
GLOSSARY OF VENUE HAZARD KEYWORDS 
Insufficient: capacity - insufficient space to cater for the crowds, crowd movement and 
other needs such as emergency access (e. g. area too small, 
access route too narrow, not enough space in front for people to 
queue) 
Insufficient: quantity - the quantity of the feature in the venue is not enough to meet the 
demand (e. g. no or not enough access paths, lack of toilet 
facilities, too few signs) 
Insufficient: quality - the feature is or becomes unusable or unsafe to use (e. g. 
uneven/slippery flooring, steep slope, broken fences, insecure 
structure, feature consists of protruding objects which could give 
rise to a cut or a tripping hazard, ambiguous signs) 
Obstruction: access - access to and from an area is blocked or significantly restricted 
(e. g. by an object or by other people) 
Obstruction: from view - the feature is blocked and cannot be seen from a distance (e. g. 
people are unable to see a turning ,a staircase or a ramp beforehand, an information display board is hidden behind an 
object or a gathering crowd or its text is too small to read from a 
distance) 
Obstruction: line of - the view of spectators is blocked by an object or by other people 
sight (e. g. by a pillar) 
Pinch point/funnelling a narrow stretch or point which could hold up access or cause the 
effect crowd flows to taper 
Unguarded - no or insufficient prevention of access to dangerous parts of an 
object or an area (e. g. exposed sharp edges, an unprotected pot- 
hole or where members of the public can wander into a dangerous 
part of a work site) 
APPENDIX D 
GLOSSARY OF THE BEHAVIOURAL KEYWORDS 
GLOSSARY OF BEHAVIOURAL KEYWORDS 
Uneven distribution - higher concentrations of people in some part(s) of the venue or on 
some access route(s). 
High crowd density - the density of the crowd is such that it has the potential to cause 
problems, such as overcrowding and crushing. 
Disruption to a- actions which have the potential to cause chaos to a stationary 
stationary crowd crowd (e. g. people cut through a crowd, pushing, surging, lateral 
movement etc. ). 
Rapid crowd flow - the speed of the crowd movement is such that it has the potential 
to cause problems, such as crushing, pile-up and trampling. 
Cross flows - the direction(s) of the crowd movement could cause a safety 
problem (e. g. significant amount of cross flows, a contraflow, a 
whirlpool effect, etc. ). 
Disruption or - actions that could disrupt the smooth flow of the crowd or obstruct 
obstruction to a crowd crowd flow (e. g. people suddenly stop or slow down or change 
flow direction, people try to cut in or to cut through, individuals or a 
queue blocking an access route, etc. ). 
Non-compliance - disregarding the "house-rules" or not following instructions or 
directions (e. g. entering a restricted or a closed-off area, smoking 
in a no smoking area, illegal parking, moving in the wrong direction 
up a one-way system, refusing to move away from the gangway 
when asked, etc. ). 
Dangerous behaviour - actions which in themselves could cause harm to oneself and 
others (e. g. climb up/down/over, jump over, slide or run down a 
steep slope, etc. ). 
Aggressive behaviour - including antagonistic behaviour, fighting, missile throwing, etc.. 
People with special - people such as disabled persons, parents with young children, old 
needs people, people carrying large items, etc. may act and behave 
differently. 
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INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
Large crowds are a normal part of the operation of many public venues. From a 
commercial point of view large numbers of visitors may be desirable. But excessive 
crowding and poor safety provisions could lead at worst to injury or death and at the very 
least to frustration, dissatisfaction and reduced enjoyment. 
2. The Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 (HSW Act) places a duty on the employer 
to ensure the health and safety of his employees and persons not in his employment who 
may be affected by his undertaking. When applied to a public venue where the work 
activity involves the attendance of crowds, the employer has a duty to safeguard the 
health and safety of such crowds and to ensure that the risk to which they are exposed is 
as low as is reasonably practicable. 
3. Under Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 
(MHSWR), the employer is also required to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of 
the risks to the health and safety of his employees and others who might be affected. In a 
public venue, this means the public venue owner should assess the risk his undertaking 
poses to employees and others, including the visiting crowds. 
SCOPE 
4. This guide is intended to help the public venue owner to assess the safety risks his venue 
poses to the visitors. It consists of two parts: Introduction and A Method for Assessing 
Crowd Safety Risks in Public Venues. The first part outlines the risk assessment 
principles and gives guidance on who should carry out the assessment. The second part 
suggests a method for assessing crowd safety risks and gives practical advice on how to 
carry it out. This guide is not prescriptive. With the large number of public venues 
involved, considerable variation in venue design, visitor types and work practices exists. 
The content of this document can only be used as guidance and the reader will need to 
use discretion where the guidance does not match the exact circumstances of the venue. 
5. This guide is concerned with the assessment of risks to the safety of the visiting crowds 
only. In order to comply with Regulation 3 of the MHSWR, the public venue owner should 
also assess the health and safety risks to his employees and others who may be affected 
(e. g. contractors, tenants). 
DEFINITIONS FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS GUIDE 
6. Crowd safety - the safety of members of the visiting crowds. It covers the safety of 
individual members as well as the crowd as a whole. 
7. Front line staff - members of the employed and volunteer staff who have direct contact 
with the visiting crowds and whose work involves interacting with, managing and/or 
monitoring them (e. g. stewards, ticket collectors at turnstiles, etc. ). 
8. Hazard - anything which has the potential to cause harm to members of the visiting crowds. 
This could be (a dangerous property of) an item or a substance, a condition, a situation or 
an activity. 
9. Public venue -a place which opens to members of the public and where they assemble. It 
could be purpose built or otherwise, permanent or temporary, fixed or transient and indoor 
or outdoor. Examples of public venues include airports, railway stations, stadia, shopping 
malls, exhibition halls, leisure parks, fairgrounds and sites that are used to hold one-off 
events (e. g. concerts, street festivals). 
10. Public venue owner -a person or an organisation which owns the public venue and/or can 
legally seek to control the number of people entering the venue and the activities within it. 
11. Risk - the likelihood that the harm from a hazard is realised and the extent of it (i. e. the 
number of people who might be exposed and the consequences for them). In the context 
of a risk assessment, risk should reflect both the likelihood that harm will occur and its 
severity. In this document, a qualitative measure of risk has been developed (see Figure 
4). 
WHAT IS A RISK ASSESSMENT? 
12. Risk assessment is a systematic process that examines an undertaking and assesses the 
risks that could arise from it. In general, it involves identifying the hazards present and 
then evaluating the risks involved, taking into account whatever precautions are already 
being taken. The purpose of a risk assessment is to help the public venue owner to 
decide what additional actions need to be taken to eliminate the hazards or to reduce the 
risks. This will help him to comply with his duties under the HSW Act and other relevant 
health and safety law. 
13. Many public venue owners already carry out some form of risk assessment on a day-to- 
day basis. During the course of their operations, they will monitor the situation, recognise 
problems as they develop and introduce corrective measures by either taking immediate 
action there and then or by implementing longer term solutions. The MHSWR however 
requires that public venue owners should undertake a systematic general examination of 
their venues and that they should record significant findings from that risk assessment. 
14. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992: Approved Code of 
Practice sets out the principles of a risk assessment. In particular, a suitable and 
sufficient risk assessment should: 
(a) identify all relevant hazards and address all significant risks; 
(b) enable the employer to identify and prioritise the measures that need to be taken; 
(c) be appropriate to the nature of the work and remain valid for a reasonable period of 
time; 
(d) address what actually happens rather than what is supposed to happen. Actual 
practice may differ from the procedures and this is frequently a route whereby risks 
creep in unnoticed; 
(e) ensure that all groups of employees and others who might be affected are 
considered; 
(f) identify those groups who might be particularly at risk; 
(g) take account of existing preventive or precautionary measures. 
15. Risk assessment is not a stand-alone process. Rather, it is an integral part of the planning 
process, undertaken to ensure the smooth running of the venue. Its findings could help 
the venue owner to create policies, to set performance standards and to allocate 
resources. It can also help the venue owner to decide what changes should be made to 
his venue, what crowd management measures to take, the appropriate staffing levels and 
the need for future development. 
WHO SHOULD CARRY OUT THE ASSESSMENT? 
16. It is the duty of the public venue owner to conduct a suitable and sufficient assessment of 
the health and safety risks his venue poses to the visiting crowds. He may appoint one or 
more of his own employees as assessors to assist him in carrying out this duty and/or may 
enlist help or support from outside the organisation (e. g. a consultant). However, this 
does not absolve him from this legal duty. Ultimately, the responsibility rests with him. 
17. The public venue owner is also responsible for ensuring that a suitable and sufficient 
assessment has been carried out of the risks posed by other operations which take place 
in his venue. For example, in a multi-occupancy situation where the activities of different 
occupants could affect each other and where there are safety issues which are of 
common concern, the risk assessment may need to cover the venue as a whole to be fully 
effective. This will require some degree of co-ordination and co-operation. 
18. The assessor(s) appointed by the public venue owner should be competent. In general, 
the assessor(s) should have: 
(a) a knowledge and understanding of the venue and its operation; 
(b) a knowledge and understanding of the principles of risk assessment; 
(c) the capacity to apply his knowledge to crowd safety risk assessment. This will 
include identifying crowd safety problems and assessing the need for action; 
(d) an understanding of relevant current best practice in ensuring crowd safety; 
(e) an awareness of the limitations of his own experience and knowledge; and 
(f) a willingness and ability to supplement existing experience and knowledge. 
19. The public venue owner is solely responsible for ensuring that those he has appointed are 
competent and given adequate information and support (e. g. training, time and resources) 
to carry out their tasks. 
20. A crowd safety risk assessment may be carried out by individual assessors on their own or 
by a team of assessors. In the view of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), however, a 
team approach is usually more desirable especially for large venues. The advantage of a 
team approach is that the assessment can draw on the range of knowledge and 
experience of the team members. It can also ensure that the risk assessment has taken 
different views and understanding into account. 
21. The size of the assessment team could vary, depending on the complexity of the venue. 
As a rule of thumb, it should have enough people to answer the majority of the queries 
that could arise in the assessment without recourse to further expertise. 
22. Therefore, for an existing public venue, the assessment team would normally consist of: 
(a) the venue manager - he is responsible for the venue operation, understands the 
overall situation and is in the position to make most decisions; and 
(b) appropriate members of the front line staff - they deal with the visiting crowds and 
therefore know what actually happens on the ground. They also have in-depth 
knowledge and experience of what problems could arise. 
23. For a brand new public venue or a new extension to an existing venue, it is often useful to 
carry out a preliminary risk assessment at the design stage to examine the main features. 
A detailed assessment can be carried out later on when the venue is closer to its 
completion. The assessment team would normally consist of representatives of the venue 
owner and the designer organisations. The former will be responsible for operating the 
venue and can contribute by identifying operational problems posed by the design. The 
latter has the technical expertise to suggest design solutions and to comment on their 
costs and feasibility. 
24. In addition, at some points in the assessment, it may be necessary to involve others from 
both within and outside the organisation who could provide additional expertise or whose 
activities interact with the operation. It is up to the venue owner to decide how they should 
be involved (e. g. as a member of the assessment team, to participate in parts of the 
assessment or to co-ordinate and exchange information only when necessary). The 
following are examples of those who may be involved in the risk assessment: 
(a) other departments within the organisation where some of the front line staff belong 
(e. g. catering); 
(b) the emergency services; 
(c) the promoter(s) or organiser(s) of the event to be held in the venue; 
(d) major tenants (e. g. in a shopping centre or a transport venue); 
(e) operators of the transport systems used by many visitors; 
(f) the local authority planning or environmental health department; 
(g) specialists who can provide the necessary technical input to the assessment (e. g. 
where fireworks, laser or other special effects are used). 
25. There are no fixed rules about how the assessment team should work. But experience 
from other sectors (e. g. the high hazard industries) suggests a structured brainstorming 
(i. e. a group discussion which encourages uninhibited expression of views) could be 
useful. This provides an opportunity for team members to share their knowledge and 
experience and to discuss specific concerns. The venue owner needs to appoint a 
chairperson who is competent in risk assessment and in chairing such meetings. His role 
will be to control and guide the team through the assessment. A brainstorming can be 
done in half-day sessions. How many sessions are required would obviously depend on 
the size of the venue and the complexity of the operation. For most public venues, once 
the team is familiar with the method, it would be able to complete the bulk of the 
assessment between one and a few sessions. 
A METHOD FOR ASSESSING CROWD SAFETY RISKS 
IN PUBLIC VENUES 
THE OVERALL RISK ASSESSMENT APPROACH 
26. When carrying out a crowd safety risk assessment, you need to think about what hazards 
could arise and why, who might be harmed and how, whether the existing precautions are 
enough and, if not, what more should be done. The assessment would therefore consist 
of the following steps: 
Step 1: Identify hazards 
Step 2: Identify causes, consequences and who might be harmed 
Step 3: Decide whether existing precautions are adequate 
Step 4: Evaluate risks 
Step 5: Decide what further actions might be required 
Step 6: Record assessment findings 
Step 7: Review and revise assessment 
Figure 1 gives an overview of the assessment process for quick reference. You may find 
the assessment record form in Appendix A useful for recording what you have found 
throughout the assessment. 
27. The rest of this guide takes you through each step of the assessment. Where specific 
advice is given in support of the guidance, they are included in an Inset. Examples are 
also provided to show how the guidance could be applied in practice. 
28. If you are responsible for a number of similar venues (e. g. railway stations) or if your 
venue contains a number of similar features (e. g. rides in an amusement park), you might 
produce a basic "model" risk assessment reflecting the core hazards and risks associated 
with these venues or features. This may be applied by managers at each venue or by 
supervisors at each feature, but only if they. 
(a) are satisfied that the "model" assessment is broadly appropriate to their venues or 
features; and 
(b) adapt the model to the detail of the actual situations in their venues or features, 
including any extension necessary to cover hazards and risks not referred to in the 
model. 
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT PARAGRAPHS IN 
STAGES 
PROCESS THIS GUIDE 
1. Break down the venue into more manageable areas 33 
2. Look afresh at what hazards the venue itself could pose 34-37 
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3. Think about what the visitors do and how they may behave 38-40 
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Figure 1: Crowd Safety Risk Assessment Process 
STEP 1: IDENTIFY HAZARDS 
29. The aim here is to systematically identify all significant hazards which could arise in your 
venue. You may already be aware of some hazards. But it is also important to identify 
hazards that are not immediately apparent - for example, a latent hazard or a new hazard 
which arises due to, say, the introduction of a new feature. Any hazards which are not 
identified here will not be addressed and thus leave a gap in the risk assessment. 
30. Public safety hazards often arise from a combination of the following factors. You need to 
examine them, look for things that could go wrong and then decide what problems they 
could pose to public safety: 
(a) the venue (e. g. a pinch point), 
(b) the visitors (i. e. what they do and how they behave), 
(c) poor safety management (e. g. insufficient staff training), 
(d) the presence of hazardous substances or items (e. g. the use of a special effects), 
(e) a disruption to the normal or intended operation (e. g. delays or cancellation of a 
service or a fire). 
Guidance on how to examine these factors are given below. 
31. Involve your front line staff. They might have noticed things which are not immediately 
obvious. Also, they might help to reveal what actually happens on the ground. At the very 
least, you should ask them what they think. However, it is much better to include them as 
part of the assessment team. For a major venue, you may need to carry out some form of 
brainstorming session (see paragraph 25). For a smaller venue, you can sit down with 
one or two experienced members of the front line staff and systematically go through each 
part of your venue. 
32. In addition to a brainstorming session, it is often useful to carry out a venue inspection and 
to observe the crowds. This allows you to look afresh at what could cause harm. You 
could also find the information needed to identify hazards from sources such as past 
incident records, written comments from the front line staff, customer complains, safety 
audit reports, notes made in debriefing sessions and post-event reports. 
Break down the venue into more manageable areas 
33. It may be difficult to assess the whole venue at once especially if the venue is large. 
Therefore, it is worth breaking it down into a number of smaller and more manageable 
areas first and then examining each area in turn. You can do so based on the main 
function for which each area is used (i. e. into functional areas) or in accordance with any 
system already in use to distinguish different parts of the venue. 
For example: An airport terminal can be broken down into the following functional areas: 
access routes from a train station, from a bus station, from car park(s); 
forecourt; check-in area; concourse; passport control; departure lounge; 
gate rooms; etc.. 
A theme park can be broken down into the forecourt; the concourse and 
different attraction or ride areas. 
In order to help the visitors to find their ways around, a large shopping 
complex may have already been divided into a number of smaller zones. 
They could also be used for the purpose of the risk assessment. 
A street event can be broken down in terms of the streets it occupies. 
Look afresh at what hazards the venue itself could pose 
34. Examine the overall layout of the venue to identify: 
(a) if any popular areas, busy access routes, main attractions and popular facilities are 
situated too close together or intersect each other; and 
(b) if there is a convergence of several access routes into a single area or route. 
35. Examine the features in each area and find out what hazards they could pose. One way 
of doing this is to apply suitable combinations of the following venue feature keywords and 
venue hazard keywords. The former lists the types of feature you might find in each area. 
The latter describes how they may lead to a hazard. 
VENUE FEATURE KEYWORDS 
Place 
Access route 
Entry/exit point 
Flooring/underfoot condition 
Slope, stairway, escalators, lifts, etc. 
Step, kerb, ramp, etc. 
Bank and edge 
Wall, pillar, post, bollard, fence, etc. 
Furniture/street furniture 
Facilities 
Information source 
Maintenance or construction work 
VENUE HAZARD KEYWORDS 
Insufficient: capacity 
Insufficient: quantity 
Insufficient: quality 
Obstruction: access 
Obstruction: view 
Pinch point/funnelling effect 
Unguarded 
Examples of the application of some of the venue feature keywords is shown in Appendix 
B. A glossary of the venue hazard keywords is given in Appendix C. 
36. These keywords are here only to prompt you, the assessors, and to structure the hazard 
identification process so that it is systematic. They are not meant to be exhaustive. You 
can add your own keywords to the lists, remove those which you think are irrelevant and 
refine them to meet your needs. Inset 1 advises on how to use these keywords. 
Inset 1: A step-by-step guide to the use of the venue feature keywords and the 
hazard keywords 
(a) Select a relevant venue feature keyword; say, Place 
(b) Select the hazard keywords which are applicable to the selected venue feature keyword, 
say, Insufficient: capacity 
(c) Combine the venue feature keyword with each of the hazard keywords selected to identify 
how that particular venue feature may lead to public safety hazards 
For example: If you are assessing the forecourt of a amusement park, the 
keywords Place - Insufficient: capacity could mean that it is 
not big enough to cope with the number of people there (i. e. 
including those arriving, queuing to buy tickets, waiting to get 
through the entrance turnstiles, large groups waiting to get in, 
etc. ). A hazard which could arise from this is that some of them 
may spill onto the adjacent road and mingle with the traffic. 
(d) Some keywords may not be applicable to your venue. Therefore, do not be surprised if 
they do not generate an issue. Just ignore them and move on. 
(e) Select the next relevant venue feature keyword and so on until all features in this area have 
been considered. 
37. You do not have to apply the keywords rigidly and don't let them restrict your thoughts. 
Write down whatever hazards you can think of from the keywords even though it does not 
seem the right place. You may have also identified the immediate cause of a hazard here. 
Write it down as well (see Example 1). The aim here is to identify as many hazards as 
possible. Exactly where and how they are identified is not important. 
E_iaittple 1 (using the suggested assessment form shown in Appendix A): 
Area: Forecourt 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSE 
Hazards Causes Consequences Existin 
Part of the crowd may spill onto During peak hours, the 
the adjacent road and mingle number of people arriving 
with moving vehicles. exceeds the capacity of the 
forecourt. 
Think about what the visitors do and how they may behave 
38. The aim is to identify those activities and behaviours which could lead to a hazard. Think 
about what the area is used for, who your visitors are, the circumstances they may be in 
(e. g. in a hurry, in a lively mood) and so on. There is no need to account for all activities 
and behaviour, just look for those which could cause a problem. You can probably identify 
much of what the visitors do from experience and from past problems. But it can also be 
useful to observe the crowds and note down the things which concern you. 
39. You may find the following venue feature keywords and behavioural keywords useful. The 
venue feature keywords are the same as those given in paragraph 35. The behaviour 
keywords describe the types of activity or behaviour which could cause harm. Appendix D 
gives a glossary of the behavioural keywords. 
VENUE FEATURE KEYWORDS 
Place 
Access route 
Entry/exit point 
Flooring/underfoot condition 
Slope and stairway 
Step, kerb, ramp, etc. 
Bank and edge 
Wall, pillar, post, bollard, fence, etc. 
Furniture/street furniture 
Facilities 
Information source 
Maintenance or construction work 
BEHAVIOURAL KEYWORDS 
Uneven distribution 
High crowd density 
Disruption to a stationary crowd 
Rapid crowd flow 
Cross flows 
Disruption or obstruction to a crowd flow 
Non-compliance 
Dangerous behaviour 
Aggressive behaviour 
People with special needs 
40. Again, these keywords are here only to prompt you. They are not meant to be exhaustive, 
don't let them restrict your thoughts. Inset 2 advises on how to use these keywords. 
Inset 2: A step-by-step guide to the use of the venue feature keywords and 
behavioural keywords 
(a) Select a relevant venue feature keyword; say, Place 
(b) Select the behavioural keywords to describe the type of activity or behaviour which could 
take place there; say, Uneven distribution 
(c) Combine the venue feature keyword with each of the behavioural keywords selected to 
decide what problems such activity or behaviour may cause. 
For example: Place - Uneven distribution could mean that too many people 
choose to stay in the same area in, say, a large hall. This could 
lead to overcrowding. 
(d) Ignore those hazards which you have already identified earlier and move on. Also ignore 
keywords which do not apply to your situation. 
For example: A path is obstructed by a stationary crowd in front of a nearby 
attraction. You may have already identified this earlier when 
examining the venue layout. You may have also thought of 
people entering a restricted area through a broken fence (i. e. 
Fence - Non-compliance) when you assessed this feature 
earlier. 
(e) Select the next behavioural keyword and so on until all features in this area have been 
considered. 
For example: From Place - Disruption to a stationary crowd, you could 
identify behaviour such as surging and people pushing their way 
through a packed crowd. 
Facilities - Disruption or obstruction to a crowd flow could 
remind you of the situation where movement is blocked by 
people waiting for others nearby. 
See Example 2 
Example 2: 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASS, 
Area: Forecourt 
Hazards Causes Consequences Exist 
Crowd movement is obstructed 
by people waiting for others 
nearby 
People try to cut through the 
crowd to get to the toilets 
Assess your safety management system 
41. Look afresh at your safety management system. The following issues are particularly 
relevant to ensuring public safety. First, identify any shortcomings relating to each issue. 
Then consider how they could affect your operation in each area. 
SAFETY MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Staff roles and responsibilities 
Command and communication 
Co-operation and Co-ordination with other bodies 
Monitoring of crowds 
Staffing levels 
Staff selection and training 
Inset 3 advises on how this can be done. 
Inset 3: A step-by-step guide on how to assess your safety management system 
(a) Select a relevant issue; say, command and communication. 
(b) Decide what could go wrong; say, breakdown in communications. You may find a few 
shortcomings in each issue. 
(c) For each shortcoming, ask yourself how it could affect your operation. 
For example: As a result of a breakdown in communications, the arriving 
crowds are sent to the wrong entrance. 
(d) Decide what hazards could arise. 
For example: Severe congestion at that entrance and/or severe cross flows 
created by people turning back. 
(e) Select the next issue and so on until all issues that are relevant to your operation in the 
area have been considered. 
See Example 3 
Example 3: 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSE, 
Area: Forecourt 
Hazards Causes Consequences Existi 
Severe congestion and/or cross Breakdown in communications 
flows at entrance A results in arriving crowd being 
incorrectly sent to this 
entrance 
Identify hazards associated with substances and items which could cause harm 
42. Your operation may involve the use (and storage) of substances and/or items which have 
the potential to cause harm to members of the public. If this is the case, you need to 
identify the hazards and assess the risks created by them. First, identify what they are 
and where they are used and stored. The following are examples of the kinds of 
substances and items which could create hazards in a public venue: 
(a) substances which are hazardous to health and are covered by the Control of 
Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1994 (COSHH) (e. g. substances that 
are toxic, corrosive or irritant; have maximum exposure limits or occupational 
exposure standards; have chronic or delayed effects; or biological agents) 
(b) machinery (e. g. escalators, turnstiles, ticket machines, rides in a fairground or an 
amusement park, etc. ) 
(c) electric cables, generators, etc. 
(d) fireworks, special effects in a place of entertainment or a show (e. g. laser), etc. 
(e) open fire/naked flame (e. g. at a stall selling hot food) 
(f) moving objects (e. g. vehicles, trolleys, etc. ) 
43. Then, decide what hazards each substance or item could pose to the visitors. Think about 
where and when it is used and how visitors may be exposed to it. Address what could 
actually happen rather than what is supposed to happen. Take into account any 
possibility for human errors by staff who handle the substance or operate and maintain the 
item. Also think about the visitors' behaviour (see Example 4). Manufacturers' 
instructions or datasheets and accident records can also help you to spot hazards and to 
put risks in perspective. 
Example 4: 
Area: Forecourt 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSES 
Hazards Causes Consequences Existin 
People pushed against 
unguarded mobile electric 
_generators People knock over hot food 
equipment 
Look for potential disruption to the normal or intended operation 
44. The aim is to consider how your venue operation could be disrupted and what new 
hazards could arise as a result. A major disruption such as a major fire would call for a 
complete change of the mode of operation (e. g. from normal operation to an evacuation) 
thus introducing new hazards. Even a relatively minor disruption such as a train delay or 
cancellation could exacerbate a problem or turn the trivial into a significant hazard. 
45. First, identify the scenarios which could disrupt your operation. The following are some 
examples: 
(a) accident (e. g. traffic accident outside or within the venue) 
(b) closure of a part of the venue 
(c) closure of a nearby or related venue (e. g. the closure of an adjacent train station) 
(d) delay or cancellation (e. g. flight delay, late kick-off in a football match) 
(e) disruption to the arrival/departure profile (e. g. severe traffic congestion on a main 
approach road) 
(f) emergency situation (e. g. a fire, bomb threat, structural collapse, toxic release, etc. ) 
(g) loss of utility (e. g. power cut) 
(h) public disorder 
(i) system or equipment failure (e. g. escalator stops, a jammed door or gate, etc. ) 
(j) weather (e. g. a sudden change of weather and adverse weather condition such as 
too hot/cold, heavy rainfall/snowfall, high wind, etc. ) 
46. For a minor disruption which causes a slight deviation in parts of the venue, hazard 
identification could be relatively straightforward to do. Simply think about what effects 
each relevant scenario could have on the venue operation, on crowd movement, on 
people's behaviour and on the substances and items used. Then identify the problems 
which could arise as a result (see Example 5). 
Example 5: 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSE 
Area: Forecourt 
Hazards Causes Consequences Existi 
Congestion on access route to Escalator(s) fail. 
the escalators. 
Last minute rush. A severe traffic problem due to 
roadworks on one of the main 
approach roads to the venue 
47. A detailed assessment would be necessary in the case of a major disruption where the 
operation required to ensure safety is very different from the normal operation. The 
assessment would involve examining the venue itself, the visitors, the safety management 
system and the substances and items in the vicinity. Again, the venue feature keywords 
(see paragraph 35), the venue hazard keywords (paragraph 35), the behavioural 
keywords (paragraph 39), and the safety management issues (paragraph 41), could help 
you to assess the first three of the above. Hazardous substances and items can be 
assessed by considering how they could react in that situation and what hazards this 
could introduce. 
48. Write down what you have identified. You need to indicate on the assessment record 
form the scenario you are considering (see Example 6). 
Example 6: 
RECORD OF CROWD SAFETY RISK ASS 
Scenario: A major fire at the store room behind Entrance A 
Area: Forecourt 
Hazards Causes Consequences T Exis 
Assess route X and Entrance A 
are blocked by the fire 
(i. e. from the keywords Access 
route - Obstruction: access) 
Entrance B at the other end of This remains the only main 
the forecourt could become a exit point and people tends 
pinch point in an evacuation to leave through here 
(i. e. from the keywords rather than to use other Entry/exit point - Insufficient: emergency exits capacity) 
People still arriving at Staff at a nearby train station 
Entrance A. are not informed about the fire 
until much later. Hence, they 
still direct the arriving crowd to 
this entrance (i. e. lack of co- 
ordination) 
A certain chemical in the store The heat 
room could release fumes 
Electric cable could be The fire or the heat 
[damaged 
STEP 2: IDENTIFY CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND WHO MIGUT BE 
HARMED 
49. The aim is to find out what causes the hazards or hazardous situations identified in STEP 
1, what danger they could pose and who might be affected. Identifying the cause(s) could 
help you to decide later in the assessment process what actions are needed to get rid of 
the hazards. The identification of consequences and who might be harmed could help 
you to decide how to protect people against the harm and to estimate risks (see Example 
7). 
Example 7: 
Hazards Causes Consequences T Existi 
Part of the crowd spills onto the During peak hours, the People, especially young 
adjacent road and mingles with number of people arriving children, could get 
moving vehicles. exceeds the capacity of the knocked down by 
forecourt. vehicles. 
" not enough ticket 
counters 
" only a minority of the 
visitors buy tickets in 
advance 
" tickets are not 
processed quickly 
enough at the entrance 
Crowd movement is obstructed People waiting for friends, etc. Exacerbate the crowd 
by people waiting for others congestion problem in the 
nearby. area 
People try to cut through the Entrances to the toilets are Severe cross flows 
crowd to get to the toilets. often blocked by the main especially when persons 
crowd flow in wheelchairs try to make 
their way to the disabled 
persons toilet 
People pushed against crowding and cross Burns. Toddlers and 
unguarded mobile electric flows in the area young children are 
generators some generators particularly vulnerable 
protrude slightly onto due to their height 
the access route 
People knock over hot food crowding and cross Severe burns to those in 
equipment flows in the area the immediate vicinity. 
" people being pushed Teenagers and young 
against the grills persons are particularly 
" people try to push their likely to be involved as 
way through the crowd they are more "lively" and 
tend to push each other 
around. 
Congestion on access route to " Escalator(s) fail Crowding problem which 
the escalators. " No alternative access routes could affect the 
or people not aware of their immediate area and 
existence possibly beyond 
Last minute rush. "A severe traffic problem due Crushing at the 
to roadworks on one of the entrance/turnstiles 
main approach roads to the 
venue 
" No alternative routes or 
people not aware of their 
existence 
For each hazard, decide what causes the problem 
50. Find out what causes a hazard. You may have already found the immediate causes 
earlier on in STEP 1. But don't stop there - there could well be other (underlying) causes 
that are equally important. It is worth bearing in mind that a hazard often arises due to a 
combination of reasons. Some of them may not be obvious. It could, for example, arise 
from the overall layout of the venue rather than the features you were assessing. It could 
be because of another problem elsewhere in the venue or what happens in another place 
(e. g. crowds leaving a nearby football match). It is also possible that the problem is 
caused by a part of your operation which seems not directly linked to crowd management 
(e. g. how tickets are sold). 
For example: Crowd congestion in a forecourt could be caused by one or more of the 
following reasons: the forecourt is simply too small, the venue becomes 
more popular than originally designed for, not enough ticket counters, only 
a minority of the visitors buy tickets in advance, tickets are not processed 
quickly enough at the entrance and so on. 
51. If the hazard is caused by people's behaviour, it is important to consider what makes them 
behave in such a way. You will not be able to find a satisfactory solution to the problem if 
you simply dismiss this as the fault of the individuals concerned! 
52. If a hazard is due to a poor safety management system, you may have to look beyond the 
immediate issues listed in paragraph 41. Think about the more "global" safety 
management issues (e. g. policy, safety culture, etc. ) and ask yourself whether you have 
done enough. You can find out more about safety management systems in the HSE 
publication entitled Successful Health and Safety Management and the HSE leaflet 
Five Steps to Successful Health and Safety Management (see Appendix E). 
Think about who may be harmed and how 
53. When identifying the consequences and who might be harmed, also think about how 
many people may be affected (i. e. whether a hazard would harm a few individuals or most 
people in the vicinity) and whether any visitor groups are particularly vulnerable. 
Vulnerable groups may include disabled persons, young children and elderly people. 
They are often more likely to be harmed or are likely to suffer more when harmed. 
STEP 3: DECIDE WHETHER EXISTING PRECAUTIONS ARE ADEQUATE 
Identify the precautions already in place and consider how effective they are 
54. Some hazards may already be controlled in some way, whether by deliberate measures 
(e. g. by venue design, safety devices (such as barriers), crowd management measures or 
operational procedures) or by the circumstances in which they are found. The aim is 
therefore to identify the precautions and decide whether they are adequate or whether 
more should be done. 
55, Think about how effective the existing precautions are. Again, you need to look at how 
they actually work, not how they are supposed to work. Also consider how your 
precautions may fail or become less effective. You could get caught out if you 
automatically assume that they would always work as intended! 
For example: The circumstances could change as a result of an incident elsewhere. 
Venue features and engineered devices could suffer from vandalism, wear 
and tear, component failures, etc.. 
Crowd management measures and procedures could be hindered by 
equipment failures, human errors, breakdown in communications, 
confusion in roles and responsibilities and so on. 
Decide whether the precautions are enough 
56. In order to decide whether the existing precautions are enough, you will need to carry out 
a preliminary risk evaluation. As a general guide, if taking into account the existing 
precautions the risk is trivial or if is no greater than exists in a similar everyday situation, 
you can say that it is adequately controlled and no further action will be needed . 
You can 
therefore ignore the hazard and exclude it from the rest of the risk assessment. 
Otherwise, the hazard is still significant and you need to evaluate it in detail (see STEP 4). 
A trivial risk is one which is extremely remote (i. e. it has never happened before and there 
are no reasons whatsoever to suggest that it will ever happen) or one which does not 
cause any real harm (i. e. no more than inconvenience to the visitors, discomfort, 
frustration and so on). When deciding how the risk compares with that in an everyday 
situation, you should compare like with like. You cannot ignore a hazard on the grounds 
that its risk compares favourably with that involved in, say, a dangerous sport! 
For example: In a street event, the pavement kerb could pose a tripping hazard. But, you 
could ignore it on the grounds that the risk is no more than that arising from 
walking along the high street on a normal Saturday afternoon. 
If the crowd density is much higher than that on the normal high street, so 
will be the risk. One reason for this is that people may not see the kerb. 
Therefore, the above argument is no longer valid and this hazard should be 
evaluated further. 
STEP 4: EVALUATE RISKS 
For each remaining hazard, estimate its likelihood and the severity of its 
consequences 
57. The aim is to decide for each significant hazard how much risk is involved after the 
existing precautions have been taken. The findings will enable you to establish how 
significant the hazards are and thus to prioritise any remedial actions required to control 
them. The evaluation of risk usually involves the following steps: 
(a) decide how likely the hazard is to be realised (i. e. estimate the likelihood); 
(b) decide how serious the harm is should the hazard be realised (i. e. estimate the 
severity); and 
(c) establish the level of risk based on the above. 
58. When estimating likelihood, it is important that you consider both how likely the hazard is 
to occur and to cause harm, not just how likely it is to occur. This is because not all 
hazards cause harm all the time; the potential for a hazard to cause harm is realised only 
under some circumstances. In a risk assessment, we are only interested in the likelihood 
of someone being harmed. 
For example: Cross flows and obstructions do not normally give rise to a significant 
problem unless they take place in a busy area. 
59. When estimating severity, you need to take into account the circumstances under which 
the hazard takes place. 
For example: If people climb up to a height, the seriousness of the injury, should they fall, 
will depend on how high they manage to climb. Also, more people would 
be injured if this behaviour takes place where there is a packed crowd 
underneath. 
The severity (and the likelihood of an injury) of people mingling with moving 
vehicles will depend on whether it takes place on a busy main road with 
fast moving traffic or on a quiet side road where the vehicles move slowly. 
Establish the risk level 
60. You can find out the risk level of a hazard based on its estimated likelihood and severity. 
Inset 4 gives a step-by-step description on how to evaluate risk. 
Inset 4: A step-by-step guide to risk evaluation 
(a) To estimate likelihood, select a Likelihood Category (LC) from Figure 2 which can best 
describe how likely the hazard is to be realised. 
Category Definition 
Likely (L) A similar problem has happened before (either here or elsewhere) 
AND there are no reasons to think that it will not happen in the 
foreseeable future. 
Possible (P) Never happened before BUT there are reasons to suggest that it 
could happen. 
Unlikely (U) Never happened before BUT could occur under exceptional 
circumstances. 
Very Unlikely Never happened before AND there are no reasons to suggest that it 
(UL) will. 
Figure 2: Likelihood Categories 
(b) To estimate severity, select a Severity Category (SC) from Figure 3 which can best describe 
how serious the consequence will be should the hazard be realised. 
Category Definition 
Catastrophic Multiple deaths/life threatening injuries. 
(Ca) 
Major (Ma) A single death/life threatening injury OR injuries to a number of 
people who require hospitalisation. 
Significant (Si) A single injury which requires hospitalisation OR injuries to a number 
of people who require first-aid treatment. 
Minor (Mi) A single injury which may require some first-aid treatment; visitors 
feel anxious and are concerned about their safety. 
Negligible No real harm; no more than inconvenience, discomfort, frustration, 
(Ne) etc.. 
Figure 3: Severity Categories 
Inset 4: A step-by-step guide to risk evaluation (cont. ) 
(c) From the selected likelihood category and severity category, you can establish the risk level 
of the hazard from the matrix given in Figure 4 
Likely Possible Unlikely Very Unlikely 
Catastrophic 
Major 
Significant 
Minor 
Negligible 
See Example 8 
A A B - 
A 13 C - 
B C D - 
C I) - - 
Figure 4: A Risk Classification Matrix 
(d) The interpretation of the risk levels is laid down in Figure 5. 
Risk Level Interpretation 
A Intolerable risk. Immediate action(s) must be taken to eliminate the 
hazard or to eliminate its source, regardless of the cost. 
ß Should not be tolerated unless risk reduction is impracticable or if its 
cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained. 
C Should not be tolerated unless the cost of risk reduction exceeds 
the improvement gained. 
D Broadly acceptable risk. But risk reduction should still be made if 
an inexpensive measure can be found. 
- Trivial risk. No further actions required. 
Figure 5: Interpretation of Risk Levels 
There are no hard and fast rules for deciding whether the risk reduction cost is grossly 
disproportionate to or exceeds the improvement gained. You need to use your own 
judgement. To put things in perspective, it is often useful to think about the costs of failing 
to take the necessary precautions. Apart from personal suffering, the costs may also 
include compensation payments, insurance costs, adverse publicity, loss of revenue, 
possible prosecution and other effects on your company's viability. 
61. Inset 4 is given as guidance only. You can modify the likelihood categories, the severity 
categories and the number of risk levels to meet your specific needs. However, at the 
very least, you need to be able to decide whether the risks are intolerable, should be kept 
as low as reasonably practicable or are broadly acceptable. 
Example 8: 11 
Hazards 
Part of the crowd spills onto the 
adjacent road and mingles with 
moving vehicles 
Crowd movement is obstructed 
by people waiting for others 
nearby 
People try to cut through the 
crowd to get to the toilet 
People try to cut through the 
crowd to get to the toilet 
People try to cut through the 
crowd to get to the toilet 
People try to cut through the 
crowd to get to the toilet 
People try to cut through the 
crowd to get to the toilet 
Existing Precautions LC F- SC Risk Acti 0ý " the road is normally quiet P Si C 
with only a few vehicles at 
any one time 
" vehicles are slow moving 
U Mi - 
P Si C 
L Si B 
L Ma A 
Procedures to divert crowd U Mi - 
flows have been tried and 
tested many times in the past. 
" arrangements with the P Ma B 
police and a motoring 
organisation to receive 
information on any major 
roadworks well in advance. 
" well established 
procedures to warn coach 
parties of the roadworks 
STEP 5: DECIDE WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS MIGHT BE 
REQUIRED 
Decide what more should be done to reduce the risk further 
62. Identify what more should be done to eliminate each remaining hazard or to reduce the 
risk. Ask yourself: 
(a) whether you have done all the things that the law says you have got to do; and 
(b) whether generally accepted standards are in place. 
The law also says that you must do what is reasonably practicable to keep the venue safe. 
Therefore, your real aim is to make the risks as small as possible by adding to your 
precautions if necessary. Figure 5 suggests the appropriate courses of action for each 
risk level. Priority should be given to hazards which pose the higher risks. 
63. First, consider whether it is possible to get rid of the hazard altogether. This can usually 
be achieved by removing the source of the hazard or by tackling its causes. If this is not 
"reasonably practicable" to do (see Figure 5), then think about how to control the risk (i. e. 
to make it less likely to occur or to cause harm, to reduce its severity and/or to protect 
people against harm). Guidance and good practices by other venues could help you to 
identify the remedial actions required. 
If there is more than one set of possible solutions, decide which is the best option 
64. If there are several possible actions, you may have to examine them in more detail to 
decide which of them to take. In general, you need to think about the level of risk posed, 
how effective the actions would be in controlling the risk, whether they could give rise to a 
problem elsewhere, how soon they can be put in place and whether the hazard needs to 
be addressed urgently or whether it is better to wait for a more permanent solution. You 
can of course also take into consideration related cost-benefit factors such as the costs of 
taking those actions and how they may affect things like visitors' enjoyment and the 
attractiveness of the venue. 
65. Keep a record of what you have decided. If you believe that no actions are needed, it is 
useful to write down the reasons. It is also good practice to write down who is to carry out 
each action (see Exawnple 9) and to have in place a way of monitoring its progress. 
Example 9 
Hazards -77 
Part of the crowd spills onto the 
adjacent road and mingles with 
moving vehicles. 
Crowd movement is obstructed 
by people waiting for others 
nearby 
People try to cut through the 
crowd to get to the toilets 
People pushed against 
unguarded mobile electric 
generators 
People knock over hot food 
equipment 
Congestion on access route to 
the escalators 
Last minute rush 
Precautions LC SC Risk Actions 
is normally quite P Si C " open more ticket counters 
a few vehicles at during peak periods 
time " find ways to encourage 
are slow moving advance purchase 
" review procedures on 
processing tickets 
actions on: Sales Manager 
U Mi - The above actions should 
help to reduce this problem. 
Therefore no further actions. 
P Si C Could relocate the toilets but 
the cost of doing so 
outweighs the improvement 
ained. No actions. 
L Si B " the generators should be 
guarded 
" ensure that generators 
are in line 
" closely monitor crowd 
flows and control access 
into this area when 
necessary 
actions on: Operation 
Manager and Duty 
Supervisors 
L Ma A " carry out inspection to 
ensure that all such grills 
are adequately guarded 
" relocate traders to 
another part of the venue 
" closely monitor crowd 
flows and control access 
into this area when 
necessary 
" stewards should 
discourage such "lively" 
behaviour in this area 
actions on: Operation 
Manager and Duty 
Supervisors 
es to divert crowd U Mi - No inexpensive action 
been tried and identified to reduce risk 
times in the past. 
ements with the P Ma B " publicise and advise 
and a motoring visitors to set off early 
ation to receive action on: Sales Manager 
ion on any major " increase staff level and 
well in advance. put in extra crowd control 
lished measures 
es to warn coach f " consider delaying the 
road works start of the event if the 
situation significantly 
deteriorates 
actions on: Operation 
Manager and Duty 
Supervisors 
STEP 6: RECORD ASSESSMENT FINDINGS 
66. If your undertaking has five or more employees, you are required by the MHSWR to 
record the significant findings of your assessment. You should be able to show, through 
the record, that you have undertaken a suitable and sufficient assessment and that you 
have done what is reasonably practicable to reduce the risks. Significant findings usually 
include: 
(a) the significant hazards identified in the assessment; 
(b) the existing precautions in place; 
(c) the remaining risks, including any groups of visitors who are especially at risk; 
(d) the conclusions of the assessment, including the actions you have identified to 
further reduce the risks. 
The record could be documented in writing or by other means (e. g. electronically) so long 
as it is retrievable for use by management or for examination (e. g. by enforcing authority 
inspectors). 
67. Some hazards may have already been addressed elsewhere. For example, if hazardous 
substances are used, your COSHH assessment should have addressed the risks. Also, 
some of the existing precautions may have already been described in other documents 
(e. g. procedures). There is no need to repeat this information in the record, you can 
simply refer to where it can be found. 
68. Keep the record for future reference or use. It helps to show that you have done what the 
law requires and can therefore help you if an inspector questions your precautions or if 
you become involved in any legal action (e. g. for civil liability). It can also remind you to 
keep an eye on particular concerns. Appendix A shows the crowd safety risk assessment 
record form used throughout this guide. You may find it useful. Alternatively, you can 
develop your own form or record your assessment in another format if that suits you 
better. 
STEP 7: REVIEW AND REVISE ASSESSMENT 
69. Risk assessment is not a once-and-for-all activity. You are required under the MHSWR to 
review your assessment and, if necessary, revise it if there are developments which 
suggest that your assessment may no longer be valid, such as: 
(a) a significant change to your operation, to your venue, in visitor composition or in the 
circumstances (e. g. the introduction of new hazards due to activities elsewhere, 
renewed terrorist threats); 
(b) the detection of a significant problem; or 
(c) the occurrence of a major incident or a potentially serious near miss. 
In any case, it is good practice to review your assessment at regular intervals (e. g. 
annually) and record any amendments you have made. Even if there are no changes, it is 
useful to record that fact to show that you have carried out the review. 
70. If your operation concerns the staging of a regular event, ideally you need to start your 
review shortly after the event has finished. This is so that any problems and incidents 
which took place in the event are still fresh in people's minds. In any case, the timing of 
the review should be such that you have enough time before the next event to implement 
the new actions identified in the assessment. 
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APPENDIX B: EXAMPLES OF THE APPLICATION OF SOME VENUE FEATURE 
KEYWORDS 
KEYWORDS EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION 
Place viewing areas, a hall, rooms, an open space where people gather 
Access route designated/undesignated paths, corridors, junctions, turnings 
Entry/exit point including doors, gates, turnstiles 
Bank and edge River bank, dockside, the edge of a platform, etc. 
Furniture/street furniture lamp posts, benches, plants/trees, decor, fountains, monuments 
Facilities toilets, food and drink outlets, stalls, litter bins, check-in desk, ticket 
machines 
Information source information display boards/monitor screens, public address systems, 
enquiry desks, signs, notices 
APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY OF THE VENUE HAZARD KEYWORDS 
Insufficient: capacity - insufficient space to cater for the crowds, crowd movement and 
other needs such as emergency access (e. g. area too small, access 
route too narrow, not enough space in front for people to queue) 
Insufficient: quantity - the quantity of the feature in the venue is not enough to meet the 
demand (e. g. no or not enough access paths, lack of toilet facilities, 
too few signs) 
Insufficient: quality - the feature is or becomes unusable or unsafe to use (e. g. 
uneven/slippery flooring, steep slope, broken fences, insecure 
structure, feature consists of protruding objects which could give rise 
to a cut or a tripping hazard, ambiguous signs) 
Obstruction: access - access to and from an area is blocked or significantly restricted (e. g. 
by an object or by other people) 
Obstruction: view - the feature is blocked and cannot be seen from a distance (e. g. 
people are unable to see a turning ,a staircase or a ramp beforehand, an information display board is hidden behind an object 
or a gathering crowd or its text is too small to read from a distance) 
OR the view of spectators is blocked by an object or by other people 
(e. g. by a pillar) 
Pinch -a narrow stretch or point which could hold up access or cause the 
point/funnelling effect crowd 
flows to taper 
Unguarded - no or insufficient prevention of access to dangerous parts of an 
object or an area (e. g. exposed sharp edges, an unprotected pot- 
hole or where members of the public can wander into a dangerous 
part of a work site) 
APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY OF THE BEHAVIOURAL KEYWORDS 
Uneven distribution - higher concentrations of people in some part(s) of the venue or on 
some access route(s). 
High crowd density - the density of the crowd is such that it has the potential to cause 
problems, such as overcrowding and crushing. 
Disruption to a- actions which have the potential to upset the stability/order of a 
stationary crowd 
stationary crowd (e. g. people cut through a crowd, pushing, 
surging, lateral movement etc. ). 
Rapid crowd flow - the speed of the crowd movement is such that it has the potential 
to cause problems, such as crushing, pile-up and trampling. 
Cross flows - the direction(s) of the crowd movement could cause a safety 
problem (e. g. significant amount of cross flows, a contraflow, a 
whirlpool effect, etc. ). 
Disruption or - actions that could disrupt the smooth flow of the crowd or obstruct 
obstruction to a crowd crowd 
flow (e. g. people suddenly stop or slow down or change 
direction, people try to cut in or to cut through, individuals or a 
flow queue blocking an access route, etc. ). 
Non-compliance - disregarding the "house-rules" or not following instructions or 
directions (e. g. entering a restricted or a closed-off area, smoking 
in a no smoking area, illegal parking, moving in the wrong direction 
up a one-way system, refusing to move away from the gangway 
when asked, etc. ). 
Dangerous behaviour - actions which in themselves could cause harm to oneself and 
others (e. g. climb up/down/over, jump over, slide or run down a 
steep slope, etc. ). 
Aggressive behaviour - including antagonistic behaviour, fighting, missile throwing, etc.. 
People with special - people such as disabled persons, parents with young children, old 
needs people, people carrying 
large items, etc. may act and behave 
differently. 
APPENDIX E: FURTHER READING 
The following list of HSE publications is only a small selection of those available. A 
comprehensive list is available from HSE Books. Free leaflets are available from both HSE 
Books and the HSE Area Offices. 
A Guide to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974: Guidance on the Act, L1, ISBN 0 
11 8855557 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992: Approved Code of Practice, 
L21, ISBN 0 7176 0716 X 
Five Steps to Risk Assessment, IND(G)163L (free leaflet) 
Successful Health and Safety Management, HS(G)65, ISBN 0 7176 0425 X 
Essentials of Health and Safety at Work, 1994 ISBN 0 7176 0716 X 
Five Steps to Successful Health and Safety Management: Special help for directors and 
managers, IND(G)132L (free leaflet) 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health and Control of Carcinogenic Substances. 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1994: Approved Codes of 
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THE HSE GUIDE ON CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT 
BRIEFING NOTES FOR EVALUATORS TAKING PART IN THE USER TRIALS 
About the Guide: 
Regulation 3 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992 
requires all employers to assess the risks their undertaking poses to employees and 
others who may be affected, including the public. Such a requirement also applies to 
public venue owners. The Health and Safety Executive has commissioned RM 
Consultants Ltd (RMC) to develop a guide to the assessment of crowd safety risks in 
public venues. The aim of the guide is to provide the assessors with the necessary 
support and assistance so that they can conduct a suitable and sufficient risk 
assessment on crowd safety. It is intended for public venue managers and others 
whose duties include assessing crowd safety. 
About the User Trial: 
The guide consists of a suggested risk assessment method and associated 
guidance. The aim of the user trial is to evaluate the method and how it is 
presented. This will enable us to identify ways of improving the guide so that it 
adequately addresses your assessment needs. Enclosed is a copy of the guide. 
The instructions for the trial are as follows: 
" You are advised to read the guide before the trial. This will help to reduce the 
time required to complete the trial. 
" Prior to the trial, select a part of your venue (or an event) which you wish to 
assess. It would be beneficial if the selected part is as typical as possible of the 
venue (i. e. in terms of the types of crowd safety problems that could arise). 
0 Where possible, bring with you a plan of the selected part and other materials 
which you may need for the trial assessment. 
0 On the day of the trial, you will be asked to apply the method suggested in the 
guide to assess crowd safety in the selected part of your venue/event. 
" Zachary Au from RMC will be present to observe the assessment. This will give 
him an opportunity to identify any problems posed by the guide. It is worth noting 
that it is the guide, not the evaluator, which is being tested in this trial! 
After the trial, you will be invited to give your comments by filling in a short 
questionnaire. 
THE EVALUATION OF THE CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDE 
USER TRIAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire aims to identify any deficiencies and weaknesses in the current 
version of the above guide. You are invited to comment on all aspects of the guide, 
such as the risk assessment method suggested here and how useful the guidance 
is. Please record your comments by completing this questionnaire. Based on your 
comments, RMC will modify the guide so that it becomes more appropriate to your 
risk assessment needs. 
The Risk Assessment Method: 
1. Do you find any parts of the assessment method difficult to apply in practice or 
do you think they might cause problems to other assessors in a similar situation? 
Please record your comments in terms of the following risk assessment steps 
(i) identify public safety hazards 
(ii) identify the causes and consequences of the hazards 
(iii) decide whether the hazards are already sufficiently controlled 
(iv) estimate the risks 
(v) decide what further actions are needed and their priorities 
(vi) record your assessment findings 
(vii) review and revise your assessment 
Please explain what the problems are and comment on how the guide might be 
improved. 
2. Apart from those problems you have already mentioned above, is there anything 
else which you particularly like or dislike? 
3. Do you have any comments about the assessment method as a whole and how it 
could be improved? (e. g. Is it easy to use? Is it sufficient? Does it address the 
kind of public safety issues that concern you? Is it too time consuming or 
resource intensive to do? etc. ) 
The Guidance: 
4. Did you find any parts of the risk assessment guide difficult to understand or did 
you feel unsure about what they meant (please specify)? 
5. Do you think the guidance and the information given in the guide is appropriate 
to your needs? 
6. Do you think the guidance and the information given is comprehensive enough or 
do you require more information (please specify)? 
7. Do you have any other comments about the guide? (e. g. document length; ease 
of use; "way finding"; clarity of new phases, terms and concepts; layout; 
illustrative materials; etc. ) 
Thank you for taking part in the user trial. 
THE EVALUATION OF THE HSE CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT GUIDE 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EVALUATORS 
This questionnaire aims to identify any deficiencies or weaknesses in the current 
version of the above guide. You are invited to review all aspects of the guide, such 
as the risk assessment method suggested here and how useful the guidance is. 
Please record your comments by completing this questionnaire. You may need to 
write them down on a separate sheet of paper. Based on your comments, RMC will 
modify the guide so that it becomes more appropriate to your risk assessment 
needs. 
The Risk Assessment Method: 
1. Do you find any parts of the risk assessment method difficult to apply in practice 
or do you think they might cause problems to other assessors in a similar 
situation? Please record your comments in terms of the following risk 
assessment steps: 
(i) identify public safety hazards 
(ii) identify the causes and consequences of the hazards 
(iii) decide whether the hazards are already sufficiently controlled 
(iv) estimate the risks 
(v) decide what further actions are needed and their priorities 
(vi) record your assessment findings 
Please explain what the problems are and comment on how the guide might be 
improved. 
2. Apart from those problems you have already identified above, is there anything 
else which you particularly like or dislike? 
3. Do you have any comments about the assessment method as a whole and how it 
could be improved? (e. g. Is it easy to use? Is it sufficient? Does it address the 
kind of crowd safety issues that concern you? Is it too time consuming or 
resource intensive to do? etc. ) 
The Guidance: 
4. Did you have difficulty in understanding any part of the guide or did you feel 
unsure about what it meant (please specify)? 
5. Do you think the guidance and the information given in the guide is appropriate 
to your needs and the needs of other assessors in a similar situation? If not, 
please suggest how the guide could be improved. 
6. Do you think the guidance and the information given is comprehensive enough or 
do you require more information (please specify)? 
7. Do you have any other comments about the guide? (e. g. document length; ease 
of use; "way finding"; clarity of new phases, terms and concepts; layout; 
illustrative materials; etc. ) 
Thank you for taking part in our evaluation. Please use the enclosed stamped 
addressed envelope to return your comments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Large crowds are a normal part of the operation of many public venues. From a 
commercial point of view large numbers of visitors may be desirable. But 
excessive crowding and poor safety provisions could lead at worst to injury or 
death and at the very least to frustration, dissatisfaction and reduced enjoyment. 
The legal requirements 
2. Under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974 (HSW Act), employers have 
general duties to ensure that risks to the health and safety of their employees and 
others who may be affected, including members of the public in a public venue, 
are properly controlled. 
3. As a way of managing the health and safety law, Regulation .3 of the 
Management 
of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 19921 (MHSWR) states explicitly that 
employers are required to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks. 
This requirement applies to almost everyone who runs a public venue. 
Scope 
4. This methodology is developed to help public venue owners, managers and others 
whose duties include looking after the public to assess the crowd safety risks in 
their venues. It is intended for all places where members of the public assemble. 
including: 
(a) train stations, bus stations, airports, ferry terminals and passenger terminals 
of other land, air and sea transport facilities; 
(b) stadia, race grounds and all other sports venues; 
(c) markets, shopping malls, museums and galleries, exhibition halls and leisure 
complexes; 
(d) fairgrounds, leisure parks and show grounds; 
(e) cinemas, theatres, concerts and other venues for shows and entertainment; 
and 
(f) sites that are used to hold outdoor or street events. 
5. The methodology sets out an assessment approach for public venues in general. 
However, it is not prescriptive. There are considerable variations between 
different venues in their design, visitor types and work practices. Therefore. 
readers will need to use discretion where the content of this document does not 
match the exact circumstances of their venues. There are more specific 
documents for particular venue types (see FURTHER READING at the back of 
this document). They will need to be read in conjunction for specific cases. 
6. This methodology is for the assessment of the safety risks to the visiting crowds 
only. In order to comply with Regulation 3 of the MHSWR, public venue owners 
should also assess the risks to their employees and others who may be affected 
(e. g. contractors, tenants). 
Definitions for the purposes of this methodology 
7. The following explains the meanings of some of the terms used in this document: 
Crowd safety - the safety of members of the visiting crowds. It covers the 
safety of individual members as well as the crowd as a 
whole. 
Front line staff - members of the employed and volunteer staff who have 
direct contact with the crowds and whose work involves 
interacting with, managing and/or monitoring them (e. g. 
stewards, ticket collectors at turnstiles. ). 
Hazard - anything which has the potential to cause harm to members 
of the visiting crowds. This could be (a dangerous property 
of) an item or a substance, a condition, a situation or an 
activity. 
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Public venue -a place which opens to members of the public and where 
people assemble. It could be indoor or outdoor, purpose 
built or adapted, permanent or temporary, fixed or 
transient. 
Public venue -a person or an organisation which owns the public venue 
owner and/or can legally seek to control the number of people 
entering it and the activities within it. 
Risk - the likelihood that the harm from a hazard is realised and 
the extent of it. In a risk assessment, risk should reflect 
both the likelihood that harm will occur and its severity. 
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THE RISK ASSESSMENT PRINCIPLES 
8. Risk assessment is a process which helps employers to systematically identify the 
problems present, estimate the size of the problems and decide what actions need 
to be taken. Many public venue owners already carry out some form of risk 
assessment during the course of their operations. They will monitor the situation, 
recognise the problems and introduce corrective measures. The MHSNVR 
however requires that they should undertake a systematic examination of their 
venues and record all significant findings. 
9. The HSE booklet Five steps to risk assessment sets out what an employer needs 
to do to assess risks: 
(a) identify the hazards; 
(b) decide who might be harmed and how; 
(c) evaluate the risks arising from the hazards and decide whether existing 
precautions are enough; 
(d) record all significant findings; and 
(e) review and revise the assessment from time to time. 
10. Risk assessment is not a stand-alone process. Rather, it is an integral part of 
planning to ensure the smooth running of the venue. Its findings could help venue 
owners to create policies, to decide what to do, to set performance standards and 
to allocate resources. 
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WHO SHOULD CARRY OUT RISK ASSESSMENT? 
11. The public venue owners are legally responsible for ensuring that a suitable and 
sufficient risk assessment has been carried out. They are also responsible for 
ensuring that risks posed by other operations which take place in their venue are 
properly assessed. 
12. The venue owners may appoint one or more of their employees as assessors to 
assist in carrying out this duty and to co-ordinate all safety matters. They may 
also enlist help from elsewhere. However, this does not absolve them from their 
legal duty. Ultimately, the responsibility rests with the venue owners. 
Appoint competent assessors 
13. The assessors appointed by the venue owners should be competent. In general, 
they should: 
(a) understand the venue and the operation; 
(b) have sufficient experience and knowledge on the crowd safety issues 
involved; 
(c) understand the principles of risk assessment and be able to apply this 
knowledge to assess crowd safety risks; and 
(d) have a willingness and ability to supplement existing experience and 
knowledge. 
14. In order to carry out a proper assessment, the assessors will require adequate 
training, time and resources from the venue owners. 
Team effort 
15. A crowd safety risk assessment may be carried out by individual assessors on their 
own or by a team of assessors. In the view of the HSE, however, a team approach 
C 
is usually more desirable. The advantage of a team approach is that the 
assessment can draw on the range of knowledge, experience and viewpoints of the 
team members. 
16. There are no fixed rules about how the assessment team should work but 
experience suggests a structured brainstorming (i. e. a group discussion «hick 
encourages uninhibited expression of views) could be useful. 
17. The appointment of a competent person to chair the meeting is vital to the success 
of the team approach. The role of the chairperson is to control and guide the team 
through the assessment. 
18. The size of the assessment team could vary from venue to venue. As a rule of 
thumb, it should have enough people to answer the majority of the queries that 
could arise in the assessment. 
19. Therefore, for an existing public venue, the assessment team would normally 
consist of: 
(a) the person(s) who is responsible for venue operation and safety, understands 
the overall situation and is in a position to make most decisions; and 
(b) appropriate members of the front line staff - they deal with the visiting 
crowds and therefore know what actually happens on the ground. They also 
have in-depth knowledge and first hand experience of what problems could 
arise. 
20. For a brand new venue or one which is going through significant changes, it is 
often useful to carry out a preliminary assessment at the initial design stage to 
examine the main features. A detailed assessment can be carried out later on 
when the venue is closer to its completion. The assessment team would normally 
consist of: 
A 
(a) representatives of the venue owner who will be responsible for operating the 
venue and can contribute by identifying operational problems posed by the 
design; and 
(b) representatives of the designer organisations who have the technical 
expertise to suggest design solutions and to comment on their costs and 
feasibility. 
Who else should he involved? 
21. At some points in the assessment, it may be necessary to involve others from both 
within and outside the organisation. It is up to the venue owner to decide how 
they should be involved (e. g. as a member of the assessment team, to participate in 
parts of the assessment or to co-ordinate and exchange information only when 
necessary). The following are examples of those who may be involved in the risk 
assessment: 
(a) other departments within the organisation where some of the front line staff 
belong (e. g. catering); 
(b) the emergency services; 
(c) the promoter(s) or organiser(s) of the event to be held in the venue; 
(d) major tenants (e. g. in a shopping centre or a transport venue); 
(e) operators of the transport systems used by many visitors; 
(f) the local authority planning or environmental health department; 
(g) specialists who can provide the necessary technical input to the assessment 
(e. g. where fireworks, lasers or other special effects are used). 
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A PROTOTYPE METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING 
CROWD SAFETY RISKS IN PUBLIC VENUES 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGY 
22. The methodology presented here is designed specifically for the assessment of 
crowd safety risks in public venues. It shares the same principles as general health 
and safety risk assessment - i. e. you need to think about what problems could arise 
in your venue, what causes them, who might be harmed and how, whether the 
existing precautions are enough and, if not, what more should be done. 
23. Figure 1 gives an overview of the assessment methodology which consists of 
seven steps. They are essentially the same as the five assessment steps set out in 
the HSE booklet Five steps to risk assessment (see paragraph 9). The only 
difference is that the third step in the booklet (i. e. "evaluate the risks arising from 
the hazards and decide whether existing precautions are enough") has been broken 
down into Steps 3 to 5 in this document. 
24. Step 1: Identify hazards - For each part of your venue, look for any problems 
that could arise from the venue design, the behaviour of the visitors, your crowd 
management arrangements and things that are hazardous in nature. Also think 
about what could happen should your normal operation be disrupted or in case of 
an emergency. There are some keywords later on in Table 1 of this document to 
help you to identify potential problems. 
25. Step 2: Identify causes, consequences and who might be harmed - Find out 
what causes the problems. Decide how people might be harmed and whether 
anyone is particularly vulnerable. 
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26. Step 3: Decide whether existing precautions are adequate - Look at what 
precautions you already have in place and ask yourself whether they, are enough or 
more should be done. 
27. Step 4: Evaluate risks - It is likely that you have identified problems that are 
still not properly controlled. But before deciding what to do, you need to first of 
all find out how serious these problems are. For each problem, think about how 
likely it is that people will be harmed and how severe the harm is. There is a 
complete risk rating scheme in this document to help you to estimate the 
likelihood, the severity and, eventually, the risk posed by a problem. 
28. Step 5: Decide what further actions might be required - Decide what you 
need to do to get rid of the problems or, at least, reduce their risks. Think about 
how serious the problems are. Your course of action needs to be appropriate to 
the risks of the problem it is intended to tackle. 
29. Step 6: Record assessment findings - If you have five or more employees, you 
are required by law to record all significant findings of your assessment. There is 
a risk assessment record form in Appendix A, which you can use to write down 
what you have found in each assessment step. 
30. Step 7: Review and revise assessment - The law also requires you to review 
and, if necessary, revise your assessment. Usually, you will need to do this once a 
year or if there is a significant change in venue design, management procedures or 
the circumstances. 
31. You can carry out Steps I to 5 on each hazard in turn or identify all the hazards 
first (Step 1) and then do Step 2 then Step 3 and so on. Both approaches are 
equally valid. The rest of this document takes you through each assessment step 
in detail. Where specific advice is given in support of the methodology, it is 
included in an Inset. Examples are also provided to show how the methodology 
could be applied in practice. 
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Owners of similar venues or features 
32. If you are responsible for a number of similar venues (e. g. railway stations) or if 
your venue contains a number of similar features (e. g. rides in an amusement 
park), you might produce a basic "model" risk assessment reflecting the core 
hazards and risks. This can then be applied by managers at each venue or by 
supervisors at each feature, but only if they: 
(a) are satisfied that the "model" assessment is broadly appropriate to their 
venues or features; and 
(b) adapt the model to the detail of the actual situations in their venues or 
features, including any extension necessary to cover hazards and risks not 
referred to in the model. 
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Figure 1: An Overview of the Crowd Safety Risk Assessment Methodology 
ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT PARAGRAPHS 
STAGES PROCESS IN THIS GUIDE 
Collect information for your assessment 34 - 35 1 
Break down the venue into more manageable areas 36 
STEP 1: 37 - 46 
Identify Hazards 
Identify crowd safety hazards in normal operation conditions Table 1 
& Inset 1 
Look for possible disruptions to the normal operation 
and identify hazards in those situations 47 - 51 
Identify causes 53 - 56 
STEP 2: v 
Identify Causes, 
Consequences and Identify consequences and who might be harmed 57 
Who Might be Harmed 
Identify the precautions already in place and consider how 58 - 59 effective they are 
STEP3: 
Decide Whether 
Existing Precautions 
Are Adequate Decide whether the precautions are enough 60 - 
62 
Ignore the trivial risks 
64 - 65 
T Estimate likelihood Table 2 
1 
4, & Inset 2 
66 STEP 4: 
Evaluate Risks 
Estimate severity Table 3 
1& 
Inset 2 
67 - 68 
Establish the risk level Table 4 
1& 
Inset 2 
Decide what more could be done to reduce the risk further 
69 - 72 
Table 5 
STEP 5: 
Decide What If there is more than one set of possible solutions, decide 73 - 74 Further Actions which is the best option 
Might be Required 
Follow up your actions 75 
1 
STEP 6: Record Assessment Findings 76 - 78 
1 
STEP 7: Review and Revise Assessment 79 - 80 
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STEP 1: IDENTIFY HAZARDS 
33. The aim here is to identify systematically all significant hazards that could arise in 
your venue. You may already be aware of some hazards. But it is also important 
to identify hazards that are not immediately apparent - for example. a latent hazard 
or a new hazard which arises due to, say, the introduction of a new feature. Any 
hazards that are not identified here will not be addressed and thus leave a gap in 
the risk assessment. 
Collect information for your assessment 
34. Involve your front line staff. They might have noticed things that are not 
immediately obvious to you. Also, they might help to reveal what actually 
happens on the ground. At the very least, you should ask them what they think. 
However, it is much better to include them as part of the assessment team. For a 
major venue, you may need to carry out some form of brainstorming session (see 
paragraphs 15 - 21). For a smaller venue, sit down with one or two experienced 
members of the front line staff and systematically go through each part of your 
venue. 
35. It is also useful to carry out a venue inspection and to observe the crowds. This 
allows you to look afresh at what could cause harm. You could also find useful 
information from sources such as past incident records, video recordings, written 
comments from the front line staff, customer complaints, safety audit reports, 
notes made in debriefing sessions and post-event reports. 
Break down the venue into more manageable areas 
36. It may be difficult to assess the whole venue at once especially if the venue is 
large. Therefore, it is worth breaking it down into a number of smaller areas first 
and then examining each area in turn. You can do so based on the main function 
for which each area is used (i. e. into functional areas) or in accordance with any 
system already in use to distinguish different parts of the venue. 
l-) 
For example: An aifport terminal can be broken down into the following 
functional areas: access routes to and from public transport 
facilities and car park(s); forecourt; check-in area; 
concourse; passport control; departure lounge; gate rooms; 
etc.. 
A shopping complex may have alread1' been divided into 
several zones. They could also be used for the purpose ool the 
risk assessment. 
Identify crowd safety hazards in normal operation conditions 
37. Crowd safety hazards often arise from the following factors: the design of your 
venue, visitors' behaviour, your crowd management arrangements and the 
presence of hazardous substances or items. You need to think about them 
carefully and look for things that could go wrong. 
38. Table 1 gives a set of "hazard keywords" to help your hazard identification. It 
summarises the types of hazards that could occur due to the above factors. 
Appendix B explains the meanings of the keywords - you can pull it out from this 
document for use. 
39. To identify hazards systematically, you need to go through each area of your 
venue and examine every part of it (i. e. the layout, places where people gather, the 
access routes and other features such as entry/exit points, stairs and escalators, 
barriers and railings, furniture, facilities and so on). Ask yourself the following 
five questions: 
(a) What hazards could each venue feature pose? 
(b) Who are the visitors and what might they do that could cause a problem? 
(c) Are there any shortcomings in your crowd safety management 
arrangements and what hazards could arise a the result? (e. g. unclear- roles 
and responsibility; breakdown in command and communication; lack of co- 
operation and co-ordination with other relevant bodies; insufficient 
II 
monitoring of crowds; low staffing levels and inadequate selection and 
training. ) 
(d) Are there any hazardous substances or items in or near the area (see 
paragraphs 45 and 46)? 
(e) What are the interactions between different areas? (e. g. a problem in an 
adjacent area could have a knock-on effect here or vice versa. ) 
40. Use the keywords as prompters to find out what hazards could take place there. 
Then, describe in your own words what you have identified and write them down 
in the assessment record form in Appendix A. Inset 1 gives a step-by-step 
example of how this can be done. 
Table 1: Keywords for Hazard Identification 
HAZARD KEYWORDS 
crowding/congestion 
obstruction to crowd movement 
cross flows 
rapid crowd movement or rushing 
pushing/surging 
vigorous movement in a stationary crowd 
trip, slip or stumble 
fall 
walk into/pushed against an object 
hit/struck by an object 
people get trapped or stuck 
topple 
non-compliance 
dangerous behaviour 
aggressive behaviour or disorder 
hazardous substance or item 
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Inset 1: A step-by-step example of a systematic hazard identification 
(a) Divide the venue into smaller areas and assess each one in turn. For the purposes of this 
example, the area being assessed is the forecourt of a fictitious venue (see diagram 
below). 
(b) Look at each part of the area. In this example, we have: 
0 the northern pedestrian access route with a flight of stairs and a taxi rank alongside 
0 the southern pedestrian access route with a ramp for disabled access 
0 the forecourt itself which has two large plant pots and bollards at the front, toilets, stalls 
and the ticket counters with tape barriers in front. 
0 the entry/exit point with barriers and a gate for disabled and emergency access. 
(c) Examine each of the above features. Apply the hazard keywords in Table 1 and see what 
hazards could arise there. Don't forget a safety hazard could arise from the venue itself, 
the visitors, the ways you manage the arriving/leaving crowds and substances or items 
which are hazardous in nature. 
For example: Starting from the far end of the northern pedestrian access, the first 
feature is a flight of stairs. Go through the keywords and decide 
which of them is applicable. The following hazards could be 
identified: 
" Congestion as people slow down at the top of the stairs. 
" People could trip on the stairs. 
Further along the access route, there is a taxi rank and then a large 
plant pot. Apply the keywords again and you might think of the 
following: 
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Inset 1: A step-by-step example of a systematic hazard identification (cont. ) 
" In the afternoon/evening, people stopping for a taxi could obstruct crowd flows. 
" The plant pots obstruct movement and cause congestion during busy periods. Part of the crowd spill onto the adjacent 
road and could be hit by moving vehicles. 
Move on to the next part and do the same until you have examined 
the whole forecourt. 
(d) Describe in your own words what the hazards are and write them down on the assessment 
record form (see Example 1). In here, only the northern access route and the forecourt 
itself have been examined. 
A few notes about the use of the "hazard keywords" 
41. The keywords are here only to prompt you and to structure the hazard 
identification process so that it is systematic. They are not meant to be exhaustive. 
You can add your own keywords to the lists, remove those which you think are 
irrelevant and refine them to meet your needs. 
42. The keywords are designed to account for hazards in all kinds of public venues. 
Therefore, some may not be applicable to your venue. Don't be surprised if you 
can't think of anything from a keyword. Just ignore it and move on to the next 
one. 
43. On the other hand, you may identify the same hazard from different keywords. 
You only need to record it once. The main thing is to identify the hazards - which 
keyword you use to do so is unimportant. 
For example: The fourth entry in Example 1 above could be identified from 
the keyword "congestion ", "obstruction" or "hit ". The fifth 
entry could be identified from either "fall " or "dangerous 
behaviour ". 
44. Do not apply the keywords rigidly and do not let them restrict your thoughts. Just 
write down whatever hazards you can think of from the keywords even though it 
does not seem the right place. You may have also identified the immediate cause 
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of a hazard here. Write it down as well (see Example 1). The aim here is to 
identify all significant hazards and causes. Again, where or how they are 
identified is not important. 
Example 1 (using the suggested assessment form shown in Appendix A): 
CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT Venue: A fictitious ven 
RECORD FORM 
Area: Forecourt 
Assessment Date: Jan 
Assessor: J Smith 
Signed: 
Hazards Causes Consequences & Who Existi 
Might Be Harmed 
Congestion at the top of the People slow down at the top 
stairs of the stairs 
People could trip on the stairs 
In the afternoon/evening, 
people stopping for a taxi could 
obstruct crowd flows 
Part of the crowd on the The plant pots obstruct 
northern access spill onto the movement and create 
adjacent road and could be hit congestion 
by moving vehicles 
People could fall down from 
the bollard 
Crowd movement obstructed 
by people waiting outside the 
toilets 
Cross flows near the toilets. People cut through the crowd 
to et to the toilets 
Queues in front of the ticket 
counters sometimes extend 
beyond the tape barrier and 
obstruct movement 
People pushed against 
unguarded hot food equipment 
at one of the stalls 
Hazardous substances or items 
45. Your operation may involve the use and storage of substances or items which are 
hazardous in nature. A keyword '`hazardous substance or item" has already been 
included in Table 1. But first of all, you need to identify what they are and where 
they are used and stored. The following are examples of the kinds of substances 
and items which could create hazards in a public venue: 
1? 
(a) substances which are hazardous to health and are covered by the Control of 
Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1994 (COSHII) (e. ý,. 
substances that are toxic, corrosive or irritant; have maximum exposure 
limits or occupational exposure standards; have chronic or delayed effects; 
and biological agents) 
(b) machinery (e. g. escalators, turnstiles, ticket machines, rides in a fairground, 
etc. ) 
(c) electrical equipment, electric cables, generators, etc. 
(d) fireworks, special effects in a place of entertainment or a show (e. g. laser), 
etc. 
(e) open fire/naked flame (e. g. at a stall selling hot food), hot spots, etc. 
(f) moving objects (e. g. vehicles, trolleys, etc. ) 
46. When deciding what hazards the substance or item could pose, think about where, 
when and how it is used. Take into account any possible human errors by staff 
who handle and maintain the substance or item. Also think about visitors' 
behaviour (see the last entry in Example 1). Manufacturers' instructions or data 
sheets and accident records can also help you to spot hazards and to put risks in 
perspective. 
Look for potential disruption to the normal operation and identify hazards in 
those situations 
47. The aim is to consider how your venue operation could be disrupted and what new 
hazards could arise as a result. A major disruption such as a major fire would call 
for a complete change of the mode of operation (e. g. from normal operation to an 
evacuation) thus introducing new hazards. Even a relatively minor disruption 
such as a train delay or cancellation could exacerbate a problem or turn the trivial 
into a significant hazard. 
48. First, identify the scenarios which could disrupt your operation. The following are 
some examples: 
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(a) accident (e. g. traffic accident outside or within the venue) 
(b) closure of a part of the venue 
(c) closure of a nearby or related venue (e. g. the closure of an adjacent train 
station) 
(d) delay or cancellation (e. g. flight delay, late kick-off in a football match) 
(e) disruption to the arrival/departure profile (e. g. severe traffic congestion on a 
main approach road) 
(f) emergency situation (e. g. a fire, bomb threat, structural collapse, toxic 
release, etc. ) 
(g) loss of utility (e. g. power cut) 
(h) public disorder 
(i) system or equipment failure (e. g. escalator stops, a jammed door or gate, 
etc. ) 
(j) weather (e. g. a sudden change of weather and adverse weather condition 
such as too hot/cold, heavy rainfall/snowfall, high wind, etc. ) 
49. For a minor disruption which causes a slight deviation in parts of the venue, 
hazard identification could be relatively straightforward to do. Simply think about 
what effects each relevant scenario could have on the venue operation, on crowd 
movement, on people's behaviour and on the substances and items used. Then 
identify the problems which could arise as a result (see Example 2). 
Example 2: 
CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT 
RECORD FORM 
Area: Forecourt 
Hazards Causes 
Venue: A fictitious venue 
Assessment Date: Janua 
Assessor: J Smith 
Signed: 
Consequences & Who Exist 
Might Be Harmed 
Congestion on access route to Escalator(s) fail. 
the escalators. 
A last minute rush. A severe traffic problem due 
to roadworks on one of the 
main approach roads to the 
venue 
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50. A detailed assessment would be necessary in the case of a major disruption where 
the operation required to ensure safety is very different from the normal operation. 
The assessment would involve repeating the hazard identification process 
described in paragraphs 33 - 40 and Inset 1 for each emergency scenario. 
51. Write down what you have identified. You need to indicate on the assessment 
record form the scenario you are considering (see Example 3). 
Example 3: 
CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT Venue: A fictitious venu 
Assessment Date: Janua 
RECORD FORM Assessor: J Smith 
Signed: 
Scenario: A fire at the store room behind the Entrance 
Area: Forecourt 
Hazards Causes Consequences & Who Exist 
Might Be Harmed 
Assess route and the entrance 
are blocked by the fire 
People still arriving at the 
entrance and walk into the 
affected area. 
Certain chemical in the store 
room could release fumes 
Trip or stumble, people walk Electric cable could be 
into things, etc. damaged and lighting could 
be affected 
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STEP 2: IDENTIFY CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND WHO MIGHT BE 
HARMED 
52. The aim of this step is to find out what causes the hazards identified in STEP 1. 
what danger they could pose and who might be affected. Knowing the cause(s) 
could help you to decide later in the assessment process what actions are needed to 
get rid of the hazards. The identification of consequences and who might be 
harmed could help you to decide how to protect people against the harm and to 
estimate risks. (see Example 4) 
Identify causes 
53. You may have already found the immediate causes earlier on in STEP 1. But 
don't stop there - there could well be other (underlying) causes that are equally 
important. 
54. It is worth emphasising again that a hazard could arise from a combination of 
reasons: the venue design, the visitors and their behaviour, the crowd management 
arrangements and the presence of hazardous substances or items. Some causes 
may not be obvious. Congestion, for example, could be the result of an object 
obstructing crowd flows, insufficient capacity or the existence of a pinch point 
(i. e. venue design), too many people waiting or hanging around in the area (i. e. 
behaviour) and most people being directed to use this area (i. e. crowd 
management). Also, it could be because of a problem elsewhere in the venue or 
what happens in another place (e. g. crowds leaving a nearby football match). 
55. If the hazard is caused by visitors' behaviour, you also need to know why people 
behave in such a way. The chance is you will not find a satisfactory solution if 
you simply dismiss this as the fault of the visitors! 
56. If a hazard is due to poor crowd management, you may have to look beyond the 
immediate issues listed in paragraph 39 (c). Think about the more "global" safety 
management issues (e. g. policy, safety culture, etc. ) and ask yourself whether you 
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have done enough. You can find out more about safety management systems in 
the HSE publication Successful Health and Safety Management and the HSE 
booklet Five Steps to Successful Health and Safety Management (see 
FURTHER READING). 
Example 4: 
Area: Forecourt 
Hazards Causes Consequences & Who Exist 
Might Be Harmed 
Congestion at the top of the " People slow down at the top People being pushed/fall 
stairs of the stairs. down the stairs. Could be 
trampled. 
Young children and the old 
are particularly vulnerable. 
People could trip on the stairs " Some young people try to People being pushed/fall 
push their way through the down the stairs. Could be 
crowds. trampled. 
" Inade uate lighting. 
In the afternoon/evening, " Position of the taxi rank. Overcrowding in the area 
people stopping for a taxi could and some minor crushing. 
obstruct crowd flows 
Part of the crowd on the " The plant pots obstruct People get knocked down 
northern access spill onto the movement. by vehicles. 
adjacent road and could be hit " During peak hours, the 
by moving vehicles number of people using the 
access route exceed its 
capacity. 
" Almost everyone uses this 
route because of the locations 
of the car parks, coach park 
and bus stop. Car park 4 is 
used as an over-spill car park 
only. 
People could fall down from " People, especially children Falling injuries. Usually a 
the bollard and teenagers tend to climb twisted ankle, etc. but could 
and stand on the bollard. be much worse. 
Mainly children and 
teenagers. 
Crowd movement obstructed " People waiting for others. Exacerbates the congestion 
by people waiting outside the " The position of the toilets in this area. 
toilets 
Cross flows near the toilets. " People cut through the Severe congestion, pushing 
crowd to get to the toilets. and even some minor 
" Many people do not see the crushing; especially when 
toilets at first. They go past wheelchair users, prams or 
them and then turn around. people carrying large items 
are involved. 
Queues in front of the ticket " Not enough counters. Severe congestion and 
counters sometimes extend " Only a small number of some pushing. 
beyond the tape barrier and visitors buy tickets in advance. 
obstruct movement " Queues are not properly 
managed. 
People pushed against " Crowding and cross flows in Severe burns. 
unguarded hot food equipment the area. Toddlers and young 
at one of the stalls " Some people try to push children are particularly 
their way through or vulnerable due to their 
teenagers push each other height. 
around. 
-) 1) 
Identify consequences and who might be harmed 
57. Think about how people might be harmed, how many may be affected (i. e. 
whether the hazard would harm the individuals directly involved or many more in 
the vicinity) and whether any visitor groups are particularly vulnerable. 
Vulnerable groups may include disabled persons, young children and elderly 
people. They are often more likely to be harmed or are likely to suffer more when 
harmed. 
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STEP 3: DECIDE WHETHER EXISTING PRECAUTIONS ARE ADEQUATE 
Identify the precautions already in place 
58. Some hazards may already be controlled in some way, whether by deliberate 
measures (e. g. by venue design, safety devices (such as barriers), crowd 
management measures or operational procedures) or by the circumstances in 
which they are found. The aim is therefore to identify the precautions and decide 
whether they are adequate or whether more should be done. 
59. Think about how effective the existing precautions are. Again, you need to look at 
how they actually work, not how they are supposed to work. Also consider how 
your precautions may fail or become less effective. You could get caught out if 
you automatically assume that they would always work as intended! 
For example: The circumstances could change as a result of an incident 
elsewhere. 1, Mite 
,f 
atures and engineered deviccs could 
suffer from vandalism, wear and tear, component failures, 
etc.. 
Crowd management measures and procedures could be 
hindered by equipment failures, human errors, breakdown in 
communications, confusion in roles and responsibilities and 
so on. 
Decide whether the precautions are enough 
60. In order to decide whether the existing precautions are enough, you will need to do 
a preliminary risk evaluation. For example, if after the existing precautions the 
risk is trivial or if it is no greater than exists in a similar everyday situation, you 
can say that it is adequately controlled and no further action will be needed . 
You 
can then ignore this hazard and exclude it from the rest of the risk assessment. 
Otherwise, the hazard is still significant and you need to evaluate it in detail (see 
STEP 4). 
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61. A trivial risk is one which is extremely remote (i. e. it has never happened before 
and there are no reasons whatsoever to suggest that it will ever happen) or does 
not cause any real harm (i. e. no more than inconvenience, discomfort, frustration 
and so on). 
62. When deciding how the risk compares with that in an everyday situation. you 
should compare like with like. You cannot ignore a hazard on the grounds that its 
risk compares favourably with that involved in, say, a dangerous sport! 
For example: In a street event, the pavement kerb could pose a tripping 
hazard. But, you could ignore it on the grounds that the risk is 
no more than that arising from walking along the high street 
on a normal Saturday afternoon. 
If the crowd density is much higher than that on the normal 
high street, so will be the risk. One reason for this is that 
people may not see the kerb. Therefore, the above argument is 
no longer valid and this hazard should be evaluated further. 
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STEP 4: EVALUATE RISKS 
63. The aim is to decide for each significant hazard how much risk still remains after 
the existing precautions have been taken. The findings will enable you to 
establish how significant the hazards are and thus to prioritise any remedial 
actions required to control them. The evaluation of risk usually involves the 
following steps: 
(a) decide how likely the hazard is to be realised (i. e. estimate the likelihood); 
(b) decide how serious the harm is should the hazard be realised (i. e. estimate 
the severity); and 
(c) establish the level of risk based on the above. 
Estimate likelihood 
64. When estimating likelihood, it is important that you consider how likely the 
hazard is to occur and to cause harm, not just how likely it is to occur. This is 
because not all hazards cause harm all the time; the potential for a hazard to cause 
harm is realised only under some circumstances. In a risk assessment, we are only 
interested in the likelihood of someone being harmed. 
For example: Cross flows and obstructions do not normally give rise to a 
significant problem unless they take place in a busy area. 
65. In many cases, whether people have been harmed by a similar hazard in the past 
could give you some idea as to how likely it is to occur and to cause harm. For 
example, if a similar hazard had occurred several times before despite the existing 
precautions, the chance is it is "likely" (see definitions in Table 2) to happen 
again. If it occurred only once or twice before, it is probably still "possible" to 
happen in the future. However, you must remember that a hazard which has never 
happened before does not mean it will never happen. How likely something is to 
happen does not necessarily relate to its past history. For instance, a new hazard 
could be introduced following a change in venue design, visitor profile, 
operational procedures or the circumstances. 
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Estimate severity 
66. When estimating severity, you need to take into account the circumstances under 
which the hazard takes place. 
For example: If people climb up to a height, the seriousness of the injury, 
should they fall, will depend on how high they manage to 
climb. Also, more people would be injured if this behaviour 
takes place where there is a packed crowd underneath. 
The severity (and the likelihood of an injur 0 of people 
mingling with moving vehicles will depcnd oil ii'hcthci it tukL's 
place on a busy main road with fast moving traf jic or oil o 
quiet side road 1vherc the vehicles move slowly. 
Establish the risk level 
67. You can find out the risk level of a hazard based on its estimated likelihood and 
severity. Inset 2 gives a step-by-step description on how to evaluate risk. 
68. Please note that Inset 2 is given as one possible approach only. You can modify 
the likelihood categories, the severity categories and the number of risk levels to 
meet your specific needs. However, at the very least, you need to be able to 
decide whether the risks are intolerable, should be kept as low as reasonably 
practicable or are broadly acceptable. 
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Inset 2: A step-by-step approach to risk evaluation 
(a) To estimate likelihood, select a Likelihood Category (LC) from Table 2 which can best 
describe how likely the hazard is to be realised. Bear in mind the history of a similar hazard 
Table 2: Likelihood Categories 
Category Definition 
Likely (L) It could reasonably be expected to happen in the foreseeable 
future. 
Possible (P) There are reasons to suggest that it could happen. 
Unlikely (U) Could occur under exceptional circumstances. 
Very Unlikely (VU) There are no reasons to suggest that it will happen. 
(b) To estimate severity, select a Severity Category (SC) from Table 3 which can best describe 
how serious the consequence will be should the hazard be realised. 
Table 3: Severity Categories 
Category Definition 
Catastrophic (Ca) Multiple deaths/life threatening injuries. 
Major (Ma) A single death/life threatening injury OR injuries to a number of 
people who require hospitalisation. 
Significant (Si) A single injury which requires hospitalisation OR injuries to a 
number of people who require first-aid treatment. 
Minor (Mi) A single injury which may require some first-aid treatment; visitors 
feel anxious and are concerned about their safety. 
Negligible (Ne) No real harm; no more than inconvenience, discomfort, 
frustration, etc.. 
(c) From the selected likelihood category and severity category, you can establish the risk level 
of the hazard from the matrix given in Table 4. 
Table 4: A Risk Classification Matrix 
Likely Possible Unlikely Very Unlikely 
Catastrophic 
Major 
Significant 
Minor 
Negligible 
See Example 5 
A A B - 
A 13 C - 
B C n - 
C D - - 
ýý 
Example 5: 
Hazards 
Congestion at the top of the 
stairs 
People could trip on the stairs 
In the afternoon/evening, 
people stopping for a taxi could 
obstruct crowd flows 
Part of the crowd on the 
northern access spill onto the 
adjacent road and could be hit 
by moving vehicles 
People could fall down from the 
bollard 
Crowd movement obstructed 
by people waiting outside the 
toilets 
Cross flows near the toilets. 
Queues in front of the ticket 
counters sometimes extend 
beyond the tape barrier and 
obstruct movement 
People pushed against 
unguarded hot food equipment 
at one of the stalls 
Existing Precautions LC SC Risk fiction 
P Si C 
P Si C 
P Si C 
most vehicles are slow 
moving, with the exception 
of the taxi. 
P Ma B 
P Si C 
U Si D 
U Si D 
Staff available to manage 
queues when necessary. 
VU 
L Ma A 
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STEP 5: DECIDE WHAT FURTHER ACTIONS MIGHT BE 
REQUIRED 
Decide what more should be done 
69. First of all, ask yourself: 
(a) whether you have done all the things that the law says you have Ot to do; 
and 
(b) whether generally accepted standards are in place. 
The law also says that you must do what is reasonably practicable to keep the 
venue safe. Therefore, your real aim is to make the risks as small as possible by 
adding to your precautions if necessary. 
70. The actions you identify here should be realistic, i. e. there is a good chance that 
the actions can be implemented, not a wish list. Table 5 suggests the appropriate 
courses of action for each risk level. Priority should be given to hazards which 
pose the higher risks. 
Table 5: Interpretation of Risk Levels 
Risk Level Interpretation 
Intolerable risk. Immediate action(s) must be taken to eliminate the hazard 
or to eliminate its source, regardless of the cost. 
B Should not be tolerated unless risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is 
grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained. 
C Should not be tolerated unless the cost of risk reduction exceeds the 
improvement gained. 
D Broadly acceptable risk. But risk reduction should still be made if an 
inexpensive measure can be found. 
_ Trivial risk. No further actions required. 
71. There are no hard and fast rules for deciding whether the risk reduction cost is 
grossly disproportionate to or exceeds the improvement gained. You need to use 
your own judgement. To put things in perspective, it is often useful to think about 
1ýý 
the costs of failing to take the necessary precautions. Apart from personal 
suffering, the costs may also include compensation payments, insurance costs. 
adverse publicity, loss of revenue, possible prosecution and other effects on your 
company's viability. 
72. Secondly, consider whether it is possible to get rid of the hazard altogether. This 
can usually be achieved by removing the source of the hazard or by tackling its 
causes. If this is not "reasonably practicable" to do, then think about how to 
control the risk (i. e. to make it less likely to occur or to cause harm, to reduce its 
severity and/or to protect people against the harm). Guidance on specific areas 
(e. g. COSHH) and good practices by other venues could help you to identify the 
remedial actions required. 
Select the best course of action 
73. If there are several possible actions, you may have to examine them in more detail 
to decide which of them to take. In general, you need to think about the level of 
risk posed, how effective the actions would be in controlling the risk, whether they 
could give rise to a problem elsewhere, how soon they can be put in place and 
whether the hazard needs to be addressed urgently or whether it is better to wait 
for a more permanent solution. You can of course also take into consideration 
related cost-benefit factors such as the costs of taking those actions and how they 
may affect things like visitors' enjoyment and the attractiveness of the venue. 
74. Keep a record of what you have decided. If you believe that no actions are 
needed, write down the reasons. (see Example 6) 
Follow up your actions 
75. Once you have decided what to do, you need to make sure that the actions are 
implemented and are done properly. For instance, you need to decide who should 
be responsible for carrying out each action. You may also need to set a deadline 
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and to keep a record of the progress. You can pull out the -Follow-up Form" in 
Appendix C and use it to monitor the progress of the actions. 
Example 6: 
Hazards 
Congestion at the top of the 
stairs 
People could trip on the stairs 
In the afternoon/evening, 
people stopping for a taxi could 
obstruct crowd flows 
Part of the crowd on the 
northern access spill onto the 
adjacent road and could be hit 
by moving vehicles 
People could fall down from the 
bollard 
Crowd movement obstructed 
by people waiting outside the 
toilets 
Cross flows near the toilets. 
Queues in front of the ticket 
counters sometimes extend 
beyond the tape barrier and 
obstruct movement 
People pushed against 
unguarded hot food equipment 
at one of the stalls 
Precautions LC SC Risk Actions 
P Si C " connect up car park 3 and 
the southern access and 
make car park 1 or 2 the over- 
spill car park instead. 
" send stewards to manage 
crowd flows in this area during 
peak hours. 
P Si C " send stewards to manage 
crowd flows in this area during 
peak hours. 
" improve street lighting 
P Si C relocate the taxi rank to the 
southern access or further up 
the northern access. 
e slow moving, P Ma B " connect up car park 3 and 
f the taxi the southern access and 
divert people to use this route. 
" make car park 1 or 2 the 
over-spill car park instead of 
car park 4. 
" remove the plant pots. 
P Si C " patrol this area more often 
" stewards should actively 
prevent people from climbing 
up the bollard and to ask 
those already up to get down. 
U Si D no inexpensive action 
identified to reduce risk 
U Si D could relocate the toilets but 
the cost of doing so outweighs 
the improvement gained. 
Therefore, put up signs at the 
front of the forecourt. 
manage queues VU - - no action required 
ry. 
L Ma A " carry out inspection to 
ensure that all such 
equipment is adequately 
guarded 
" relocate traders to another 
part of the venue 
" closely monitor crowd flows 
and control access into this 
area when necessary 
" stewards should discourage 
such "lively" behaviour in this 
area 
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STEP 6: RECORD ASSESSMENT FINDINGS 
76. If your undertaking has five or more employees, you are required by the MI-IS\\'R 
to record the significant findings of your assessment. You should be able to show. 
through the record, that you have undertaken a suitable and sufficient assessment 
and that you have done what is reasonably practicable to reduce the risks. 
Significant findings usually include: 
(a) the significant hazards identified in the assessment; 
(b) the existing precautions in place; 
(c) the remaining risks, including any groups of visitors who are especially at 
risk; 
(d) the conclusions of the assessment, including the actions you have identified 
to further reduce the risks. 
The record could be documented in writing or by other means (e. g. electronically) 
so long as it is retrievable for use by management or for examination (e. g. by 
enforcing authority inspectors). 
77. Some hazards may have already been addressed elsewhere. For example, if 
hazardous substances are used, your COSHH assessment should have addressed 
the risks. Also, some of the existing precautions may have already been described 
in other documents (e. g. procedures). There is no need to repeat this information 
in the record - you can simply refer to where it can be found. 
78. Keep the record for future reference or use. It helps to show that you have done 
what the law requires and can therefore help you if an inspector questions your 
precautions or if you become involved in any legal action (e. g. for civil liability). 
It can also remind you to keep an eye on particular concerns. Appendix A shows 
the crowd safety risk assessment record form used throughout this guide. You 
may find it useful. Alternatively, you can develop your own form or record your 
assessment in another format if that suits you better. 
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STEP 7: REVIEW AND REVISE ASSESSMENT 
79. Risk assessment is not a once-and-for-all activity. You are required under the 
MHSWR to review your assessment and, if necessary, revise it if there are 
developments which suggest that your assessment may no longer be valid, such 
as: 
(a) a significant change to your venue, in visitor composition, in management 
procedures, or outside influences (e. g. new activities nearby, renewed 
terrorist threats); 
(b) the detection of a significant problem; or 
(c) the occurrence of a major incident or a potentially serious near miss. 
In any case, it is good practice to review your assessment at regular intervals (e. g. 
annually) and record any amendments you have made. Even if there are no 
changes, it is useful to record that fact to show that you have carried out the 
review. 
80. If your operation concerns the staging of a regular event, ideally you need to start 
your review shortly after the event has finished. This is so that any problems and 
incidents which took place in the event are still fresh in people's minds. In any 
case, the timing of the review should be such that you have enough time before the 
next event to implement the new actions identified in the assessment. 
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FURTHER READING 
HSE publications 
The following list of publications is only a small selection of those available. :\ 
comprehensive list is available from HSE Books. Free leaflets are available from both 
HSE Books and the HSE Area Offices. 
A Guide to the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974: Guidance on the Act, LI, 
ISBN 0 11 885555 7 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992: Approved Code of 
Practice, L21, ISBN 0 7176 0716 X 
Five Steps to Risk Assessment, IND(G) 163 L (free leaflet) 
Successful Health and Safety Management, HS(G)65, ISBN 0 7176 042 5X 
Essentials of Health and Safety at Work 1994, ISBN 0 7176 0716 X 
Five Steps to Successful Health and Safety Management: Special help for directors 
and managers, IND(G)132L (free leaflet) 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health and Control of Carcinogenic Substances. 
Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 1994: Approved Codes of 
Practice, L5, ISBN 0 7176 0819 0 
Managing Crowd Safety in Public Venues: A Study to Generate Guidance for Venue 
Owners and Enforcing Authority Inspectors, CRR 54/1993, ISBN 0 7176 0708 9 
Managing Crowds Safely, HS(G)154, ISBN 0 7176 1180 9 
Publications specific to particular venue types 
Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, Home Office/Scottish Office, ISBN 0 11 41001 8 
Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Pop Concerts and Similar Events, Health and 
Safety Conunission/Home Office/Scottish Office, ISBN 0 11 341072 7 
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APPENDIX A: CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT RECORD FORM 
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APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF THE HAZARD KE\'\VORDS 
crowding/congestion - the 
density of the stationary or moving crowd is such that it has 
the potential to cause harm, such as crushing and trampling. 
obstruction to crowd - 
the movement of the crowd is completely or partially blocked by 
movement 
an object or by other people 
cross flows - people heading in different directions through the same area 
rapid crowd - the speed of the crowd movement is such that it has the potential 
movement or rushing 
to cause harm, such as crushing, pile-up and trampling. 
pushing/surging - people push their way through a stationary crowd/a crowd flow or 
a strong rush within a stationary crowd. 
vigorous movement in -a strong and massive movement within a stationary crowd, such 
a stationary crowd 
as swaying or lateral movement, jumping up and down, etc. 
trip, slip or stumble - people catch their feet, lose balance or make a false step on an 
uneven or slippery surface, a protruding object, a step, etc. 
fall - people fall from a height, off a bank or edge, down a slope or 
stairs, etc. 
walk into/pushed - people strike themselves against e. g. a protruding object, a 
against an object sharp 
object, a pillar or post, a bollard, a doorway, street 
furniture, etc. 
hit/struck by an object - people receive a blow due to impact with a moving object (e. g. a 
vehicle), a missile, falling debris, etc. 
people get trapped or - people get caught and are unable to 
free themselves. For 
stuck 
example, children trapped in between railings, wheelchair users 
are stuck on an uneven surface or in a packed crowd, people get 
trapped by machinery 
topple -A structure such as wall or fence, pillar or post, 
barriers, 
maintenance or construction work, etc. collapses and falls onto 
people. 
non-compliance - disregarding the "house-rules" or not 
following instructions or 
directions (e. g. entering a restricted or a closed-off area, smoking 
in a no smoking area, illegal parking, moving in the wrong 
direction up a one-way system, refusing to move away from the 
gangway when asked, etc. ). 
dangerous behaviour - actions which in themselves could cause 
harm to oneself and 
others (e. g. climb up/down/over, jump over, slide or run down a 
steep slope, etc. ). 
aggressive behaviour - including antagonistic behaviour, 
fighting, missile throwing, etc. 
or disorder 
hazardous substance - any substances or 
items that are hazardous in nature and could 
or item cause 
harm to people's health and safety. See paragraphs 45 
and 46 for details. 
APPENDIX C: CROWD SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT FOLLOW-UP FORM 
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APPENDIX H 
Questionnaire used in the Verification Test 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A METHODOLOGY FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF 
RISKS TO CROWD SAFETY IN PUBLIC VENUES 
VERIFICATION TEST QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire invites your comments on different parts of the "Crowd Safet\' 
Risk Assessment Method" and your opinion on how useful and appropriate they are to 
you. We believe that the new method should be designed to fit the users, not the other 
way round. Your opinion on the method and your experience in applying it would 
therefore be a useful indicator of its adequacy. 
Step 1: Identify hazards 
2 
3 
Do you have any comments on the new hazard identification method? For 
example, did you encounter any problems when applying it? Is there anything 
which you particularly like or dislike? Are the "Hazard Keywords" helpful and 
are they appropriate to your assessment? 
In your opinion, how useful is the new hazard identification method? (please 
tick) 
Very Useful Useful Fairly useful Not very useful Useless 
00 __ 0 
Compared with the method already in use by you/your organisation toi identify 
hazards, do you think the new hazard identification method is 
Much better Better About the same Worse Much Worse 
Step 2: Identify causes, consequences and who might be harmed 
4. Do you have any comments on the advice given in this part of the assessment 
method? 
5. In your opinion, how useful is the advice? 
Very Useful Useful Fairly useful Not very useful Useless 
00000 
6. Compared with the guidance or advice you/your organisation already has in 
relation to this step, do you think the advice given in the new method is 
Much better Better About the same Worse Much Worse 
00000 
Step 3: Decide whether existing precautions are adequate 
7 Do you have any comments on the advice given in this part of the assessment 
method? 
S. In your opinion, how useful is the advice? 
Very Useful Useful Fairly useful Not very useful Useless 
0I II 
9. Compared with the guidance or advice you/your organisation already has in 
relation to this step, do you think the advice given in the new method is 
Much better Better About the same Worse Much Worse 
0000 
Sten 4: Evaluate risks 
10. Do you have any comments on the new risk evaluation method? For example, 
did you have any problems when applying it? Is there anything which you 
particularly like or dislike? Are the likelihood/severity categories and the risk 
classification scheme given in Inset 2 helpful and are they appropriate to your 
assessment? 
11. In your opinion, how useful is the new risk evaluation method? 
Very Useful Useful Fairly useful Not very useful Useless 
12. Compared with the method already in use by you/your organisation to evaluate 
risks, do you think the new risk evaluation method is 
Much better Better About the same Worse Much Worse 
Step 5: Decide what further actions might be required 
13. Do you have any comments on the advice given in this part of the assessment 
method? For example, what do you think about the interpretation of different 
risk levels given in Table 5? 
14. In your opinion, how useful is the advice (including Table 5)? 
Very Useful Useful Fairly useful Not very useful Useless 
15. Compared with the guidance or advice you/your organisation already has in 
relation to this step, do you think the advice given in the new method is 
Much better Better About the same Worse Much Worse 
0000 
Step 6: Record Assessment Findings 
16. Do you have any comments on the advice given in this part of the assessment 
method? For example, what do you think about the sample assessment record 
form and follow-up form? 
17. In your opinion, how useful are the advice and the sample forms? 
Very Useful Useful Fairly useful Not very useful Useless 
0 I1 I1 
18. Compared with the guidance and any forms you/your organisation already has 
for recording assessment, do you think the advice and the forms given in the 
new method is 
Much better Better About the same Worse Much Worse 
00 __ 0 
Step 7: Review and Revise Assessment 
19. Do you have any comments on the advice given in this part of the assessment 
method? 
20. In your opinion, how useful is the advice? 
Very Useful 
0 
Useful 
0 
Fairly useful 
0 
Not very useful 
0 
Useless 
0 
21. Compared with the guidance or advice you/your organisation already has in 
relation to this step, do you think the advice given in the new method is 
Much better Better About the same Worse Much Worse 
00000 
Overall 
22. In your opinion, how useful is the "Crowd Safety Risk Assessment Method" as 
a whole? 
Very Useful Useful Fairly useful Not very useful Useless 
000 
23. Compared with the assessment method already in use by you/your organisation, 
do you think the new "Crowd Safety Risk Assessment Method" is 
Much better Better About the same Worse Much Worse 
ýý 0000 
Thank you for taking part in the verification test. 
APPENDIX I 
Analysis of Results in Experiment 2 
APPENDIX I-1 
Analysis of Results in Group B 
Experiment 2- Summary of Results - Group B 
Part 1: 
The risk levels of 15 given hazards estimated by subjects using the following 
rating system: High(H), Medium (M), Low (L) 
Hazards B-21 B-22 
Subjects 
B-23 B-24 B-25 B-26 
1 L H MM L M 
2 L H ML M L 
3 M L HH H L 
4 M M HH M M 
5 M M HM M H 
6 L H MM H L 
7 L L LL L L 
8 M L MM M M 
9 M M LM L L 
10 M M MM M H 
11 L L ML L M 
12 H L HL M M 
13 L L HM H L 
14 M M HH M H 
15 M L MM M M 
Convert rating into ranking: 
Hazards B-21 B-22 
Subjects 
B-23 B-24 B-25 B-26 
1 3.5 13 58 2 8.5 
2 3.5 13 5 2.5 7.5 3 
3 10 4 11.5 13 13 3 
4 10 9.5 11.5 13 7.5 8.5 
5 10 9.5 11.5 8 7.5 13 
6 3.5 13 58 13 3 
7 3.5 4 1 2.5 2 3 
8 10 4 58 7.5 8.5 
9 
10 10 9.5 58 7.5 13 
11 3.5 4 5 2.5 2 8.5 
12 14 4 11.5 2.5 7.5 8.5 
13 3.5 4 11.5 8 13 3 
14 10 9.5 11.5 13 7.5 13 
15 10 4 58 7.5 8.5 
Group B-1 
Part 2: 
The risk levels estimated by the same subjects weeks later using the same 
rating system. 
Hazards B-21 B-22 
Subjects 
B-23 B-24 B-25 B-26 
1 M M LL L L 
2 L M LL L L 
3 M M MM M L 
4 M H HH L M 
5 L H HM M H 
6 L L LM M L 
7 L L LL L L 
8 H M MM M M 
9 L LL L L 
10 H M ML M H 
11 M L HM L M 
12 H L ML M M 
13 M M MM M M 
14 M M HH M H 
15 M L LM L M 
Convert scores (in rating) into ranking: 
Hazards B-21 B-22 
Subjects 
B-23 B-24 B-25 B-26 
1 8 9 33 3.5 3 
2 2.5 9 33 3.5 3 
3 8 9 89 10.5 3 
4 8 13.5 12.5 13.5 3.5 8.5 
5 2.5 13.5 12.5 9 10.5 13 
6 2.5 3 39 10.5 3 
7 2.5 3 33 3.5 3 
8 13 9 89 10.5 8.5 
9 
10 13 9 83 10.5 13 
11 8 3 12.5 9 3.5 8.5 
12 13 3 83 10.5 8.5 
13 8 9 89 10.5 8.5 
14 8 9 12.5 13.5 10.5 13 
15 8 3 39 3.5 8.5 
Group B-2 
Consistency within Group B 
Kendall Coefficient of Concordance, W 
Hazards B-21 B-22 
Subjects 
B-23 B-24 B-25 B-26 Rj Rj - Rmean (Rj-Rmean) 
2 
1 3.5 13 5 8 2 8.5 40 -5 25 
2 3.5 13 5 2.5 7.5 3 34.5 -10.5 110.25 
3 10 4 11.5 13 13 3 54.5 9.5 90.25 
4 10 9.5 11.5 13 7.5 8.5 60 15 225 
5 10 9.5 11.5 8 7.5 13 59.5 14.5 210.25 
6 3.5 13 5 8 13 3 45.5 0.5 0.25 
7 3.5 4 1 2.5 2 3 16 -29 841 
8 10 4 5 8 7.5 8.5 43 -2 4 
9 
10 10 9.5 5 8 7.5 13 53 8 64 
11 3.5 4 5 2.5 2 8.5 25.5 -19.5 380.25 
12 14 4 11.5 2.5 7.5 8.5 48 3 9 
13 3.5 4 11.5 8 13 3 43 -2 4 
14 10 9.5 11.5 13 7.5 13 64.5 19.5 380.25 
15 10 4 5 8 7.5 8.5 43 -2 4 
Rmean - 45 
S= E(Rj-Rmean)2= 2347.5 
T= E(t3-t)/12 
T21 T22 T23 T24 T25 T26 E 
45.5 35 45.5 35 46 29.5 236.5 
W= s/[(1112)k2(N3- N) - kcT] 
k= 6 
N= 14 
Cofficient of Concordance, W=0.347 
Significance of W 
Chi-Square = k(N-1)W = 27.04 
df = 13 
Chi-Square >= 27.04 
Probability of Occurrence under Ho of p=0.012 
Group B-3 
Consistency Over Time - Group B 
Entire Group: 
Rj Rank 
Hazards Part 1 Part 2 Pt 1 (x) Pt 2 (y d, d; 2 
1 40 29.5 43 1 1 
2 34.5 24 32 1 1 
3 54.5 47.5 11 8 3 9 
4 60 59.5 13 12 1 1 
5 59.5 61 12 13 -1 1 
6 45.5 31 84 4 16 
7 16 18 11 0 0 
8 43 58 6 11 -5 25 
9 
10 53 56.5 10 10 0 0 
11 25.5 44.5 26 -4 16 
12 48 46 97 2 4 
13 43 53 69 -3 9 
14 64.5 66.5 14 14 0 0 
15 43 35 65 1 1 
Ed, 2 = 84 
T= E(t3-t)/12 
Tx T 
20 
N= 14 
Ex2 = [(N3- N)/12] - Tx = 225.5 
Eye = [(N3- N)/12] - T,, = 227.5 
rs = (Ex2 + Ey2 - Ed2)I[2(£x2cy2)1/2] 
= 0.815 
L 
Significance of rs 
Student's t= rs [(N-2)/(1 - rs2)]1/2 
= 4.865 
From "Table of Critical Values of t", 
For df =N-2=1, ' (one-tailed test) 
t =4.8647 is significant at p<0.0005 
Group B-4 
APPENDIX 1-2 
Analysis of Results in Group C 
Part 2: 
The risk levels estimated by the same subjects weeks later using the same 
rating system. 
Hazards C-21 C-22 
Subjects 
C-23 C-24 C-25 C-26 
1 C D CC D B 
2 C C BD C B 
3 - C CB B D 
4 - C BB B C 
5 C D CA C C 
6 B B -C - B 
7 - C -- D - 
8 - C -D D D 
9 D C C- D D 
10 C D CC C C 
11 D C CC C D 
12 D C AC B C 
13 C C CB D C 
14 C D AA D C 
15 C D -B D B 
Convert scores (in rating) into ranking: 
Hazards C-21 C-22 
Subjects 
C-23 C-24 C-25 C-26 
1 10 3 7.5 6 4.5 12.5 
2 10 9.5 11.5 2.5 9.5 12.5 
3 2.5 9.5 7.5 10.5 13 3 
4 2.5 9.5 11.5 10.5 13 7.5 
5 10 3 7.5 13.5 9.5 7.5 
6 14 14 2.5 6 1 12.5 
7 2.5 9.5 2.5 1 4.5 1 
8 2.5 9.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 3 
9 
10 10 3 7.5 6 9.5 7.5 
11 5.5 9.5 7.5 6 9.5 3 
12 5.5 9.5 13.5 6 13 7.5 
13 10 9.5 7.5 10.5 4.5 7.5 
14 10 3 13.5 13.5 4.5 7.5 
15 10 3 2.5 10.5 4.5 12.5 
Group C-2 
Consistency Within Group C 
Kendall Coefficient of Concordance, W 
Hazards C-21 C-22 
Subjects 
C-23 C-24 C-25 C-26 R R- Rmean (Rj-Rmean)2 
1 4 7.5 4 12 8.5 10.5 46.5 1.5 2.25 
2 4 7.5 2 2 2 5 22.5 -22.5 506 25 
3 9 14 6.5 12 5.5 5 52 7 49 
4 9 12.5 14 4.5 12 14 66 21 441 
5 9 7.5 11 12 5.5 10.5 55.5 10.5 110.25 
6 13.5 12.5 11 12 2 10.5 61.5 16.5 272.25 
7 1.5 7.5 2 2 2 1.5 16.5 -28.5 812.25 
8 1.5 7.5 6.5 4.5 8.5 1.5 30 -15 225 
9 
10 9 7.5 6.5 12 5.5 5 45.5 0.5 0.25 
11 4 7.5 2 2 5.5 10.5 31.5 -13.5 182.25 
12 9 7.5 11 7.5 12 10.5 57.5 12.5 156.25 
13 13.5 2 11 7.5 12 5 51 6 36 
14 9 2 11 7.5 12 5 46.5 1.5 2.25 
15 9 2 6.5 7.5 12 10.5 47.5 2.5 6.25 
<mean 7 45 
S= E(Rj-Rmean)2= 2801 5 
T= c(t3-t)/12 
T21 122 T23 124 T25 126 ET 
31 44.5 17 17.5 17.5 28 155.5 
W= sl[(1/12)k2(N3- N) - kcT] 
k= 6 
N= 14 
Cofficient of Concordance, W=0.386 
Significance of W 
Chi-Square = k(N-1)W = 30.11 
df = 13 
Chi-Square >= 30.11 
Probability of Occurrence under Ho of p=0.005 
Group C-3 
Consistency Over Time - Group C 
Entire Group: 
Rj Rank 
Hazards Part 1 Part 2 Pt 1 (x) Pt 2 (y d, d; z 
1 46.5 43.5 6.5 5.5 1 1 
2 22.5 55.5 2 14 -12 144 
3 52 46 10 7 3 9 
4 66 54.5 14 12 2 4 
5 55.5 51 11 10 1 1 
6 61.5 50 13 9 4 16 
7 16.5 21 11 0 0 
8 30 24.5 32 1 1 
9 
10 45.5 43.5 5 5.5 -0.5 0.25 
11 31.5 41 43 1 1 
12 57.5 55 12 13 -1 1 
13 51 49.5 98 1 1 
14 46.5 52 6.5 11 -4.5 20.25 
15 47.5 43 84 4 16 
f: d, ` = 215 5 
T= E(t3-t)/12 
Tx T 
0.5 0.5 
N= 14 
£x2 = [(N3- N)l12] -TX= 227 
cy2 = [(N3- N)/12] - T, = 227 
rs = (Ex2 + Ey2 - Ed2)I[2(Ex2Eyz), 
/21 
= 0.525 
LJ 
Significance of rs 
Student's t= rs [(N-2)/(1 - r52)]1/2 
= 2.139 
From "Table of Critical Values oft", 
For df =N-2= 1ý (one-tailed test) 
t =2.1387 is significant at p<0.05 
Group C-4 
APPENDIX 1-3 
Analysis of Results in Group D 
Experiment 2- Summary of Results - Group D 
Part 1: 
The risk levels of 15 given hazards estimated by teams of 3 subjects using the 
following rating system: A (highest risk), B, C, D& "-" (trivial risk) 
Hazards D-21 D-22 
Subjects 
D-23 D-24 D-25 D-26 
1 C - C- D D 
2 D - C- - - 
3 D C CD B D 
4 B C CB C C 
5 C B CC C C 
6 C B C- - - 
7 - - -- C - 
8 - - -- C D 
9 - - -- D - 
10 D C CC D C 
11 D - -- - - 
12 C C CD D D 
13 D - CD D D 
14 C D BC C D 
15 B D DC D D 
Convert scores (in rating) into ranking: 
Hazards D-21 D-22 
Subjects 
D-23 D-24 D-25 D-26 
1 10 3.5 9 3.5 6 8 
2 5 3.5 9 3.5 2 2.5 
3 5 10.5 98 14 8 
4 13.5 10.5 9 14 11 13 
5 10 13.5 9 11.5 11 13 
6 10 13.5 9 3.5 2 2.5 
7 1.5 3.5 2 3.5 11 2.5 
8 1.5 3.5 2 3.5 11 8 
9 
10 5 10.5 9 11.5 6 13 
11 5 3.5 2 3.5 2 2.5 
12 10 10.5 98 6 8 
13 5 3.5 98 6 8 
14 10 7.5 14 11.5 11 8 
15 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 6 8 
Group D-1 
Part 2: 
The risk levels estimated by the same subjects weeks later using the same 
rating system. 
Hazards D-21 D-22 
Subjects 
D-23 D-24 D-25 D-26 
1 C D CC - D 
2 D - CD C D 
3 D - CD C - 
4 D C BB C D 
5 D B CC B D 
6 - B B- - - 
7 - - C- - - 
8 - D CD - D 
9 - - C- - - 
10 D B CD C D 
11 - - C- - D 
12 C - C- D - 
13 D - BD D D 
14 D C CD D D 
15 D D CD C - 
Convert scores (in rating) into ranking: 
Hazards D-21 D-22 
Subjects 
D-23 D-24 D-25 D-26 
1 13.5 8 6 12.5 3 10 
2 8.5 3.5 68 11 10 
3 8.5 3.5 68 11 3 
4 8.5 10.5 13 14 11 10 
5 8.5 13 6 12.5 14 10 
6 2.5 13 13 2.5 3 3 
7 2.5 3.5 6 2.5 3 3 
8 2.5 8 68 3 10 
9 
10 8.5 13 68 11 10 
11 2.5 3.5 6 2.5 3 10 
12 13.5 3.5 6 2.5 7 3 
13 8.5 3.5 13 8 7 10 
14 8.5 10.5 68 7 10 
15 8.5 8 68 11 3 
Group D-2 
Consistency Within Group D 
Kendall Coefficient of Concordance, W 
Hazards D-21 D-22 
Subjects 
D-23 D-24 D-25 D-26 R R- Rmean (R. -Rmean)Z 
1 10 3.5 9 3.5 6 8 40 -5 25 
2 5 3.5 9 3.5 2 2.5 25.5 -19.5 380.25 
3 5 10.5 9 8 14 8 54.5 9.5 90.25 
4 13.5 10.5 9 14 11 13 71 26 676 
5 10 13.5 9 11.5 11 13 68 23 529 
6 10 13.5 9 3.5 2 2.5 40.5 -4.5 20.25 
7 1.5 3.5 2 3.5 11 2.5 24 -21 441 
8 1.5 3.5 2 3.5 11 8 29.5 -15.5 240.25 
9 
10 5 10.5 9 11.5 6 13 55 10 100 
11 5 3.5 2 3.5 2 2.5 18.5 -26.5 702.25 
12 10 10.5 9 8 6 8 51.5 6.5 42.25 
13 5 3.5 9 8 6 8 39.5 -5.5 30.25 
14 10 7.5 14 11.5 11 8 62 17 289 
15 13.5 7.5 4 11.5 6 8 50.5 5.5 30.25 
Kmean = 45 
S= (Rý-Rmean)z= 3596 
T= E(t3-t)/12 
T21 T22 T23 T24 T25 T26 ET 
21 23.5 62 24.5 22 35 188 
W= s/[(1/12)k2(N3- N) - k6T] 
k= 6 
N= 14 
Cofficient of Concordance, W= 0.509 
Significance of W 
Chi-Square = k(N-1)W = 39.72 
df = 13 
Chi-Square >= 39.72 
Probability of Occurrence under Ho of p= ##### 
Group 
Consistency Over Time - Group D 
Entire Group: 
Rj Rank 
Hazards Part 1 Part 2 Pt 1 (x) Pt 2 (y d; d12 
1 40 53 6 11 -5 25 
2 25.5 47 38 -5 25 
3 54.5 40 10 6 4 16 
4 71 67 14 14 0 0 
5 68 64 13 13 0 0 
6 40.5 37 74 3 9 
7 24 20.5 21 1 1 
8 29.5 37.5 45 -1 1 
9 
10 55 56.5 11 12 -1 1 
11 18.5 27.5 12 -1 1 
12 51.5 35.5 93 6 36 
13 39.5 50 5 9.5 -4.5 20.25 
14 62 50 12 9.5 2.5 6.25 
15 50.5 44.5 87 1 1 
ed; ` = 142.5 
T= E(t3-t)/12 
Tx T 
0 0.5 
N= 14 
Ex2 = [(N3- N)/12] - T,, = 227.5 
Eye = [(N3- N)/12] - TY = 227.0 
rs = (Ex2 + Ey2 - cd2)/[2(ex2Ey2)112] 
= 0.686 
Significance of rs 
Student's t= rs [(N-2)/(1 - rs2)]'/2 
= 3.27 
From "Table of Critical Values of t", 
For df =N-2=1 (one-tailed test) 
t =3.2703 is significant at p<0.05 
Group D-4 
